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RUSSIA SUPPORTED BOTH SIDES
ARMAN GALOYAN
http://www.lragir.am/src/index.php?id=pol itics&pid=14994
21:59:11 - 26/08/2009
Interview with the representative of the Armenian National Congress,
the special envoy of the Armenian president in 1992-1994 David
Shahnazaryan
Professor Frederick Star, the director of the Central Asia and Caucasus
policies at John Hopkins Institute, said in an interview with Day.az
that Russia was one of the participants of the occupation of Karabakh
and the other territories of Azerbaijan, therefore it has no right to
deploy peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. In your opinion, did Russia
participate in the liberation of Karabakh then?
Unfortunately, Fred Star is unaware of the role and participation
of Russia in the military phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in
1991-1994. In fact, Russia helped both sides. Before 1998 the essence
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the following: there were three
political sides, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and two
fighting sides. Russia supported both sides through both political
and diplomatic steps and arms and ammunition. And at the crucial
moment it gave military and political assistance to Azerbaijan. In
December 1993 Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive along the
full length of the front line.
By the way, at that time we were unaware that Azerbaijan was planning
a large-scale offensive on Armenia in December. Heidar Aliyev had come
to power there, and Azerbaijan had thoroughly prepared that offensive,
invested immense funds. Heidar Aliyev had already made Azerbaijan a
member of the CIS, in return for which it expected serious compensation
from Russia. Therefore, the preparations and the military and political
actions were planned and implemented with the approval and support
of Russia.
A month before that offensive, on November 20, 1993 the special
representative of the Russian president Vladimir Kazimirov was
to arrive in Armenia from Baku. It was arranged that he come by
the famous Ghazakh-Idjevan road which was the usual road, and the
Idjevan-Ghazakh frontier point was the customary place of meetings
with Azerbaijan. There was no other road, and there is no other
road now. For whatever reason, however, without agreement with the
Armenian side, they went to Noyemberyan instead of Idjevan, while at
that time our official delegation was waiting for Kazimirov at the
Idjevan-Ghazakh frontier point. The Russian side had inquired about
the existence of another route only and was informed that no change
of route is possible.
The Azerbaijani soldiers who accompanied Kazimirov and his assistant
took the special envoy of Russia along a road which was blocked before
the line of contact by such a deep anti-tank hindrance (dug by the
Azerbaijanis) where no transport could pass. At that time there were
warning shots from our positions, in addition, the shooting occurred
when the accompanying car started approaching the line of contact. The
Azerbaijanis knew what they were doing, they had left Kazimirov's
car behind, and they moved on, provoking our soldiers. By the way,
after this incident I met our soldiers, and they told me the details
that they did their duty.
After the shooting the Azerbaijanis went back, they had already
finished their task, and now the Russian foreign minister Kozirev spoke
on behalf of the Russian political government. And Kozirev attacked
Armenia, demanding apology at the top level, for which there was
no reason, and naturally there was no apology. We officially said
sorry for the incident, noting that those who are responsible for
this incident should be sought for outside Armenia. Kozirev took an
unprecedented step. He called the Russian ambassador to Armenia to
Moscow for a consultation.
However, as a result of the reserved and balanced, dignified
behavior of the Armenian government, the Russian-Azerbaijani joint
provocation was politically useless. Moreover, Kozirev appeared
in a funny situation (some Russian media started noting Kozirev's
nervous statements). Kozirev pulled himself together, stopped using
that rhetoric in speaking with Armenia, and Stupishin returned to
Yerevan. (I am sure this incident will be discussed later, there are
a lot of interesting details.) I think Kazimirov was unaware of what
was awaiting him at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. I am sorry that
in his book Kazimirov told Kozirev's version of that incident.
Later when Azerbaijan's large scale offensive failed, Heidar Aliyev
had to sign the ceasefire in May 1994. But those months were the
worst period of the war, and both sides had immense losses. This is
the best example of how Russia behaved during the military actions.
As to Fred Star, he had better remember that Azerbaijan launched
military actions, lost territories in the war it had launched, rejected
the ceasefire, and Chechen militants and Afghans and Russian military
pilots participated on the Azerbaijani side.
For the non-constructive stance and behavior of Azerbaijan in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the U.S. government used sanctions against
Azerbaijan through the resolution 907 adopted in 1992.
Today deployment of peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh is discussed
a lot, and especially which countries should deploy troops. What is
your attitude?
For the time being, there is no sign that peacekeepers, I mean armed
peacekeepers will be deployed. On the contrary, there seems to be
an arrangement that unarmed peacekeepers will be deployed, that
is international observers. I think this is a serious concession on
behalf of Armenia because the presence of international peacekeepers is
necessary as a military guarantee of the security of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In your opinion, which countries must deploy peacekeeping forces?
The Armenian government must claim deployment of peacekeeping
forces besides observers. In that case, the countries should deploy
peacekeepers which do not have direct interests in the region.
Are there such countries?
The Scandinavian countries, countries of Eastern Europe could deploy
peacekeepers. In other words, the countries which have never pursued
interests in the region. Arrangements had been made in the OSCE Minsk
Group that the neighboring countries and the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs
cannot participate in the peacekeeping mission.
S. As the special envoy of the president of Armenia, David Shahnazaryan
dealt with the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the
Armenian-Turkish relations.
ARMAN GALOYAN
http://www.lragir.am/src/index.php?id=pol itics&pid=14994
21:59:11 - 26/08/2009
Interview with the representative of the Armenian National Congress,
the special envoy of the Armenian president in 1992-1994 David
Shahnazaryan
Professor Frederick Star, the director of the Central Asia and Caucasus
policies at John Hopkins Institute, said in an interview with Day.az
that Russia was one of the participants of the occupation of Karabakh
and the other territories of Azerbaijan, therefore it has no right to
deploy peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. In your opinion, did Russia
participate in the liberation of Karabakh then?
Unfortunately, Fred Star is unaware of the role and participation
of Russia in the military phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in
1991-1994. In fact, Russia helped both sides. Before 1998 the essence
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the following: there were three
political sides, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and two
fighting sides. Russia supported both sides through both political
and diplomatic steps and arms and ammunition. And at the crucial
moment it gave military and political assistance to Azerbaijan. In
December 1993 Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive along the
full length of the front line.
By the way, at that time we were unaware that Azerbaijan was planning
a large-scale offensive on Armenia in December. Heidar Aliyev had come
to power there, and Azerbaijan had thoroughly prepared that offensive,
invested immense funds. Heidar Aliyev had already made Azerbaijan a
member of the CIS, in return for which it expected serious compensation
from Russia. Therefore, the preparations and the military and political
actions were planned and implemented with the approval and support
of Russia.
A month before that offensive, on November 20, 1993 the special
representative of the Russian president Vladimir Kazimirov was
to arrive in Armenia from Baku. It was arranged that he come by
the famous Ghazakh-Idjevan road which was the usual road, and the
Idjevan-Ghazakh frontier point was the customary place of meetings
with Azerbaijan. There was no other road, and there is no other
road now. For whatever reason, however, without agreement with the
Armenian side, they went to Noyemberyan instead of Idjevan, while at
that time our official delegation was waiting for Kazimirov at the
Idjevan-Ghazakh frontier point. The Russian side had inquired about
the existence of another route only and was informed that no change
of route is possible.
The Azerbaijani soldiers who accompanied Kazimirov and his assistant
took the special envoy of Russia along a road which was blocked before
the line of contact by such a deep anti-tank hindrance (dug by the
Azerbaijanis) where no transport could pass. At that time there were
warning shots from our positions, in addition, the shooting occurred
when the accompanying car started approaching the line of contact. The
Azerbaijanis knew what they were doing, they had left Kazimirov's
car behind, and they moved on, provoking our soldiers. By the way,
after this incident I met our soldiers, and they told me the details
that they did their duty.
After the shooting the Azerbaijanis went back, they had already
finished their task, and now the Russian foreign minister Kozirev spoke
on behalf of the Russian political government. And Kozirev attacked
Armenia, demanding apology at the top level, for which there was
no reason, and naturally there was no apology. We officially said
sorry for the incident, noting that those who are responsible for
this incident should be sought for outside Armenia. Kozirev took an
unprecedented step. He called the Russian ambassador to Armenia to
Moscow for a consultation.
However, as a result of the reserved and balanced, dignified
behavior of the Armenian government, the Russian-Azerbaijani joint
provocation was politically useless. Moreover, Kozirev appeared
in a funny situation (some Russian media started noting Kozirev's
nervous statements). Kozirev pulled himself together, stopped using
that rhetoric in speaking with Armenia, and Stupishin returned to
Yerevan. (I am sure this incident will be discussed later, there are
a lot of interesting details.) I think Kazimirov was unaware of what
was awaiting him at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. I am sorry that
in his book Kazimirov told Kozirev's version of that incident.
Later when Azerbaijan's large scale offensive failed, Heidar Aliyev
had to sign the ceasefire in May 1994. But those months were the
worst period of the war, and both sides had immense losses. This is
the best example of how Russia behaved during the military actions.
As to Fred Star, he had better remember that Azerbaijan launched
military actions, lost territories in the war it had launched, rejected
the ceasefire, and Chechen militants and Afghans and Russian military
pilots participated on the Azerbaijani side.
For the non-constructive stance and behavior of Azerbaijan in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the U.S. government used sanctions against
Azerbaijan through the resolution 907 adopted in 1992.
Today deployment of peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh is discussed
a lot, and especially which countries should deploy troops. What is
your attitude?
For the time being, there is no sign that peacekeepers, I mean armed
peacekeepers will be deployed. On the contrary, there seems to be
an arrangement that unarmed peacekeepers will be deployed, that
is international observers. I think this is a serious concession on
behalf of Armenia because the presence of international peacekeepers is
necessary as a military guarantee of the security of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In your opinion, which countries must deploy peacekeeping forces?
The Armenian government must claim deployment of peacekeeping
forces besides observers. In that case, the countries should deploy
peacekeepers which do not have direct interests in the region.
Are there such countries?
The Scandinavian countries, countries of Eastern Europe could deploy
peacekeepers. In other words, the countries which have never pursued
interests in the region. Arrangements had been made in the OSCE Minsk
Group that the neighboring countries and the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs
cannot participate in the peacekeeping mission.
S. As the special envoy of the president of Armenia, David Shahnazaryan
dealt with the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the
Armenian-Turkish relations.