"You Shouldn't Trust The International Community": Matthew Bryza To

[Karakhanian Suren]

"YOU SHOULDN'T TRUST THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY": MATTHEW BRYZA TO ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN AND KARABAKH

NEWS.am
20:00 / 08/12/2009

NEWS.am presents the whole presentation and Q&A of U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew
Bryza in International Center for Human Rights In Tsakhkadzor, Armenia.

EUROFORUM

The International Center for Human Rights Tsakhkadzor, Armenia August
7, 2009

Matthew Bryza's speech and Q&A

It is a great opportunity during our friendship and a chance to see
all of you. Be in such a wonderful group of students, reminds me that
time is passing - and it's passing for me. This is last days in my
capacity as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia which gives me oversight for U.S. policy for all the South
Caucasus, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and Europe. I will still take a
little while as a Minsk Group Co-Chair, but today this is my last
day as Deputy Assistant Secretary. I will talk a little bit too
about our full set of relations with the countries of the Caucasus,
all our interests in Armenia and then the focus will be on Nagorno
Karabakh. And I promise not to take too long as I am here also for your
questions. And I will just say I am so grateful to all the people here
in Armenia who have always been so warm to me - whether it's in the
government or people on the streets, or restaurants, taxi drivers,
barbers. I have had nothing but warmest feelings conveyed to me by
everyone I met in Armenia. I don't know if everybody agrees with what
I say. There is a lot of suspicion about what the Co-Chairs have tried
never happened but frankly speaking Armenian people are so precious
and warm that you only maybe feel like the most loved of them guests
every second I've been here, and I've spent many seconds here, many
minutes, many hours, many days, many months. And I have always been
grateful to you for that. So, thank you.

In terms of our overall policy for Caucasus region, the United
States has three sets of strategic interests that I think, I know
are enduring from one U.S. president to another. I know that because
I've been working on the South Caucasus for twelve years, last 12
years straight. I began working on the South Caucasus under President
Clinton, continued all the way with President Bush's administration
including his personal set of layouts in the White House, and now I
am back working for the US Secretary Clinton and President Obama.

Our three sets of strategic interests are more or less the
same...well... - three areas: security, energy and economic
cooperation, and internal reform (democratic and market/economic
reform). Our view is that all three of these sets of interests are
related to each other. You can't achieve any one of those sets of
interests if you are not making progress with all three. Sometimes we
move faster with one set of interests than with another. But just to
get an example here in Armenia - the most important security interests
is of course Nagorno Karabakh which we need to find settlement
today. If we are not making progress for the Nagorno Karabakh
settlement then there is no sense of security here in the country,
it's difficult to attract investment, therefore it's difficult to
foster the economic cooperation in the region that needs to make an
economic growth forward, if economic growth is slow its more difficult
for democratic reform take place, well, when democratic reform is
not taking place there is also less stability within the society -
less security - less investment... So, all three sets of interests
are connected with each other.

Sometimes we move faster I think it is your near one security with
Armenian authorities in Nagorno Karabakh settlement and the whole
normalization of Armenia's relations with Turkey. We've seen Armenia
enjoyed fast economic reform and development. There are no economic
difficulties now, slow growth - that was a result both of global
economic crisis and a view to faster reforms here. And in the democracy
as well, there was a set back with what happened during the March 1
election, but there was some progress as well. We welcome the Mayor
elections in Yerevan. We also saw improvements on freedom of assembly,
freedom of media. The election itself is significant shortcomings. But,
we also saw the amnesty granted by President Sargsyan, a while ago and
we want to know he releases everybody who was kept in prison after the
March 1 election and the tragic events after. We've all seen progress
of democracy, always has been more progress on democracy not only in
Armenia, but in whole Caucasus and our own country.

Improving democracy and democratic system is a never ending pass,
and if you look at the media in my country you will see debates on how
are we to improve our democratic system. We have constant debates on
the question of lobby and the need to refuse the influence of narrow
interests who donate money to influence political guarantees in our
country. Some people here in the Caucasus say what's the difference
between lobbying and corruption? I won't tell the explanation of
the difference, I'll just say there are a lot of people in my own
country who say we need to clean up the system of lobbying to make
sure there is clear separation of free speech from corruption. So,
even in America we constantly have a lot of work to do on democratic
reform. I am not here to lecture, I am not here to say we've come up
with all the answers in my country. You have your own experience of
democratic system, and trying to make it better and make sure it appear
from a perspective that is strategic. If it is not a continuous process
on democratic reform there won't be long-term stability in the country,
without that stability its difficult to attract foreign investment that
is needed for economic growth, without economic growth and political
stability it's much more difficult to resolve the big security problems
like Nagorno Karabakh settlement or like Turkey-Armenia normalization.

So within that framework, I'd like to explain our approach to Nagorno
Karabakh. I often read with astonishment by some critics of myself or
our colleagues in Washington and in United States, that some of the
Minsk Group Co-Chris are trying to force Armenia to make concessions,
we are trying to force Armenia to agree to reopen the border with
Turkey. We are trying to force Armenia to give up some aspects of
Nagorno Karabakh that are the long-standing Armenian positions. That
is an absolutely ridiculous perspective. I am criticized in Turkey
of trying to force the Turkish government to reopen its border with
Armenia. So, I am getting accused on both sides of trying to push
either Armenia, or Turkey or Azerbaijan to make concessions... We
are not pressuring anybody. I am a mediator and derive the greatest
meaning in my professional career as a diplomat for the possibility
of helping countries resolve the war and reach peace. There is no
more motivating factor for a diplomat to have a chance to help your
countries, especially two countries that are so friendly to the United
States, reach a peace agreement in the war.

Simply put, that's why we are all in Nagorno Karabakh peace
process. You may think it's not me, you may think we have behaved
just like other countries in the region, that we have our ulterior
interests to control the region. We have no pretence about being able
to control the region. We don't live here. We live not just across
the continent, we live across the ocean which separates Armenia, and
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey from us. We have no pretension about
trying to push anybody out of the region. Russia will always be a
member of the Caucasus, for ever...The Caucasian mounts will always
be where they are, Russia will be partially in the Caucasus, and in
the South Caucasus will be your countries. So, Russia will always be
a part of any solution whether it be on energy or means to political
solutions to wars or other conflicts. And we always gonna be distant
with our state interests will always be in trying to create stability
so that we can foster security, energy and other economic, and our
political-economic freedom in the three sets of strategic interests.

We also know that there cannot be any solution to the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict or any other conflict if the agreement is not
mutual. We can't force anyone to want the agreement. The parties have
to decide themselves have to decide they agree. And so, though all
these years in negotiating on Nagorno Karabakh in the Minsk Group,
what we came to understand is for two sides to agree on anything
the only opportunity, the only option is for a settlement to be
based on the three fundamental principles of the Helsinki final
act that I've talked of so often, which is: the principle of self
determination of people, the principle of territorial integrity of
states, and the principle of non-use of force. Those three principles
maybe sound contradictory, or least the first two might (territorial
integrity and self determination) but they are not. It's difficult to
reconcile them and that is why we negotiate so long and why the talks
are so complicated. But I think we have found a formula in the basic
principles. As reflected in the Madrid document of November 2007 and
now is reflected in the updated version of that document the co-chairs
worked together in Krakow a week and a half ago that does strike out
that doubts. So, maybe I will explain that to you a little bit more
right now and then will answer to your questions on Nagorno Karabakh
and will talk about Turkey-Armenia just couple of minutes.

The way we will strike, or you - the parties will strike the balance
between self determination and territorial integrity is as follows:
as Presidents Obama, Medvedev and Sarkozy announced within their fact
sheet after their July 10 joint statement.

The basic idea of the agreement is that Nagorno Karabakh will receive
an interim status - which will be the legalization of the status
quo. And what is the status quo? Status quo will maintain security for
the residents of Nagorno Karabakh and the residents of Nagorno Karabakh
will elect their leaders, manage their economic affairs, will be in
charge of their own lives, and all feeling their own destinies. Interim
status will make clear and ensure that status will continue for the
interior period until there is a vote by the residents of Nagorno
Karabakh to determine the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh. So,
there is a way that self determination is expressed in terms of this
interim status and the final status that will be determined by law.

The principle of territorial integrity will be reflected in a return of
territories to Azerbaijan with seven territories surrounding Nagorno
Karabakh. These territories will be returned in a stages way that
President Aliyev described in July on television - with several 5 or
6 territories be returned immediately and that one or two, or part
of one, or another territory returned with some delay - maybe five
years, maybe another number of years. So we will also take care of the
principle of territorial integrity to the return of these territories
to Azerbaijan, whith the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh to
be determined at some point - I can't say when, or we can't say when
today at point when the parties all agree - through vote.

In addition, knowing that the most important factor for the
residents of Nagorno Karabakh is their security - there will be a
special security regime with guarantees that ensure there won't be
any corruptly military forces surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, because
territories around Nagorno Karabakh will create means to have permit
that there won't be a war. There will be the international peacekeepers
as well. And international community will find the way through its
observation, through other methods to provide certain guarantee that
this security situation and mutual agreement will be implemented,
will be in force. I find it 200 kilometers are the corridor connecting
Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia and at the same spirit leading a full
opening of all transit leads between Azerbaijan and Armenia, including
Nagorno Karabakh, including Nakhichevan. And so that Armenia is fully
entered into the regional economy which will bring certain economic
benefits to Armenia itself and to the region. So that is another
example, of how security issues, meaning an end to the war in Karabakh
and the peaceful settlement, are connecting economic issues and how the
economic issues, as they are leading to economic growth, are connected
to democratic reform, and stability, and security. All these issues
are inter-related and need to move forward at the same time.

The question I know you have is - "how quickly, how soon will we solve
the problem?" It depends on the presidents of the countries, and their
own attitudes depend more primarily on the linear societies, and these
societies are you. My job as a co-chair is to make sure that whatever
is negotiated by the presidents is figured, is balanced, involves an
equal amount of compromise on both sides, so that all agree - in your
societies and in Azerbaijan we will get the agreements straight up -
that's my job. It is the job of the presidents to tell us what they
need to convince you that the agreement is fair, will create a sense
of security and will spell prosperity to the entire region.

During my years working on the issue I've seen a remarkable degree
of progress. The two presidents right now are on the verge of the
break-though, that could be within the months to finalize the basic
principles. I can't predict exactly when they will come up with that
agreement to finalize the basic principles, because they still wonder
about each other. They wonder: does my counterpart president really
want settlement or is he trying to manipulate me. Is he trying to get
more concessions from me so that the agreement be as worth as possible
to his population or is he trying to get a little more advantage over
me. Which is normal for presidents to think that way about each other,
they are negotiating about the most important issue to their people.

What I can say is: to criticize either president for making stop, to
criticize either president for being too quick to offer compromises
is simply not in accordance with reality. Anyone who makes this
criticism is simply no longer in touch with the way negotiations
are really moved. In this country every major political party
has made its contributions to the basic principles. They're either
members of the coalitions that have negotiated the basic principles,
or they themselves have offered many of key concepts of the basic
principles. It is hard to find any major leader in this country today
who has not made his or her contribution to the basic principles. So to
criticize the basic principles, is being disadvantageous to Armenia,
will be to say that every native political leader in Armenia for
these past few years has been operating isn't in Armenian national
interests. And that's ridiculous. I have noticed during my wok on
the issue that Armenian political leaders, no matter what political
party, have worked very hard to defend their country's national
interests. They fought very hard for fundamental principles in which
they believe and they have been constructive.

It doesn't mean they can solve and be giving anything away unfair,
but they have fought hard. We should give credit to former president
Kocharyan, and former foreign minister Oskanian for doing just
what I've said: fighting very hard for Armenia to develop its set
of principles that are in Armenia's interests but being flexible
enough to allow the negotiations to move forward and to get to the
point when president Sargsyan, foreign minister Nalbandyan are able
to take over and pull the process even further, and much further to
the final agreement of the basic principles.

I don't mean that I am optimistic or pessimistic about where people
go from here, all I can do is observe like the processes moved a
remarkable distance practically since June 2004. When I was still
working in the White House in Washington I had a chance to be in the
first time discussing with the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan
and the NATO somewhere in Istanbul became the basic principles. We've
come from general principles to the framework peace agreement that
is just about ready to approve. When those basic principles are
finally agreed by the two presidents after then they will begin a
very intensive negotiating process that I hope will just last a few
months to reach a full-bound peace treaty. But before you can get
to the peace treaty you have to make that the basic concepts will
be basic principles that are building big political building-blocks
and are serving deployees. Naturally, it will mean that once the
fundamental building-blocks are serving hard its own place, negotiating
the final details for a prolonged peace treaty will be easier and be
less dramatic in the major concepts that will take place.

Finally on Turkey-Armenia I'll say just a couple of words about that. I
just saw some criticism of United States and me for pressuring Armenia
to agree to historical commission. Again, that is absolutely unfair
criticism. I and United States are not parties to the negotiations,
Armenia and Turkey are negotiating themselves. In the agreement that
will allow full normalization of diplomatic relations between Turkey
and Armenia and allow reopening of Turkey-Armenia border - what Armenia
is to offer Turkey, and what Turkey is to offer Armenia? To reach such
an agreement is none of the business of the United States. Whatever the
two parties have agreed in certain protocols is their own reflection,
and their political and diplomatic will. Our job is then as mediators,
if the parties have asked us, to approve the mediation and to think
through possible compromises language to solve any differences that may
remain. But our desire to see Turkey's border reopened with Armenia,
or Armenian border reopened with Turkey has been a consistent foreign
policy objective for every US administration since the border closed
back in 1990s. We aren't pressuring anybody, we are trying to help
the parties find a set of traditions that are mutually acceptable,
so that they themselves can agree to this historic task, historic
opportunity - I should say, normalizing Turkey-Armenia relations and
restoring what has been case of so much of history which has a sense
of coming....of coming home... in the broader Anatolian region. That
has been the status of relations between Armenians and Turks for
centuries...when Armenians plaid a crucial role in Constantinople and
Istanbul, they were architects, manufacturers, bakers, had factories,
and they were fully integrated into Istanbul society. So, Armenians,
Aramean and post-Aramean history should be interplied and together
there are difficult historic issues that have to be worked through. But
how it is resolved it is none of the business of the United States,
it is up to Armenia and Turkey to work out.

And the very last point is that normalization of Turkey-Armenia
relations is a separate process from Nagorno Karabakh peace process. As
I have said so many times here, and elsewhere: each process is moving
until momentum in similar directions when it is positive. They are
moving at different speeds and as one process moves forward it helps
another process move forward because progress in one area improves
diplomatic climate, reduces the level of distrust between the parties,
and helps therefore create the right atmosphere psychologically and
diplomatically for progress in the other area. So these are separate
processes but right now all the countries that I've mentioned:
Azerbaijan, Turkey, Armenia have a historic opportunity that comes
along very rarely - to change history and to restore traditional
patterns of economic cooperation and other cooperation that were
broken for century and longer. For Armenia, restoring the normal
patterns will have a dramatic impact on Armenia's economy and will
stabilize general life as well and create a sense of security that
should be there, that has been interrupted for a few years. And it
will have a similar impart in Turkey and Azerbaijan as well. Again, my
last comment is that these are separate processes that will evolve at
different speeds but they help each other as one process moves forward.

I'll stop there, I've spoken long enough and I will be happy to take
your questions for a while and any questions are welcome. Thank you.

Q&A

Tevan Poghosyan (Executive Director of the International Center
for Human Development (ICHD): After so many years of competition in
our region we need to develop trust. But only yesterday Azerbaijani
Ambassador made statements that spoilt the positive trend that with
so much difficulty could become possible in settling the historic
problem. What international community can offer to build up the
trust between the nations before asking them to go ahead with the
peace process?

A.: It took me 24 hours to get here, because one of my flights was
cancelled. So, I didn't see those statements, I haven't read them
yet but I heard about them. As I've said during my presentation,
any settlement that would be agreed on by all sides as in case of
the principle of non-use of force as well as self-determination and
territorial integrity. Threatening to use force and using force
at this point is not helpful. We in United States government say
there is absolutely no military solution for this conflict. There
was a military solution in 1990s but there is no military solution
today. It is quite simply because no matter who will win in such a
military conflict the other side will never forget, the other side
will always forbear for the next conflict and the next opportunity
to retake that territory. One side may feel as getting stronger, one
side may feel it will never be able to be defeated and that could lead
the population think maybe war is an option - but it is not. Again,
there is no military solution for this conflict - because the hatred
that would come from a war will never be able to be extinguished once
again we've gotten into the situation of bloodshed. The risk of war
is enormous regardless the country one lives in one risks everything
they have now.

In Armenia you are going through a difficult economic period, but
that will be over soon. Economic growth will be restored. In 2008
there was 6.8 percent economic growth, in six years the growth will
be 10 percent, you have your life getting better, you see investment
coming, your tradition, history - reflex your powerful entrepreneurial
spirit, survival, a lot suffering. What you've created after the
suffering that is amazing and an example for everybody. I can't
believe anybody say they wont to get back to the period before all
the successes that you had within the resent year. And the same goes
for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is attracting enormous foreign investment
now, it is developing pipelines now, they are going to make quite
wealthy. Nobody would like to put that at risk. Risk means losing
everything. In the situation in 1990s the life was not so great. So
I believe when everybody sits back and thinks in a rational way
they will recognize that the only way forward is the set of basic
principles we negotiated that again come for the fundamental needs
for their societies: self determination, territorial integrity and
for the non-use of force.

I have been disappointed by some of those statements that you've
mentioned, but there have been positive statements too. Just a few
weeks ago, probably in July President Aliyev speaking on Russian
television, made a very positive statement without any thread of
use of force, in which he talked about the need of self governance
of Karabakhi Armenian population, he talked about the need for
them to feel safe and have a connection to Armenia. I realize that
with many Armenians that does not go far enough, but for where the
statements have been in Azerbaijan that is quite a step forward and
means President Aliyev is preparing his population for the settlement
that I've been talking about.

Mediamax news agency: Armenian opposition declared that just recently
Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan reached an agreement in Moscow
Whereas OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have already got down to a broad
agreement. Please comment on it.

A.: I think we should be very careful with selecting the words we
use. The word "ñîãëaøå&#xE D;& #xE8;å" ('agreement' in Russian) there is not a
formal agreement between the parties yet. We co-chairs hoped that when
Presidents Sargsyan and Aliyev, met in Moscow on the 17th of July,
that they would do what they indicated to us what they were about to
do - which is announce agreement on several of the final elements of
the basic principles that had not yet been formally agreed. To put it
in perspective, back in January the two presidents met in Zurich and
they communicated to us Co-Chairs that they agree on the basic concepts
of the basic principles as outlined in that fact sheet released with
Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and Medvedev made in their joint statement
on July 10. So, in Zurich we had a conceptual agreement between the
presidents. In Prague we saw again that conceptually they agree but
they want to go a little bit more to find a concept for their state
to agree. In St. Petersburg there were a couple of more steps. And
between St. Petersburg on June 4 and Moscow on July 17 the co-chairs,
the presidents and foreign ministers worked through some of the details
that we hoped will allow the presidents to announce we are agreed
on the concepts of the main details on a sample of final outlines
of the basic principles. But they did not make the announcement and
that was disappointing for us all. They were right on the verge of
making the announcement. And we as co-chairs try to move the process
a little bit closer to the agreement of the concepts of what the
presidents agreed in Moscow. So, there was not final agreement but
we were close. But I hope it will be made when co-chairs and Bernard
Fassier arrives in the region by mid September then we will be at
the point of this agreement on the last few elements of the basic
principles that remain not yet agreed.

Student A: Mr Bryza, everybody has been speaking about compromises
and some countries expect from Armenia more compromises than we have
already done. There some ideas of re-annexation of Nagorno Karabakh
by Azerbaijan however as far as I remember we were the last who wanted
that war. So, why should we do all these compromises? And at the same
time, I don't see any compromise from Azerbaijan.

And I've got a brief second question. The USA was one of the initiators
of the supporters of independence of Kosovo. Can you explain what is
the difference between Kosovo and Karabakh? and why U.S. won't insist
on Karabakh's independence as well?

A.: Excellent question, not the first time that I heard that. May
I ask you a question as well then? What means Azerbaijan makes no
compromises?

Student A: Well, I never heard about them.

A.: Or what do you know about the course of the negotiations? Tell me
what was Azerbaijan's position in the beginning? And, where it is now?

Student A: In the beginning thy were ready to fight, now they are
demanding the territories back. That's the difference.

A.: Oh, you mean in 1990s.

Student A: Yeas I mean 1990s.

A.: (emotionally) I mean in the negotiations...What do you know about
were Azerbaijan was in the beginning of this round of negotiations
and were they are now? No, you don't. You can't possibly, so you
don't. So you have no idea what compromises Azerbaijan is making, it
is impossible for you to know. So, unfortunately, you have to trust
that. (laughing...) You don't know what compromises Azerbaijani
were doing so you assume they have made none. And many Armenian
politicians make this accusation. Often, Armenian politicians who
were deeply involved in the framework that's on the table right now
and that framework has not changed dramatically at all from when
it was two years ago, or three years ago. It is the same framework,
and it is that we just move forward some of the details.

Before, there was never any discussion in Azerbaijan about the
corridor. You never heard President of Azerbaijan that Karabakhi
Armenians need to feel secure, they need to control their own affairs
- never heard that before. So, this framework that I talked about
balances self-determination and territorial integrity can only become
aloud if there is compromise on both sides, right? Because as you do
well know the Azerbaijani side really cares only about territorial
integrity, and the Armenian side understandably cares more about
self determination.

But the laid framework that is very close to being agreed that is
a balance of both of those principles. So to get to that balance by
a definition Azerbaijan had to give up quite a bit from a position
where it was in the beginning when it said we will never talk on
self determination. And of course to bring Azerbaijan to that point,
Armenia had to give something up as well, because its a negotiation,
right? So the alternative is either the parties finalize this set
of basic principles which reflects learning, reflects learning from
the experience of 1990s, 97-98, from Key West and other formulas
that were tries but failed. Now we've come up and will be in touch
with the only possible formula to move forward - that I've already
described. So, both sides are making compromises, but everybody who
takes part in negotiations knows, that is no actual compromise made
by anybody because there is no agreement. Nothing is agreed until
all the elements are agreed at once. So, at the negotiation table in
terms of principles, yes each side is making compromises but in the
legal sense nobody made compromises because they have not finalized
the agreement. So the alternative for not being in agreement on the
basic principles is either status quo - which will not last forever,
or a war. And war is a thing that hardly anybody wants. So, to get
out of that terrible scenario it has to be agreed on both sides.

It is not just United States that has not recognized Nagorno Karabakh,
but the government of Armenia has not either. And the reason why
the government of Armenia does not recognize Nagorno Karabakh's
independency is because it knows that if it does that, the chance to
negotiate a peaceful settlements finish.

In case of Kosovo, it was totally different compliments of events. The
chance to negotiate a peaceful settlement was ended when Serbia
attacked Kosovo. And then the entire international community and
the former competent missions of Security Council resolutions came
together and created a special regime by United Nations and managed
its figures of Kosovo. There is no such a thing in the case of
Nagorno Karabakh. There have been Security Council resolutions but
they certainly don't call for Karabakh's independence. So these is a
qualitative different situation in Kosovo in terms of international
law, and as we can all observe if we sit back and think about history
- there is no simple law that becomes a formula for all countries. I
come from a country that before were separatists, right? We Americans
were separatists, the way as Russians - but different separatists. US
we were separatists from Great Britain and then we got independence,
maybe we got lucky.

In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we say we will never
recognize their independence. When it comes for Nagorno Karabakh
what we are saying is not that, what we are saying is 'let the
parties negotiate together, address Azerbaijan's need for territorial
integrity and Armenia's need for self determination, solve each set
of the conflict. Such things never happened. Unites States fought
for independence, sought international recognition. Kosovo fought
for independence, got the international recognition from the United
Nations. Abkhazia and South Ossetia - two countries have recognized
its independence, we never will. Karabakh were in different situation,
we began negotiations to agree on settlement.

I was a bit aggressive in my response to you but what I am trying to
show is that we are not pressuring anybody to make compromises. Armenia
is not making more compromises than Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan is not
making more compromises than Armenia. Each side has to make enough
compromises to get the other side to make sufficient number of
compromises so that they are comfortable. And, there is no guarantee
or other way except for to sit down and step by step or concept by
concept work through individual issues. And, we never know when
the negotiation will come out. Because it depends on geographic
tradition...the outcome depends on strength of the countries, and
the outcome depends on the skill of the leader to introduce in your
population and in your counterpart however right it's in deeds. Thank
you it's a great question. And I always find it interesting that those
people, the opposition leaders always say: "those people in power are
giving away too much" - even though they don't really know what it's
giving way...

Armenian reporter: Well, from your words I understand that Madrid
principles were written in Armenia, were written by Armenian
authorities. This is a joke.

My question is - you talked about three principles: territorial
integrity, self-determination, and non-use of force. When we are
talking about Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, am I right that
we mean, you mean, the mediators mean that this is Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity minus status quo anti - I mean - 4,4 thousand
sq km and plus a narrow linkage with Nagorno Karabakh, with mother
land Armenia?

A.: What we mean by territorial integrity is whatever the
parties can agree on. Each party has a different concept of what
self-determination means or what territorial integrity means. And,
it does not matter maybe for my concept of self determination and
territorial integrity. What matters is what the parties will reach
in the end. It sounds as it is not a certain argument but I do not
doubt that the co-chairs do not have their own formula of whether
territorial integrity means what you said or whether it means something
else. Finding a way to that the parties to agree on territorial
integrity and on self-determination is the most difficult step to
be faced - and that is what diplomacy can convince. But I cannot
give you such a specific answer as there are so many questions of
international law. The answer is whatever the parties agree on.

And their sense of what they can agree on depends on the costs of
what they do not agree, and if the cost is worth it will comes
to balance their account, if the cost is...they try war meaning
not giving the territories that is doublized within to the peace
agreement - that is a factor in their mentality and it is impossible
to predict how those factors will play themselves out. Because,
as these developments happen, as societies become more cognoscente
of the risks of the agreement, - their own sense of the benefits
and risks, of compromising now, change. So, I do not know where the
final balance that will be. I know where we are now and I cannot tell
you any brief detail because it will be very unprofessional of me to
tell what the two presidents chance to work through. All I can is -
to have our interests is fair and they are to be mutually agreeable.

Student B: I was one of those thousands humble beings who were brought
to Armenia from Nagorno Karabakh. I met so many people talking about
the safety they need and they all say that constant status quo will
be much more fair and much more safe solution than any that you and
the parties can suggest. In this context my question is why don't you
think of demilitarization efforts towards Azerbaijan? Why didn't you
start their demilitarization yesterday so that to present a better
image of the country? I think you will be in a much safer and better
position when you introduce a better image of the other party.

A.: Sure, we did and we have. But this is a negotiation and Azerbaijan
is an independent country with a will of its own and the population has
its own will. There are many people in the country who say (and maybe
you won't believe as it sounds incredibly) that they are ready to go
war. I find it hard to believe that anybody who had true experience
of war and lost their love lands and had at risk what Azerbaijan has
at risk - I will not believe that. But that's the reality that we
face. Just like here, I know there are people who are saying, rather
than compromise if Azerbaijan were to open war - we are ready. And
again I find difficult to believe that people think that there can
be other agreeable way out of this mess, out of this difficulty,
better than a peaceful agreement so that the both sides agree. And
you probably know people who take things that way.

So our job is to try to convince both sides of people, to convince
the people in Azerbaijan that there is no military solution. We are
trying to do that. And we are trying to convince them to agree to
these restrictions on representing militarize...trying to convince
them, but just because we are saying you should think that way does
not mean they do way. We are not so powerful to magically make these
deep-seeded desires, or fears, or impulses vanish just because the
United States say you should not think about war. It is just beyond
our power to do that. What we can do is to pull our influence to try
out the parties agree with each other that it is ridiculous to think
of military settlement. That is what we are trying to do.

Getting back to the first part of your question about the status quo,
perhaps that is the most sane situation from the perspective of all
these focused threads, but the second part of your quest reflects
- why there is no such status quo? There is no status quo in the
case of many unresolved conflicts. As long as the level of anger or
humiliation for emotionality is as high as it is here, or as more as
in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, the status quo is incredible, because
there are people at both places who are at both places, or at three
places - I should say - who want change that status quo. So before
those forces take the lead we need to do all we can as the corpses of
peace to help the parties negotiate out of that way of death. That's
all I can tell you about. But I wish I can magically with whatever
power, influence, or charming make everybody forget about war. But
we can't...we can't...So all we can is to negotiate out of it so that
war cannot break between the two parties.

Let's put it different way. In Cyprus there was a conflict in which
there was a war, in which many people died, but there is no longer any
danger of war, no longer... And you see there is no danger of war in
many other lasting conflicts over last few years. After three decades
finally Cyprus got in the situation where war is no longer possible,
found a way out of the long political disputes.

I hope we can get Nagorno Karabakh to that situation when war is no
longer possible. There was just difference of appeal on political
status of Nagorno Karabakh of some kind, but let's get the parties to
negotiate to the point where there is demilitarization, where peace
ends the chance for the conflict to develop into war, when are this
poor soldiers being killed by Cyprus on both sides to the conflict -
that's the goal of the Minsk Group process right now. When once we
have stabilized the situation and once we eliminate the prospect of
war, then we can also, before the process is finalized, final legal
status of Karabakh. But to be clear about it, I am not saying that
the voting process that happened in Cyprus when voting was Kofi
Annan is the same process that will happen in Nagorno Karabakh. I
just want to make the appoint, that if the international community
brings all its diplomatic strength, if we help the parties negotiate
we can transform the conflict often quickly into one when the war is
no longer possible. And that is not kind of difficult.

Novosti Armenii news agency: There is a deep-rooted opinion in Armenia
that it has no guarantees Nagorno Karabakh's status will be resolved
in exchange for Armenia's unilateral concessions and return of the
territories. When speaking of economic benefits you forget that
these are historically Armenian lands. Armenian side will not be
ready to return the lands unless in exchange for Karabakh's status,
and the scenario that took place during the former president Levon Ter
Petrosyan could repeat. Aren't you afraid that the situation may repeat
and negotiation process will bounce back where it was decades ago.

A.: The historically Armenian lands, I guess you are specifically
talking about Nagorno Karabakh, and how they will be returned to
Azerbaijan, right? If you look very carefully either at what I have
said today or what Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and Medvedev talk about
or what was in the fact sheet, you will see that what they are talking
about in the return of territories around Nagorno Karabakh, return of
the territories around Nagorno Karabakh (!). And you will hear and
you will see as talking on the interim status for Nagorno Karabakh,
right? that allows the people of Karabakh, the residents there to
remain there, to govern their own lives, to protect themselves,
to select their own leaders, their own judicial leader, their own
legislative leaders, and executive leaders, to manage their own
economy, to attract foreign investment, foreign assistance. So, what
we are talking about is the status quo, and the status quo today is
what it is. So, we are talking about the return of the territories
around Nagorno Karabakh and that for an indefinite period that Nagorno
Karabakh will have an interim legal status. And what I cannot tell
you today is when the final status will be determined through vote,
but you did not hear me say that Nagorno Karabakh will be returned to
Azerbaijan. I never said that. I just said that interim status will
be determined now and the final legal status will be determined by
the people of Karabakh.

Novosti Armenii news agency: I mean that also these seven Azerbaijani
regions are historically Armenian territories and if in exchange for
Karabakh Armenia could return them it would have already done so;
otherwise the old scenario during Levon Ter Petrosyan may repeat.

Tevan Poghosyan: I would like to add it is not Armenia who is to
return any territories but Karabakhi people are to agree to do so.

A.: It is probably not useful to get into the argument whether these
territories are Armenian or historically Azeri, I think if you look
at the ethnographical history of the region you come to different
conclusion but that is not why I am here today. With your arguments
about the Karabakhi Armenians participating in the negotiations does
it totally different way. And the discomfort of the Karabakhi Armenians
with the possible return of those territories is something we co-chairs
feel, something we talked about with Karabakhi leadership, with the
civil society in Karabakh, and with the Armenian leadership. And,
those views of the Karabakhis have influenced the course of the
negotiation. So, we incorporated into the negotiations those views,
those concerns, and those fears of the Karabakhi Armenians.

And your question is when Karabakhi Armenians sit at the negotiation
table to make decisions, - that's a question that has to be answered
by negotiating parties now, by Baku and Yerevan. Until 1998 Karabakhi
Armenians were formally part of the negotiations, when it was the
former government of Armenia who decided to change that situation. It
was not the co-chairs who made the decision that was the government of
Armenia. So, bringing Karabakhi Armenians back to the table there has
to be an agreement by the two parties. As co-chairs we know that we
cannot be in an agreement that's viable if the views of the Karabakhi
Armenians are not fully incorporated. One day we will provide for the
table something that we are working on now, and I hope that will be
an agreement as we once will finalize the basic principles.

Student from Belarus: As American how can you evaluate the growing
role of the EU in current processes in the South Caucasus? Do you
find them needed and corresponding to existing Russian-American policy
or policies... Do find it possible that Armenia becomes a subject of
strain between Turkey and Europe about joining EU?

A.: I know it does reflect fears here and in Russia. The European
Union's member states are the closest allies to United States. I don
forget about Japan, Canada, Australia, or New Zeland. But, EU is the
most important set of friends we have in terms of working together
to resolve problems globally. There is none major issue anywhere in
the world where U.S. or our EU partner are not working together. In
everything, whether how Russia brings energy to Europe or, the
conflict in Georgia, when Russia invaded Georgia last year. We care
about Nagorno Karabakh but not as much because of the structure of
the Minsk Group, North Korea, Iran, Iraq - any major problem anywhere
in the world: global economic crisis. The first place we turn when
we talk to resolve our problems is to our allies in the European Union.

The role that EU is playing in Caucasus is greater than ours. If
Armenia, and Turkey, and EU could develop a treaty relationship,
that would be great. We will do all we can to encourage that, the EU
is the only in the world with who we share absolutely fundamentally
the same values. All our values come from what is today EU. The whole
foundation of American democracy comes from the Great Britain and is
enlightened by the enlightenment in Europe.

In the case of Georgia, if it were not EU monitors that are the only
ones now on the ground after Russia vetoed the extension of the UN
mandate. So I'd say - thanks god for the EU monitoring machine in
Georgia. That monitoring machine plays a critical role to discount
false reports of a Georgian military buildup who all the time assault
Ossetian side - it is not true, the EU was there to make clear that is
not true. And thanks god EU was there to deter the provocations from
either side. We were asked very often, do you want to participate
in the EU monitoring machine in Georgia? We were not asked and we
don't see any reason too as long as the EU continues its monitoring
machine there.

When it comes to Nagorno Karabakh conflict, I know Peter Semneby is
anxious to get EU more involved somehow. There is lack of understanding
between the parties, and the best contribution now I think is that
the countries exchange their experts, journalists and intellectuals -
because, the EU is not just the Minsk co-chair. The more one knows
of the EU, from my perspective, the better.

Shant TV channel: Mr. Bryza what is meant by international forces? Will
they be armed forces or just observers? Will they have the mandate of
compulsion to peace if one of the sides violates the agreement? Will
the forces be deployed only in the Lachin corridor or along the whole
contact-line? Is the contingent of the peacekeepers being discussed?

And the second question that sooner or late will become topical. If
it will really come to the referendum and Karabakhi people will
again unanimously vote for a complete independence from Azerbaijan,
and Azerbaijanis again will not recognize this right, will it mean
that the international community this time will recognize Nagorno
Karabakh Republic as an independent state?

A.: When it comes to international peacekeepers first of all, they
will all be negotiated. But what we promote as co-chairs is that
not necessarily that they be armed, but that they be observers who
cannot compel armies not to fight - because nowhere in the world
has been any successful agreement when we relied on international
peacekeepers to compel people not to fight with each other. No, our
perspective is that we need to be smarter to negotiate an agreement
that will be strong enough and be sufficiently supported by the sides
so that the risk of war vanishes or reduces dramatically as it has
happened over a time in Cyprus. And that there won't need to be any
international peacekeepers to enforce people live together. I don't
think that's possible. But if one party or the other is determined
to go war it is very difficult for international peacekeepers to
have sufficient force to guarantee there won't be any war - as the
experience in Kosovo and Bosnia shows. So, we the co-chairs have to
be smart and skillful enough to put at place a settlement in which
the international peacekeepers will be primarily observers, will
protect themselves, and deter any provocateur from doing something
stupid. But we want that the agreement will maintain the peace, and
that requires separation of force, sense of security, within Karabakh,
a sense that Karabakhi's residents can defend themselves, a sense for
the Azerbaijani population could return to Karabakh and would feel
safe. So these are very complicated issues that we were negotiating
for a long time. But the agreement has to stand on these all merits.

In terms of contribution who will make up the peacekeeper force. We
co-chairs can make recommendations, but the parties themselves will
have to approve what countries can provide peacekeepers, maybe
one party doesn't like a particular country that may contribute
peacekeeping forces.

Of course the supposition for us Minsk co-chairs in designing this
agreement is when vote takes place it is a legal binding...legal
binding...and I can't predict what the outcome will be. If the vote
will take place today, we will know what the outcome will be, but
if the vote is taking for few years from now - everything may have
changed. I don't know what the outcome will be. But we believe that
this vote outcome must be legally binding. And then we will also
discuss how this legally binding will be implemented.

Student C: My question also is about security guarantees for Karabakh
and Armenian people. You said you are here to restore peace which
we have not for more than 18 years. What do you suggest in terms
of international law is for Armenian side to be more vulnerable
and loose its strategic place as it has liberated Karabakh as the
result which Armenia is going to have less security measures than it
has right now. What would you suggest us to trust the international
community, for us to trust the United States who have not been with us
in Genocide, and during the events of 1988 in Sumgait and Baku? And
can we trust the United States now that it has not yet recognized
the Genocide? So, what do you suggest?

A.: I think I said it before...Well, I am not asking you to trust
the international community - that is the whole point. You shouldn't
trust the international community. My answer about the peacekeepers
was exactly that - no one should trust international peacekeepers. We
need to come up with an agreement that provides Karabakhi Armenians
(today it means the Armenian residents of Nagorno Karabakh) a sense
of security, a sense that they will be safe, that they can remain
in Karabakh regardless what settlement is because they don't need to
worry about being attacked from Azerbaijan. And that is what we are
negotiating now. Today there are more Armenian population, so who need
to feel safe is Karabakhi Armenians. Years ago, it was around 75-80%
Armenians and around 20% Azeris. Now, when it comes to the vote on
Karabakh's final status, and when those who lived in Karabakh will
return, the eligible voters will be 80% and 20% - as per the last
census. Why I am talking so carefully about the population is that
there were three phases. The third will be when people return.

Q.: What about the return of refugees? How are you expecting Armenians
and Azerbaijanis live together? How will the mutual trust restored?

A.: What we have done in the negotiations so far is - returnees to be
in the territory of Nagorno Karabakh. Of course Azerbaijani would like
their returnees to come to Nagorno Karabakh, especially to Shusha. And
of course the Armenians would like to return to Baku. There are many
Baku Armenians who want to go back. I guess there are not lot of
Armenians who would like to return to Sumgait, because atrocity was
very critical. But the right to return is something that needs to be
dealt with in sequence because if you just talk without being very
careful about all the population returns to all their old areas you
will create an explosion. And its impossible to generate the trust
that you mean without all end meet in the agreement.

I very much understand why in Armenia you believe the status quo is the
safest and the most stable. But in the world were we live status quo
is not possible. It is not possible because there are many people in
Azerbaijan who want it separate. And so before all of those attitudes -
that you so much asked me about today about heights, about war - grow
stronger. What we are saying is let's get a compromise settlement now,
let's get done it today. If you look at the settlement that was on
the table in the past, or let say for the Palestinians...in the case
of Palestine, what was on the table years ago you will see that what
was on the table years ago there was much more will see there was much
more advantageous than what is on the table today. And I can say the
same thing about Armenia's approach to Karabakh. As in an agreement a
decade ago Armenia was in a much stronger negotiation position. So,
let's get the agreement done now, today, so that all those negative
influences that mean those people talking about status quo won't be
able to determine what happens. Armenia is still in the position of
strength. Armenia's economy will come back but it has to negotiate. We
and EU can make the negotiations be fair, we can provide the guarantees
as best as it can be provided.

Q.: When listening to your presentation I've noticed a slight wording
in the macro principles. One of the principles of Kosovo resolution
was that one side is going to suffer a strong pain but in a longer
perspective we all understand that the sides are going to live in
peace in a long-term perspective. One is this perspective Karabakh is
different from Kosovo? As what Serbs did was the same what Azeris did,
so what is the essential difference in these conflicts?

A.: So again, why is Kosovo different from Nagorno Karabakh? In Kosovo,
Slobodan Milochevich was condemned by international community as a
war criminal and the international community is in search of Vaclov
Vladic as a war criminal. The EU let the conflict end because of
the clear aggression of Serbia against Kosovo. You would say: "well,
that is exactly what Azerbaijan did for Armenia." And you don't know
what they say in Azerbaijan. So, we don't have the same situation in
terms of what the international community makes a decision. Do you
get what I say? I can process this situation as a mediator after the
international community set its way in this direction. The best way to
resolve this unjust and complicated situation is get an agreement now
that is fair only solution to this situation is to make the agreement
that is fair, that is meets with Armenia and Armenia's interests.

Arminfo news agency: Which aspects are you going to address in the
updated Madrid principles? You have very optimistically presented the
refugees' return, none the less, how realistic will the mechanism of
IDPs return be? If Azerbaijani population won't agree with results
of the referendum, will that mean they will have to go back?

A.: I will not answer on it, as I've already said it is not
appropriate of a diplomat to tell you exactly what the presidents
are negotiating. I gave you the basic concepts of the principles.

I don't know what I said that was optimistic about the refugee
return. What I said was that it is a very difficult question. And that
co-chairs say the process will be turned only when the territories
around Nagorno Karabakh are returned. The details of the return
process are still to be negotiated. So there was nothing optimistic...

As, concerning the result of the vote - well, we don't know what the
outcome of the voting will be. We know if the vote takes place today
it is pretty clear what will the. To get the Azerbaijani side to
agree to the basic principles, to be in a vote - we, everybody have
to listen to their call over a time once the basic principles' first
phase is in place. Which is the interim status of Nagorno Karabakh,
return of the seven territories, return of Azerbaijanis to their
territory in Karabakh - so that one day Armenians and Azerbaijanis
will live together again and mutually reinvest in each other, start
businesses together and try to live their life. And the issue of
status will be less intense. It may be that that never happens. It
maybe as refugees return the tension will grow. And now I can't tell
what the outcome will be. I don't know when the vote will be.

But once the parties come close together, as in Cyprus, we found the
way out, the way to negotiate and mutually agree on the status. I've
been envoled in it with parties of both communities. And I saw n the
course of last years they also went a long way to get close to such
an agreement.

Student B: But there are still Turkey's troops in Cyprus. Twenty
years have passed but nothing moves from the status quo position, why?

A.: Yes, the troops are there because there is no such agreement
yet. The question is how long Turkish soldiers will remain there once
they make that agreement.

You may decide Azerbaijani self-defense forces will remain, or Armenian
self-defense forces, or Karabakhi self-defense forces to remain,
and that's what we propose. So, sounds like you get what you want,
and to reach mutual agreement.

Aysor.am: You always say that Armenian authorities made a decision
to exclude Karabakh from the negotiation process. But do you know,
Mr. Bryza, that Armenian side did it under the pressure of Azeri's
ultimatum in 1998. If it depends on Karabakh's 'yes' or 'not' about
participation in the peace process, why Karabakh is not at the
negotiation table now?

A.: ---------- NEWS.am: If after the referendum Nagorno Karabakh's
independence will be confirmed how will Azerbaijan's territorial
integrity be maintained in that case? And what do you mean by the
second phase of the peace process now that no particular agreement
has been reached concerning the Madrid principles? - as, official
Yerevan accepts the principles only as a basis of the negotiations,
and does not actually agree with the principles. Won't the gained
independence provoke force and counteraction?

A.: Well, I don't know the answer to this question because I don't
know what will happen or when, when that vote will take place. In
the diplomatic situation like this you can't overload the law. All
you can do is resolve as many of the issues as history and parties'
psychology will allow to resolve. I don't know the answer how will
we resolve the issue of territorial integrity as well as I have no
answer of how will we resolve the issue of returnees to Karabakh? Many
historic issues will need to be resolved. I don't have an answer,
like I don't have an answer about how will we resolve the problem of
return of refugees. All I can say is that today what we have on the
table is a balance. If we continue the status quo we fear we will
increase the thread of war, the solution is to reach agreement like
in Cyprus - when the war scenario is no longer possible. We have to
eliminate the risk of war. The alternative is to do what happened
in Cyprus. That's the goal. You don't get anything for nothing. And
in the negotiations you have to buy through your concessions the
other side's concessions, that is the jungle rule of international
diplomacy in order to reach the agreement: where you will have to
give out to eliminate the risk of war, where will you to give up to
get self determination or you will make Azerbaijan to give up to get
territorial integrity. That is what the negotiations go around. But
I can't say about the outcome because it is negotiation.

Thank you.

NEWS.am apologises for any inconsistences that may appear due to
technical reasons.