Tweet
MENSOIAN: TRANSLATING THE ARF ROADMAP TO REGIME CHANGE INTO ACTION (PART II)
By Michael Mensoian
Armenian Weekly
December 9, 2009
The roadmap to regime change is a response to conditions that were
crystallized by the recently signed protocols which represent the
first step in the process of rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey.
The ARF has properly viewed these documents as being detrimental
to Armenia's present and future national interests. In response to
this assessment, the party has announced its formal opposition to
the protocols. In Part I an explanation was offered as to how the
ARF can deliver on its roadmap to regime change. Although this is
a gargantuan task for which the ARF has the necessary experience
to undertake, it is the how of the undertaking that is crucial. The
response by the ARF, if it is to be effective, must be multi-faceted
in its objectives and multi-operational in its implementation. The
use of demonstrations and rallies within Armenia and throughout the
Armenian Diaspora are means to address the first objective: to prevent
ratification of the protocols by the Armenian Parliament. The need for
an informat ion gathering and distribution system, and the convening
of conferences where the objectives of the roadmap are presented to
selected audiences, were suggested as vital components of the effort
at regime change. The need to develop a program that would assist
journalists, legislators, advocacy leaders, and businessmen to hear
and view firsthand the conditions in Javakhk and to understand the how
and why of the Karabaghtsis' demand for independence were discussed.
Part II considers the remaining two objectives of the roadmap: a viable
socio-economic program and preparing for the forthcoming elections. The
need to create a cadre of field workers to develop grassroots support
for the ARF's initiatives to improve the standard of living of the
workers and their families, and to win their support for the ARF
candidates for president and parliament in the forthcoming elections,
is an absolute necessity to ensure a reasonable certainty of success.
The program to improve the quality of life of the worker and his
family must be doable and not campaign pie-in-the-sky rhetoric that
will appeal only to the most desperate members of society. Again,
the participation of Armenian men and women with expertise in the
fields of education, medical delivery systems, agrarian reform,
housing, rural infrastructure, etc. must be enlisted to formulate
practical programs that are not only on target, but can be achieved
with the limited resources that will be initially available. Promising
more than can be delivered is anathema to the long-term support that
the ARF requires. The Armenian worker has become cynical by having
relied on too many promises made and not kept. The inadequacies
of the oligarchic Sarkisian government in failing to include the
workers in an equitable sharing of the wealth that they have produced
must be relentlessly hammered home. More importantly, the ARF must
explain-point by point-how the Sarkisian Administration's failures
will be effectively a ddressed by the program proposed by the ARF to
improve the workers' quality of life.
The remaining objectives demand that the ARF prepares for the
forthcoming Armenian parliamentary and presidential elections
in 2011 and 2013, respectively. The ARF must begin the task of
selecting viable candidates for president and parliament. These
potential candidates must become the face of this roadmap to regime
change. They should become household names and faces, and appear at
rallies, demonstrations, and conferences. The presidential candidate
must tour the diaspora explaining why the roadmap to regime change
is important for Armenia's political viability, how it will be
implemented, and its relationship to the legitimate objectives of
Hai Tahd (the Armenian Cause). The candidate's presence should be
used to raise funds to underwrite what will be an expensive program
if regime change is to be achieved. The presidential candidate should
meet with sympathetic journalists, business leaders, advocacy leaders,
and legislators (especially members of the United States Congressional
Armenian Caucus) wherever the ARF has influence in the diaspora.
Winning the presidency must be viewed as achievable. Should the party
fail to elect the president, at the very least the ARF must win a
sufficient number of parliamentary seats to be able to advance its
legislative program for the benefit of the citizens and the state.
Working from a position of strength within the administration
(assuming the ARF is not the administration) is more effective than
working outside the government structure. However, being part of the
administration has its potential liabilities should the ARF be unable
to deliver on its program or is cast as part of the problems that
continue to persist. In a related note, the ARF's recent participation
in the Sarkisian Administration did not earn it any accolades.
The Sarkisian Administration must be aggressively attacked on its
record of having failed to improve the condition of workers and
their families; on having failed to ensure the basic norms of free,
democratic elections; of having failed to have Karabagh recognized
as a member of the negotiation process; and of having failed to
effectively represent to the Georgian government the issues confronting
the Javakheti Armenians. This is a battle for the political survival
of the jomeland (Armenia, Artsakh, and Javakhk) for a better day for
workers and their families and for the Armenian Cause. There will be no
second chance. Given the enormity of what is at stake, no one should
doubt that the present administration and its supporters will seek
to create obstacles to hinder the ARF from holding political rallies,
having access to television time and media coverage, and importantly,
organizing grassroots support. The ARF must be prepared to respond
immediately and effectively to any counter efforts by Yerevan, Ankara,
and possibly by the Minsk Group should attempts be made to undermine
its efforts at regime change.
Organizing grassroots support is a vital component in gaining the
necessary public support for the ARF's roadmap to regime change and to
ensure voter support for its candidates in the forthcoming elections.
Winning the "heart and soul" of the Armenian worker and his family
is a sine qua non if there is any hope of achieving this fundamental
change. The results of the parliamentary election in 2007 (winning
16 of 131 seats) and the presidential election of 2008 (where the ARF
candidate received under 7 percent of the total votes cast) indicate
what needs to be done if regime change is to be successful. To sell
its program and to develop the required grassroots support required
for electoral victories, the ARF must train a cadre of paid field
representatives who will live and work with the people they seek to
influence. Their pay would be in the form of a stipend in addition
to required expenses for travel, food, and lodging, which would also
be underwritten by the party. Working in pairs for moral support and
safety (should that become a factor), these field workers could live
with local families who would in turn receive payment for their room
and board. The ARF field representatives must be properly trained,
provided with relevant materials, and adequately monitored and
supported.
It is vital that these field representatives operate under the
supervision of district committees for each of Armenia's 10 districts
and the capital district of Yerevan. Monthly progress reports would be
filed by each team with their respective district committee, who would
then file a summary report to be sent to the Central Committee. The
Central Committee would compile a summary report for distribution
to ARF regional central committees and from there to their local
gomidehs. Appropriate authorities would decide what material would be
released for public distribution. Being informed is a key requirement
to keep members and all segments of the Armenian community within
the homeland and the diaspora energized. These field workers would
be on the front line and would form an indispensible component in
implementing the roadmap. The field workers would be responsible for
explaining the roadmap's objectives, to link the inadequacies of the
present administration with the solutions proposed by the ARF, and
to gai n support for the ARF candidates for parliament and president
in the forthcoming elections.
The republic is at a critical moment in its history. The roadmap for
regime change demands a full scale offensive that requires harnessing
human resources and fund raisingefforts far beyond anything the ARF
has ever attempted.
It must be recognized that Armenia is being pressured to normalize
relations with a government whose leaders remain unrepentant and
as anti-Armenian as their political progenitors who carried out the
systematic murder of some 1.5 million innocent Armenian men, women, and
children using the most heinous methods conceivable. The protocols are
documents that speak to Turkish interests, are supported by the Minsk
Group (France, Russia, and the United States), and are detrimental
to Armenia's interests-dismissive of the injustices expressed in
Hai Tahd and contemptuous of Armenia's sovereignty. That should be
sufficient to motivate any Armenian.
By Michael Mensoian
Armenian Weekly
December 9, 2009
The roadmap to regime change is a response to conditions that were
crystallized by the recently signed protocols which represent the
first step in the process of rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey.
The ARF has properly viewed these documents as being detrimental
to Armenia's present and future national interests. In response to
this assessment, the party has announced its formal opposition to
the protocols. In Part I an explanation was offered as to how the
ARF can deliver on its roadmap to regime change. Although this is
a gargantuan task for which the ARF has the necessary experience
to undertake, it is the how of the undertaking that is crucial. The
response by the ARF, if it is to be effective, must be multi-faceted
in its objectives and multi-operational in its implementation. The
use of demonstrations and rallies within Armenia and throughout the
Armenian Diaspora are means to address the first objective: to prevent
ratification of the protocols by the Armenian Parliament. The need for
an informat ion gathering and distribution system, and the convening
of conferences where the objectives of the roadmap are presented to
selected audiences, were suggested as vital components of the effort
at regime change. The need to develop a program that would assist
journalists, legislators, advocacy leaders, and businessmen to hear
and view firsthand the conditions in Javakhk and to understand the how
and why of the Karabaghtsis' demand for independence were discussed.
Part II considers the remaining two objectives of the roadmap: a viable
socio-economic program and preparing for the forthcoming elections. The
need to create a cadre of field workers to develop grassroots support
for the ARF's initiatives to improve the standard of living of the
workers and their families, and to win their support for the ARF
candidates for president and parliament in the forthcoming elections,
is an absolute necessity to ensure a reasonable certainty of success.
The program to improve the quality of life of the worker and his
family must be doable and not campaign pie-in-the-sky rhetoric that
will appeal only to the most desperate members of society. Again,
the participation of Armenian men and women with expertise in the
fields of education, medical delivery systems, agrarian reform,
housing, rural infrastructure, etc. must be enlisted to formulate
practical programs that are not only on target, but can be achieved
with the limited resources that will be initially available. Promising
more than can be delivered is anathema to the long-term support that
the ARF requires. The Armenian worker has become cynical by having
relied on too many promises made and not kept. The inadequacies
of the oligarchic Sarkisian government in failing to include the
workers in an equitable sharing of the wealth that they have produced
must be relentlessly hammered home. More importantly, the ARF must
explain-point by point-how the Sarkisian Administration's failures
will be effectively a ddressed by the program proposed by the ARF to
improve the workers' quality of life.
The remaining objectives demand that the ARF prepares for the
forthcoming Armenian parliamentary and presidential elections
in 2011 and 2013, respectively. The ARF must begin the task of
selecting viable candidates for president and parliament. These
potential candidates must become the face of this roadmap to regime
change. They should become household names and faces, and appear at
rallies, demonstrations, and conferences. The presidential candidate
must tour the diaspora explaining why the roadmap to regime change
is important for Armenia's political viability, how it will be
implemented, and its relationship to the legitimate objectives of
Hai Tahd (the Armenian Cause). The candidate's presence should be
used to raise funds to underwrite what will be an expensive program
if regime change is to be achieved. The presidential candidate should
meet with sympathetic journalists, business leaders, advocacy leaders,
and legislators (especially members of the United States Congressional
Armenian Caucus) wherever the ARF has influence in the diaspora.
Winning the presidency must be viewed as achievable. Should the party
fail to elect the president, at the very least the ARF must win a
sufficient number of parliamentary seats to be able to advance its
legislative program for the benefit of the citizens and the state.
Working from a position of strength within the administration
(assuming the ARF is not the administration) is more effective than
working outside the government structure. However, being part of the
administration has its potential liabilities should the ARF be unable
to deliver on its program or is cast as part of the problems that
continue to persist. In a related note, the ARF's recent participation
in the Sarkisian Administration did not earn it any accolades.
The Sarkisian Administration must be aggressively attacked on its
record of having failed to improve the condition of workers and
their families; on having failed to ensure the basic norms of free,
democratic elections; of having failed to have Karabagh recognized
as a member of the negotiation process; and of having failed to
effectively represent to the Georgian government the issues confronting
the Javakheti Armenians. This is a battle for the political survival
of the jomeland (Armenia, Artsakh, and Javakhk) for a better day for
workers and their families and for the Armenian Cause. There will be no
second chance. Given the enormity of what is at stake, no one should
doubt that the present administration and its supporters will seek
to create obstacles to hinder the ARF from holding political rallies,
having access to television time and media coverage, and importantly,
organizing grassroots support. The ARF must be prepared to respond
immediately and effectively to any counter efforts by Yerevan, Ankara,
and possibly by the Minsk Group should attempts be made to undermine
its efforts at regime change.
Organizing grassroots support is a vital component in gaining the
necessary public support for the ARF's roadmap to regime change and to
ensure voter support for its candidates in the forthcoming elections.
Winning the "heart and soul" of the Armenian worker and his family
is a sine qua non if there is any hope of achieving this fundamental
change. The results of the parliamentary election in 2007 (winning
16 of 131 seats) and the presidential election of 2008 (where the ARF
candidate received under 7 percent of the total votes cast) indicate
what needs to be done if regime change is to be successful. To sell
its program and to develop the required grassroots support required
for electoral victories, the ARF must train a cadre of paid field
representatives who will live and work with the people they seek to
influence. Their pay would be in the form of a stipend in addition
to required expenses for travel, food, and lodging, which would also
be underwritten by the party. Working in pairs for moral support and
safety (should that become a factor), these field workers could live
with local families who would in turn receive payment for their room
and board. The ARF field representatives must be properly trained,
provided with relevant materials, and adequately monitored and
supported.
It is vital that these field representatives operate under the
supervision of district committees for each of Armenia's 10 districts
and the capital district of Yerevan. Monthly progress reports would be
filed by each team with their respective district committee, who would
then file a summary report to be sent to the Central Committee. The
Central Committee would compile a summary report for distribution
to ARF regional central committees and from there to their local
gomidehs. Appropriate authorities would decide what material would be
released for public distribution. Being informed is a key requirement
to keep members and all segments of the Armenian community within
the homeland and the diaspora energized. These field workers would
be on the front line and would form an indispensible component in
implementing the roadmap. The field workers would be responsible for
explaining the roadmap's objectives, to link the inadequacies of the
present administration with the solutions proposed by the ARF, and
to gai n support for the ARF candidates for parliament and president
in the forthcoming elections.
The republic is at a critical moment in its history. The roadmap for
regime change demands a full scale offensive that requires harnessing
human resources and fund raisingefforts far beyond anything the ARF
has ever attempted.
It must be recognized that Armenia is being pressured to normalize
relations with a government whose leaders remain unrepentant and
as anti-Armenian as their political progenitors who carried out the
systematic murder of some 1.5 million innocent Armenian men, women, and
children using the most heinous methods conceivable. The protocols are
documents that speak to Turkish interests, are supported by the Minsk
Group (France, Russia, and the United States), and are detrimental
to Armenia's interests-dismissive of the injustices expressed in
Hai Tahd and contemptuous of Armenia's sovereignty. That should be
sufficient to motivate any Armenian.