Tweet
Mensoian: Artsakh's Independence Before Normalization: Reordering
Armenia's Priorities
By Michael Mensoian
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/08/0 1/mensoian-artsakhs-independence-before-normalizat ion-reordering-armenias-priorities/
August 1, 2009
The following comment is attributed to President Ilham Aliyev of
Azerbaijan conjecturing on the possibility of Artsakh achieving local
autonomy when it is returned to Baku's jurisdiction. `It may take a
year, maybe 10 years, maybe 100 years, or it will never be possible.
Time will tell.' That mindset that Karabagh will revert to Azerbaijani
control is given credence by the continuing pressure by the Minsk Group
representing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) for Armenia to accept another nuanced Madrid Proposal as the
basis for negotiating a resolution of the Karabagh conflict. To accept
these principles places the burden on the Armenian negotiators,
effectively precluding our brothers and sisters in Artsakh from ever
achieving a peaceful de jure independence.
Given that rather ominous outlook, the leadership in Yerevan remains
hell-bent on implementing an ill-conceived policy that seeks to
normalize relations with a government in Ankara that continues a
decades-long national policy of denial, obfuscation, and revisionism
with respect to the genocide of the Armenian nation that began on April
24, 1915. It should come as no revelation that the Turkish leaders have
no20intention of normalizing relations with Yerevan until the Karabagh
conflict is resolved. The Turkish solution is simple: The liberated
districts must revert to Azeri control and Karabagh's ultimate status
to be determined by a vote under conditions and at an indefinite time
in the future. While Armenia seeks to appease Ankara on its western
border, for what purpose one might ask, it is being outflanked on its
eastern border.
These ongoing negotiations to achieve normalization are part of a
well-conceived Turkish diplomatic offensive that seeks to force Yerevan
into accepting compromises that are inimical to its political viability
and future security. The soccer invitation by Armenian President Serge
Sarkisian to Turkish President Abdullah Gul was part and parcel of this
shrewd Turkish offensive. The invitation was anything but spontaneous
by the Armenian president. The hesitancy by the Turkish president in
accepting was part of the drama that set the stage for the current
negotiations. Unwary Yerevan'better that said than to say they were
party to this subterfuge'has little if anything substantive to gain
from these negotiations. Yerevan has yet to produce any objective
evidence as to how normalization will promote its present
political-economic situation or long-term national security interests.
An analysis of the limited and conflicting information that is
available indicates that whatever gains may be anticipated will come
at an exorbitant cost to Armenia.
If this is not sufficient reason to end negotiations, perhaps a more
compelling reason is the need for Yerevan to reorient its priorities
and view Artsakh's independence rather than normalization as the key to
its future. The loss of Artsakh would seriously weaken Yerevan's
position within the south Caucasus and would likely result in the
disaffection of a significant number of diasporan Armenians. Yerevan
must develop and enunciate a stratagem supported by the major political
parties in tandem with Stepanakert that will maintain and strengthen
the de facto independence of Artsakh as this coalition works toward its
recognition as a free and independent political entity. Failure to
develop a broadly supported stratagem creates a vacuum that facilitates
the ongoing campaign by Ankara and Baku of comments from their leaders
that seek to create the illusion that negotiations are progressing
satisfactorily. This causes what they expect: confusion and
consternation on the part of the Armenian political parties not privy
to the negotiations, and an erosion of Armenia's position in the
negotiations. The lack of an effective response by Yerevan makes its
leaders appear to be the intransigent neighbor while Turkey assumes the
role of the cooperative negotiator. It is a shrewd gambit by Ankara
that seems to be resonating with the principal players'the Minsk Group
representing the OSCE, of which Russia and the United States serve as
co-chairs with France, and by Russia and the United States as separate
entities apart from their participation in the Minsk Group'as they
continue to pressure Armenia to make compromises.
These nations want an open border'seemingly at Armenia's expense'and a
peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict'at Karabagh's
expense'ostensibly to bring political and economic stability to the
region. Political and economic stability in the south Caucasus is a
legitimate objective. However, nowhere are provisions suggested to be
implemented that would improve the economy of Armenia, its active
participation in the ongoing economic development programs and projects
in the south Caucasus, guarantees of free access to Black Sea ports in
Georgia and Turkey or to address the various issues that are an
outgrowth of the Armenian Genocide. Rather, both Armenia's and
Karabagh's vital interests are being ignored in preference to those of
Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is everything to suggest, based on the
available evidence, that if the present set of circumstances prevail,
Armenia and Karabagh will be relegated to political and economic
servitude, their potential forever circumscribed by the interests of
Ankara and Baku (see `The Roadmap to Normalization is a Roadmap to
Oblivion for Armenia,' The Armenian Weekly, May 23, 2009).
The ultimate independence of20Artsakh must be viewed as infinitely more
compelling than the normalization of relations with Ankara. Failure to
achieve Artsakh's independence will be the death knell for Hai Tahd,
which represents the Armenian nation's legitimate demand for justice.
The first link in that long-sought demand for justice is the
recognition of Artsakh as an independent entity. Should that fail,
Yerevan has no hope whatsoever that the normalization of relations with
Turkey will be either politically or economically beneficial, or that
its national security interests can be protected. With a defeat in
Artsakh, what is it that normalization can yield? What incentive would
there be for Ankara to ever offer no more than token responses to the
legitimate Armenian claims of restitution, reparation, recognition (of
the genocide), and rectification (of the boundary)? Whatever
concessions that were finally made to Armenia would serve solely to
burnish Turkey's image as a nation willing to overcome its past in
order to achieve political and economic stability within the south
Caucasus. Turkish leaders know that this ploy would play well in the
capitals of the European Union and the United States, whose governments
are anxious to finally settle the `Armenian Question' redefined in the
context of their collective 21st century interests. Does anyone expect
the nations that have recognized the Armenian Genocide to support
Armenia's cause under these circumstances?
For Yerevan the issue that must be confronted is not whether Karabagh
is part of the negotiation process, but the constant pressure to have
the Madrid Proposals serve as the basis for negotiations. No matter how
these proposals are nuanced , they are the same proposals that were
introduced in 2007 and they still speak to the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan. Completely ignored is the principle that supports the
inalienable right of an ethnic minority to seek independence from the
rule of a despotic government. There is no part of international law
that precludes Artsakh from being recognized today as an independent
country. If the principle of territorial integrity was so sacrosanct
Kosovo could not have been recognized by the United States and Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not have occurred (see
`Is Artsakh's Cause Less Than Kosovo's?' The Armenian Weekly, May 10,
2009).
Even a cursory examination of these principles leaves little doubt that
they are skewed against Karabagh's independence. The first principle
requires the withdrawal of the Karabagh Defense Force from the
liberated territories that form Karabagh's security zone. Withdrawal
from these lands would cause the Line of Contact (LoC) to contract to
the borders of the Karabagh districts. This would make the defense of
Karabagh immeasurably more difficult as well as effectively cutting it
off from both Armenia and Iran. The Lachin Corridor cannot be viewed as
a dependable link to Armenia if the Kashatagh and Lachin districts
(Kelbajar) are occupied by Azerbaijan. The Lachin Corridor road under
the best of conditions is a fragile link to Armenia and can be easily
severed once the security zone is occupied by the Azerbaijan military.
An international peacekeeping force under the aegis of the United
Nations might be an option. However, their effectiveness judged by the
past performances of such peace-keeping forces in similar situations
too numerous to mention is not reassuring. They normally have neither
the capacity nor the mandate to effectively challenge any military
action that the host nation may decide to take. What is the status of
the occupied eastern margins of Martakert and Martuni and the district
of Shahumian? Will they revert to Karabagh's control or continue to
remain under Azeri occupation?
A second principle speaks to the return of internally displace persons
(IDP) to the liberated districts as well as to Karabagh itself. What of
the Armenian IDP's that are in Karabagh who fled from Baku and Sumgait
and the districts of Shahumian and the eastern border regions of
Martakert and Martuni that are presently occupied by Azeri forces. Then
there are those Armenians that left Azerbaijan for Armenia or Russia.
These people are the only legitimate refugees of the war to liberate 0D
Artsakh, although the term is incorrectly used by Baku to identify
their IDP's.
This requirement to resettle the IDP's combined with a third principle
that suggests a future plebiscite to determine the status of Karabagh
all but insures that the people of Karabagh will never achieve
independence. When this plebiscite will take place will be determined
by whom? When will it be held? What geographic regions will be
included? Karabagh only? Or will the voting include all of Azerbaijan
as a referendum on whether or not Karabagh should be granted some form
of local autonomy? Actually none of these questions are relevant simply
because Karabagh's independence will never be one of the options.
Possibly Aliyev's off repeated threat of a military solution may be the
more desirable option (see `The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Revisited,'
The Armenian Weekly, August 16, 2008).
The loss of Artsakh would represent a catastrophic political and
psychological setback for Armenia and for the creditability of the ARF.
Hai Tahd and the socioeconomic and political reforms that define the
ideology of the ARF would have been seriously tarnished. That may be a
harsh assessment, but it is closer to the truth than ignoring the
consequences of Artsakh's demise.
Artsakh not only would represent a significant victory in the Armenian
nation's determination to obtain justice, but it strengthens the count
ry's strategic position athwart the Russian-Iranian north-south
axis and the Turkish-Azerbaijani west-east axis. At any moment Russia
has the capability to occupy Georgia which is Turkey's only land
connection to Baku and beyond. The neutralization of Armenia and the
reversion of Karabagh to Azerbaijan would provide Turkey with an
important alternate route. There can be no doubt that Turkey desires to
extend its political and economic influence across the Caspian Sea into
central Asia and beyond. This is the old pan-Turanian (or Pan-Turkic)
dream resurrected.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's recent charge that the Chinese
government was committing genocide in Xingtiang (Sinkiang) against the
ethnic Moslem Uighurs speaks to that objective. The United States,
Russia, and the European Union should consider that Turkey's
geostrategic interests will ultimately run counter to their respective
geostrategic interests. From the Balkans to Chinese Xingtiang and from
the south Caucasus to the Gulf of Aden, there is no country within this
vast region that can compete on the ground with Turkey. This includes
both Israel and Iran.
No one questions the fact that Yerevan is not dealing from a position
of power. However, President Sargsyan courts disaster if he continues
to carry on negotiations without broad based political support and a
degree of transparency. Allaying suspicions and the need to engender
support from the diaspora is an absolute necessity. The ARF is well
positioned to make an important contribution if Yerevan accepts the
need not only to reposition itself with respect to its objectives, but
to develop a plan of action that speaks, first and foremost, to the de
jure independence of Karabagh. If not, then this difficult burden must
fall on the ARF to represent the people of Karabagh in their epic
struggle to become a free and independent entity.
Armenia's Priorities
By Michael Mensoian
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/08/0 1/mensoian-artsakhs-independence-before-normalizat ion-reordering-armenias-priorities/
August 1, 2009
The following comment is attributed to President Ilham Aliyev of
Azerbaijan conjecturing on the possibility of Artsakh achieving local
autonomy when it is returned to Baku's jurisdiction. `It may take a
year, maybe 10 years, maybe 100 years, or it will never be possible.
Time will tell.' That mindset that Karabagh will revert to Azerbaijani
control is given credence by the continuing pressure by the Minsk Group
representing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) for Armenia to accept another nuanced Madrid Proposal as the
basis for negotiating a resolution of the Karabagh conflict. To accept
these principles places the burden on the Armenian negotiators,
effectively precluding our brothers and sisters in Artsakh from ever
achieving a peaceful de jure independence.
Given that rather ominous outlook, the leadership in Yerevan remains
hell-bent on implementing an ill-conceived policy that seeks to
normalize relations with a government in Ankara that continues a
decades-long national policy of denial, obfuscation, and revisionism
with respect to the genocide of the Armenian nation that began on April
24, 1915. It should come as no revelation that the Turkish leaders have
no20intention of normalizing relations with Yerevan until the Karabagh
conflict is resolved. The Turkish solution is simple: The liberated
districts must revert to Azeri control and Karabagh's ultimate status
to be determined by a vote under conditions and at an indefinite time
in the future. While Armenia seeks to appease Ankara on its western
border, for what purpose one might ask, it is being outflanked on its
eastern border.
These ongoing negotiations to achieve normalization are part of a
well-conceived Turkish diplomatic offensive that seeks to force Yerevan
into accepting compromises that are inimical to its political viability
and future security. The soccer invitation by Armenian President Serge
Sarkisian to Turkish President Abdullah Gul was part and parcel of this
shrewd Turkish offensive. The invitation was anything but spontaneous
by the Armenian president. The hesitancy by the Turkish president in
accepting was part of the drama that set the stage for the current
negotiations. Unwary Yerevan'better that said than to say they were
party to this subterfuge'has little if anything substantive to gain
from these negotiations. Yerevan has yet to produce any objective
evidence as to how normalization will promote its present
political-economic situation or long-term national security interests.
An analysis of the limited and conflicting information that is
available indicates that whatever gains may be anticipated will come
at an exorbitant cost to Armenia.
If this is not sufficient reason to end negotiations, perhaps a more
compelling reason is the need for Yerevan to reorient its priorities
and view Artsakh's independence rather than normalization as the key to
its future. The loss of Artsakh would seriously weaken Yerevan's
position within the south Caucasus and would likely result in the
disaffection of a significant number of diasporan Armenians. Yerevan
must develop and enunciate a stratagem supported by the major political
parties in tandem with Stepanakert that will maintain and strengthen
the de facto independence of Artsakh as this coalition works toward its
recognition as a free and independent political entity. Failure to
develop a broadly supported stratagem creates a vacuum that facilitates
the ongoing campaign by Ankara and Baku of comments from their leaders
that seek to create the illusion that negotiations are progressing
satisfactorily. This causes what they expect: confusion and
consternation on the part of the Armenian political parties not privy
to the negotiations, and an erosion of Armenia's position in the
negotiations. The lack of an effective response by Yerevan makes its
leaders appear to be the intransigent neighbor while Turkey assumes the
role of the cooperative negotiator. It is a shrewd gambit by Ankara
that seems to be resonating with the principal players'the Minsk Group
representing the OSCE, of which Russia and the United States serve as
co-chairs with France, and by Russia and the United States as separate
entities apart from their participation in the Minsk Group'as they
continue to pressure Armenia to make compromises.
These nations want an open border'seemingly at Armenia's expense'and a
peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict'at Karabagh's
expense'ostensibly to bring political and economic stability to the
region. Political and economic stability in the south Caucasus is a
legitimate objective. However, nowhere are provisions suggested to be
implemented that would improve the economy of Armenia, its active
participation in the ongoing economic development programs and projects
in the south Caucasus, guarantees of free access to Black Sea ports in
Georgia and Turkey or to address the various issues that are an
outgrowth of the Armenian Genocide. Rather, both Armenia's and
Karabagh's vital interests are being ignored in preference to those of
Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is everything to suggest, based on the
available evidence, that if the present set of circumstances prevail,
Armenia and Karabagh will be relegated to political and economic
servitude, their potential forever circumscribed by the interests of
Ankara and Baku (see `The Roadmap to Normalization is a Roadmap to
Oblivion for Armenia,' The Armenian Weekly, May 23, 2009).
The ultimate independence of20Artsakh must be viewed as infinitely more
compelling than the normalization of relations with Ankara. Failure to
achieve Artsakh's independence will be the death knell for Hai Tahd,
which represents the Armenian nation's legitimate demand for justice.
The first link in that long-sought demand for justice is the
recognition of Artsakh as an independent entity. Should that fail,
Yerevan has no hope whatsoever that the normalization of relations with
Turkey will be either politically or economically beneficial, or that
its national security interests can be protected. With a defeat in
Artsakh, what is it that normalization can yield? What incentive would
there be for Ankara to ever offer no more than token responses to the
legitimate Armenian claims of restitution, reparation, recognition (of
the genocide), and rectification (of the boundary)? Whatever
concessions that were finally made to Armenia would serve solely to
burnish Turkey's image as a nation willing to overcome its past in
order to achieve political and economic stability within the south
Caucasus. Turkish leaders know that this ploy would play well in the
capitals of the European Union and the United States, whose governments
are anxious to finally settle the `Armenian Question' redefined in the
context of their collective 21st century interests. Does anyone expect
the nations that have recognized the Armenian Genocide to support
Armenia's cause under these circumstances?
For Yerevan the issue that must be confronted is not whether Karabagh
is part of the negotiation process, but the constant pressure to have
the Madrid Proposals serve as the basis for negotiations. No matter how
these proposals are nuanced , they are the same proposals that were
introduced in 2007 and they still speak to the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan. Completely ignored is the principle that supports the
inalienable right of an ethnic minority to seek independence from the
rule of a despotic government. There is no part of international law
that precludes Artsakh from being recognized today as an independent
country. If the principle of territorial integrity was so sacrosanct
Kosovo could not have been recognized by the United States and Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not have occurred (see
`Is Artsakh's Cause Less Than Kosovo's?' The Armenian Weekly, May 10,
2009).
Even a cursory examination of these principles leaves little doubt that
they are skewed against Karabagh's independence. The first principle
requires the withdrawal of the Karabagh Defense Force from the
liberated territories that form Karabagh's security zone. Withdrawal
from these lands would cause the Line of Contact (LoC) to contract to
the borders of the Karabagh districts. This would make the defense of
Karabagh immeasurably more difficult as well as effectively cutting it
off from both Armenia and Iran. The Lachin Corridor cannot be viewed as
a dependable link to Armenia if the Kashatagh and Lachin districts
(Kelbajar) are occupied by Azerbaijan. The Lachin Corridor road under
the best of conditions is a fragile link to Armenia and can be easily
severed once the security zone is occupied by the Azerbaijan military.
An international peacekeeping force under the aegis of the United
Nations might be an option. However, their effectiveness judged by the
past performances of such peace-keeping forces in similar situations
too numerous to mention is not reassuring. They normally have neither
the capacity nor the mandate to effectively challenge any military
action that the host nation may decide to take. What is the status of
the occupied eastern margins of Martakert and Martuni and the district
of Shahumian? Will they revert to Karabagh's control or continue to
remain under Azeri occupation?
A second principle speaks to the return of internally displace persons
(IDP) to the liberated districts as well as to Karabagh itself. What of
the Armenian IDP's that are in Karabagh who fled from Baku and Sumgait
and the districts of Shahumian and the eastern border regions of
Martakert and Martuni that are presently occupied by Azeri forces. Then
there are those Armenians that left Azerbaijan for Armenia or Russia.
These people are the only legitimate refugees of the war to liberate 0D
Artsakh, although the term is incorrectly used by Baku to identify
their IDP's.
This requirement to resettle the IDP's combined with a third principle
that suggests a future plebiscite to determine the status of Karabagh
all but insures that the people of Karabagh will never achieve
independence. When this plebiscite will take place will be determined
by whom? When will it be held? What geographic regions will be
included? Karabagh only? Or will the voting include all of Azerbaijan
as a referendum on whether or not Karabagh should be granted some form
of local autonomy? Actually none of these questions are relevant simply
because Karabagh's independence will never be one of the options.
Possibly Aliyev's off repeated threat of a military solution may be the
more desirable option (see `The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Revisited,'
The Armenian Weekly, August 16, 2008).
The loss of Artsakh would represent a catastrophic political and
psychological setback for Armenia and for the creditability of the ARF.
Hai Tahd and the socioeconomic and political reforms that define the
ideology of the ARF would have been seriously tarnished. That may be a
harsh assessment, but it is closer to the truth than ignoring the
consequences of Artsakh's demise.
Artsakh not only would represent a significant victory in the Armenian
nation's determination to obtain justice, but it strengthens the count
ry's strategic position athwart the Russian-Iranian north-south
axis and the Turkish-Azerbaijani west-east axis. At any moment Russia
has the capability to occupy Georgia which is Turkey's only land
connection to Baku and beyond. The neutralization of Armenia and the
reversion of Karabagh to Azerbaijan would provide Turkey with an
important alternate route. There can be no doubt that Turkey desires to
extend its political and economic influence across the Caspian Sea into
central Asia and beyond. This is the old pan-Turanian (or Pan-Turkic)
dream resurrected.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's recent charge that the Chinese
government was committing genocide in Xingtiang (Sinkiang) against the
ethnic Moslem Uighurs speaks to that objective. The United States,
Russia, and the European Union should consider that Turkey's
geostrategic interests will ultimately run counter to their respective
geostrategic interests. From the Balkans to Chinese Xingtiang and from
the south Caucasus to the Gulf of Aden, there is no country within this
vast region that can compete on the ground with Turkey. This includes
both Israel and Iran.
No one questions the fact that Yerevan is not dealing from a position
of power. However, President Sargsyan courts disaster if he continues
to carry on negotiations without broad based political support and a
degree of transparency. Allaying suspicions and the need to engender
support from the diaspora is an absolute necessity. The ARF is well
positioned to make an important contribution if Yerevan accepts the
need not only to reposition itself with respect to its objectives, but
to develop a plan of action that speaks, first and foremost, to the de
jure independence of Karabagh. If not, then this difficult burden must
fall on the ARF to represent the people of Karabagh in their epic
struggle to become a free and independent entity.