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MATTHEW BRYZA'S PLANS FOR ARTSAKH: FORMULA FOR DISASTER FOR ARMENIANS
News.am
17:41 / 08/21/2009
Matthew Bryza, the U.S. mediator for Artsakh (Karabagh), discussed
in great detail for the first time the critical issues dealing with
the behind the scene negotiations on resolving that conflict.
Mr. Bryza is the U.S. Co-Chair of the Minsk Group and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. He delivered a
speech on the Artsakh conflict at the International Center for Human
Rights in Tsakhkadzor, Armenia, on August 7. Mr. Bryza's lengthy
presentation, followed by an extensive question and answer period
(19 pages), was transcribed by NEWS.am Armenian news agency.
While Mr. Bryza has regularly met with members of the media during his
frequent visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan, often recanting in Yerevan
what he reportedly said in Baku, he has never before disclosed the
details of the settlement being negotiated between the presidents of
the two conflicting countries and the three Co-Chairs of the Minsk
Group, composed of France, Russia, and the United States.
The Armenian public certainly appreciates Mr. Bryza's willingness
to discuss the terms of a future agreement on the Artsakh
conflict. Nevertheless, one wonders why was Mr. Bryza in such a
talkative mood? Was he preparing the Armenian public for the painful
compromises that are to be made or was he trying to impress his
Washington superiors with his negotiating skills, as he is being
considered for an ambassadorial post in Baku?
Mr. Bryza began his remarks by stating that the negotiations for the
settlement of the Artsakh conflict are based on the three fundamental
principles of the Helsinki Final Act: Self-determination, territorial
integrity, and non-use of force.
Claiming that the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan "right now
are on the verge of a breakthrough," an assertion he has made many
times before, Mr. Bryza proceeded to disclose a highly controversial
roadmap of the agreement currently under consideration. Mr. Bryza
stated that Artsakh would preserve its current status for an "interim
period." Armenians would then turn over to Azerbaijan most of the
"seven territories" surrounding Artsakh. After the Azeri refugees
who left Artsakh during the war return to their homes, a referendum
would be held to determine the final status of Artsakh.
During the question and answer period, Mr. Bryza stated that the
Minsk Group Co-Chairs were disappointed that during their July 17
meeting in Moscow, Presidents Sargsyan and Aliyev did not come to an
agreement "on several of the final elements of the basic principles,"
despite the fact that, during their January meeting in Zurich, they
had "agreed on the basic concepts." He said he expected an agreement
in September "on the last few elements of the basic principles that
remain not yet agreed."
When asked if Azerbaijan was making any compromises, Mr. Bryza pointed
out Baku's increasingly accommodating position on the Lachin Corridor
which links Artsakh to Armenia, its concern for the security of
Artsakh Armenians and their need to run their own affairs. Mr. Bryza
further claimed that "Azerbaijan had to give up quite a bit from a
position where it was in the beginning when it said it will never
talk about self-determination. And, of course, to bring Azerbaijan
to that point, Armenia had to give something up as well.... So,
both sides are making compromises."
Mr. Bryza defended the non-recognition of Artsakh by the United States,
by pointing out that the government of Armenia has not recognized it
either. He said that the reason Armenia does not recognize Artsakh's
independence is that "it knows that if it does that, the chances to
negotiate a peaceful settlement finish."
In response to a complaint from the audience that Artsakh was left out
of the negotiations, Mr. Bryza blamed its absence on the Kocharian
government. "Until 1998, Karabakh Armenians were formally part of
the negotiations, when it was the former government of Armenia who
decided to change that situation. It was not the Co-Chairs who made the
decision - that was the government of Armenia," he said. Mr. Bryza did
not mention the fact that Azerbaijan had rejected Artsakh's inclusion
in the talks.
Responding to another question, Mr. Bryza made the surprising
disclosure that the international peacekeeping troops to be stationed
in or around Artsakh would not be armed, simply because they would
not be able to compel the two sides not to fight, if they are intent
on going to war against each other. He stated that "the Co-Chairs
have to be smart and skillful enough to put at place a settlement in
which the international peacekeepers will be primarily observers."
Mr. Bryza candidly told his Armenian audience not to trust the
international peacekeepers to secure the peace in Artsakh. He also
stated that a "legally binding" referendum to determine the status of
Artsakh would be held in several years, after the original Azerbaijani
inhabitants, who before the war constituted 20% of the territory's
population, would return to Artsakh.
Mr. Bryza concluded by urging Armenians to accept "a compromise
settlement now," warning that "a decade ago, Armenia was in a much
stronger negotiation position!"
The terms of the possible settlement, as outlined by Mr. Bryza, is a
disaster waiting to happen to Armenians. They are supposed to first
turn over to Azerbaijan practically all of the territories surrounding
Artsakh. Then the former Azeri inhabitants of Artsakh are to return,
after which a referendum would be held on the status of Artsakh,
under the watchful eyes of UNARMED international peacekeepers. If
Azerbaijan, at a future date, uses its massive petrodollars to
acquire sophisticated weaponry and invade Artsakh, particularly after
Armenians have given up the buffer zones they are currently holding,
the population of Artsakh risks being completely destroyed.
>From the Armenian point of view, the only acceptable solution to
the Artsakh conflict would be to either maintain the status quo or to
agree to a package deal that would require Azerbaijan's recognition
of Artsakh's independence and the establishment of a demilitarized
zone on the Azeri side of the border, before giving up a single inch
of land or allowing the return of a single Azeri refugee!
News.am
17:41 / 08/21/2009
Matthew Bryza, the U.S. mediator for Artsakh (Karabagh), discussed
in great detail for the first time the critical issues dealing with
the behind the scene negotiations on resolving that conflict.
Mr. Bryza is the U.S. Co-Chair of the Minsk Group and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. He delivered a
speech on the Artsakh conflict at the International Center for Human
Rights in Tsakhkadzor, Armenia, on August 7. Mr. Bryza's lengthy
presentation, followed by an extensive question and answer period
(19 pages), was transcribed by NEWS.am Armenian news agency.
While Mr. Bryza has regularly met with members of the media during his
frequent visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan, often recanting in Yerevan
what he reportedly said in Baku, he has never before disclosed the
details of the settlement being negotiated between the presidents of
the two conflicting countries and the three Co-Chairs of the Minsk
Group, composed of France, Russia, and the United States.
The Armenian public certainly appreciates Mr. Bryza's willingness
to discuss the terms of a future agreement on the Artsakh
conflict. Nevertheless, one wonders why was Mr. Bryza in such a
talkative mood? Was he preparing the Armenian public for the painful
compromises that are to be made or was he trying to impress his
Washington superiors with his negotiating skills, as he is being
considered for an ambassadorial post in Baku?
Mr. Bryza began his remarks by stating that the negotiations for the
settlement of the Artsakh conflict are based on the three fundamental
principles of the Helsinki Final Act: Self-determination, territorial
integrity, and non-use of force.
Claiming that the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan "right now
are on the verge of a breakthrough," an assertion he has made many
times before, Mr. Bryza proceeded to disclose a highly controversial
roadmap of the agreement currently under consideration. Mr. Bryza
stated that Artsakh would preserve its current status for an "interim
period." Armenians would then turn over to Azerbaijan most of the
"seven territories" surrounding Artsakh. After the Azeri refugees
who left Artsakh during the war return to their homes, a referendum
would be held to determine the final status of Artsakh.
During the question and answer period, Mr. Bryza stated that the
Minsk Group Co-Chairs were disappointed that during their July 17
meeting in Moscow, Presidents Sargsyan and Aliyev did not come to an
agreement "on several of the final elements of the basic principles,"
despite the fact that, during their January meeting in Zurich, they
had "agreed on the basic concepts." He said he expected an agreement
in September "on the last few elements of the basic principles that
remain not yet agreed."
When asked if Azerbaijan was making any compromises, Mr. Bryza pointed
out Baku's increasingly accommodating position on the Lachin Corridor
which links Artsakh to Armenia, its concern for the security of
Artsakh Armenians and their need to run their own affairs. Mr. Bryza
further claimed that "Azerbaijan had to give up quite a bit from a
position where it was in the beginning when it said it will never
talk about self-determination. And, of course, to bring Azerbaijan
to that point, Armenia had to give something up as well.... So,
both sides are making compromises."
Mr. Bryza defended the non-recognition of Artsakh by the United States,
by pointing out that the government of Armenia has not recognized it
either. He said that the reason Armenia does not recognize Artsakh's
independence is that "it knows that if it does that, the chances to
negotiate a peaceful settlement finish."
In response to a complaint from the audience that Artsakh was left out
of the negotiations, Mr. Bryza blamed its absence on the Kocharian
government. "Until 1998, Karabakh Armenians were formally part of
the negotiations, when it was the former government of Armenia who
decided to change that situation. It was not the Co-Chairs who made the
decision - that was the government of Armenia," he said. Mr. Bryza did
not mention the fact that Azerbaijan had rejected Artsakh's inclusion
in the talks.
Responding to another question, Mr. Bryza made the surprising
disclosure that the international peacekeeping troops to be stationed
in or around Artsakh would not be armed, simply because they would
not be able to compel the two sides not to fight, if they are intent
on going to war against each other. He stated that "the Co-Chairs
have to be smart and skillful enough to put at place a settlement in
which the international peacekeepers will be primarily observers."
Mr. Bryza candidly told his Armenian audience not to trust the
international peacekeepers to secure the peace in Artsakh. He also
stated that a "legally binding" referendum to determine the status of
Artsakh would be held in several years, after the original Azerbaijani
inhabitants, who before the war constituted 20% of the territory's
population, would return to Artsakh.
Mr. Bryza concluded by urging Armenians to accept "a compromise
settlement now," warning that "a decade ago, Armenia was in a much
stronger negotiation position!"
The terms of the possible settlement, as outlined by Mr. Bryza, is a
disaster waiting to happen to Armenians. They are supposed to first
turn over to Azerbaijan practically all of the territories surrounding
Artsakh. Then the former Azeri inhabitants of Artsakh are to return,
after which a referendum would be held on the status of Artsakh,
under the watchful eyes of UNARMED international peacekeepers. If
Azerbaijan, at a future date, uses its massive petrodollars to
acquire sophisticated weaponry and invade Artsakh, particularly after
Armenians have given up the buffer zones they are currently holding,
the population of Artsakh risks being completely destroyed.
>From the Armenian point of view, the only acceptable solution to
the Artsakh conflict would be to either maintain the status quo or to
agree to a package deal that would require Azerbaijan's recognition
of Artsakh's independence and the establishment of a demilitarized
zone on the Azeri side of the border, before giving up a single inch
of land or allowing the return of a single Azeri refugee!