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RHETORIC AND REALITY: TURKISH POLITICS INSIDE AND OUT
By Nigar Goksel
Today's Zaman
31 July 2009, Friday
Turkey sets high expectations with rhetoric about its indispensable
role for the solution of regional conflicts, for bridging
civilizations, and for spreading values of tolerance and democracy
among its neighbors.
However, Turkey itself is polarized, ridden with cultural clashes,
tolerance deficits, and widespread conviction that domestic balances
of power are inadequate. And it is not only the domestic environment
but also perceived dissonance in Turkish foreign policy that raises
questions about Turkey's ability to maneuver the complex dynamics of
its neighborhood.
Turkey's added value The debate about Turkey's foreign policy in
Washington centers around whether Turkey is anchored to the West as it
strengthens its regional ties or whether Turkey is intent on creating
a second bloc, a "Muslim pole," for a new and just world order. In
other words, does Turkey aim to leverage its indispensability toward
being a full and equal partner of the Western bloc, or is Turkey
positioning itself as a stand-alone power that has to be reckoned
with for policy accomplishments in this region?
In terms of anchoring Turkey in the West (and vice versa), a promising
step took place on July 13 with transit countries signing an agreement
on the strategic Nabucco pipeline, set to bring natural gas from the
Caspian to Turkey and onwards to Europe. At the time, this author was
in Baku facing questions from Azerbaijani oppositionists on why the
Turkish government can confront Israel over the Palestinians and China
over the Uigurs, but remain silent as youth activists face violence
and are imprisoned in Azerbaijan.
Energy deals between Turkey and Azerbaijan, alongside
rhetoric of brotherhood between the nations, does not meet their
expectations. However, there are no easy answers to the challenges of
Turkey's neighborhood, and leaving questions hanging is a tactic used
all too frequently by Ankara. Asked by some in Washington, "If Turkish
foreign policy is all about realpolitik, why does the Prime Minister
seem to be trying to win the Arab street when it comes to Middle East
policies, even when this means alienating key Arab regimes?" Lala
Shovket Hajiyeva, the head of a small opposition party in Azerbaijan,
echoes a common sentiment among the vocal opposition when she says,
"I wish it was Turkey and not the Europeans bringing us democracy." A
young activist noted that the frustrations in his country, coupled
with schools and networks allegedly connected to the Fethullah Gulen
movement, gradually lay the foundation for a religiously-motivated
political alternative in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the country's ruling
establishment performs a challenging balancing act between not only
the West and Russia, but also the interest-driven power centers within,
as well as expectations within society, that have grown by witnessing
domestic changes in neighboring Georgia that have improved many aspects
of Georgians' lives. Commenting on Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan,
a more cynical (and older) Azerbaijani simply said, "just make sure
to move Turkey forward to the EU because if you head anywhere else,
it will affect our direction ever more."
Turkey as a center of attraction Today, Turkey is ever more
polarized. Clashing camps speak of the "greater good" of their
cause. A member of the government may claim that a de facto
affirmative action-like approach is legitimate, in order to empower
the conservative classes that have been excluded for decades. On the
other hand, many staunch critics of the government perceive state
capture and power abuse by the ruling party and fear this will become
irreversible due to a weak balance of powers.
The shortcuts to identifying who belongs to each camp get shorter
by the day, including the newspaper one reads, the TV channel a
company advertisement is broadcasted, and even the restaurant that
slips a person's name to the front of the waiting list. Express
concern of patronage in an AKP municipality and someone is coined a
"Kemalist." Mention the harm of banning headscarves in universities
and one is labeled an opportunist who must be trying to appease the
government, if not an outright Islamist. There is a divided judiciary,
parallel lawyers associations, bureaucrats pitted against each other,
and battling nongovernmental organizations. Turks might get shuffled
into a camp to which they do not feel affinity, based on shortcuts
for classifying people based on symbols.
Foreigners are not immune from this absurd reductionism either. After
four Azerbaijani members of Parliament visited Turkey and criticized
the government for their Armenia policies in April, the Turkish
Prime Minister reportedly accused them of being connected to
Turkey's deep state. There have indeed been attempts to wrestle
power from this government using undemocratic means, with many
of the involved currently on trial or being investigated. However,
exploiting this by labeling critics of the government as coup-mongers
is unjustified. Tolerance to criticism on behalf of the government in
Turkey would be most inspiring to those from countries where aligning
with power holders is necessary for social and economic mobility.
International expectations of courage and vision from both
Turkey and the current U.S. administration are enormous. While the
U.S. administration is mirroring its policy of "reaching out" in the
world with its domestic efforts to do so, the Turkish government must
also go out of its way to overcome traditional lines of confrontation
with its legitimate critics in Turkey itself. This will be what
determines its success both domestically and globally. A good place
to start in building confidence inside would be to move forward with
reforms foreseen in the European integration agenda that also curb
the power of the government.
The United States, the European Union, and Turkey Within Washington the
debate about Turkey is weak and divided. While some in the U.S. capital
noted the rapid extension of congratulations from Turkey to Ahmadinejad
after the elections in Iran as an extension of Turkey's realist and
pragmatic foreign policy, others saw this as a sign that power would
eventually be consolidated by Islamists in Turkey while Iran joined
the free world.
In a sense, the Turkish government has a stronger hand in its
relations with Washington than ever before. The Obama administration is
attempting to reach out to the Muslim world and a conservative Muslim
party with strong popular backing is governing Turkey. In negotiating
with the United States, AKP can conveniently point to the still very
high levels of anti-Americanism in Turkish society as a bargaining
chip. The leading opposition parties are all more U.S.-skeptic in
rhetoric than AKP. Moreover, with many more pressing challenges on its
agenda, Washington would hardly opt for more strain in its Turkey ties.
During the Cold War it was important for the Western alliance not to
"lose" Turkey, and it is today too. However, today when the risks
of losing Turkey are debated, it is the value of Turkey's soft
power that is in the forefront, not its geostrategic and military
function. Faced with a new set of regional challenges and very
different power balances in Turkey, it is the ruling AKP with which
Washington needs collaboration most. It is often said that Washington
turned a blind eye to abuses committed by the Turkish military when
the military relationship was central to the two countries' joint
interests. It is important today that expectations from the Turkish
government regarding rule of law and pluralism are not lowered.
Ranging from impartiality of the judiciary to institutional
arrangements to combat corruption, the EU membership requirements
address the many issues that are critical for Turkey to implement in
order to break out of the nearly chronic perception of existential
crisis. It is, therefore, puzzling that the Turkish opposition parties
are not calling for the EU accession agenda to be implemented more
aggressively in Turkey. Those in both Turkey and the United States
who are concerned about Turkey's direction should put more emphasis
on the roadmap that the EU process provides.
The messages President Barack Obama gave during his recent visit to
Turkey reflected a welcome sensitivity to Turkey's internal balances by
emphasizing principles over partisanship. Though it is in the interest
of the United States that Turkish democracy is consolidated, Washington
has a limited set of tools to steer Turkey down this path. The EU
process is the single most influential factor in correcting the
many distortions within Turkey's political world. In this sense,
disheartening messages from European capitals about Turkey's eventual
membership strike a blow not only to Democrats in Turkey but also to
the strategic interests of Washington.
"" THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES ON TURKEY * Nigar
Goksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative and
editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views expressed here
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of GMF or those of the European Stability Initiative.
By Nigar Goksel
Today's Zaman
31 July 2009, Friday
Turkey sets high expectations with rhetoric about its indispensable
role for the solution of regional conflicts, for bridging
civilizations, and for spreading values of tolerance and democracy
among its neighbors.
However, Turkey itself is polarized, ridden with cultural clashes,
tolerance deficits, and widespread conviction that domestic balances
of power are inadequate. And it is not only the domestic environment
but also perceived dissonance in Turkish foreign policy that raises
questions about Turkey's ability to maneuver the complex dynamics of
its neighborhood.
Turkey's added value The debate about Turkey's foreign policy in
Washington centers around whether Turkey is anchored to the West as it
strengthens its regional ties or whether Turkey is intent on creating
a second bloc, a "Muslim pole," for a new and just world order. In
other words, does Turkey aim to leverage its indispensability toward
being a full and equal partner of the Western bloc, or is Turkey
positioning itself as a stand-alone power that has to be reckoned
with for policy accomplishments in this region?
In terms of anchoring Turkey in the West (and vice versa), a promising
step took place on July 13 with transit countries signing an agreement
on the strategic Nabucco pipeline, set to bring natural gas from the
Caspian to Turkey and onwards to Europe. At the time, this author was
in Baku facing questions from Azerbaijani oppositionists on why the
Turkish government can confront Israel over the Palestinians and China
over the Uigurs, but remain silent as youth activists face violence
and are imprisoned in Azerbaijan.
Energy deals between Turkey and Azerbaijan, alongside
rhetoric of brotherhood between the nations, does not meet their
expectations. However, there are no easy answers to the challenges of
Turkey's neighborhood, and leaving questions hanging is a tactic used
all too frequently by Ankara. Asked by some in Washington, "If Turkish
foreign policy is all about realpolitik, why does the Prime Minister
seem to be trying to win the Arab street when it comes to Middle East
policies, even when this means alienating key Arab regimes?" Lala
Shovket Hajiyeva, the head of a small opposition party in Azerbaijan,
echoes a common sentiment among the vocal opposition when she says,
"I wish it was Turkey and not the Europeans bringing us democracy." A
young activist noted that the frustrations in his country, coupled
with schools and networks allegedly connected to the Fethullah Gulen
movement, gradually lay the foundation for a religiously-motivated
political alternative in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the country's ruling
establishment performs a challenging balancing act between not only
the West and Russia, but also the interest-driven power centers within,
as well as expectations within society, that have grown by witnessing
domestic changes in neighboring Georgia that have improved many aspects
of Georgians' lives. Commenting on Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan,
a more cynical (and older) Azerbaijani simply said, "just make sure
to move Turkey forward to the EU because if you head anywhere else,
it will affect our direction ever more."
Turkey as a center of attraction Today, Turkey is ever more
polarized. Clashing camps speak of the "greater good" of their
cause. A member of the government may claim that a de facto
affirmative action-like approach is legitimate, in order to empower
the conservative classes that have been excluded for decades. On the
other hand, many staunch critics of the government perceive state
capture and power abuse by the ruling party and fear this will become
irreversible due to a weak balance of powers.
The shortcuts to identifying who belongs to each camp get shorter
by the day, including the newspaper one reads, the TV channel a
company advertisement is broadcasted, and even the restaurant that
slips a person's name to the front of the waiting list. Express
concern of patronage in an AKP municipality and someone is coined a
"Kemalist." Mention the harm of banning headscarves in universities
and one is labeled an opportunist who must be trying to appease the
government, if not an outright Islamist. There is a divided judiciary,
parallel lawyers associations, bureaucrats pitted against each other,
and battling nongovernmental organizations. Turks might get shuffled
into a camp to which they do not feel affinity, based on shortcuts
for classifying people based on symbols.
Foreigners are not immune from this absurd reductionism either. After
four Azerbaijani members of Parliament visited Turkey and criticized
the government for their Armenia policies in April, the Turkish
Prime Minister reportedly accused them of being connected to
Turkey's deep state. There have indeed been attempts to wrestle
power from this government using undemocratic means, with many
of the involved currently on trial or being investigated. However,
exploiting this by labeling critics of the government as coup-mongers
is unjustified. Tolerance to criticism on behalf of the government in
Turkey would be most inspiring to those from countries where aligning
with power holders is necessary for social and economic mobility.
International expectations of courage and vision from both
Turkey and the current U.S. administration are enormous. While the
U.S. administration is mirroring its policy of "reaching out" in the
world with its domestic efforts to do so, the Turkish government must
also go out of its way to overcome traditional lines of confrontation
with its legitimate critics in Turkey itself. This will be what
determines its success both domestically and globally. A good place
to start in building confidence inside would be to move forward with
reforms foreseen in the European integration agenda that also curb
the power of the government.
The United States, the European Union, and Turkey Within Washington the
debate about Turkey is weak and divided. While some in the U.S. capital
noted the rapid extension of congratulations from Turkey to Ahmadinejad
after the elections in Iran as an extension of Turkey's realist and
pragmatic foreign policy, others saw this as a sign that power would
eventually be consolidated by Islamists in Turkey while Iran joined
the free world.
In a sense, the Turkish government has a stronger hand in its
relations with Washington than ever before. The Obama administration is
attempting to reach out to the Muslim world and a conservative Muslim
party with strong popular backing is governing Turkey. In negotiating
with the United States, AKP can conveniently point to the still very
high levels of anti-Americanism in Turkish society as a bargaining
chip. The leading opposition parties are all more U.S.-skeptic in
rhetoric than AKP. Moreover, with many more pressing challenges on its
agenda, Washington would hardly opt for more strain in its Turkey ties.
During the Cold War it was important for the Western alliance not to
"lose" Turkey, and it is today too. However, today when the risks
of losing Turkey are debated, it is the value of Turkey's soft
power that is in the forefront, not its geostrategic and military
function. Faced with a new set of regional challenges and very
different power balances in Turkey, it is the ruling AKP with which
Washington needs collaboration most. It is often said that Washington
turned a blind eye to abuses committed by the Turkish military when
the military relationship was central to the two countries' joint
interests. It is important today that expectations from the Turkish
government regarding rule of law and pluralism are not lowered.
Ranging from impartiality of the judiciary to institutional
arrangements to combat corruption, the EU membership requirements
address the many issues that are critical for Turkey to implement in
order to break out of the nearly chronic perception of existential
crisis. It is, therefore, puzzling that the Turkish opposition parties
are not calling for the EU accession agenda to be implemented more
aggressively in Turkey. Those in both Turkey and the United States
who are concerned about Turkey's direction should put more emphasis
on the roadmap that the EU process provides.
The messages President Barack Obama gave during his recent visit to
Turkey reflected a welcome sensitivity to Turkey's internal balances by
emphasizing principles over partisanship. Though it is in the interest
of the United States that Turkish democracy is consolidated, Washington
has a limited set of tools to steer Turkey down this path. The EU
process is the single most influential factor in correcting the
many distortions within Turkey's political world. In this sense,
disheartening messages from European capitals about Turkey's eventual
membership strike a blow not only to Democrats in Turkey but also to
the strategic interests of Washington.
"" THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES ON TURKEY * Nigar
Goksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative and
editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views expressed here
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of GMF or those of the European Stability Initiative.