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WHAT RUSSIA MAKES SECONDARY HAKOB BADALYAN
LRAGIRT.AM
11:39:54 - 20/04/2009
Serge Sargsyan's visit to Moscow, which was scheduled for April
23, proves the attempt of Russia's reactivation, which takes place
after the try to "recharge" the U.S. relations with Russia. Some
kind of situation seems to be shaped when Russia, after recharging,
understood that it was just a step with which the U.S. took up the
control of the Russia- U.S. competition including the Armenian and
Turkish relations which is one of its fields or flats. Obama's visit
to Turkey and the statements issued there revealed everything to
Russia and the Russians realized that the real aim of the recharge
was the "reburying", sure, in the sense of political role. Perhaps,
the "attempt of resurrection", which Russia seems to be engaged in,
is the surrounding itself by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey.
In this situation, Russia has 2 ways of controlling the situation
and enhancing its role in this situation.
Either, the Russians, in spite of the U.S., do everything possible
to impede the Armenian and Turkish relations, unlike the post-August
period when Russia in fact took up the process of the normalization
of the Armenian and Turkish relations; or they get engaged in the
settlement of the major obstacle in the Armenian and Turkish relations
normalization-the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. In other words, if
the Russians "own" the settlement of the obstacle, so they enhance
their role in the Armenian and Turkish relations.
With which version we deal in particular will be seen in the nearest
future. In other words, time will show whether Russia is trying to
impede the opening of the Armenian and Turkish border or, as the
U.S. gets exited about it, Russia attempts to keep the Armenian and
Turkish process under its control by "governing" the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue settlement. However, it seems to be obvious that in both
of the cases the Russian policy seems to contradict the Armenian
state interests just by the simple reason that in both of the case
Azerbaijan becomes the ally of Russia. Perhaps, it is not accidental
that the Russians first chose the president of Azerbaijan Aliyev to
invite to Moscow from Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan trio and only after
it the Armenian and Turkish representatives.
Moreover, the speech of the Russian president Medvedev on the question
that "there is some perspective of settlement and everything should be
based on the international norms and the UN and OSCE documents first
of all" proves that Russia perceives Azerbaijan as its ally. Moreover,
Medvedev states that that the process should not be influenced by
secondary "sometimes difficult factors". Very interesting to know what
difficult factors means in particular the Russian president considering
them secondary. The logic hints that the settlement supposes solutions
for difficult questions, because easy questions in fact do not need
any solution. Consequently, the most important is to settle the hard
questions, because the easy ones may be solved by everyone even by
Singapore. So, the hard questions which Medvedev notes, most likely
are not secondary at all, moreover, the most difficult is considered
to be the Nagorno-Karabakh issue settlement.
Consequently, Russia seems to be evident to try to make this question
a secondary one. Only the Armenian government is left show whether it
will manage to make a right "selection" between the "main" questions
on the Nagorno-Karabakh "secondary" issue or the loan of 500 million.
LRAGIRT.AM
11:39:54 - 20/04/2009
Serge Sargsyan's visit to Moscow, which was scheduled for April
23, proves the attempt of Russia's reactivation, which takes place
after the try to "recharge" the U.S. relations with Russia. Some
kind of situation seems to be shaped when Russia, after recharging,
understood that it was just a step with which the U.S. took up the
control of the Russia- U.S. competition including the Armenian and
Turkish relations which is one of its fields or flats. Obama's visit
to Turkey and the statements issued there revealed everything to
Russia and the Russians realized that the real aim of the recharge
was the "reburying", sure, in the sense of political role. Perhaps,
the "attempt of resurrection", which Russia seems to be engaged in,
is the surrounding itself by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey.
In this situation, Russia has 2 ways of controlling the situation
and enhancing its role in this situation.
Either, the Russians, in spite of the U.S., do everything possible
to impede the Armenian and Turkish relations, unlike the post-August
period when Russia in fact took up the process of the normalization
of the Armenian and Turkish relations; or they get engaged in the
settlement of the major obstacle in the Armenian and Turkish relations
normalization-the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. In other words, if
the Russians "own" the settlement of the obstacle, so they enhance
their role in the Armenian and Turkish relations.
With which version we deal in particular will be seen in the nearest
future. In other words, time will show whether Russia is trying to
impede the opening of the Armenian and Turkish border or, as the
U.S. gets exited about it, Russia attempts to keep the Armenian and
Turkish process under its control by "governing" the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue settlement. However, it seems to be obvious that in both
of the cases the Russian policy seems to contradict the Armenian
state interests just by the simple reason that in both of the case
Azerbaijan becomes the ally of Russia. Perhaps, it is not accidental
that the Russians first chose the president of Azerbaijan Aliyev to
invite to Moscow from Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan trio and only after
it the Armenian and Turkish representatives.
Moreover, the speech of the Russian president Medvedev on the question
that "there is some perspective of settlement and everything should be
based on the international norms and the UN and OSCE documents first
of all" proves that Russia perceives Azerbaijan as its ally. Moreover,
Medvedev states that that the process should not be influenced by
secondary "sometimes difficult factors". Very interesting to know what
difficult factors means in particular the Russian president considering
them secondary. The logic hints that the settlement supposes solutions
for difficult questions, because easy questions in fact do not need
any solution. Consequently, the most important is to settle the hard
questions, because the easy ones may be solved by everyone even by
Singapore. So, the hard questions which Medvedev notes, most likely
are not secondary at all, moreover, the most difficult is considered
to be the Nagorno-Karabakh issue settlement.
Consequently, Russia seems to be evident to try to make this question
a secondary one. Only the Armenian government is left show whether it
will manage to make a right "selection" between the "main" questions
on the Nagorno-Karabakh "secondary" issue or the loan of 500 million.