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Sunday's Zaman, Turkey
Dec 6 2009
Stop the old `bridge' metaphor; Turkey has become a new regional `hub'
During Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's upcoming visit to Washington, his host
at the White House is likely to offer him diplomatic niceties on
Turkey's role as a `bridge' between East and West.
Our argument is that this metaphor, however flattering it may have
been in the past, no longer fits the reality of contemporary Turkey.
Today, Turkey is less of a bridge and more of a dynamic regional hub
in a rapidly changing world where a fundamental power shift is taking
place towards Asia and away from the West. Turkey has re-emerged as a
powerful actor in its own right, deriving its strength from a
$750-billion-strong economy, large military, huge cultural and
historic hinterland, and an increasingly effective and trusted broker
role for protracted problems in the region. Turks also have redefined
their strategic interests and are not happy at all to be treated in a
patron-client relationship.
Our suggestion is that Western officials should accept this new
reality not as a challenge but as a positive development. If they stop
treating Turkey as a biddable client providing useful transit services
(as implied by the bridge metaphor) and instead recognize Turkey's
autonomous status and far-reaching national interests, a far healthier
basis for future relations between Turkey and its Western allies will
emerge.
One way or another, a resurgent Turkey is rewriting the rules of the
power game in the Middle East, Eurasia and Southeast Europe. It is
doing so in a positive and non-confrontational manner that, when seen
through this new `hub' lens, accords well with Western interests in
the troubled regional geography in which Turkey lies at the center.
In effect, what we are witnessing today is the emergence of a Turkish
version of the German Ostpolitik of the 1960s -- with just the same
potential for positive outreach into a troubled region.
The current Turkish behavior is shaped by the shifts in the country's
international identity and the changes in Turkey's vision of its new
geopolitical role. These, in turn, are the result of powerful
processes that are reshaping the socio-political life of the country.
These processes are the economic development in the Anatolian
hinterland, the broadening of the elite through the emergence of the
new ambitious provincial social actors, who are economically dynamic
and culturally conservative, and the increasing role of elected
officials and thus a stronger government. None of these dynamics need
be seen as detrimental to Western interests.
In revisiting the `Turkey dossier,' the first step for Western policy
makers will therefore be to back away from the past, where Turkey was
seen as the `sick man of Europe' or a `loyal ally' of the West on the
outer margins of the EU, NATO or Asia. A more constructive image is to
view Turkey as being located in the very heart of Eurasia and now
working free from the post-Ottoman cliché of `modernization.'
Policy shift to rise as a regional powerhouse
The signature policy of Turkey's new self-confidence is the policy of
`zero problems with neighbors.' This marks a revolutionary change from
the `siege mentality' that promoted the paranoiac view that Turkey was
surrounded by enemy countries. One after another initiative has been
launched to pave the ground for the settlement of most historically
deep-seated and complex problems.
In this context, Turkey and Armenia, two historic enemies, broke new
ground in October by signing protocols providing for the restoration
of diplomatic relations and the opening of the long-closed border
between them. If borders are not reopened by April 2010, it seems
certain that the Turkish-American partnership could possibly be dealt
another blow due to the long-standing proposed `Armenian genocide'
bill.
Iran remains the single most important item on Turkey's plate.
ErdoÄ?an's recent visit to Tehran resulted in new projects to increase
the existing $11 billion trade volume to $30 billion over the next few
years. There was talk of Turkey brokering a deal with Iran on nuclear
matters including storage of enriched uranium on Turkish soil. Joint
exploration and production of natural gas, trade in local currencies,
the establishment of an industrial border area and a joint airline are
also among the points agreed upon to boost economic cooperation
between the two neighbors.
Two other visits this past October may serve to more vividly
illustrate Turkey's activist foreign policy. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an,
accompanied by nine ministers and an Airbus full of businessmen,
visited Baghdad, where he held a joint session with the Iraq
government and signed no fewer than 48 memoranda in the fields of
commerce, energy, water, security, forestry, the environment and so
forth. At almost the same time, Foreign Minister DavutoÄ?lu was in
Aleppo, where he signed another 40 agreements with Syrian Foreign
Minister Walid al-Muallim, of which perhaps the most important was the
removal of visas, allowing for a free flow of people across their
common border.
These developments have been balanced by some loosening in Ankara's
traditionally close ties to Tel Aviv. Turkey has closed its airspace
to Israeli military training (while holding joint military exercises
and opening borders with Syria). However, the Nov. 24 visit to Ankara
by Israeli Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor Binyamin `Fuad' Ben
Eliezer demonstrated that both sides are open-minded to repairing
their mutual relations.
In the wake of Turkey's accelerating regional engagement, the EU
accession process enjoys less priority, partly due to the particularly
unwelcoming approach under the Sarkozy presidency and the Cyprus
problem still staying as a stumbling block.
In fact, Turkey's accession story is like an unfinished symphony,
started almost half a century ago and yet to be finalized. Turks tend
to see EU policy as evasive and full of double standards, with many
promises going unfulfilled. This has cost Brussels a serious loss of
credibility in the eyes of most Turks, even those who are fervently
pro-European. Turkey has certainly not lost its European vocation, but
this will have to be adjusted to fit the new circumstances. On Cyprus,
for example, Ankara made it clear that if a choice has to be made at
the end of this year between Cyprus and EU membership it would be
undoubtedly Cyprus.
In order for its `zero problem with neighbors' strategy to be
credible, Turkey has to deal with its own domestic problems first on
the basis of widely shared consensus with internal stakeholders.
Turkey has always been a conservative country and the vast majority of
Turks have traditionally voted for center-right parties. The rise of
the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) represents a struggle
between the military and the civilian bureaucratic elites, and
challenges the secular, modernist forces in the country.
There are signs that the AK Party finds it difficult to divorce the
country's foreign policy goals from its own cultural and religious
sensitivities. In a historic turnaround, the current government has
opened Pandora's box on the Kurdish issue, albeit not in a
well-engineered and orchestrated manner. Turkey is now using a softer
approach. A peaceful settlement of this decades-long problem will
enhance Turkey's desire to implement a more activist regional
strategy.
Turks eager to get promoted in energy politics
Energy has a pivotal role in shaping Turkey's regional role as the
country, a major consumer of energy in its own, is also key to linking
oil and gas producers in Russia, Caspian, Central Asia and the Middle
East with energy-hungry markets in Europe. Yet, Turks are not content
to be a simple `bridge' over which energy flows only; they aspire to
become a regional `hub' extracting greater value for the crisscrossing
oil, gas pipelines and power interconnections.
Unlike the West, Russia seems to have adjusted much earlier to this
new geopolitical game. Seizing the opportunity created by Ankara's
growing frustration with the EU and the US, Russian Prime Minister
Putin traveled to Turkey on Aug. 6 with his basket of tempting
strategic and economic proposals immediately after a similar Nabucco
agreement mission in July 2009 by his EU opponents.
The crystal-clear message from Russia to Turkey during Putin's visit
was, `We will make it worth your while to do business with Russia.'
Hence, the visit has generated a series of unprecedented commercial
and energy contracts worth $40 billion that will support Turkey's
drive to become a regional hub for fuel transshipments while helping
Moscow maintain its preferred partner status on natural gas shipments
from Asia to Europe.
There are heightened fears in several capitals about Turkey becoming
too cozy with Moscow at the expense of overriding some Western energy
and strategic interests, with possible security ramifications in the
long run. Some of the same misgivings were felt at the time of
Germany's Ostpolitik outreach to then-Soviet-occupied Europe. Just as
those fears proved misplaced, so a smart engagement strategy to keep
Turkey plugged into the West's preferred energy strategy will require
a more nuanced understanding of this country's interests. We believe
that this is entirely possible; but, so far, that is not what we have
seen.
These developments have unsettled Western assumptions about Turkey. In
particular, it has undermined the article of faith that the West
enjoyed the whip hand over Turkey because of the latter's aspiration
to join the EU. This was the theme of President Obama's speech to the
Turkish Parliament in April. This assumption needs to be reviewed. It
does not help when Western think tanks hold conferences about Turkey,
they talk about Turkey's `dangerous drift' in Turkey's progress toward
adopting the `acquis communautaire.' This is living in the past.
President Obama has a lot in store to discuss with Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an, including Russia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Armenia, Syria and
Israel, when he comes to the White House on Dec. 7. There is an
important lesson here for the Obama administration. With its strategic
commitments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and economic challenges at
home, the US is less able to dictate strategic outcomes to countries
like Turkey.
Luckily, the more astute of America's diplomats already know this.
They recognize that, increasingly, if Washington wants to promote and
protect US interests in this critical region, it will have to do so
through serious diplomacy -- by respecting evolving balances of power
and accommodating the legitimate interests of others so that US
interests will be respected. Turkey's current policy provides a
valuable model of what that kind of diplomacy could be like.
Let's not jump to an easy conclusion that what Turkey has been doing
systemically since 2002 in this most difficult part of the world is a
simple drifting away from the West and embracing `rogue' and
`anti-Western' nations at the expense of its historical western
vocation. It is also too early to judge Turkey's multi-vectored drives
as successful. Indeed, far from looking for a life without them,
Turkey is looking for an upgraded relationship with the US and the EU.
Turkey can hardly expand its influence without first having a firm
footage in the West.
A more promising approach lies in better understanding Turkey's
drivers, needs and priorities and seeking western alignment for a
durable, `win-win' relationship with Ankara as well as using Turks'
leverage in the broader Middle East, Eurasia and Southeast Europe to
find solutions to protracted problems that the West has thus far
failed to address.
Turkey is the only country in the world which can simultaneously talk
in a spirit of trust and partnership to Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus,
Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Baku and Yerevan, as well as enjoying
dialogue with most radical groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and
Afghanistan. Hence, Ankara stands at a historic juncture and possesses
the ability to shape politics beyond its borders if it pays attention
to the two following parameters: maintain its newfound global role
only by building international constituencies and prove that its heart
beats for Muslims and non-Muslims, and Turks and non-Turks, with the
same strength.
Turkey's respected and non-confrontational rise in that volatile,
troubled region that is increasingly peaceful, with countries
cooperating with one another, is good for the West and the world. This
is an exceptional and unique role Turkey could play as a regional
`hub,' rather than a `bridge.' This is what Washington and Brussels
should be supporting wholeheartedly, rather than getting worried
about.
---------------------------------- ------------------------------
* Mehmet Ã-Ä?ütçü ;, a former Turkish diplomat, OECD international staff
member and an honorary fellow with University of Dundee, is currently
with a major multinational corporation based in London. Jonathan
Clarke, a former UK diplomat, is a senior fellow at the Carnegie
Council for Ethics in International Affairs in New York.
06 December 2009, Sunday
MEHMET Ã-Ä?Ã`TÃ?Ã`/JONATHAN CLARKE*
Dec 6 2009
Stop the old `bridge' metaphor; Turkey has become a new regional `hub'
During Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's upcoming visit to Washington, his host
at the White House is likely to offer him diplomatic niceties on
Turkey's role as a `bridge' between East and West.
Our argument is that this metaphor, however flattering it may have
been in the past, no longer fits the reality of contemporary Turkey.
Today, Turkey is less of a bridge and more of a dynamic regional hub
in a rapidly changing world where a fundamental power shift is taking
place towards Asia and away from the West. Turkey has re-emerged as a
powerful actor in its own right, deriving its strength from a
$750-billion-strong economy, large military, huge cultural and
historic hinterland, and an increasingly effective and trusted broker
role for protracted problems in the region. Turks also have redefined
their strategic interests and are not happy at all to be treated in a
patron-client relationship.
Our suggestion is that Western officials should accept this new
reality not as a challenge but as a positive development. If they stop
treating Turkey as a biddable client providing useful transit services
(as implied by the bridge metaphor) and instead recognize Turkey's
autonomous status and far-reaching national interests, a far healthier
basis for future relations between Turkey and its Western allies will
emerge.
One way or another, a resurgent Turkey is rewriting the rules of the
power game in the Middle East, Eurasia and Southeast Europe. It is
doing so in a positive and non-confrontational manner that, when seen
through this new `hub' lens, accords well with Western interests in
the troubled regional geography in which Turkey lies at the center.
In effect, what we are witnessing today is the emergence of a Turkish
version of the German Ostpolitik of the 1960s -- with just the same
potential for positive outreach into a troubled region.
The current Turkish behavior is shaped by the shifts in the country's
international identity and the changes in Turkey's vision of its new
geopolitical role. These, in turn, are the result of powerful
processes that are reshaping the socio-political life of the country.
These processes are the economic development in the Anatolian
hinterland, the broadening of the elite through the emergence of the
new ambitious provincial social actors, who are economically dynamic
and culturally conservative, and the increasing role of elected
officials and thus a stronger government. None of these dynamics need
be seen as detrimental to Western interests.
In revisiting the `Turkey dossier,' the first step for Western policy
makers will therefore be to back away from the past, where Turkey was
seen as the `sick man of Europe' or a `loyal ally' of the West on the
outer margins of the EU, NATO or Asia. A more constructive image is to
view Turkey as being located in the very heart of Eurasia and now
working free from the post-Ottoman cliché of `modernization.'
Policy shift to rise as a regional powerhouse
The signature policy of Turkey's new self-confidence is the policy of
`zero problems with neighbors.' This marks a revolutionary change from
the `siege mentality' that promoted the paranoiac view that Turkey was
surrounded by enemy countries. One after another initiative has been
launched to pave the ground for the settlement of most historically
deep-seated and complex problems.
In this context, Turkey and Armenia, two historic enemies, broke new
ground in October by signing protocols providing for the restoration
of diplomatic relations and the opening of the long-closed border
between them. If borders are not reopened by April 2010, it seems
certain that the Turkish-American partnership could possibly be dealt
another blow due to the long-standing proposed `Armenian genocide'
bill.
Iran remains the single most important item on Turkey's plate.
ErdoÄ?an's recent visit to Tehran resulted in new projects to increase
the existing $11 billion trade volume to $30 billion over the next few
years. There was talk of Turkey brokering a deal with Iran on nuclear
matters including storage of enriched uranium on Turkish soil. Joint
exploration and production of natural gas, trade in local currencies,
the establishment of an industrial border area and a joint airline are
also among the points agreed upon to boost economic cooperation
between the two neighbors.
Two other visits this past October may serve to more vividly
illustrate Turkey's activist foreign policy. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an,
accompanied by nine ministers and an Airbus full of businessmen,
visited Baghdad, where he held a joint session with the Iraq
government and signed no fewer than 48 memoranda in the fields of
commerce, energy, water, security, forestry, the environment and so
forth. At almost the same time, Foreign Minister DavutoÄ?lu was in
Aleppo, where he signed another 40 agreements with Syrian Foreign
Minister Walid al-Muallim, of which perhaps the most important was the
removal of visas, allowing for a free flow of people across their
common border.
These developments have been balanced by some loosening in Ankara's
traditionally close ties to Tel Aviv. Turkey has closed its airspace
to Israeli military training (while holding joint military exercises
and opening borders with Syria). However, the Nov. 24 visit to Ankara
by Israeli Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor Binyamin `Fuad' Ben
Eliezer demonstrated that both sides are open-minded to repairing
their mutual relations.
In the wake of Turkey's accelerating regional engagement, the EU
accession process enjoys less priority, partly due to the particularly
unwelcoming approach under the Sarkozy presidency and the Cyprus
problem still staying as a stumbling block.
In fact, Turkey's accession story is like an unfinished symphony,
started almost half a century ago and yet to be finalized. Turks tend
to see EU policy as evasive and full of double standards, with many
promises going unfulfilled. This has cost Brussels a serious loss of
credibility in the eyes of most Turks, even those who are fervently
pro-European. Turkey has certainly not lost its European vocation, but
this will have to be adjusted to fit the new circumstances. On Cyprus,
for example, Ankara made it clear that if a choice has to be made at
the end of this year between Cyprus and EU membership it would be
undoubtedly Cyprus.
In order for its `zero problem with neighbors' strategy to be
credible, Turkey has to deal with its own domestic problems first on
the basis of widely shared consensus with internal stakeholders.
Turkey has always been a conservative country and the vast majority of
Turks have traditionally voted for center-right parties. The rise of
the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) represents a struggle
between the military and the civilian bureaucratic elites, and
challenges the secular, modernist forces in the country.
There are signs that the AK Party finds it difficult to divorce the
country's foreign policy goals from its own cultural and religious
sensitivities. In a historic turnaround, the current government has
opened Pandora's box on the Kurdish issue, albeit not in a
well-engineered and orchestrated manner. Turkey is now using a softer
approach. A peaceful settlement of this decades-long problem will
enhance Turkey's desire to implement a more activist regional
strategy.
Turks eager to get promoted in energy politics
Energy has a pivotal role in shaping Turkey's regional role as the
country, a major consumer of energy in its own, is also key to linking
oil and gas producers in Russia, Caspian, Central Asia and the Middle
East with energy-hungry markets in Europe. Yet, Turks are not content
to be a simple `bridge' over which energy flows only; they aspire to
become a regional `hub' extracting greater value for the crisscrossing
oil, gas pipelines and power interconnections.
Unlike the West, Russia seems to have adjusted much earlier to this
new geopolitical game. Seizing the opportunity created by Ankara's
growing frustration with the EU and the US, Russian Prime Minister
Putin traveled to Turkey on Aug. 6 with his basket of tempting
strategic and economic proposals immediately after a similar Nabucco
agreement mission in July 2009 by his EU opponents.
The crystal-clear message from Russia to Turkey during Putin's visit
was, `We will make it worth your while to do business with Russia.'
Hence, the visit has generated a series of unprecedented commercial
and energy contracts worth $40 billion that will support Turkey's
drive to become a regional hub for fuel transshipments while helping
Moscow maintain its preferred partner status on natural gas shipments
from Asia to Europe.
There are heightened fears in several capitals about Turkey becoming
too cozy with Moscow at the expense of overriding some Western energy
and strategic interests, with possible security ramifications in the
long run. Some of the same misgivings were felt at the time of
Germany's Ostpolitik outreach to then-Soviet-occupied Europe. Just as
those fears proved misplaced, so a smart engagement strategy to keep
Turkey plugged into the West's preferred energy strategy will require
a more nuanced understanding of this country's interests. We believe
that this is entirely possible; but, so far, that is not what we have
seen.
These developments have unsettled Western assumptions about Turkey. In
particular, it has undermined the article of faith that the West
enjoyed the whip hand over Turkey because of the latter's aspiration
to join the EU. This was the theme of President Obama's speech to the
Turkish Parliament in April. This assumption needs to be reviewed. It
does not help when Western think tanks hold conferences about Turkey,
they talk about Turkey's `dangerous drift' in Turkey's progress toward
adopting the `acquis communautaire.' This is living in the past.
President Obama has a lot in store to discuss with Prime Minister
ErdoÄ?an, including Russia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Armenia, Syria and
Israel, when he comes to the White House on Dec. 7. There is an
important lesson here for the Obama administration. With its strategic
commitments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and economic challenges at
home, the US is less able to dictate strategic outcomes to countries
like Turkey.
Luckily, the more astute of America's diplomats already know this.
They recognize that, increasingly, if Washington wants to promote and
protect US interests in this critical region, it will have to do so
through serious diplomacy -- by respecting evolving balances of power
and accommodating the legitimate interests of others so that US
interests will be respected. Turkey's current policy provides a
valuable model of what that kind of diplomacy could be like.
Let's not jump to an easy conclusion that what Turkey has been doing
systemically since 2002 in this most difficult part of the world is a
simple drifting away from the West and embracing `rogue' and
`anti-Western' nations at the expense of its historical western
vocation. It is also too early to judge Turkey's multi-vectored drives
as successful. Indeed, far from looking for a life without them,
Turkey is looking for an upgraded relationship with the US and the EU.
Turkey can hardly expand its influence without first having a firm
footage in the West.
A more promising approach lies in better understanding Turkey's
drivers, needs and priorities and seeking western alignment for a
durable, `win-win' relationship with Ankara as well as using Turks'
leverage in the broader Middle East, Eurasia and Southeast Europe to
find solutions to protracted problems that the West has thus far
failed to address.
Turkey is the only country in the world which can simultaneously talk
in a spirit of trust and partnership to Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus,
Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Baku and Yerevan, as well as enjoying
dialogue with most radical groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and
Afghanistan. Hence, Ankara stands at a historic juncture and possesses
the ability to shape politics beyond its borders if it pays attention
to the two following parameters: maintain its newfound global role
only by building international constituencies and prove that its heart
beats for Muslims and non-Muslims, and Turks and non-Turks, with the
same strength.
Turkey's respected and non-confrontational rise in that volatile,
troubled region that is increasingly peaceful, with countries
cooperating with one another, is good for the West and the world. This
is an exceptional and unique role Turkey could play as a regional
`hub,' rather than a `bridge.' This is what Washington and Brussels
should be supporting wholeheartedly, rather than getting worried
about.
---------------------------------- ------------------------------
* Mehmet Ã-Ä?ütçü ;, a former Turkish diplomat, OECD international staff
member and an honorary fellow with University of Dundee, is currently
with a major multinational corporation based in London. Jonathan
Clarke, a former UK diplomat, is a senior fellow at the Carnegie
Council for Ethics in International Affairs in New York.
06 December 2009, Sunday
MEHMET Ã-Ä?Ã`TÃ?Ã`/JONATHAN CLARKE*