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ARTSAKH'S INDEPENDENCE BEFORE NORMALIZATION: REORDERING ARMENIA'S PRIORITIES
Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
http://www.asbarez.com/2009/08/1 2/artsakh%e2%80%99s-independence-before-normalizat ion-reordering-armenia%e2%80%99s/
Aug 12, 2009
The following comment is attributed to President Ilham Aliyev of
Azerbaijan conjecturing on the possibility of Artsakh achieving
local autonomy when it is returned to Baku's jurisdiction. "It may
take a year, maybe 10 years, maybe 100 years, or it will never be
possible. Time will tell. That mindset that Karabakh will revert to
Azerbaijani control is given credence by the continuing pressure
by the Minsk Group representing the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for Armenia to accept another nuanced
Madrid Proposal as the basis for negotiating a resolution of the
Karabakh conflict. To accept these principles places the burden on
the Armenian negotiators, effectively precluding our brothers and
sisters in Artsakh from ever achieving a peaceful de jure independence.
Given that rather ominous outlook, the leadership in Yerevan remains
hell-bent on implementing an ill-conceived policy that seeks to
normalize relations with a government in Ankara that continues a
decades-long national policy of denial, obfuscation, and revisionism
with respect to the genocide of the Armenian nation that began on
April 24, 1915. It should come as no revelation that the Turkish
leaders have no intention of normalizing relations with Yerevan until
the Karabakh conflict is resolved. The Turkish solution is simple:
The liberated districts must revert to Azeri control and Karabakh's
ultimate status to be determined by a vote under conditions and at an
indefinite time in the future. While Armenia seeks to appease Ankara
on its western border, for what purpose one might ask, it is being
outflanked on its eastern border.
These ongoing negotiations to achieve normalization are part of
a well-conceived Turkish diplomatic offensive that seeks to force
Yerevan into accepting compromises that are inimical to its political
viability and future security. The soccer invitation by Armenian
President Serge Sarkisian to Turkish President Abdullah Gul was
part and parcel of this shrewd Turkish offensive. The invitation was
anything but spontaneous by the Armenian president. The hesitancy by
the Turkish president in accepting was part of the drama that set
the stage for the current negotiations. Unwary Yerevan-better that
said than to say they were party to this subterfuge-has little if
anything substantive to gain from these negotiations. Yerevan has yet
to produce any objective evidence as to how normalization will promote
its present political-economic situation or long-term national security
interests. An analysis of the limited and conflicting information
that is available indicates that whatever gains may be anticipated
will come at an exorbitant cost to Armenia.
If this is not sufficient reason to end negotiations, perhaps a more
compelling reason is the need for Yerevan to reorient its priorities
and view Artsakh's independence rather than normalization as the key
to its future.
The loss of Artsakh would seriously weaken Yerevan's position within
the south Caucasus and would likely result in the disaffection of
a significant number of diasporan Armenians. Yerevan must develop
and enunciate a stratagem supported by the major political parties
in tandem with Stepanakert that will maintain and strengthen the de
facto independence of Artsakh as this coalition works toward its
recognition as a free and independent political entity. Failure
to develop a broadly supported stratagem creates a vacuum that
facilitates the ongoing campaign by Ankara and Baku of comments from
their leaders that seek to create the illusion that negotiations are
progressing satisfactorily. This causes what they expect: confusion
and consternation on the part of the Armenian political parties not
privy to the negotiations, and an erosion of Armenia's position in the
negotiations. The lack of an effective response by Yerevan makes its
leaders appear to be the intransigent neighbor while Turkey assumes
the role of the cooperative negotiator. It is a shrewd gambit by
Ankara that seems to be resonating with the principal players-the
Minsk Group representing the OSCE, of which Russia and the United
States serve as co-chairs with France, and by Russia and the United
States as separate entities apart from their participation in the
Minsk Group-as they continue to pressure Armenia to make compromises.
These nations want an open border-seemingly at Armenia's expense-and
a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict-at Karabakh's
expense-ostensibly to bring political and economic stability to the
region. Political and economic stability in the south Caucasus is
a legitimate objective. However, nowhere are provisions suggested
to be implemented that would improve the economy of Armenia, its
active participation in the ongoing economic development programs and
projects in the south Caucasus, guarantees of free access to Black
Sea ports in Georgia and Turkey or to address the various issues that
are an outgrowth of the Armenian Genocide. Rather, both Armenia's and
Karabakh's vital interests are being ignored in preference to those
of Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is everything to suggest, based on the
available evidence, that if the present set of circumstances prevail,
Armenia and Karabakh will be relegated to political and economic
servitude, their potential forever circumscribed by the interests of
Ankara and Baku (see "The Roadmap to Normalization is a Roadmap to
Oblivion for Armenia, The Armenian Weekly, May 23, 2009).
The ultimate independence of Artsakh must be viewed as infinitely more
compelling than the normalization of relations with Ankara. Failure
to achieve Artsakh's independence will be the death knell for Hai
Tahd, which represents the Armenian nation's legitimate demand for
justice. The first link in that long-sought demand for justice is the
recognition of Artsakh as an independent entity. Should that fail,
Yerevan has no hope whatsoever that the normalization of relations
with Turkey will be either politically or economically beneficial, or
that its national security interests can be protected. With a defeat in
Artsakh, what is it that normalization can yield? What incentive would
there be for Ankara to ever offer no more than token responses to the
legitimate Armenian claims of restitution, reparation, recognition
(of the genocide), and rectification (of the boundary)? Whatever
concessions that were finally made to Armenia would serve solely to
burnish Turkey's image as a nation willing to overcome its past in
order to achieve political and economic stability within the south
Caucasus. Turkish leaders know that this ploy would play well in the
capitals of the European Union and the United States, whose governments
are anxious to finally settle the "Armenian Question" redefined in
the context of their collective 21st century interests. Does anyone
expect the nations that have recognized the Armenian Genocide to
support Armenia's cause under these circumstances?
For Yerevan the issue that must be confronted is not whether Karabakh
is part of the negotiation process, but the constant pressure to have
the Madrid Proposals serve as the basis for negotiations. No matter how
these proposals are nuanced , they are the same proposals that were
introduced in 2007 and they still speak to the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan. Completely ignored is the principle that supports the
inalienable right of an ethnic minority to seek independence from the
rule of a despotic government. There is no part of international law
that precludes Artsakh from being recognized today as an independent
country. If the principle of territorial integrity was so sacrosanct
Kosovo could not have been recognized by the United States and Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not have occurred
(see "Is Artsakh's Cause Less Than Kosovo's?) The Armenian Weekly,
May 10, 2009).
Even a cursory examination of these principles leaves little doubt that
they are skewed against Karabakh's independence. The first principle
requires the withdrawal of the Karabakh Defense Force from the
liberated territories that form Karabakh's security zone. Withdrawal
from these lands would cause the Line of Contact (LoC) to contract to
the borders of the Karabakh districts. This would make the defense of
Karabakh immeasurably more difficult as well as effectively cutting
it off from both Armenia and Iran. The Lachin Corridor cannot be
viewed as a dependable link to Armenia if the Kashatagh and Lachin
districts (Kelbajar) are occupied by Azerbaijan. The Lachin Corridor
road under the best of conditions is a fragile link to Armenia and can
be easily severed once the security zone is occupied by the Azerbaijan
military. An international peacekeeping force under the aegis of the
United Nations might be an option. However, their effectiveness judged
by the past performances of such peace-keeping forces in similar
situations too numerous to mention is not reassuring. They normally
have neither the capacity nor the mandate to effectively challenge
any military action that the host nation may decide to take. What is
the status of the occupied eastern margins of Martakert and Martuni
and the district of Shahumian? Will they revert to Karabakh's control
or continue to remain under Azeri occupation?
A second principle speaks to the return of internally displace
persons (IDP) to the liberated districts as well as to Karabakh
itself. What of the Armenian IDP's that are in Karabakh who fled
from Baku and Sumgait and the districts of Shahumian and the eastern
border regions of Martakert and Martuni that are presently occupied
by Azeri forces. Then there are those Armenians that left Azerbaijan
for Armenia or Russia. These people are the only legitimate refugees
of the war to liberate Artsakh, although the term is incorrectly used
by Baku to identify their IDP's.
This requirement to resettle the IDP's combined with a third
principle that suggests a future plebiscite to determine the status
of Karabakh all but insures that the people of Karabakh will never
achieve independence. When this plebiscite will take place will be
determined by whom? When will it be held? What geographic regions
will be included? Karabakh only? Or will the voting include all
of Azerbaijan as a referendum on whether or not Karabakh should be
granted some form of local autonomy? Actually none of these questions
are relevant simply because Karabakh's independence will never be one
of the options. Possibly Aliyev's off repeated threat of a military
solution may be the more desirable option (see "The Nagorno Karabakh
Conflict Revisited,) The Armenian Weekly, August 16, 2008).
The loss of Artsakh would represent a catastrophic political and
psychological setback for Armenia and for the creditability of the
ARF. Hai Tahd and the socioeconomic and political reforms that define
the ideology of the ARF would have been seriously tarnished. That may
be a harsh assessment, but it is closer to the truth than ignoring
the consequences of Artsakh's demise.
Artsakh not only would represent a significant victory in the Armenian
nation's determination to obtain justice, but it strengthens the
country's strategic position athwart the Russian-Iranian north-south
axis and the Turkish-Azerbaijani west-east axis. At any moment Russia
has the capability to occupy Georgia which is Turkey's only land
connection to Baku and beyond. The neutralization of Armenia and
the reversion of Karabakh to Azerbaijan would provide Turkey with an
important alternate route. There can be no doubt that Turkey desires
to extend its political and economic influence across the Caspian
Sea into central Asia and beyond. This is the old pan-Turanian (or
Pan-Turkic) dream resurrected.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's recent charge that the Chinese
government was committing genocide in Xingtiang (Sinkiang) against
the ethnic Moslem Uighurs speaks to that objective. The United
States, Russia, and the European Union should consider that Turkey's
geostrategic interests will ultimately run counter to their respective
geostrategic interests. From the Balkans to Chinese Xingtiang and from
the south Caucasus to the Gulf of Aden, there is no country within
this vast region that can compete on the ground with Turkey. This
includes both Israel and Iran.
No one questions the fact that Yerevan is not dealing from a position
of power. However, President Sargsyan courts disaster if he continues
to carry on negotiations without broad based political support and a
degree of transparency. Allaying suspicions and the need to engender
support from the diaspora is an absolute necessity.
The ARF is well positioned to make an important contribution if
Yerevan accepts the need not only to reposition itself with respect
to its objectives, but to develop a plan of action that speaks,
first and foremost, to the de jure independence of Karabakh. If
not, then this difficult burden must fall on the ARF to represent
the people of Karabakh in their epic struggle to become a free and
independent entity.
Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
http://www.asbarez.com/2009/08/1 2/artsakh%e2%80%99s-independence-before-normalizat ion-reordering-armenia%e2%80%99s/
Aug 12, 2009
The following comment is attributed to President Ilham Aliyev of
Azerbaijan conjecturing on the possibility of Artsakh achieving
local autonomy when it is returned to Baku's jurisdiction. "It may
take a year, maybe 10 years, maybe 100 years, or it will never be
possible. Time will tell. That mindset that Karabakh will revert to
Azerbaijani control is given credence by the continuing pressure
by the Minsk Group representing the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for Armenia to accept another nuanced
Madrid Proposal as the basis for negotiating a resolution of the
Karabakh conflict. To accept these principles places the burden on
the Armenian negotiators, effectively precluding our brothers and
sisters in Artsakh from ever achieving a peaceful de jure independence.
Given that rather ominous outlook, the leadership in Yerevan remains
hell-bent on implementing an ill-conceived policy that seeks to
normalize relations with a government in Ankara that continues a
decades-long national policy of denial, obfuscation, and revisionism
with respect to the genocide of the Armenian nation that began on
April 24, 1915. It should come as no revelation that the Turkish
leaders have no intention of normalizing relations with Yerevan until
the Karabakh conflict is resolved. The Turkish solution is simple:
The liberated districts must revert to Azeri control and Karabakh's
ultimate status to be determined by a vote under conditions and at an
indefinite time in the future. While Armenia seeks to appease Ankara
on its western border, for what purpose one might ask, it is being
outflanked on its eastern border.
These ongoing negotiations to achieve normalization are part of
a well-conceived Turkish diplomatic offensive that seeks to force
Yerevan into accepting compromises that are inimical to its political
viability and future security. The soccer invitation by Armenian
President Serge Sarkisian to Turkish President Abdullah Gul was
part and parcel of this shrewd Turkish offensive. The invitation was
anything but spontaneous by the Armenian president. The hesitancy by
the Turkish president in accepting was part of the drama that set
the stage for the current negotiations. Unwary Yerevan-better that
said than to say they were party to this subterfuge-has little if
anything substantive to gain from these negotiations. Yerevan has yet
to produce any objective evidence as to how normalization will promote
its present political-economic situation or long-term national security
interests. An analysis of the limited and conflicting information
that is available indicates that whatever gains may be anticipated
will come at an exorbitant cost to Armenia.
If this is not sufficient reason to end negotiations, perhaps a more
compelling reason is the need for Yerevan to reorient its priorities
and view Artsakh's independence rather than normalization as the key
to its future.
The loss of Artsakh would seriously weaken Yerevan's position within
the south Caucasus and would likely result in the disaffection of
a significant number of diasporan Armenians. Yerevan must develop
and enunciate a stratagem supported by the major political parties
in tandem with Stepanakert that will maintain and strengthen the de
facto independence of Artsakh as this coalition works toward its
recognition as a free and independent political entity. Failure
to develop a broadly supported stratagem creates a vacuum that
facilitates the ongoing campaign by Ankara and Baku of comments from
their leaders that seek to create the illusion that negotiations are
progressing satisfactorily. This causes what they expect: confusion
and consternation on the part of the Armenian political parties not
privy to the negotiations, and an erosion of Armenia's position in the
negotiations. The lack of an effective response by Yerevan makes its
leaders appear to be the intransigent neighbor while Turkey assumes
the role of the cooperative negotiator. It is a shrewd gambit by
Ankara that seems to be resonating with the principal players-the
Minsk Group representing the OSCE, of which Russia and the United
States serve as co-chairs with France, and by Russia and the United
States as separate entities apart from their participation in the
Minsk Group-as they continue to pressure Armenia to make compromises.
These nations want an open border-seemingly at Armenia's expense-and
a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict-at Karabakh's
expense-ostensibly to bring political and economic stability to the
region. Political and economic stability in the south Caucasus is
a legitimate objective. However, nowhere are provisions suggested
to be implemented that would improve the economy of Armenia, its
active participation in the ongoing economic development programs and
projects in the south Caucasus, guarantees of free access to Black
Sea ports in Georgia and Turkey or to address the various issues that
are an outgrowth of the Armenian Genocide. Rather, both Armenia's and
Karabakh's vital interests are being ignored in preference to those
of Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is everything to suggest, based on the
available evidence, that if the present set of circumstances prevail,
Armenia and Karabakh will be relegated to political and economic
servitude, their potential forever circumscribed by the interests of
Ankara and Baku (see "The Roadmap to Normalization is a Roadmap to
Oblivion for Armenia, The Armenian Weekly, May 23, 2009).
The ultimate independence of Artsakh must be viewed as infinitely more
compelling than the normalization of relations with Ankara. Failure
to achieve Artsakh's independence will be the death knell for Hai
Tahd, which represents the Armenian nation's legitimate demand for
justice. The first link in that long-sought demand for justice is the
recognition of Artsakh as an independent entity. Should that fail,
Yerevan has no hope whatsoever that the normalization of relations
with Turkey will be either politically or economically beneficial, or
that its national security interests can be protected. With a defeat in
Artsakh, what is it that normalization can yield? What incentive would
there be for Ankara to ever offer no more than token responses to the
legitimate Armenian claims of restitution, reparation, recognition
(of the genocide), and rectification (of the boundary)? Whatever
concessions that were finally made to Armenia would serve solely to
burnish Turkey's image as a nation willing to overcome its past in
order to achieve political and economic stability within the south
Caucasus. Turkish leaders know that this ploy would play well in the
capitals of the European Union and the United States, whose governments
are anxious to finally settle the "Armenian Question" redefined in
the context of their collective 21st century interests. Does anyone
expect the nations that have recognized the Armenian Genocide to
support Armenia's cause under these circumstances?
For Yerevan the issue that must be confronted is not whether Karabakh
is part of the negotiation process, but the constant pressure to have
the Madrid Proposals serve as the basis for negotiations. No matter how
these proposals are nuanced , they are the same proposals that were
introduced in 2007 and they still speak to the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan. Completely ignored is the principle that supports the
inalienable right of an ethnic minority to seek independence from the
rule of a despotic government. There is no part of international law
that precludes Artsakh from being recognized today as an independent
country. If the principle of territorial integrity was so sacrosanct
Kosovo could not have been recognized by the United States and Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not have occurred
(see "Is Artsakh's Cause Less Than Kosovo's?) The Armenian Weekly,
May 10, 2009).
Even a cursory examination of these principles leaves little doubt that
they are skewed against Karabakh's independence. The first principle
requires the withdrawal of the Karabakh Defense Force from the
liberated territories that form Karabakh's security zone. Withdrawal
from these lands would cause the Line of Contact (LoC) to contract to
the borders of the Karabakh districts. This would make the defense of
Karabakh immeasurably more difficult as well as effectively cutting
it off from both Armenia and Iran. The Lachin Corridor cannot be
viewed as a dependable link to Armenia if the Kashatagh and Lachin
districts (Kelbajar) are occupied by Azerbaijan. The Lachin Corridor
road under the best of conditions is a fragile link to Armenia and can
be easily severed once the security zone is occupied by the Azerbaijan
military. An international peacekeeping force under the aegis of the
United Nations might be an option. However, their effectiveness judged
by the past performances of such peace-keeping forces in similar
situations too numerous to mention is not reassuring. They normally
have neither the capacity nor the mandate to effectively challenge
any military action that the host nation may decide to take. What is
the status of the occupied eastern margins of Martakert and Martuni
and the district of Shahumian? Will they revert to Karabakh's control
or continue to remain under Azeri occupation?
A second principle speaks to the return of internally displace
persons (IDP) to the liberated districts as well as to Karabakh
itself. What of the Armenian IDP's that are in Karabakh who fled
from Baku and Sumgait and the districts of Shahumian and the eastern
border regions of Martakert and Martuni that are presently occupied
by Azeri forces. Then there are those Armenians that left Azerbaijan
for Armenia or Russia. These people are the only legitimate refugees
of the war to liberate Artsakh, although the term is incorrectly used
by Baku to identify their IDP's.
This requirement to resettle the IDP's combined with a third
principle that suggests a future plebiscite to determine the status
of Karabakh all but insures that the people of Karabakh will never
achieve independence. When this plebiscite will take place will be
determined by whom? When will it be held? What geographic regions
will be included? Karabakh only? Or will the voting include all
of Azerbaijan as a referendum on whether or not Karabakh should be
granted some form of local autonomy? Actually none of these questions
are relevant simply because Karabakh's independence will never be one
of the options. Possibly Aliyev's off repeated threat of a military
solution may be the more desirable option (see "The Nagorno Karabakh
Conflict Revisited,) The Armenian Weekly, August 16, 2008).
The loss of Artsakh would represent a catastrophic political and
psychological setback for Armenia and for the creditability of the
ARF. Hai Tahd and the socioeconomic and political reforms that define
the ideology of the ARF would have been seriously tarnished. That may
be a harsh assessment, but it is closer to the truth than ignoring
the consequences of Artsakh's demise.
Artsakh not only would represent a significant victory in the Armenian
nation's determination to obtain justice, but it strengthens the
country's strategic position athwart the Russian-Iranian north-south
axis and the Turkish-Azerbaijani west-east axis. At any moment Russia
has the capability to occupy Georgia which is Turkey's only land
connection to Baku and beyond. The neutralization of Armenia and
the reversion of Karabakh to Azerbaijan would provide Turkey with an
important alternate route. There can be no doubt that Turkey desires
to extend its political and economic influence across the Caspian
Sea into central Asia and beyond. This is the old pan-Turanian (or
Pan-Turkic) dream resurrected.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's recent charge that the Chinese
government was committing genocide in Xingtiang (Sinkiang) against
the ethnic Moslem Uighurs speaks to that objective. The United
States, Russia, and the European Union should consider that Turkey's
geostrategic interests will ultimately run counter to their respective
geostrategic interests. From the Balkans to Chinese Xingtiang and from
the south Caucasus to the Gulf of Aden, there is no country within
this vast region that can compete on the ground with Turkey. This
includes both Israel and Iran.
No one questions the fact that Yerevan is not dealing from a position
of power. However, President Sargsyan courts disaster if he continues
to carry on negotiations without broad based political support and a
degree of transparency. Allaying suspicions and the need to engender
support from the diaspora is an absolute necessity.
The ARF is well positioned to make an important contribution if
Yerevan accepts the need not only to reposition itself with respect
to its objectives, but to develop a plan of action that speaks,
first and foremost, to the de jure independence of Karabakh. If
not, then this difficult burden must fall on the ARF to represent
the people of Karabakh in their epic struggle to become a free and
independent entity.