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A KEY FOR REGULATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH: THE MAIN TASK OF PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS PREVENTION OF THE CONFLICT ESCALATION
by Vladimir Kazimirov
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 2, 2009 Wednesday
Russia
OSCE NEEDS TO PRESSURIZE AZERBAIJAN TO PREVENT THREATS TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEM OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH BY FORCE; President of Azerbaijan Ilkham
Aliyev released direct threats to stop negotiations and to transit
to military resolving of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh two times.
Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh regulation have been going for
more than 17 years but no end can be seen yet. Despite a number of
achievements in negotiations many contradictions remain. The conclusion
is simple: first of all, it is necessary to fully exclude a possibility
of restarting of hostilities for the years of negotiations.
President of Azerbaijan Ilkham Aliyev released direct threats to stop
negotiations and to transit to military resolving of the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh two times.
Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh regulation have been going for more
than 17 years but no end can be seen yet.
Despite a number of achievements in negotiations many contradictions
remain. The conclusion is simple: first of all, it is necessary to
fully exclude a possibility of restarting of hostilities for the
years of negotiations.
A long way to go to a compromise yet
International organizations and intermediary countries demand that the
parties look for a compromise themselves. They appeal to the principles
beneficial for themselves (Azerbaijanis appeal to the territorial
integrity and Armenians appeal to the right for self-determination)
but this does not settle the dispute: in practical application these
principles differ obviously and other Helsinki principles are not
taken into account too. These are even the two principles that are
outlined exactly for the conflict situations: 1) peaceful resolving
of disputes; 2) non-use of forces and threats to use force.
The intermediaries, co-chairs of the Minsk OSCE group, also forgot
about these two principles. Recently, they started referring to non-use
of force but in a reduced form without mentioning of threats to use
force. What is it? A pardon for those who use threats and ignore
these two rules?
However, in Nagorno-Karabakh affairs the intermediary countries,
OSCE and international community should have their own priority, even
an ultimatum imperative, exactly complete ruling out of restarting
of hostilities.
A new war would collide already not semi-guerilla forces but well-armed
armies and would multiple victims and destructions.
Blitzkrieg is excluded
Approximate equality of forces excludes a blitzkrieg and unambiguous
victory. Even superiority of on of the parties may only shift the
frontline but will not yield the final solution of the conflict. Their
own losses and external pressure will return to the parties to the
table of negotiations. At the cost of huge losses they will find
themselves in a situation much worse than the current one.
There is also another important factor: the importance of Transcaucasia
in international geopolitics and the need for relieving of tension
there grew dramatically in the last 20 years. A new war would have
serious consequences for the entire region and for international
relations in general.
Third, this would be a moral collapse for the OSCE that has been
conducting negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh since 1992. Its potential
already causes questions and inability to defend its peacekeeping
mission and to prevent a war will devaluate the OSCE seriously.
Thus, catastrophic consequences are obvious
Co-chairs of the Minsk group of the OSCE speak against the threats,
acceleration of the arms race and dangerous incidents. In any case,
this is only a level of ambassadors and supreme structures of the
OSCE keep silent, do not use secret channels or, if necessary, public
channels to impact the countries.
Meanwhile, August of 2008 and Moscow declaration forced the belligerent
leaders to remains silent for some time. Officials in Baku abstained
from obvious belligerent calls leaving them to political scientists
and journalists until November of 2009 when Ilkham Aliyev turned
to threats again. This means that it is necessary to continue and
to increase pressure. It is high time for civil society of various
countries to declare calls for war an international crime.
Initiatives of intermediaries remain without attention
The OSCE does not provide for fulfillment of the only agreement
signed under its aegis according to the initiative of Russia, that is
agreement on settlement of incidents. Yerevan and Stepanakert called
for its observance frequently. Baku did not react to this for many
years, although President of Azerbaijan Geidar Aliyev approved the
document personally in 1995. Baku officials condemn Armenians daily
for breaching of the truce, sometimes in several places simultaneously,
or for deaths or injuries of civilians and servicemen.
If this is so, where are proposals of Baku regarding prevention of
incidents? There are no such proposals. Giving up of the initiative
of the intermediaries to remove snipers from the frontline positions
by Azerbaijan is also characteristic.
This contradicts the spirit and the essence of both agreements: on
the truce and on strengthening of the ceasefire regime. They do not
imply any exceptions for snipers.
There appears a paradoxical but very serious question: can all parties
observe the documents that they have signed?
In these circumstances it is quite natural to propose the same
agreement that has been rejected by Mikhail Saakashvili recently, that
is an agreement on non-use of force in resolving of the conflict. The
people who want revenge will hardly accept this proposal. In any
case, it is necessary to propose it to hinder the most belligerent
elements in the supreme authorities. It is surprising that the OSCE
has not done this yet. Refusal to sign such agreement would receive
an adequate characteristic in the history of the conflict and on
international arena.
It is high time to show that references of Baku to the right of
self-defense are not valid. This is parrying of an attack and not
re-playing of a war of 15 years ago. It is absurd to pose these
years as a voluntarily declared moratorium on use of the right for
self-defense and to pose the multi-faceted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
as an attack of one country on another.
Posing of 15 years of the truce as a big concession to Armenians is
another absurdity. Baku did not wish to cease the fire for a long time
but by May of 1994 it struggled for achievement of a truce itself to
prevent a full collapse.
Could Armenians take seven districts of Azerbaijani if Baku accepted
the proposal of Russia and the Minsk OSCE group to stop the hostilities
in 1992? Trying to win by force, Baku ignored these calls and even
the key requirement of the UN Security Council (for more than a
year). Azerbaijan did not wish to sign a truce and was losing a
district by district. It has not learned the lessons and unfounded
optimism again.
Demanding liberation of its land, Baku does not offer security
guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh even now and even threatens to use
force.
by Vladimir Kazimirov
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 2, 2009 Wednesday
Russia
OSCE NEEDS TO PRESSURIZE AZERBAIJAN TO PREVENT THREATS TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEM OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH BY FORCE; President of Azerbaijan Ilkham
Aliyev released direct threats to stop negotiations and to transit
to military resolving of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh two times.
Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh regulation have been going for
more than 17 years but no end can be seen yet. Despite a number of
achievements in negotiations many contradictions remain. The conclusion
is simple: first of all, it is necessary to fully exclude a possibility
of restarting of hostilities for the years of negotiations.
President of Azerbaijan Ilkham Aliyev released direct threats to stop
negotiations and to transit to military resolving of the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh two times.
Negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh regulation have been going for more
than 17 years but no end can be seen yet.
Despite a number of achievements in negotiations many contradictions
remain. The conclusion is simple: first of all, it is necessary to
fully exclude a possibility of restarting of hostilities for the
years of negotiations.
A long way to go to a compromise yet
International organizations and intermediary countries demand that the
parties look for a compromise themselves. They appeal to the principles
beneficial for themselves (Azerbaijanis appeal to the territorial
integrity and Armenians appeal to the right for self-determination)
but this does not settle the dispute: in practical application these
principles differ obviously and other Helsinki principles are not
taken into account too. These are even the two principles that are
outlined exactly for the conflict situations: 1) peaceful resolving
of disputes; 2) non-use of forces and threats to use force.
The intermediaries, co-chairs of the Minsk OSCE group, also forgot
about these two principles. Recently, they started referring to non-use
of force but in a reduced form without mentioning of threats to use
force. What is it? A pardon for those who use threats and ignore
these two rules?
However, in Nagorno-Karabakh affairs the intermediary countries,
OSCE and international community should have their own priority, even
an ultimatum imperative, exactly complete ruling out of restarting
of hostilities.
A new war would collide already not semi-guerilla forces but well-armed
armies and would multiple victims and destructions.
Blitzkrieg is excluded
Approximate equality of forces excludes a blitzkrieg and unambiguous
victory. Even superiority of on of the parties may only shift the
frontline but will not yield the final solution of the conflict. Their
own losses and external pressure will return to the parties to the
table of negotiations. At the cost of huge losses they will find
themselves in a situation much worse than the current one.
There is also another important factor: the importance of Transcaucasia
in international geopolitics and the need for relieving of tension
there grew dramatically in the last 20 years. A new war would have
serious consequences for the entire region and for international
relations in general.
Third, this would be a moral collapse for the OSCE that has been
conducting negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh since 1992. Its potential
already causes questions and inability to defend its peacekeeping
mission and to prevent a war will devaluate the OSCE seriously.
Thus, catastrophic consequences are obvious
Co-chairs of the Minsk group of the OSCE speak against the threats,
acceleration of the arms race and dangerous incidents. In any case,
this is only a level of ambassadors and supreme structures of the
OSCE keep silent, do not use secret channels or, if necessary, public
channels to impact the countries.
Meanwhile, August of 2008 and Moscow declaration forced the belligerent
leaders to remains silent for some time. Officials in Baku abstained
from obvious belligerent calls leaving them to political scientists
and journalists until November of 2009 when Ilkham Aliyev turned
to threats again. This means that it is necessary to continue and
to increase pressure. It is high time for civil society of various
countries to declare calls for war an international crime.
Initiatives of intermediaries remain without attention
The OSCE does not provide for fulfillment of the only agreement
signed under its aegis according to the initiative of Russia, that is
agreement on settlement of incidents. Yerevan and Stepanakert called
for its observance frequently. Baku did not react to this for many
years, although President of Azerbaijan Geidar Aliyev approved the
document personally in 1995. Baku officials condemn Armenians daily
for breaching of the truce, sometimes in several places simultaneously,
or for deaths or injuries of civilians and servicemen.
If this is so, where are proposals of Baku regarding prevention of
incidents? There are no such proposals. Giving up of the initiative
of the intermediaries to remove snipers from the frontline positions
by Azerbaijan is also characteristic.
This contradicts the spirit and the essence of both agreements: on
the truce and on strengthening of the ceasefire regime. They do not
imply any exceptions for snipers.
There appears a paradoxical but very serious question: can all parties
observe the documents that they have signed?
In these circumstances it is quite natural to propose the same
agreement that has been rejected by Mikhail Saakashvili recently, that
is an agreement on non-use of force in resolving of the conflict. The
people who want revenge will hardly accept this proposal. In any
case, it is necessary to propose it to hinder the most belligerent
elements in the supreme authorities. It is surprising that the OSCE
has not done this yet. Refusal to sign such agreement would receive
an adequate characteristic in the history of the conflict and on
international arena.
It is high time to show that references of Baku to the right of
self-defense are not valid. This is parrying of an attack and not
re-playing of a war of 15 years ago. It is absurd to pose these
years as a voluntarily declared moratorium on use of the right for
self-defense and to pose the multi-faceted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
as an attack of one country on another.
Posing of 15 years of the truce as a big concession to Armenians is
another absurdity. Baku did not wish to cease the fire for a long time
but by May of 1994 it struggled for achievement of a truce itself to
prevent a full collapse.
Could Armenians take seven districts of Azerbaijani if Baku accepted
the proposal of Russia and the Minsk OSCE group to stop the hostilities
in 1992? Trying to win by force, Baku ignored these calls and even
the key requirement of the UN Security Council (for more than a
year). Azerbaijan did not wish to sign a truce and was losing a
district by district. It has not learned the lessons and unfounded
optimism again.
Demanding liberation of its land, Baku does not offer security
guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh even now and even threatens to use
force.