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THE BURDEN OF INDEPENDENCE
Ivan Sukhov
RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest
August 27, 2009 Thursday
Russia's gains from recognizing ex-Georgian territories turn to losses
A year ago, in the wake of the so-called five-day war with Georgia,
Russia officially recognized two of the country's breakaway regions -
South Ossetia and Abkhazia - as independent states. Having taken the
two republics under military protection, Russia replaced its limited
peacekeeping forces there with permanent military contingents. Russian
strategists insist that this "buffer" is especially important
because of
Georgia's NATO accession plans, even though postponed. That the small
victorious war boosted Russians' national confidence is certainly a
plus. But it has also added to the overconfidence of Russia's political
elite, which has successfully tested the international community's
tolerance limits. Ever since August 2008, Russia has been making
every effort to confirm its regional superpower status and its right
to influence the political fates of at least its closest neighbors.
It was also important to demonstrate military might to the residents
of southern Russian regions bordering on South Ossetia; they have
always followed the events with predictable interest to see whether
Russia stands up for Abkhazia and South Ossetia or gives them up.
However, some of the apparent benefits have turned out to be
losses. Having shut the two republics' borders with Georgia,
Russia disrupted its own land transport with South Caucasus -
a region comprising, along with the Western-oriented Georgia, the
friendly Armenia. Armenia cannot use the roads leading to Russia
across Azerbaijan because of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. These
logistic problems have already prodded Armenia into growing
contacts with Turkey. If the situation leads on to the opening of the
Armenian-Turkish border, currently blocked, this would mean Armenia's
geopolitical turnaround.
As for Nagorny Karabakh, Moscow cannot afford to be consistent here
and recognize the region as well, for fear of losing Azerbaijan,
which has already shown concern over its oil traffic, affected by last
summer's hostilities. On the other hand, to show all-out support for
Azerbaijan would mean a break-up with Armenia.
Russia is also as far as it has ever been from control over Georgian
sections of existing or planned pipelines from Central Asia to Turkey
and Southern Europe.
Russia's recognition of the two former Georgian territories has
immediately revived similar sentiments in the North Caucasus, and not
only in Chechnya, which has in fact fought twice for independence
from the "colonial power" - the region is historically a seat of a
whole bunch of latent ethnic movements.
Ivan Sukhov
RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest
August 27, 2009 Thursday
Russia's gains from recognizing ex-Georgian territories turn to losses
A year ago, in the wake of the so-called five-day war with Georgia,
Russia officially recognized two of the country's breakaway regions -
South Ossetia and Abkhazia - as independent states. Having taken the
two republics under military protection, Russia replaced its limited
peacekeeping forces there with permanent military contingents. Russian
strategists insist that this "buffer" is especially important
because of
Georgia's NATO accession plans, even though postponed. That the small
victorious war boosted Russians' national confidence is certainly a
plus. But it has also added to the overconfidence of Russia's political
elite, which has successfully tested the international community's
tolerance limits. Ever since August 2008, Russia has been making
every effort to confirm its regional superpower status and its right
to influence the political fates of at least its closest neighbors.
It was also important to demonstrate military might to the residents
of southern Russian regions bordering on South Ossetia; they have
always followed the events with predictable interest to see whether
Russia stands up for Abkhazia and South Ossetia or gives them up.
However, some of the apparent benefits have turned out to be
losses. Having shut the two republics' borders with Georgia,
Russia disrupted its own land transport with South Caucasus -
a region comprising, along with the Western-oriented Georgia, the
friendly Armenia. Armenia cannot use the roads leading to Russia
across Azerbaijan because of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. These
logistic problems have already prodded Armenia into growing
contacts with Turkey. If the situation leads on to the opening of the
Armenian-Turkish border, currently blocked, this would mean Armenia's
geopolitical turnaround.
As for Nagorny Karabakh, Moscow cannot afford to be consistent here
and recognize the region as well, for fear of losing Azerbaijan,
which has already shown concern over its oil traffic, affected by last
summer's hostilities. On the other hand, to show all-out support for
Azerbaijan would mean a break-up with Armenia.
Russia is also as far as it has ever been from control over Georgian
sections of existing or planned pipelines from Central Asia to Turkey
and Southern Europe.
Russia's recognition of the two former Georgian territories has
immediately revived similar sentiments in the North Caucasus, and not
only in Chechnya, which has in fact fought twice for independence
from the "colonial power" - the region is historically a seat of a
whole bunch of latent ethnic movements.