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ARMENIAN FOOTBALL AND TURKS CHESS: OWN GOAL IN THREE MOVES
http://www.lragir.am/src/index.php?id=comme nts&pid=14934
11:47:55 - 15/08/2009
The process of Karabagh conflict settlement is rapidly moving toward
a new, unknown phase full of challenges. However, new developments
in peace process do not mean necessarily that the resolution of the
problem will get any closer. Throughout all this time the leadership
of Armenian National Congress repeatedly has been articulating the
developments around the Karabagh question and their possible negative
consequences for the Armenian population.
>From time to time I was asking myself why months before the
presidential elections (February 19, 2008), the OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairmen initiated several meetings with the prime minister
Serge Sargsyan and conducted detailed discussions with him about
Karabagh negotiations. It was unprecedented, since co-chairmen did
not meet with prime ministers. It was probably for guaranteeing the
agreements achieved during those meetings, that they initiated the
formalization of the ongoing negotiations (Prague process) and the
high level settlement document of a few pages, which was later called
the Madrid Document and was archived by three Foreign Ministers at
the OSCE depositary. This was followed by the presidential elections,
during which the majority of serious violations took place and were
registered by OSCE/ODIHR observers already in the pre-electoral
phase (which was reflected in more than 20 pages in the final report
published three months after the elections by OSCE/ODIHR), and in
spite of that, the elections of February 20 were assessed positively.
During the highly lawful protests, which started as a result of the
rigged and shameful elections, when the law enforcement bodies, as
the blunt tools of the ruling power, threatened the protesters with
the use of force, no international organization or country issued
any call or statement for restraining the authorities' temptation
to violently suppress the lawful protest of its own people. (In
Georgia, for example, where the silk protests starting April this
year were much smaller in scale, the international community issued
a dozen of statements/calls and encouraged the two sides to stay
away from violence.) In recent times, the pressures on Armenia for
expediting the settlement of the Karabagh issue started to mount (I
repeat that such thing did not happen throughout the 10 years of the
rule of Kocharyan). Putting together all these facts, I come to the
conclusion that there was a very important mission from the beginning
- to settle the Karabagh conflict through Serge Sargsyan within the
framework of the document, which was inherited by today's regime from
the Robert Kocharyan-Vartan Oskanyan pair (Madrid Document). There
was only one argument missing in order to be able to state all
this, and that was the clear signs that S. Sargsyan has come to an
agreement. Today, we have those signs and it is clear why during the
time when R. Kocharyan and S. Sargsyan were suppressing the lawful
protest of their own people against the rigged elections with tanks
and guns, the international community should have closed its eyes on
even such degree of unlawfulness of S. Sargsyan, who had committed
itself to a mission important for the international community.
Obvious retreat from the Madrid Document
In early July, I. Aliev, during an interview with the "Vesti"
TV station, announced about the "recapture" of seven territories
-indicating a five year deadline for the return of Kelbajar and
Lachin. It seemed that the Armenian side should have conditioned
the Kelbajar issue with the conducting of a referendum, and the
status of Lachin corridor should not be different from that of the
Nagorno Karabagh. But the absence of announcements/reactions from
Armenia in this regard, encouraged Bryza, OSCE Misnk Group American
Co-chaiman to approve Aliev's revelations. Even after the announcement
of Bryza, the persistent silence of the official Yerevan is a sign
that S. Sargsyan has made unprecedented concessions. The volume of
concessions is not limited only to the return of territories which
are currently the guarantee for Artsakh's security; in the future,
we will refer to all those points, where the regime of S. Sargsyan
is recording unimaginable retreat and defeatism.
All this is proven also by the positive reaction of S. Sargsyan,
E. Nalbandyan and officials of the Armenian Republican Party to the
"Basic Principles", consisting of six points for settling the conflict,
made public on 10 July by the heads of co-chairing states.
Here I have to note that these principles, to be more correct -
conflict settlement points - are only very generally linked to
the "Document on Basic Principles" presented in Madrid in November
2007. Moreover, they have already moved away from the very important
provisions of the "Madrid Document", and it would be more proper
to say that there is an obvious deviation from the basic principles
of the Madrid Document, and this deviation undoubtedly weakens our
positions. We should note that those principles have been filled
out with many important details and in this regard contain much
bigger challenges for Armenians. The most basic principle declared
by the Aliev-Bryza pair refers to the issue of territories. Although
the latter mentions that five territories will be returned after
the signing of the Main Agreement on the settlement (which will be
drafted by the parties after the signing of the "Document on Basic
Principles"), it is clear that with the signing of the latter and
with the documented commitment to return the territories, the Armenian
side will no longer be able to prolong negotiations and consequently
it will not be possible to prevent the return of the territories.
Speaking about the statement made public on July 10, we must
underline that the issue of the status of Nagorno Karabagh, which
is the most important one for us, is presented in a very vague
and unclear formulation and has not ended up among the first few
points. While in the Madrid Document, the point on the future status
of Nagorno Karabagh was the first one and was the core and axis of
the document. It is clear that I. Aliev could agree with the point on
the future status of Nagorno Karabagh -the self determination of the
people of Nagorno Karabagh, only with one condition. That is the return
of at least a part of Azeri refugees to Nagorno Karabagh. This is the
most complicated point dealing with the confidence of the population
of Nagorno Karabagh, feeling of security on their own land. The Madrid
Document envisaged the return of refugees in accordance with the ratio
of population in late 1980s (about 78% to 22%). Another point of the
Madrid Document specifically indicated that any result of the voting,
even the vote for independence, will be recognized by the sides and
internationally. The details of the return of refugees should have
been developed by one of the four joint committees envisaged in the
Madrid Document. Those committees should have been formed after the
signing of the document.
The possibility for revising some points of the document presented by
the mediators in Madrid is indicated by the announcement of co-chairmen
stating that the parties "have moved beyond the Madrid Document" and
are now working on the updated version. We would like to repeat that
the updated version, with its main provisions relating to the interests
of the Armenian states, its basic principles, and also its crucial
details, has significantly deviated from the Madrid Document. The
proof is this month's interesting, and in some sense strange,
developments with the participation of mediators. Presidents of the
three countries, by their announcement, instructed the co-chairmen
to present the updated version of the Madrid Document to the parties.
It is clear that the sixth Sargsyan-Aliev meeting one week later could
not proceed with the old version of the negotiation document. While
the co-chairmen declared in Krakow at the end of July that they plan
to prepare the updated document. Surprisingly slow compliance with
the instruction of the three Presidents ... In reality, the "progress"
in the previous meeting was being summarized and documented in Krakow
(this positive evaluation was shared by all the parties, which is
itself unprecedented) and the proposals on the two points yet to be
agreed on were being elaborated.
Here we would like to present our interpretation of the other points
in the published document. We have already mentioned that they
are different from the Madrid Document and this is indicated by the
announcement itself. Presidents of the three countries underline that
only the preliminary version of the basic principles was presented
in Madrid. And what is presented today is the updated, elaborated
version reflecting the concessions made by the Armenian side. It
must be noted that the Co-chair's six points, which initially seem
to be innocent and understandable, are in effect very dangerous,
considering the unacceptable omissions they contain. We must also
underline that in such documents details are most important, and we
will try to discuss some of them.
Comments on the six points
- Return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani
control. A reasonable Armenian negotiator would not agree to return the
territories to Azeri control without mentioning their unconditional
demilitarization. Here reference could have been made to the buffer
zone, territories transferred to the control of peacekeepers, but
not immediate control of Azerbaijan, without mentioning its basic
attribute - the prohibition of the presence of any armed forces
in those territories. We could have assumed that in this working
paper under negotiation, Armenia has insisted on including points
in its favor. But considering the positive reaction of the Foreign
Minister of Armenia to the announcement of the co-chairing countries,
our pessimistic suspicions become more credible. And really, if the
negotiations envisage the return of territories to the effectively
full and unconditional control of Azerbaijan, what is there to be
welcomed? After this, what confidence can a regular resident of
Karabagh think about?
Considering the complexity of the issue and the intertwining of
security issues, this point, in accordance with the Madrid Document,
should have been further elaborated by a joint Committee.
- An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for
security and self-governance. This point also raises numerous
questions. The interim status of Nagorno Karabagh should be
different from the current one. This means that, as mentioned by
the representatives of the Foreign Ministry of Armenia, elements of
sovereignty will be granted to Karabagh. In fairly recent times, in the
framework of this point the possibility of recognizing the Republic
of Nagorno Karabagh by OSCE and other international organizations;
in one form or another, stationing of own armed forces in Karabagh,
as well as a multilayered security zone, were being seriously
discussed. In the negotiations around this point, which is not yet
agreed, the Armenian side should ensure such functions (institutional
establishments), which would not be less than the current status of
the Nagorno Karabagh Republic.
- A corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno Karabagh. As mentioned in
numerous publications, already in 2006, the Armenian side insisted
that the Lachin corridor should have the same status as the Nagorno
Karabagh. This was a clear threshold, beyond which the Armenian side
was not ready to make any concession. According to the statement of
Azerbaijan and the mediators, five years after the signing of the
"Document on Basic Principles", the Lachin region (not to be confused
with the corridor) will be transferred to Azeri control. Within this
context, a clearly defined status of the corridor acquires a more
than crucial significance. One should also remind the reader that the
electoral platform of S. Sargsyan clearly indicated that "the Republic
of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh should have a common
border". Agreeing to any status of the corridor differing from that
of the Nagorno Karabagh would contradict the mentioned point and
would record the defeatist process of negotiations conducted by the
regime. With regard to this point I would also like to mention that
formerly the Armenian side insisted on the necessity of the widest
possible corridor - heated negotiations were conducted for each and
every village in Lachin region. I am convinced that the width of the
corridor cannot be ignored by any Armenian negotiator and that it
should not be narrower than the time S. Sargsyan came to power.
- Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno Karabagh
through a legally binding expression of will. In addition to what was
said above, it must be noted that the absence of the word "people"
in this point is a matter of extreme concern1. I think this is the
result of persistence of the Azeri side, which prompted Shavarsh
Kocharyan, Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia to state that "the
document smells oil". The agreement of I. Aliev to the expression of
the will of people on the status of Nagorno Karabagh would mean that
Azerbaijan questions its own territorial integrity, for which it has
put in huge efforts, specially in recent times. The fact that this is
also the most important issue for the Armenian side is beyond doubt,
consequently I do not think that any Armenian official can agree to
a method of self determination or expression of will, other than a
legally binding vote of the people. Here also I would like to refer
to the electoral platform of S. Sargsyan: "the right of Artsakh's
people to self determination should be recognized internationally
and conditions should be created for its realization", which clearly
envisages not only the participation of people in "the realization of
the right to self determination", but also how it should be done. This
means that the document cannot bypass the point on "the conditions
for realization of the right to self determination". I would like to
repeat that the term "plebiscite/ population vote" was included in
the first article of the Madrid Document, and replacing it with any
legal act of the Parliament or President of the Republic of Nagorno
Karabagh would mean a huge retreat from the interests of Armenia and
Karabagh. I would like to draw the attention of the reader also to the
word "future" in this point. This word is not used in other points,
therefore it creates reasonable doubt about the disproportionate
concessions made by the sides.
- The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return
to their former places of residence. The conflict has resulted in more
than one million refugees from the both sides. Such formulation of the
principle allows us to demand that the issue of Armenian refugees be
addressed at the same level with Azeri refugees. In this regard, the
announcement made by the Foreign Minister in recent days in Stepanakert
is quite interesting - "the return of refugees to Karabagh is not under
any discussion. This issue can be referred to only after the final
settlement of the Karabagh question, in a wider context considering
also the issue of around 400,000 Armenian refugees". This announcement,
although with positive aspects for Armenian citizens, unfortunately
raises more questions. If the issue of refugees has really not been
discussed, then how could Aliev agree with the principle on Artsakh's
self determination. There is only one possibility - putting together
the above-mentioned a statement of the Foreign Minister and the absence
of the word "people" in the previous principle announced by the three
Presidents, we come to the conclusion that the mediators could have
recorded the following agreement of the sides: the Armenian side
refrains from the process of the expression of the will of people
(referendum or plebiscite) and Azerbaijan from the return of refugees
to Nagorno Karabagh. Otherwise, without referring to the issue of
refugees, one cannot talk about any document or agreement. It must
also be noted that according to the Madrid Document, this principle of
the return of refugees was also to be discussed in a joint committee.
- International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping
operation. This issue is also one of the most important ones. Today,
the security of Nagorno Karabagh is protected by our army, whose units
are stationed in the most favorable positions from a defense point
of view. Any movement of our army units will weaken our positions
and make them more vulnerable. This is why the Madrid Document had
envisaged multilayer international security guarantees. They included
the stationing of peacekeeping forces, recognizing Armenia as the
guarantee for security, political guarantees given by co-chairing
states and a special resolution of the UN Security Council. The
current formulation of the mentioned principle is unacceptable, since
the term "peacekeeping operation" means not only the peacekeeping
operation by armed peacekeepers, but also the dispatching of civilian
observers. The term "demilitarization of territories" as the guarantee
of international security is also missing. Thus, here also there is
room for doubt that, in this case too, it is not the position of the
Armenian side, with that of the Azeri side that has been reflected
in the statement of the three Presidents.
Conclusion
Hence, what was compelling the authorities, even after numerous
warnings, to take inadequately calculated steps toward the trap in the
Armenia-Turkey relationships and make unprecedented concessions in the
process of the settlement of Nagorno Karabagh issue? The amateurish
conduct of the foreign policy, or the imbecile diplomacy lacking
content, or ... The chain of the facts mentioned above disclose the
following unfortunate reality:
- Already from the time when S. Sargsyan was the prime minister,
the Karabagh settlement issue was used to ensure the succession of
power in the form of the relevant promises, and maybe also undertaking
certain commitments. Now, it is time to deliver its previous promises;
- S. Sargsyan, ending up as the President through rigged elections,
massacre of people by the authorities and introducing an illegal state
of emergency, has decided to acquire international legitimacy through
concessions in the Nagorno Karabagh issue and accepting Turkey's
preconditions (creation of the commission of historians).
- Turkey's linking of the opening of the borders with the Nagorno
Karabagh issue and the limited time available for regulating the
relationships with Turkey, have forced S. Sargsyan to activate the
negotiations on Nagorno Karabagh. That can be done only through the
unjustified and unfair concessions made by the Armenian side. And the
"progress" made in the last meeting was ensured only thanks to the
"flexibility" of S. Sargsyan. The complexity of the issue is that
S. Sargsyan's not visiting Turkey in October has the potential of
not only freezing the relationships with Turkey, but also creating
a dangerous vacuum in the peaceful process of Nagorno Karabagh
settlement. S. Sargsyan has fallen into that trap prepared by the
Turks from where there is no advantageous exit.
Possible solutions
1. Understanding the complexity of the situation created, S. Sargsyan
toughens the negotiating positions, also harming the improvement
of Armenia-Turkey relationships. The result might be the total
loss of the support of the international community and stronger
pressure on both the regime and Armenia. A vacuum might be created
in the negotiations, which increases the danger of unpredictable,
dangerous and uncontrollable developments, including the resumption
of military operations.
2. The proposed "Basic Principles" document is signed (it can remain
confidential for a certain period of time - the end of this year) and
S. Sargsyan visits Turkey in October. Here I would like to particularly
mention that the authorities did not comment on the information
published in the "Haykakan Jamanak" newspaper regarding the signing of
the document during the last Sargsyan-Aliev meeting. This signed, or
90 percent agreed, document is full of one-sided concessions, which are
more dangerous than the frequently criticized provisions of the Madrid
Document. When the latter is made public, it will be revealed to what
shamefully low threshold has the S. Sargsyan-E. Nalbandyan pair sunk
the settlement process by making concessions and giving everything
for maintaining their power. The price is the security of Nagorno
Karabagh. The result is the loss of legitimacy in Nagorno Karabagh,
as well as among the army and even own circle of acquaintances;
rallying people to prevent such developments.
3. There is also a third option - letting Aliev cause the failure of
the document as usual. The danger of this option is that pretending
to be constructive and taking obvious risks, S. Sargsyan is forced
to make ever larger concessions. All these have been recorded by
mediators and included in newer documents, in this case the one
drafted in Krakow. One day answers should to be given for all those
concessions ...
The recent statement of Davutoglu, Foreign Minister of Turkey indicate
that the ball is in our court, and not the Turk's, as stated by
the speakers of our authorities. The Turks are currently playing
a brilliant middle game -increasing the pressure on the Armenian
side. The Turks and Azeris do not even need to make any move -the
Armenian side is in a zugzwang of time and content.
Epilogue
This period will probably enter the textbooks for politics and
diplomacy as an example of how and why one should not conduct a
foreign policy lacking content, preferring only the form and the
external effect and falling into one's own trap.
As a representative of the opposition, it would seem that I would
prefer the developments to go down the path of the second option. But
this is not an issue where one should be an ill-wisher. I do not wish
to present the created situation in dramatic and dark colors. Solutions
are available, but everything comes at a cost. It remains to hope
that the cost would not be too high ...
VLADIMIR KARAPETYAN Member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Armenian National Congress
1 In a recent meeting with the foreign minister of Sweden, the
current presidency of the European Union, presenting the principle
of the status of Nagorno Karabagh, S. Sargsyan also bypassed the word
"people", thus making the suspicion that he is making some unacceptable
and unjustified concessions even stronger.
http://www.lragir.am/src/index.php?id=comme nts&pid=14934
11:47:55 - 15/08/2009
The process of Karabagh conflict settlement is rapidly moving toward
a new, unknown phase full of challenges. However, new developments
in peace process do not mean necessarily that the resolution of the
problem will get any closer. Throughout all this time the leadership
of Armenian National Congress repeatedly has been articulating the
developments around the Karabagh question and their possible negative
consequences for the Armenian population.
>From time to time I was asking myself why months before the
presidential elections (February 19, 2008), the OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairmen initiated several meetings with the prime minister
Serge Sargsyan and conducted detailed discussions with him about
Karabagh negotiations. It was unprecedented, since co-chairmen did
not meet with prime ministers. It was probably for guaranteeing the
agreements achieved during those meetings, that they initiated the
formalization of the ongoing negotiations (Prague process) and the
high level settlement document of a few pages, which was later called
the Madrid Document and was archived by three Foreign Ministers at
the OSCE depositary. This was followed by the presidential elections,
during which the majority of serious violations took place and were
registered by OSCE/ODIHR observers already in the pre-electoral
phase (which was reflected in more than 20 pages in the final report
published three months after the elections by OSCE/ODIHR), and in
spite of that, the elections of February 20 were assessed positively.
During the highly lawful protests, which started as a result of the
rigged and shameful elections, when the law enforcement bodies, as
the blunt tools of the ruling power, threatened the protesters with
the use of force, no international organization or country issued
any call or statement for restraining the authorities' temptation
to violently suppress the lawful protest of its own people. (In
Georgia, for example, where the silk protests starting April this
year were much smaller in scale, the international community issued
a dozen of statements/calls and encouraged the two sides to stay
away from violence.) In recent times, the pressures on Armenia for
expediting the settlement of the Karabagh issue started to mount (I
repeat that such thing did not happen throughout the 10 years of the
rule of Kocharyan). Putting together all these facts, I come to the
conclusion that there was a very important mission from the beginning
- to settle the Karabagh conflict through Serge Sargsyan within the
framework of the document, which was inherited by today's regime from
the Robert Kocharyan-Vartan Oskanyan pair (Madrid Document). There
was only one argument missing in order to be able to state all
this, and that was the clear signs that S. Sargsyan has come to an
agreement. Today, we have those signs and it is clear why during the
time when R. Kocharyan and S. Sargsyan were suppressing the lawful
protest of their own people against the rigged elections with tanks
and guns, the international community should have closed its eyes on
even such degree of unlawfulness of S. Sargsyan, who had committed
itself to a mission important for the international community.
Obvious retreat from the Madrid Document
In early July, I. Aliev, during an interview with the "Vesti"
TV station, announced about the "recapture" of seven territories
-indicating a five year deadline for the return of Kelbajar and
Lachin. It seemed that the Armenian side should have conditioned
the Kelbajar issue with the conducting of a referendum, and the
status of Lachin corridor should not be different from that of the
Nagorno Karabagh. But the absence of announcements/reactions from
Armenia in this regard, encouraged Bryza, OSCE Misnk Group American
Co-chaiman to approve Aliev's revelations. Even after the announcement
of Bryza, the persistent silence of the official Yerevan is a sign
that S. Sargsyan has made unprecedented concessions. The volume of
concessions is not limited only to the return of territories which
are currently the guarantee for Artsakh's security; in the future,
we will refer to all those points, where the regime of S. Sargsyan
is recording unimaginable retreat and defeatism.
All this is proven also by the positive reaction of S. Sargsyan,
E. Nalbandyan and officials of the Armenian Republican Party to the
"Basic Principles", consisting of six points for settling the conflict,
made public on 10 July by the heads of co-chairing states.
Here I have to note that these principles, to be more correct -
conflict settlement points - are only very generally linked to
the "Document on Basic Principles" presented in Madrid in November
2007. Moreover, they have already moved away from the very important
provisions of the "Madrid Document", and it would be more proper
to say that there is an obvious deviation from the basic principles
of the Madrid Document, and this deviation undoubtedly weakens our
positions. We should note that those principles have been filled
out with many important details and in this regard contain much
bigger challenges for Armenians. The most basic principle declared
by the Aliev-Bryza pair refers to the issue of territories. Although
the latter mentions that five territories will be returned after
the signing of the Main Agreement on the settlement (which will be
drafted by the parties after the signing of the "Document on Basic
Principles"), it is clear that with the signing of the latter and
with the documented commitment to return the territories, the Armenian
side will no longer be able to prolong negotiations and consequently
it will not be possible to prevent the return of the territories.
Speaking about the statement made public on July 10, we must
underline that the issue of the status of Nagorno Karabagh, which
is the most important one for us, is presented in a very vague
and unclear formulation and has not ended up among the first few
points. While in the Madrid Document, the point on the future status
of Nagorno Karabagh was the first one and was the core and axis of
the document. It is clear that I. Aliev could agree with the point on
the future status of Nagorno Karabagh -the self determination of the
people of Nagorno Karabagh, only with one condition. That is the return
of at least a part of Azeri refugees to Nagorno Karabagh. This is the
most complicated point dealing with the confidence of the population
of Nagorno Karabagh, feeling of security on their own land. The Madrid
Document envisaged the return of refugees in accordance with the ratio
of population in late 1980s (about 78% to 22%). Another point of the
Madrid Document specifically indicated that any result of the voting,
even the vote for independence, will be recognized by the sides and
internationally. The details of the return of refugees should have
been developed by one of the four joint committees envisaged in the
Madrid Document. Those committees should have been formed after the
signing of the document.
The possibility for revising some points of the document presented by
the mediators in Madrid is indicated by the announcement of co-chairmen
stating that the parties "have moved beyond the Madrid Document" and
are now working on the updated version. We would like to repeat that
the updated version, with its main provisions relating to the interests
of the Armenian states, its basic principles, and also its crucial
details, has significantly deviated from the Madrid Document. The
proof is this month's interesting, and in some sense strange,
developments with the participation of mediators. Presidents of the
three countries, by their announcement, instructed the co-chairmen
to present the updated version of the Madrid Document to the parties.
It is clear that the sixth Sargsyan-Aliev meeting one week later could
not proceed with the old version of the negotiation document. While
the co-chairmen declared in Krakow at the end of July that they plan
to prepare the updated document. Surprisingly slow compliance with
the instruction of the three Presidents ... In reality, the "progress"
in the previous meeting was being summarized and documented in Krakow
(this positive evaluation was shared by all the parties, which is
itself unprecedented) and the proposals on the two points yet to be
agreed on were being elaborated.
Here we would like to present our interpretation of the other points
in the published document. We have already mentioned that they
are different from the Madrid Document and this is indicated by the
announcement itself. Presidents of the three countries underline that
only the preliminary version of the basic principles was presented
in Madrid. And what is presented today is the updated, elaborated
version reflecting the concessions made by the Armenian side. It
must be noted that the Co-chair's six points, which initially seem
to be innocent and understandable, are in effect very dangerous,
considering the unacceptable omissions they contain. We must also
underline that in such documents details are most important, and we
will try to discuss some of them.
Comments on the six points
- Return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani
control. A reasonable Armenian negotiator would not agree to return the
territories to Azeri control without mentioning their unconditional
demilitarization. Here reference could have been made to the buffer
zone, territories transferred to the control of peacekeepers, but
not immediate control of Azerbaijan, without mentioning its basic
attribute - the prohibition of the presence of any armed forces
in those territories. We could have assumed that in this working
paper under negotiation, Armenia has insisted on including points
in its favor. But considering the positive reaction of the Foreign
Minister of Armenia to the announcement of the co-chairing countries,
our pessimistic suspicions become more credible. And really, if the
negotiations envisage the return of territories to the effectively
full and unconditional control of Azerbaijan, what is there to be
welcomed? After this, what confidence can a regular resident of
Karabagh think about?
Considering the complexity of the issue and the intertwining of
security issues, this point, in accordance with the Madrid Document,
should have been further elaborated by a joint Committee.
- An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for
security and self-governance. This point also raises numerous
questions. The interim status of Nagorno Karabagh should be
different from the current one. This means that, as mentioned by
the representatives of the Foreign Ministry of Armenia, elements of
sovereignty will be granted to Karabagh. In fairly recent times, in the
framework of this point the possibility of recognizing the Republic
of Nagorno Karabagh by OSCE and other international organizations;
in one form or another, stationing of own armed forces in Karabagh,
as well as a multilayered security zone, were being seriously
discussed. In the negotiations around this point, which is not yet
agreed, the Armenian side should ensure such functions (institutional
establishments), which would not be less than the current status of
the Nagorno Karabagh Republic.
- A corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno Karabagh. As mentioned in
numerous publications, already in 2006, the Armenian side insisted
that the Lachin corridor should have the same status as the Nagorno
Karabagh. This was a clear threshold, beyond which the Armenian side
was not ready to make any concession. According to the statement of
Azerbaijan and the mediators, five years after the signing of the
"Document on Basic Principles", the Lachin region (not to be confused
with the corridor) will be transferred to Azeri control. Within this
context, a clearly defined status of the corridor acquires a more
than crucial significance. One should also remind the reader that the
electoral platform of S. Sargsyan clearly indicated that "the Republic
of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh should have a common
border". Agreeing to any status of the corridor differing from that
of the Nagorno Karabagh would contradict the mentioned point and
would record the defeatist process of negotiations conducted by the
regime. With regard to this point I would also like to mention that
formerly the Armenian side insisted on the necessity of the widest
possible corridor - heated negotiations were conducted for each and
every village in Lachin region. I am convinced that the width of the
corridor cannot be ignored by any Armenian negotiator and that it
should not be narrower than the time S. Sargsyan came to power.
- Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno Karabagh
through a legally binding expression of will. In addition to what was
said above, it must be noted that the absence of the word "people"
in this point is a matter of extreme concern1. I think this is the
result of persistence of the Azeri side, which prompted Shavarsh
Kocharyan, Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia to state that "the
document smells oil". The agreement of I. Aliev to the expression of
the will of people on the status of Nagorno Karabagh would mean that
Azerbaijan questions its own territorial integrity, for which it has
put in huge efforts, specially in recent times. The fact that this is
also the most important issue for the Armenian side is beyond doubt,
consequently I do not think that any Armenian official can agree to
a method of self determination or expression of will, other than a
legally binding vote of the people. Here also I would like to refer
to the electoral platform of S. Sargsyan: "the right of Artsakh's
people to self determination should be recognized internationally
and conditions should be created for its realization", which clearly
envisages not only the participation of people in "the realization of
the right to self determination", but also how it should be done. This
means that the document cannot bypass the point on "the conditions
for realization of the right to self determination". I would like to
repeat that the term "plebiscite/ population vote" was included in
the first article of the Madrid Document, and replacing it with any
legal act of the Parliament or President of the Republic of Nagorno
Karabagh would mean a huge retreat from the interests of Armenia and
Karabagh. I would like to draw the attention of the reader also to the
word "future" in this point. This word is not used in other points,
therefore it creates reasonable doubt about the disproportionate
concessions made by the sides.
- The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return
to their former places of residence. The conflict has resulted in more
than one million refugees from the both sides. Such formulation of the
principle allows us to demand that the issue of Armenian refugees be
addressed at the same level with Azeri refugees. In this regard, the
announcement made by the Foreign Minister in recent days in Stepanakert
is quite interesting - "the return of refugees to Karabagh is not under
any discussion. This issue can be referred to only after the final
settlement of the Karabagh question, in a wider context considering
also the issue of around 400,000 Armenian refugees". This announcement,
although with positive aspects for Armenian citizens, unfortunately
raises more questions. If the issue of refugees has really not been
discussed, then how could Aliev agree with the principle on Artsakh's
self determination. There is only one possibility - putting together
the above-mentioned a statement of the Foreign Minister and the absence
of the word "people" in the previous principle announced by the three
Presidents, we come to the conclusion that the mediators could have
recorded the following agreement of the sides: the Armenian side
refrains from the process of the expression of the will of people
(referendum or plebiscite) and Azerbaijan from the return of refugees
to Nagorno Karabagh. Otherwise, without referring to the issue of
refugees, one cannot talk about any document or agreement. It must
also be noted that according to the Madrid Document, this principle of
the return of refugees was also to be discussed in a joint committee.
- International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping
operation. This issue is also one of the most important ones. Today,
the security of Nagorno Karabagh is protected by our army, whose units
are stationed in the most favorable positions from a defense point
of view. Any movement of our army units will weaken our positions
and make them more vulnerable. This is why the Madrid Document had
envisaged multilayer international security guarantees. They included
the stationing of peacekeeping forces, recognizing Armenia as the
guarantee for security, political guarantees given by co-chairing
states and a special resolution of the UN Security Council. The
current formulation of the mentioned principle is unacceptable, since
the term "peacekeeping operation" means not only the peacekeeping
operation by armed peacekeepers, but also the dispatching of civilian
observers. The term "demilitarization of territories" as the guarantee
of international security is also missing. Thus, here also there is
room for doubt that, in this case too, it is not the position of the
Armenian side, with that of the Azeri side that has been reflected
in the statement of the three Presidents.
Conclusion
Hence, what was compelling the authorities, even after numerous
warnings, to take inadequately calculated steps toward the trap in the
Armenia-Turkey relationships and make unprecedented concessions in the
process of the settlement of Nagorno Karabagh issue? The amateurish
conduct of the foreign policy, or the imbecile diplomacy lacking
content, or ... The chain of the facts mentioned above disclose the
following unfortunate reality:
- Already from the time when S. Sargsyan was the prime minister,
the Karabagh settlement issue was used to ensure the succession of
power in the form of the relevant promises, and maybe also undertaking
certain commitments. Now, it is time to deliver its previous promises;
- S. Sargsyan, ending up as the President through rigged elections,
massacre of people by the authorities and introducing an illegal state
of emergency, has decided to acquire international legitimacy through
concessions in the Nagorno Karabagh issue and accepting Turkey's
preconditions (creation of the commission of historians).
- Turkey's linking of the opening of the borders with the Nagorno
Karabagh issue and the limited time available for regulating the
relationships with Turkey, have forced S. Sargsyan to activate the
negotiations on Nagorno Karabagh. That can be done only through the
unjustified and unfair concessions made by the Armenian side. And the
"progress" made in the last meeting was ensured only thanks to the
"flexibility" of S. Sargsyan. The complexity of the issue is that
S. Sargsyan's not visiting Turkey in October has the potential of
not only freezing the relationships with Turkey, but also creating
a dangerous vacuum in the peaceful process of Nagorno Karabagh
settlement. S. Sargsyan has fallen into that trap prepared by the
Turks from where there is no advantageous exit.
Possible solutions
1. Understanding the complexity of the situation created, S. Sargsyan
toughens the negotiating positions, also harming the improvement
of Armenia-Turkey relationships. The result might be the total
loss of the support of the international community and stronger
pressure on both the regime and Armenia. A vacuum might be created
in the negotiations, which increases the danger of unpredictable,
dangerous and uncontrollable developments, including the resumption
of military operations.
2. The proposed "Basic Principles" document is signed (it can remain
confidential for a certain period of time - the end of this year) and
S. Sargsyan visits Turkey in October. Here I would like to particularly
mention that the authorities did not comment on the information
published in the "Haykakan Jamanak" newspaper regarding the signing of
the document during the last Sargsyan-Aliev meeting. This signed, or
90 percent agreed, document is full of one-sided concessions, which are
more dangerous than the frequently criticized provisions of the Madrid
Document. When the latter is made public, it will be revealed to what
shamefully low threshold has the S. Sargsyan-E. Nalbandyan pair sunk
the settlement process by making concessions and giving everything
for maintaining their power. The price is the security of Nagorno
Karabagh. The result is the loss of legitimacy in Nagorno Karabagh,
as well as among the army and even own circle of acquaintances;
rallying people to prevent such developments.
3. There is also a third option - letting Aliev cause the failure of
the document as usual. The danger of this option is that pretending
to be constructive and taking obvious risks, S. Sargsyan is forced
to make ever larger concessions. All these have been recorded by
mediators and included in newer documents, in this case the one
drafted in Krakow. One day answers should to be given for all those
concessions ...
The recent statement of Davutoglu, Foreign Minister of Turkey indicate
that the ball is in our court, and not the Turk's, as stated by
the speakers of our authorities. The Turks are currently playing
a brilliant middle game -increasing the pressure on the Armenian
side. The Turks and Azeris do not even need to make any move -the
Armenian side is in a zugzwang of time and content.
Epilogue
This period will probably enter the textbooks for politics and
diplomacy as an example of how and why one should not conduct a
foreign policy lacking content, preferring only the form and the
external effect and falling into one's own trap.
As a representative of the opposition, it would seem that I would
prefer the developments to go down the path of the second option. But
this is not an issue where one should be an ill-wisher. I do not wish
to present the created situation in dramatic and dark colors. Solutions
are available, but everything comes at a cost. It remains to hope
that the cost would not be too high ...
VLADIMIR KARAPETYAN Member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Armenian National Congress
1 In a recent meeting with the foreign minister of Sweden, the
current presidency of the European Union, presenting the principle
of the status of Nagorno Karabagh, S. Sargsyan also bypassed the word
"people", thus making the suspicion that he is making some unacceptable
and unjustified concessions even stronger.