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ADDRESS BY TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER OF REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AHMET DAVUTOGLU AT THE SETA
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Dec 18 2009
SETA Foundation's Washington D.C. Branch, December 8, 2009,
Unofficial Transcript of Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu's Speech
PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Grand Ballroom, Mayflower Hotel, Washington D.C.
12.15pm EST
Nuh Yılmaz, Director, SETA Washington: Good afternoon, His Excellency
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, Distinguished members of Turkish
foreign service, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.
We are here today for a keynote speech by our Foreign Minister,
Ahmet Davutoglu. His speech is entitled "Principles of Turkish
Foreign Policy." The speech will be followed by a panel discussion
and a question and answers section.
Since its establishment, our organization, The Foundation for
Political, Economic and Social Research, SETA, has conducted extensive
research and produced many studies and reports on Turkish Foreign
policy. It is a particular honor for us to host this event here
in Washington.
Professor Ahmet Davutoglu taught political science and international
relations for years at various international universities. Following
the November 2002 elections, he was appointed as Chief Adviser to the
Prime Minister and Ambassador at large. He has served as the Foreign
Minister in the successive Justice and Development Party governments.
Professor Davutoglu published several books and articles on foreign
policy, which have been translated into several languages.
Professor Davutoglu is known as the intellectual architect of the
Justice and Development Party's foreign policy and has been influential
in a number of major foreign policy developments. He is well known for
his theoretical and conceptual contributions to Turkish foreign policy;
which have been integrated into Turkish foreign policy as practical
tools and strategies. Under the umbrella term, "Strategic Depth,"
which is also the title of his now infamous book, he has formulated
strategies such as zero-problem-with-neighbors. These strategies are
now integral parts of the Turkish foreign policy.
Turkey's recent foreign policy initiatives have been characterized
as proactive and rhythmic diplomacy.
Please join me in welcoming His Excellency Foreign Minister of Turkey,
Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu.
* H.E. M of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu:
Dear participants, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. First of all
I would like to express my thanks to SETA for this opportunity and
at the same time I congratulate SETA for your new start in Washington.
Think tanks are very important, especially in Washington- to be a
bridge between Turkish and American policy makers and opinion makers.
I hope that SETA will contribute to all these efforts.
I was given the title of the talk: "The Principles of Turkish Foreign
Policy". Let me start with a semantic question: What do principals
mean, before going into details. Of course the principles are the
framework of which you are implementing foreign policy. There might
be two implications. You may have no principles guiding your foreign
policy, in each case you may have different foreign policy priorities.
And therefore you don't declare any principle. Or you may have some
principles that are static, which will bind you. These are two extreme
cases. If you not refer to any principle, you will be free to implement
different policies in different cases... But at the same time, you
will not be given a consistent framework of your foreign policy.
This is one extreme. Or you may identify very static principles that
after a while those principles will become an obstacle in front of
your foreign policy implementation.
So, then, how can we overcome two extreme consequences of these
principles? To have certain principles which are dynamic, which are
responsive to international context, which should be re-interpreted,
revised, so that there will not be a contrast
between international context and the principles of your foreign
policy; in this sense, the question becomes continuity and change.
What aspects of your foreign policy are subjects of change? What are
the permanent characteristics of your foreign policy? If you inquire
continuity there would be no sense of sequence. And there would be
no tradition. If you ignore change, that tradition would be such a
framework that you would not adapt to the international context.
Today, for example there is a discussion of a change of axis in
Turkish foreign policy. We have to approach this from a methodological
perspective first. What is axis? What is change? In order to identify
whether there is a change in axis in Turkish foreign policy, first you
have to identify axis. The question is: is axis always permanent, for
all countries forever? For example, the previous US administration had
a foreign policy based on certain conceptualization- axis of evil. If
the new administration changes that concept does it mean a shift of
axis, meaning, you have something like an "axis of goodness." So
is this shift, or an adaptation to the new conditions? How can we
identify the axis? Then change. Change of axis or change of the main
focus of foreign policy. And which can be identified as a change of
adaptation. Those who have an ideological concept of Turkish policy,
in identifying you this way or that way, for example, neo-Ottomanism.
Past Prime Ministers, other ministers, the president, or past
ministers, try to conceptualize Turkish foreign policy, with this
framework, judging it as if this is an inherent part of Turkish
foreign policy, this is not fair.
Then, the axis, if you ask me...what is the axis of Turkish foreign
policy, economy, society, or Turkish politics? I would say there are
two permanent elements that this society cannot change. Those two are
geography and history. The others are the variables. Twenty, thirty
years ago, there was a bi-polar international system. Now it has
changed. So, that environment was a variable. But you have to look
at that environment because geography and history is not performed
in a vacuum. They are meaningful only in an environment. Like, if
you have an Afro-Eurasia understanding
then the geography is important, but if you have a bi-polar
understanding, in the 70s 80s, twenty years ago, Turkey would have
been considered a wing partner of NATO. The strategic concept of NATO
has changed. If Turkey is a wing, what is Turkey doing in Afghanistan?
So, NATO is changing, the EU is changing, and Turkey is changing,
but we cannot change our geography. We have to put it in a strategic
perspective. And similarly, Ottoman history... whenever there is
a crisis in the Balkans, victims of those crises. Like Bosnians,
Albanians, Turks of Bulgaria, they look to Istanbul. We are paying
the bill of our history.
I reject the concept on neo-ottomanism. But I say that Ottoman history,
and also our Republican history, the former bi-polar world, these are
permanent parameters that cannot be changed. They are an essential
part of Turkish identity. All of these developments. The history
of bi-polarity in Turkey- US relations, comes with at least half a
century or relationship between Turkey and NATO, Turkey and the EU
and elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy because they are
relevant in the current international context. But we cannot say our
axis is Baghdad pact, for example, because it has passed.
Now, as intellectuals, and foreign policy makers of our society,
our job is to determine, what are the are the basic elements of
continuity, what are the changing variables, how can redefine the
permanent variables and how can we use these permanent variables,
and use them in Turkish foreign policy?; otherwise we cannot do it,
we cannot create a new Turkish foreign policy which adapts to the new
international context, then you will have a static axis in your mind.
We have to respond to the changes in the international context. A
shift of axis can only be legitimized, if you see such a thing. A
static axis in your mind, which doesn't have continuity, you think
in your mind that nothing has changed. A shift of axis could be only
legitimized, if it happens in the reinterpretation of the geography
and history. EU and NATO are the main fixtures in Turkish foreign
policy. The main elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy. In
transatlanticism, you should ask a question..
Is the role of Turkey in NATO more today than seven years ago,
since AK Party, more or less? Did Turkey's contribution to NATO
increase? Or is Turkey ignoring NATO and concentrating on Syria,
Iran, and the East? I can give you tons of statistics to show that
Turkey's involvement in NATO is greater than before. We asked for a
higher representation in NATO. And we got it. Now, look at the EU now
in comparison to 1963. Did Turkey achieve more progress in 40 years,
or in the last 6 years? What happened in those years? Now we are being
accused of taking Turkey in other directions. What is the objective
basis of this argument if we achieved more in 6 years, than forty
years? Nobody came blame Turkey because of the policies of France,
if there was no change of President in France, or if socialist won the
election two years ago Turkey, EU relations would have been different.
Or if Cyprus had accepted the Annan plan in 2004, today Turkish-EU
relations would have been different. If the EU didn't give regard the
rejectionist Greek Cypriots, and hadn't punished the peaceful Turkish
Cypriots, things would be different, now. Is it Turkey that changed
the axis, or Europe? Yesterday, our Prime Minister underlined these.
Europe is trying to change the rules of the game, unfortunately. They
are trying to change the axis of European rules. And there are
those who are trying on the Cypriot debate, to change the concept
of justice. They are changing their concept of justice. The axis of
justice. Can you give me any example of a community that has been
punished for saying yes to peace, other than the Turkish Cypriots in
the last 7 years? Where is the axis of justice? The basic element of
humanity and the EU. The EU, blaming and, creating some misconceptions
of Turkey, I don't see any good intention. They have to give us
some scientific, objective explanation that Turkey ignored NATO,
has ignored the EU.
And another issue. The EU should show that the existing Turkish foreign
policy is not compatible with EU objectives or with transatlantic
objectives. These two conditions should be fulfilled. We agree that
Turkey has done more in EU in the last seven years than during 40
years and as well as in NATO.
The second argument, are these new principles compatible with EU and
NATO transatlantic relations or against?
I will mention three methodological principles and six operative
principals of Turkish foreign policy. Today, and in the last 6 years,
our methodology is a visionary approach, not a crisis oriented
approach. During the cold war because of the characteristic of the
cold war, we were in a crisis, because of one big clash with the Soviet
Union, so the issue was managing the crisis. Now, we are implementing
a vision-oriented foreign policy.
If you ask me now, since I miss lecturing, I can give hours of
lectures on our vision of Middle East, the EU, Caucasus and Central
Asia. For example, in the Middle East, no one can say that we are
acting against PKK, just to eliminate PKK, or to counterbalance Iran
or to try to manage the crisis in Syrian. No, we have a vision for
the Middle East. No one cans say for example, that in the Balkans,
Turkey is trying to act against neo-Ottomansim. We have a vision of a
multicultural, stable, Balkans. Therefore, no one could imagine that
five years ago, that Turkish, Serbian, Bosnian foreign ministers
would meet in Istanbul twice in one month, to decide to continue
this dialogue, through this mechanism, given the historical context
of Turkey and Serbia, and Bosnians and Turks. Next week, I will meet
with leaders in Sarajevo and in January we will meet in Belgrade. Our
vision is a vision of mutual respect, stability, peace and prosperity.
Our vision is the same in the Caucasus. Therefore we offered a
mechanism, a platform, Caucasian Platform Stability and Cooperation
Act. Is this vision-oriented approach compatible with EU values or
against EU objectives? I think the answer is very clear.
The second principle: a consistent, systematic framework. Our vision
for the Middle East shouldn't contrast to our approach in Central
Asia or Balkans. Our approach in Africa shouldn't be different than
the approach in Asia, nor should our approach in economic relations
differ, i.e. in the G20, with this understanding. Like we are trying
to develop with Iraq, Syria, Greece and Russia now. When someone
looks, you can see artistic works, like a painter. When you look,
you see all the colors are in the right places. Or a beautiful place,
like Sultanahmet, or the construction of the Taj Mahal. All of the
colors are in the right place. If the symmetry of the Taj Mahal is
not perfect, it cannot be a piece of classical art. Similarly, in
foreign policy, you have to put the colors in such a way, that those
who are observing the foreign policy they will feel that there is one
political brain, one approach behind this policy. Today, the advantage
of Turkey, in the last 6-7 years, there is one party government,
therefore you can follow. There is consistency, and continuity. Is
it consistent with the EU? Yes.
The third methodological principle, is trying to have a new style, in
the sense of political rhetoric and tools; an instrument. In one word
I will call it, "Soft Power". Today, Turkey is using more soft power
than hard power. Twenty-thirty years ago we didn't have this. This
is something new. Is this compatible with EU values? Why did the EU
emerge? Because the EU emerged, in context of hard and soft powers in
Second World War. No Turkish leaders have used any terminology in any
plane that has threatened the use of hard power. All soft power. But,
we are of course, proud of our hard power, our military force, because
this is also a changing variable based on technological advancement.
But, which power will be used, in which contrast? The balance between
soft and hard power... This is important.
All three of these principles: vision orientation; a systematic
framework; using soft power. They are all compatible with European
values and transatlantic orientation. Otherwise, to be frank, you
should criticize those organizations who are critical of Turkey,
if they are not compatible. These are the humanitarian aspects.
Sometimes I am accused of being Utopian with these concepts. Now,
I am coming to six operative principles. I will make a checklist,
did we achieve these six principles in the last 7 years?
The first principle: the balance between security and freedom. Until
recently, in the Turkish psyche, the Turkish approach, there was
a sense that to have a secure and safe country there needed to
be some limitation on freedom to in turn have security, in Turkey,
therefore we had some military interventions. Therefore after military
interventions, there was always a transitional stage. In this was
always a discussion of how to enlarge democracy. Step by step. This
government, has implemented nine, comprehensive democratic packages,
and the most compressive one is still on the way. But, security, for
Turkey, from outside or inside, is much less of an issue for Turkey
now. We don't see that these two principles are contradictory to
each other. If you ignore security for freedom you will have anger
and chaos. If you ignore freedom for security, you will have an
authoritarian, autocratic society. We don't want to ignore either of
these two. Is this principle compatible with the EU and transatlantic
values? Yes. Otherwise the Copenhagen criteria shouldn't be mentioned.
The second principle, very well know now: "zero problems with our
neighbors". When we declared this for the first time we were accused of
being Utopian. Of course we know very well, that not only neighbors,
even in the family, between brothers and sisters there will always
be disagreements. We know it is just a target. But if you give these
targets to your diplomats, to you people, your military, society,
than the perception will change. I was criticized in our budgetary
session in the Parliament. They said, why are you defending this? It
means you need to make compromises, in order to have zero problems. And
they said.. it is unrealistic.. Utopian. I gave them an example of a
saying by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, "peace at home, and peace with our
neighbors". A very successful military commander.
Throughout his life he fought in many wars. He knew it was impossible
to have peace always, but he wanted to show a new target for a society
which had thirty years of continuous war in the Ottoman territories,
the Balkans to Yemen. He wanted to show that we need a new era of
peace to recover. Similarly, now, we want to show that there will be
a new era with our neighbors. We want to show our neighbors that we
may disagree on many points but we have to reintegrate because our
destiny is the same.
Last week I was in Athens. It was a very nice experience to mention.
In our meeting
with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou. Before the meeting, with our
team, we have consulted, what should be our priority. I made a set
of agenda. I will mention four levels, bil-lateral relations: under
which we have economic, political cultural, minority issues, Cyprus.
Second, we discussed regional cooperation in the Middle East, the
Eastern Mediterranean, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Black Sea.
Third, our cooperation in the EU. How to make the Eastern Mediterranean
a center of attraction, once Turkey becomes member of EU. At the
meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou, as a nice surprise, he made
almost the same recommendations.
What is the main issue between Turkey and Greece foreign ministers,
there is no problem. Just asking the question. Where is the shift
of access? Which one is more European? Why don't you also see our
relations with Greece, Georgia, with Armenia, with our neighbors?
Whenever Turkish foreign policy is active, this question comes up. In
the US some circles are saying, that you have are very clever, that
you have an Islamic foreign policy, but you are using "zero problems",
such good terminology, as a cover. And to mask Turkey's pulling away
from the West. Those who say this don't understand geography. Turkey
has 12 indirect countries, and only four neighbors are Muslim: Iraq,
Syria, Iran and Azerbaijan. The rest are non-Muslim, Georgia, Armenia,
Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Greece. Check whether our
relations with Syria and Iran are improving and our relationship with
Greece and Georgia are going down, then you may have a point. But if
we implement this principle, consistently, with all of our neighbors,
regardless of religious and ethnic origin then nobody can criticize
us. And this is our choice. Why choice? This is the necessity of
geography. We live in the most risky geographical environment. Only
we know, as our foreign ministers, our Undersecretaries, our Prime
Minister, government knows of how many crises in our region we have
dealt with. Which leaders called us from our region to help with
a crisis. With this mobile telephone you have, wherever there is a
crisis, they will find you. It is easy to say for someone who is far
away from the center of Afro-Eurasia to limit your relations with
neighbors. We want this. Sorry, this is our geography; this is our
future with our neighborhood.
When I became Minister of foreign affairs I said maximum cooperation,
and economic integration with our neighbors. In the last six months we
established high level strategic council meetings with Syria and Iraq,
and we signed 48 agreements with Iraq, through joint-cabinet meeting.
We will now have such mechanisms with Russia and Greece, and we will
have similar meetings with other neighbors. There was a question to
the Prime Minister, yesterday, about Visa's while he was here. Why is
Turkey implementing a Visa liberalization policy with Syria, Albania,
Jordan, and Libya? Yes, in the last four months, we abolished the Visa
requirement between Turkey and these four countries. We will continue.
If someone asks us why we are doing this and not with the EU...I will
tell them, ask this question to the EU. For the last fifteen years,
Turkey has implemented custom union with full consistency. And
according to the custom union, the EU has to open the market to
our businessmen. It is a service sector...If a businessman cannot
go freely to another country, how can he make a business? How can
you implement a custom union? They didn't implement, although they
promised. And now they are implementing a Visa liberalization regime
with Serbia, which is not even a candidate country for EU. Also,
Croatia, and Macedonia, leaving out Albania. Now somebody ask the
EU, about Turkey. It is an accession candidate country. We are not
against Serbia or Macedonia's liberalization processes, we fully
support this. In fact we are criticizing the EU for not giving it to
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why not? But someone should ask
this question. Why not to Turkey? As Turkey, with a dynamic economy,
with almost 1 trillion usd, based on PPP criteria. We will wait until
Europe one day decides to open its market to us, and we will keep our
commodity, our people, our Visa's with our neighbors in a very strict
regime. Turkey, as David Milliband mentioned once in his speech, is
a giant. I am not using this is a prop. But, it is a big country in
the region. We believe in the economies of our region and we believe
with this economic leadership there will
provide peace, as well, for the Middle East, and for Caucasus.
Therefore we are in favor of our relations with Armenia. Please ask
many of the faces I know here, they are the best experts of Turkish
foreign policy. Three years, four years ago, even last year, would
imagine that Turkey would sign two protocols with Armenia? Is this
compatible with the EU or not? Is this a shift of axis, or not? In
which direction, if it's a shift of axis, towards problematic? I am not
using Orientalist terminology. But, problematic East or more compromise
oriented West? But, nobody can tell us that Turkish-Armenia protocols
are the only issues in the Caucasus. We are not trying to solve only
once crisis in the Caucasus. We want to have a new Caucasia where
there will be no close borders. Not only partnerships between Turkey
and Armenia, but also between Turkey and Azerbaijan, between Russia
and Georgia. This is our vision. All of these normalization processes
are parallel to each other. Those who are asking us and praising us
because of our normalization process with Armenia should also propose
that Armenia should stop the invasion of 20% of Azeri territories. It
is against international law, and international criteria of norms and
values. This a division we have. As I said, this is a critical issue.
The third operative principle, is a proactive peace diplomacy, not
only with neighbors, but with all the regions.
I will discuss our vision with the Middle East based on security for
all, conflict resolution mechanisms, high-level political dialogue,
economic integration, and multicultural coexistence. This is valid
for Balkans, for Middle East and Caucasus. When I say proactive,
I also mean preventative, at the same time. If there is a crisis,
we shouldn't wait until the tension becomes a high level and even war.
You can see many of our efforts. Like, the Iraqi Syrian dispute. The
next day I was in Damascus. Like Syria-Israeli peace efforts. Nobody
asked us. No administration asked us. We had tried to convince them
to do something good. Ambassador Wilson knows the background of many
of the consultations at the time. Is it compatible with transatlantic
values or not? Syria and Israeli indirect talks, for example. Last
year, we
had almost completed the indirect talks between Syria and Israel in
Ankara, unfortunately the Gaza attacks came and we did not continue.
Or the Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, or Lebanese reconciliation
in Lebanon and now Serbian, Bosnia reconciliation in Balkans. This
is our approach to the surrounding region and these will continue.
The fourth principle: compatible global relations. We are not involved
in a bipolar world anymore. It means our good relations with Russia is
not an alternative to the EU. Or our model partnership with the United
States is not a new partnership against Russia. No, it's a positive
partnership, active, not reactive partnership, unlike bipolar world;
therefore Russia is our main trade partner, 30 billion usd.
But our main strategic partner is the United States; as we shared,
all of these things yesterday at the White House, without any
reservations. As two allies, we are looking at the world with the
same perspective. Also with EU, today, with the preparations of the EU
summit, our perspective of the EU, is one of full Turkish integration
to EU. We hope that in the next few years, we will be a full partner.
These are not competitive. Nobody should criticize us that one of
these is against the other. This is over. Similar to our relations
with the Muslim world. This is also compatible with other efforts. I
mentioned yesterday, in the Philippines, both government there and
Muslim minority, where they are having problems, they approached Turkey
to help resolve their crisis with some other countries, because they
trust Turkish mediation; similarly, in Somalia, and other places.
This is the fifth principle: active involvement in all global and
international issues, in all international organizations. Again,
five, six seven years ago, becoming a member of the UN security
Council member was a dream, and we are chairing three critical
commissions on the council: Afghanistan, the fight against terror
and North Korea. We are also a member of G20. We are an observer of
the African Union, and the Arab League...Now, we want to be a part
of the Pacific Forum. We are opening ten new embassies in Africa,
two in Latin America, therefore after this evening we will be in
Mexico. Also, climate change: we signed the Kyoto protocol. Why?
Because this is the future of all humanity. And it shows a new
perspective of Turkey, one which is based on vision, soft power,
a universal language, implementing such consistent foreign policies
in different parts of the world.
Being in the West, the North, East and South. Trying to work hard
on all of these fronts without creating an issue of axis- to defend
regional and global peace. Where is the axis? The axis is in Ankara.
Yesterday, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan referred to Rumi, 'your one
leg will be wherever you are, but you have to see all of the universe
with the other leg'.
Nuh Yılmaz: Thank you, His Excellency. The floor is now open to
questions. Please tell us your name and affiliation.
Wendy Chamberlain, President, MEI: Mr. Davutoglu, you have played
every active role in the Middle East Palestinian and Israeli talks.
Where do you see it going in the next year.
FM Ahmet Davutoglu: Yes, we have been very active in the Middle
Eastern peace process. Not only in one front, because all of these
issues in the Middle East are interrelated, and because we have the
broader Middle East. Iran, Egypt, Iraq. But here Israel-Arab tension,
I am talking about here. There are three legs, essentially. Israeli
relations with Syria, Israeli- Palestinian, Israeli- Lebanon. In the
last six years we've had serious difficulties on all of these fronts.
The Lebanese war in 2006. A continuous tension between Israel
and Palestine, and latest Gaza attacks of last year, and also
Syrian-Israeli attack, and the Israel bombardment Syria in September
2007. This is the picture we have. Turkey is trying to contribute
to the three legs, in such a way that all the legs can support each
other. We were very active policy in Syria-Israeli indirect talks in
2008. When we started in May 2008, the same day the Doha agreement
was achieved, we purposefully declared the same day, because we were
very active from October 2007 to May 2008 in Lebanon. I have been
to Lebanon more than ten times in the last six months just to help
Lebanese reconciliation. So these legs are all supporting each other,
without Syrian-Israeli indirect talks a broader peace could not be
successful. During the initial talks we talked to both parties and
determined that two places must be quiet. Lebanon and Gaza. With
these tensions, Syria-Israeli talks could not continue. I am sure
you remember, after the start of indirect talks in Istanbul, on May
20, 2008, within one month, Hamas and Israel had signed a ceasefire
agreement with the Egyptian mediation. So they already supported
each other. The three legs supported each other. This established
a new balance. But the Israel attacks on Gaza destroyed this leg,
unfortunately. After December 2008 in Gaza, it destroyed the third
leg. And that created a collapse, with one leg out of balance. This
same day, there was a suspension. Now, what can we do today? I am sure
you followed the Prime Ministers speech yesterday. We criticize Israel,
yes, and we think Gaza was a big mistake. Using phosphorous bombs was
also a crime. This was the same week that Prime Minister Olmert came
to Ankara to finalize the first written agreed text between Syrian
and Israel. It was a blow up and we didn't have any indication of
this. For almost three years we had worked to build a building. The
Prime Minister and Olmert were talking. I went tons of times, meeting
with delegations, negotiating. Then Monday, we wake up when Olmert
was to sign the last word with Turkish Prime Minister..
and the building we were building collapsed. For us it was not wise,
or correct. And Turkey criticized. If the same thing happens, we will
criticize again.
We will not tolerate humanitarian massacres in our region any more.
When the Kurds were massacred by Saddam, we defended them, and we will
defend them. Today I received a call that there were terrorist attacks
in Baghdad, after one hour we are calling, we gave them 100% of support
and told them, all Turkish facilities are at your disposal. We will
not tolerate any terrorist attack in Iraq. Against whom is not the
question. Sunni or Shiites, it is not important. This is our approach.
Then, there was a change of government in Israel. We hope that now,
there is an, in fact, President Obama's new approach is a great asset
for our region. I hope that everyone will understand this. There is
full coordination between Turkey and the US
on the Syrian-Israeli track, Israeli-Palestinian track. We will
do everything possible, that our region will not see tension, war,
or humanitarian tragedies in the future. We had some contacts with
Syrian, Israel on these issues. We hope both parties will be ready
to re-start these efforts. Similarly, we are working on Palestinian
reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Without this reconciliation
there will not be peace between Palestine and Israel. We will work
on all three of these fronts.
Abdullah Akyuz, TUSIAD US, President: Thank you very much, Mister
Minister for your remarks. My question is regarding Turkey's economic
dimension and soft power in the region. Can you elaborate on this
dimension. How does it work on the ground and what is the interaction
between Turkey's economic activities in the region and Turkish foreign
policy toward the region?
FM Ahmet Davutoglu: There are many dimensions but let me give you two.
In the last six years, the share of neighboring countries in Turkish
foreign trade has risen from 8 percent to 32 percent. For example,
what is the ultimate consequence of these? One of the reasons why
Turkish economy was less affected during the last world economic crisis
was because of the rise of trade with our neighboring countries was
because most of these countries were not integrated in the global
economy therefore they didn't have decline of demand, unlike the
European Union. The EU is part of the global economy, therefore the
demand from EU to Turkey commodities declined dramatically, it did
not decline between Turkey and Egypt and Iran, and Syria. This was
a concrete example of how important asset for us. And when we say
economic integration, we really want to integrate these economies.
Like, in Iraq we signed 48 agreements with Iraq. 11 of these were
transportation agreements. We want to have a railway from Basra,
through Iraq and Northern Iraq, to Turkey, then to Europe. We want to
have a road connection. We will have flights to all Iraqi cities, if
possible. So, it is to prepare the ground. Similarly, we signed 4-5
energy agreements with Iraq. We would like make the flow of energy
from Iraq, through Turkey, then to Europe. Similar with Syria, we
have many projects. After two weeks, we will go to Syria and
sign around 40 agreements, in all sectors. In health, Turkey will
modernize or rehabilitate health system in Iraq and Syria. We signed
agreements with Libya, on construction, because Libya has huge
projects for the future, almost 50 billion dollar projects. Turkish
construction companies are the second biggest sector in the world
after China, and the US is third. We are opening all these markets,
all of this potential, to our business. Turkey has a free market
economy. Our businesses sector will be active. So we are trying to
open the ways for our business sector.
Alan Makovsky, Senior Staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee: First
of all, the Prime Minister has made it a theme. He repeated it last
night. Ever since his Brookings talk last year...That there should
be no double standards regarding nuclear issues...that those states
that have nuclear arms don't really have the right to press others
not to get them. I assume he's talking about Israel here, not about
the US, France, UK, Russia. If I'm wrong about that please correct
me. He usually doesn't specify which country he has in mind. But,
I wanted to ask you which is more threatening to Turkey: A nuclear
Iran, or a nuclear Israel?
Question two, when you had your opening to Hamas, and I think
you've used similar language when you had your opening with Iran,
you said that you wanted to keep channels open for the West in order
to influence them to change. And I wondered if this is an open ended
concept? Will you always keep that channel open? Or will there be a
point, if there is no change when there is no change that you throw
your hands up and try a different approach?
FM Ahmet Davutoglu: Our PM has made it clear many times, but let
me try to identify three basic principles of Turkey regarding the
nuclear issue.
First, all nations have the right to obtain peaceful, nuclear
technology, because technology doesn't belong to one country, one
group, is the culmination of the knowledge of humanity, there cannot
be a monopoly on technology, therefore Iran, Israel, including Turkey
have the right to obtain peaceful nuclear technology. Secondly, we are
against nuclear weapons. I am saying this not only as a Minister, but
as a human being, as an intellectual, I am repeating the same thing:
there is no ethical justification for a nuclear weaponry system. No
justification at all. Wherever, and whoever has it. We had this in the
Second World War, although it was very primitive. But now we have all
of these experiences. We should not risk, I am sure you watched 2012,
the movie, it was a natural disaster, but a nuclear weapon would
create much more of a destructive atmosphere than that of a natural
disaster. Nobody can defend a nuclear weaponry system. We have an
IAEA system, non proliferation treaty; we have to be realistic and
work within this framework.
The objective should be, ultimately, a nuclear free world. If we cannot
achieve this objective now, with our zero problems with our neighbors,
what can we achieve, a nuclear free Middle East? The Middle East is
full of tension, it's full of disagreements, nuclear tensions within
the Middle East will add another additional element of tension.
Therefore we made this very clear to Iran.
We do not want a nuclear Iran. We don't want a nuclear Israel. You
should not give us two choices, and ask us which is the worst? Why
don't we have a good choice? No nuclear weapon anywhere. Why not none
of them? Why should we have to choose a nuclear Iran or a nuclear
Israel or both of them? The best is none of them. Which one is more
threatening to Turkey? Alan, you know nuclear war, nuclear technology.
In 1986, there was a nuclear accident in Chernobyl, even today, cancer
in some cities, in Antalya, because of the nuclear affect. Assume that
Israel uses a nuclear strike against Iran. This nuclear weapons system
is not intelligent to know where the Turkish and Iranian borders are.
It will come everywhere. Even if it only hits Iran, we would be against
it. Similarly if Iran had decided to attack Israel, the same problem
with the nuclear technology, to know the distance between Tel Aviv
and Jerusalem, 25 km. 25 km is the distance from these two cities. We
are living in such a common region.
As Turkey, in our vision, there is no nuclear weapon in the Middle
East. We will do everything possible to prevent this. The third
principal, how do you resolve this through diplomatic means? We have
to continue our efforts. Is it open ended
diplomacy as you suggested in your question? Diplomacy should be
seen as the only means to resolve our disputes. Iran says that they
don't have a nuclear weapon program. We cannot say anything. Which
institution has the authority? The IAEA. We want Iran to be transparent
to the IAEA. And we have an excellent cooperation with the IAEA. Turkey
will do everything possible to solve these issues though diplomatic
means, because if there is a military strike, we will be paying the
bill. If there are more sanctions on Iran, we know our experience
of Iraq, the sanctions of Saddam hurt Turkey more and the people
of Iraq. It is against our vision of the Middle East. We will not
tolerate such a condition in our region. I don't know if these are
clear answers, but this is our approach in our region.
Nuh Yılmaz: Thanks Foreign Minister Davutoglu and the audience.
END.
Transcribed by Hailey Cook, SETA Foundation.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Dec 18 2009
SETA Foundation's Washington D.C. Branch, December 8, 2009,
Unofficial Transcript of Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu's Speech
PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Grand Ballroom, Mayflower Hotel, Washington D.C.
12.15pm EST
Nuh Yılmaz, Director, SETA Washington: Good afternoon, His Excellency
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, Distinguished members of Turkish
foreign service, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.
We are here today for a keynote speech by our Foreign Minister,
Ahmet Davutoglu. His speech is entitled "Principles of Turkish
Foreign Policy." The speech will be followed by a panel discussion
and a question and answers section.
Since its establishment, our organization, The Foundation for
Political, Economic and Social Research, SETA, has conducted extensive
research and produced many studies and reports on Turkish Foreign
policy. It is a particular honor for us to host this event here
in Washington.
Professor Ahmet Davutoglu taught political science and international
relations for years at various international universities. Following
the November 2002 elections, he was appointed as Chief Adviser to the
Prime Minister and Ambassador at large. He has served as the Foreign
Minister in the successive Justice and Development Party governments.
Professor Davutoglu published several books and articles on foreign
policy, which have been translated into several languages.
Professor Davutoglu is known as the intellectual architect of the
Justice and Development Party's foreign policy and has been influential
in a number of major foreign policy developments. He is well known for
his theoretical and conceptual contributions to Turkish foreign policy;
which have been integrated into Turkish foreign policy as practical
tools and strategies. Under the umbrella term, "Strategic Depth,"
which is also the title of his now infamous book, he has formulated
strategies such as zero-problem-with-neighbors. These strategies are
now integral parts of the Turkish foreign policy.
Turkey's recent foreign policy initiatives have been characterized
as proactive and rhythmic diplomacy.
Please join me in welcoming His Excellency Foreign Minister of Turkey,
Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu.
* H.E. M of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu:
Dear participants, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. First of all
I would like to express my thanks to SETA for this opportunity and
at the same time I congratulate SETA for your new start in Washington.
Think tanks are very important, especially in Washington- to be a
bridge between Turkish and American policy makers and opinion makers.
I hope that SETA will contribute to all these efforts.
I was given the title of the talk: "The Principles of Turkish Foreign
Policy". Let me start with a semantic question: What do principals
mean, before going into details. Of course the principles are the
framework of which you are implementing foreign policy. There might
be two implications. You may have no principles guiding your foreign
policy, in each case you may have different foreign policy priorities.
And therefore you don't declare any principle. Or you may have some
principles that are static, which will bind you. These are two extreme
cases. If you not refer to any principle, you will be free to implement
different policies in different cases... But at the same time, you
will not be given a consistent framework of your foreign policy.
This is one extreme. Or you may identify very static principles that
after a while those principles will become an obstacle in front of
your foreign policy implementation.
So, then, how can we overcome two extreme consequences of these
principles? To have certain principles which are dynamic, which are
responsive to international context, which should be re-interpreted,
revised, so that there will not be a contrast
between international context and the principles of your foreign
policy; in this sense, the question becomes continuity and change.
What aspects of your foreign policy are subjects of change? What are
the permanent characteristics of your foreign policy? If you inquire
continuity there would be no sense of sequence. And there would be
no tradition. If you ignore change, that tradition would be such a
framework that you would not adapt to the international context.
Today, for example there is a discussion of a change of axis in
Turkish foreign policy. We have to approach this from a methodological
perspective first. What is axis? What is change? In order to identify
whether there is a change in axis in Turkish foreign policy, first you
have to identify axis. The question is: is axis always permanent, for
all countries forever? For example, the previous US administration had
a foreign policy based on certain conceptualization- axis of evil. If
the new administration changes that concept does it mean a shift of
axis, meaning, you have something like an "axis of goodness." So
is this shift, or an adaptation to the new conditions? How can we
identify the axis? Then change. Change of axis or change of the main
focus of foreign policy. And which can be identified as a change of
adaptation. Those who have an ideological concept of Turkish policy,
in identifying you this way or that way, for example, neo-Ottomanism.
Past Prime Ministers, other ministers, the president, or past
ministers, try to conceptualize Turkish foreign policy, with this
framework, judging it as if this is an inherent part of Turkish
foreign policy, this is not fair.
Then, the axis, if you ask me...what is the axis of Turkish foreign
policy, economy, society, or Turkish politics? I would say there are
two permanent elements that this society cannot change. Those two are
geography and history. The others are the variables. Twenty, thirty
years ago, there was a bi-polar international system. Now it has
changed. So, that environment was a variable. But you have to look
at that environment because geography and history is not performed
in a vacuum. They are meaningful only in an environment. Like, if
you have an Afro-Eurasia understanding
then the geography is important, but if you have a bi-polar
understanding, in the 70s 80s, twenty years ago, Turkey would have
been considered a wing partner of NATO. The strategic concept of NATO
has changed. If Turkey is a wing, what is Turkey doing in Afghanistan?
So, NATO is changing, the EU is changing, and Turkey is changing,
but we cannot change our geography. We have to put it in a strategic
perspective. And similarly, Ottoman history... whenever there is
a crisis in the Balkans, victims of those crises. Like Bosnians,
Albanians, Turks of Bulgaria, they look to Istanbul. We are paying
the bill of our history.
I reject the concept on neo-ottomanism. But I say that Ottoman history,
and also our Republican history, the former bi-polar world, these are
permanent parameters that cannot be changed. They are an essential
part of Turkish identity. All of these developments. The history
of bi-polarity in Turkey- US relations, comes with at least half a
century or relationship between Turkey and NATO, Turkey and the EU
and elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy because they are
relevant in the current international context. But we cannot say our
axis is Baghdad pact, for example, because it has passed.
Now, as intellectuals, and foreign policy makers of our society,
our job is to determine, what are the are the basic elements of
continuity, what are the changing variables, how can redefine the
permanent variables and how can we use these permanent variables,
and use them in Turkish foreign policy?; otherwise we cannot do it,
we cannot create a new Turkish foreign policy which adapts to the new
international context, then you will have a static axis in your mind.
We have to respond to the changes in the international context. A
shift of axis can only be legitimized, if you see such a thing. A
static axis in your mind, which doesn't have continuity, you think
in your mind that nothing has changed. A shift of axis could be only
legitimized, if it happens in the reinterpretation of the geography
and history. EU and NATO are the main fixtures in Turkish foreign
policy. The main elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy. In
transatlanticism, you should ask a question..
Is the role of Turkey in NATO more today than seven years ago,
since AK Party, more or less? Did Turkey's contribution to NATO
increase? Or is Turkey ignoring NATO and concentrating on Syria,
Iran, and the East? I can give you tons of statistics to show that
Turkey's involvement in NATO is greater than before. We asked for a
higher representation in NATO. And we got it. Now, look at the EU now
in comparison to 1963. Did Turkey achieve more progress in 40 years,
or in the last 6 years? What happened in those years? Now we are being
accused of taking Turkey in other directions. What is the objective
basis of this argument if we achieved more in 6 years, than forty
years? Nobody came blame Turkey because of the policies of France,
if there was no change of President in France, or if socialist won the
election two years ago Turkey, EU relations would have been different.
Or if Cyprus had accepted the Annan plan in 2004, today Turkish-EU
relations would have been different. If the EU didn't give regard the
rejectionist Greek Cypriots, and hadn't punished the peaceful Turkish
Cypriots, things would be different, now. Is it Turkey that changed
the axis, or Europe? Yesterday, our Prime Minister underlined these.
Europe is trying to change the rules of the game, unfortunately. They
are trying to change the axis of European rules. And there are
those who are trying on the Cypriot debate, to change the concept
of justice. They are changing their concept of justice. The axis of
justice. Can you give me any example of a community that has been
punished for saying yes to peace, other than the Turkish Cypriots in
the last 7 years? Where is the axis of justice? The basic element of
humanity and the EU. The EU, blaming and, creating some misconceptions
of Turkey, I don't see any good intention. They have to give us
some scientific, objective explanation that Turkey ignored NATO,
has ignored the EU.
And another issue. The EU should show that the existing Turkish foreign
policy is not compatible with EU objectives or with transatlantic
objectives. These two conditions should be fulfilled. We agree that
Turkey has done more in EU in the last seven years than during 40
years and as well as in NATO.
The second argument, are these new principles compatible with EU and
NATO transatlantic relations or against?
I will mention three methodological principles and six operative
principals of Turkish foreign policy. Today, and in the last 6 years,
our methodology is a visionary approach, not a crisis oriented
approach. During the cold war because of the characteristic of the
cold war, we were in a crisis, because of one big clash with the Soviet
Union, so the issue was managing the crisis. Now, we are implementing
a vision-oriented foreign policy.
If you ask me now, since I miss lecturing, I can give hours of
lectures on our vision of Middle East, the EU, Caucasus and Central
Asia. For example, in the Middle East, no one can say that we are
acting against PKK, just to eliminate PKK, or to counterbalance Iran
or to try to manage the crisis in Syrian. No, we have a vision for
the Middle East. No one cans say for example, that in the Balkans,
Turkey is trying to act against neo-Ottomansim. We have a vision of a
multicultural, stable, Balkans. Therefore, no one could imagine that
five years ago, that Turkish, Serbian, Bosnian foreign ministers
would meet in Istanbul twice in one month, to decide to continue
this dialogue, through this mechanism, given the historical context
of Turkey and Serbia, and Bosnians and Turks. Next week, I will meet
with leaders in Sarajevo and in January we will meet in Belgrade. Our
vision is a vision of mutual respect, stability, peace and prosperity.
Our vision is the same in the Caucasus. Therefore we offered a
mechanism, a platform, Caucasian Platform Stability and Cooperation
Act. Is this vision-oriented approach compatible with EU values or
against EU objectives? I think the answer is very clear.
The second principle: a consistent, systematic framework. Our vision
for the Middle East shouldn't contrast to our approach in Central
Asia or Balkans. Our approach in Africa shouldn't be different than
the approach in Asia, nor should our approach in economic relations
differ, i.e. in the G20, with this understanding. Like we are trying
to develop with Iraq, Syria, Greece and Russia now. When someone
looks, you can see artistic works, like a painter. When you look,
you see all the colors are in the right places. Or a beautiful place,
like Sultanahmet, or the construction of the Taj Mahal. All of the
colors are in the right place. If the symmetry of the Taj Mahal is
not perfect, it cannot be a piece of classical art. Similarly, in
foreign policy, you have to put the colors in such a way, that those
who are observing the foreign policy they will feel that there is one
political brain, one approach behind this policy. Today, the advantage
of Turkey, in the last 6-7 years, there is one party government,
therefore you can follow. There is consistency, and continuity. Is
it consistent with the EU? Yes.
The third methodological principle, is trying to have a new style, in
the sense of political rhetoric and tools; an instrument. In one word
I will call it, "Soft Power". Today, Turkey is using more soft power
than hard power. Twenty-thirty years ago we didn't have this. This
is something new. Is this compatible with EU values? Why did the EU
emerge? Because the EU emerged, in context of hard and soft powers in
Second World War. No Turkish leaders have used any terminology in any
plane that has threatened the use of hard power. All soft power. But,
we are of course, proud of our hard power, our military force, because
this is also a changing variable based on technological advancement.
But, which power will be used, in which contrast? The balance between
soft and hard power... This is important.
All three of these principles: vision orientation; a systematic
framework; using soft power. They are all compatible with European
values and transatlantic orientation. Otherwise, to be frank, you
should criticize those organizations who are critical of Turkey,
if they are not compatible. These are the humanitarian aspects.
Sometimes I am accused of being Utopian with these concepts. Now,
I am coming to six operative principles. I will make a checklist,
did we achieve these six principles in the last 7 years?
The first principle: the balance between security and freedom. Until
recently, in the Turkish psyche, the Turkish approach, there was
a sense that to have a secure and safe country there needed to
be some limitation on freedom to in turn have security, in Turkey,
therefore we had some military interventions. Therefore after military
interventions, there was always a transitional stage. In this was
always a discussion of how to enlarge democracy. Step by step. This
government, has implemented nine, comprehensive democratic packages,
and the most compressive one is still on the way. But, security, for
Turkey, from outside or inside, is much less of an issue for Turkey
now. We don't see that these two principles are contradictory to
each other. If you ignore security for freedom you will have anger
and chaos. If you ignore freedom for security, you will have an
authoritarian, autocratic society. We don't want to ignore either of
these two. Is this principle compatible with the EU and transatlantic
values? Yes. Otherwise the Copenhagen criteria shouldn't be mentioned.
The second principle, very well know now: "zero problems with our
neighbors". When we declared this for the first time we were accused of
being Utopian. Of course we know very well, that not only neighbors,
even in the family, between brothers and sisters there will always
be disagreements. We know it is just a target. But if you give these
targets to your diplomats, to you people, your military, society,
than the perception will change. I was criticized in our budgetary
session in the Parliament. They said, why are you defending this? It
means you need to make compromises, in order to have zero problems. And
they said.. it is unrealistic.. Utopian. I gave them an example of a
saying by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, "peace at home, and peace with our
neighbors". A very successful military commander.
Throughout his life he fought in many wars. He knew it was impossible
to have peace always, but he wanted to show a new target for a society
which had thirty years of continuous war in the Ottoman territories,
the Balkans to Yemen. He wanted to show that we need a new era of
peace to recover. Similarly, now, we want to show that there will be
a new era with our neighbors. We want to show our neighbors that we
may disagree on many points but we have to reintegrate because our
destiny is the same.
Last week I was in Athens. It was a very nice experience to mention.
In our meeting
with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou. Before the meeting, with our
team, we have consulted, what should be our priority. I made a set
of agenda. I will mention four levels, bil-lateral relations: under
which we have economic, political cultural, minority issues, Cyprus.
Second, we discussed regional cooperation in the Middle East, the
Eastern Mediterranean, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Black Sea.
Third, our cooperation in the EU. How to make the Eastern Mediterranean
a center of attraction, once Turkey becomes member of EU. At the
meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou, as a nice surprise, he made
almost the same recommendations.
What is the main issue between Turkey and Greece foreign ministers,
there is no problem. Just asking the question. Where is the shift
of access? Which one is more European? Why don't you also see our
relations with Greece, Georgia, with Armenia, with our neighbors?
Whenever Turkish foreign policy is active, this question comes up. In
the US some circles are saying, that you have are very clever, that
you have an Islamic foreign policy, but you are using "zero problems",
such good terminology, as a cover. And to mask Turkey's pulling away
from the West. Those who say this don't understand geography. Turkey
has 12 indirect countries, and only four neighbors are Muslim: Iraq,
Syria, Iran and Azerbaijan. The rest are non-Muslim, Georgia, Armenia,
Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Greece. Check whether our
relations with Syria and Iran are improving and our relationship with
Greece and Georgia are going down, then you may have a point. But if
we implement this principle, consistently, with all of our neighbors,
regardless of religious and ethnic origin then nobody can criticize
us. And this is our choice. Why choice? This is the necessity of
geography. We live in the most risky geographical environment. Only
we know, as our foreign ministers, our Undersecretaries, our Prime
Minister, government knows of how many crises in our region we have
dealt with. Which leaders called us from our region to help with
a crisis. With this mobile telephone you have, wherever there is a
crisis, they will find you. It is easy to say for someone who is far
away from the center of Afro-Eurasia to limit your relations with
neighbors. We want this. Sorry, this is our geography; this is our
future with our neighborhood.
When I became Minister of foreign affairs I said maximum cooperation,
and economic integration with our neighbors. In the last six months we
established high level strategic council meetings with Syria and Iraq,
and we signed 48 agreements with Iraq, through joint-cabinet meeting.
We will now have such mechanisms with Russia and Greece, and we will
have similar meetings with other neighbors. There was a question to
the Prime Minister, yesterday, about Visa's while he was here. Why is
Turkey implementing a Visa liberalization policy with Syria, Albania,
Jordan, and Libya? Yes, in the last four months, we abolished the Visa
requirement between Turkey and these four countries. We will continue.
If someone asks us why we are doing this and not with the EU...I will
tell them, ask this question to the EU. For the last fifteen years,
Turkey has implemented custom union with full consistency. And
according to the custom union, the EU has to open the market to
our businessmen. It is a service sector...If a businessman cannot
go freely to another country, how can he make a business? How can
you implement a custom union? They didn't implement, although they
promised. And now they are implementing a Visa liberalization regime
with Serbia, which is not even a candidate country for EU. Also,
Croatia, and Macedonia, leaving out Albania. Now somebody ask the
EU, about Turkey. It is an accession candidate country. We are not
against Serbia or Macedonia's liberalization processes, we fully
support this. In fact we are criticizing the EU for not giving it to
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why not? But someone should ask
this question. Why not to Turkey? As Turkey, with a dynamic economy,
with almost 1 trillion usd, based on PPP criteria. We will wait until
Europe one day decides to open its market to us, and we will keep our
commodity, our people, our Visa's with our neighbors in a very strict
regime. Turkey, as David Milliband mentioned once in his speech, is
a giant. I am not using this is a prop. But, it is a big country in
the region. We believe in the economies of our region and we believe
with this economic leadership there will
provide peace, as well, for the Middle East, and for Caucasus.
Therefore we are in favor of our relations with Armenia. Please ask
many of the faces I know here, they are the best experts of Turkish
foreign policy. Three years, four years ago, even last year, would
imagine that Turkey would sign two protocols with Armenia? Is this
compatible with the EU or not? Is this a shift of axis, or not? In
which direction, if it's a shift of axis, towards problematic? I am not
using Orientalist terminology. But, problematic East or more compromise
oriented West? But, nobody can tell us that Turkish-Armenia protocols
are the only issues in the Caucasus. We are not trying to solve only
once crisis in the Caucasus. We want to have a new Caucasia where
there will be no close borders. Not only partnerships between Turkey
and Armenia, but also between Turkey and Azerbaijan, between Russia
and Georgia. This is our vision. All of these normalization processes
are parallel to each other. Those who are asking us and praising us
because of our normalization process with Armenia should also propose
that Armenia should stop the invasion of 20% of Azeri territories. It
is against international law, and international criteria of norms and
values. This a division we have. As I said, this is a critical issue.
The third operative principle, is a proactive peace diplomacy, not
only with neighbors, but with all the regions.
I will discuss our vision with the Middle East based on security for
all, conflict resolution mechanisms, high-level political dialogue,
economic integration, and multicultural coexistence. This is valid
for Balkans, for Middle East and Caucasus. When I say proactive,
I also mean preventative, at the same time. If there is a crisis,
we shouldn't wait until the tension becomes a high level and even war.
You can see many of our efforts. Like, the Iraqi Syrian dispute. The
next day I was in Damascus. Like Syria-Israeli peace efforts. Nobody
asked us. No administration asked us. We had tried to convince them
to do something good. Ambassador Wilson knows the background of many
of the consultations at the time. Is it compatible with transatlantic
values or not? Syria and Israeli indirect talks, for example. Last
year, we
had almost completed the indirect talks between Syria and Israel in
Ankara, unfortunately the Gaza attacks came and we did not continue.
Or the Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, or Lebanese reconciliation
in Lebanon and now Serbian, Bosnia reconciliation in Balkans. This
is our approach to the surrounding region and these will continue.
The fourth principle: compatible global relations. We are not involved
in a bipolar world anymore. It means our good relations with Russia is
not an alternative to the EU. Or our model partnership with the United
States is not a new partnership against Russia. No, it's a positive
partnership, active, not reactive partnership, unlike bipolar world;
therefore Russia is our main trade partner, 30 billion usd.
But our main strategic partner is the United States; as we shared,
all of these things yesterday at the White House, without any
reservations. As two allies, we are looking at the world with the
same perspective. Also with EU, today, with the preparations of the EU
summit, our perspective of the EU, is one of full Turkish integration
to EU. We hope that in the next few years, we will be a full partner.
These are not competitive. Nobody should criticize us that one of
these is against the other. This is over. Similar to our relations
with the Muslim world. This is also compatible with other efforts. I
mentioned yesterday, in the Philippines, both government there and
Muslim minority, where they are having problems, they approached Turkey
to help resolve their crisis with some other countries, because they
trust Turkish mediation; similarly, in Somalia, and other places.
This is the fifth principle: active involvement in all global and
international issues, in all international organizations. Again,
five, six seven years ago, becoming a member of the UN security
Council member was a dream, and we are chairing three critical
commissions on the council: Afghanistan, the fight against terror
and North Korea. We are also a member of G20. We are an observer of
the African Union, and the Arab League...Now, we want to be a part
of the Pacific Forum. We are opening ten new embassies in Africa,
two in Latin America, therefore after this evening we will be in
Mexico. Also, climate change: we signed the Kyoto protocol. Why?
Because this is the future of all humanity. And it shows a new
perspective of Turkey, one which is based on vision, soft power,
a universal language, implementing such consistent foreign policies
in different parts of the world.
Being in the West, the North, East and South. Trying to work hard
on all of these fronts without creating an issue of axis- to defend
regional and global peace. Where is the axis? The axis is in Ankara.
Yesterday, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan referred to Rumi, 'your one
leg will be wherever you are, but you have to see all of the universe
with the other leg'.
Nuh Yılmaz: Thank you, His Excellency. The floor is now open to
questions. Please tell us your name and affiliation.
Wendy Chamberlain, President, MEI: Mr. Davutoglu, you have played
every active role in the Middle East Palestinian and Israeli talks.
Where do you see it going in the next year.
FM Ahmet Davutoglu: Yes, we have been very active in the Middle
Eastern peace process. Not only in one front, because all of these
issues in the Middle East are interrelated, and because we have the
broader Middle East. Iran, Egypt, Iraq. But here Israel-Arab tension,
I am talking about here. There are three legs, essentially. Israeli
relations with Syria, Israeli- Palestinian, Israeli- Lebanon. In the
last six years we've had serious difficulties on all of these fronts.
The Lebanese war in 2006. A continuous tension between Israel
and Palestine, and latest Gaza attacks of last year, and also
Syrian-Israeli attack, and the Israel bombardment Syria in September
2007. This is the picture we have. Turkey is trying to contribute
to the three legs, in such a way that all the legs can support each
other. We were very active policy in Syria-Israeli indirect talks in
2008. When we started in May 2008, the same day the Doha agreement
was achieved, we purposefully declared the same day, because we were
very active from October 2007 to May 2008 in Lebanon. I have been
to Lebanon more than ten times in the last six months just to help
Lebanese reconciliation. So these legs are all supporting each other,
without Syrian-Israeli indirect talks a broader peace could not be
successful. During the initial talks we talked to both parties and
determined that two places must be quiet. Lebanon and Gaza. With
these tensions, Syria-Israeli talks could not continue. I am sure
you remember, after the start of indirect talks in Istanbul, on May
20, 2008, within one month, Hamas and Israel had signed a ceasefire
agreement with the Egyptian mediation. So they already supported
each other. The three legs supported each other. This established
a new balance. But the Israel attacks on Gaza destroyed this leg,
unfortunately. After December 2008 in Gaza, it destroyed the third
leg. And that created a collapse, with one leg out of balance. This
same day, there was a suspension. Now, what can we do today? I am sure
you followed the Prime Ministers speech yesterday. We criticize Israel,
yes, and we think Gaza was a big mistake. Using phosphorous bombs was
also a crime. This was the same week that Prime Minister Olmert came
to Ankara to finalize the first written agreed text between Syrian
and Israel. It was a blow up and we didn't have any indication of
this. For almost three years we had worked to build a building. The
Prime Minister and Olmert were talking. I went tons of times, meeting
with delegations, negotiating. Then Monday, we wake up when Olmert
was to sign the last word with Turkish Prime Minister..
and the building we were building collapsed. For us it was not wise,
or correct. And Turkey criticized. If the same thing happens, we will
criticize again.
We will not tolerate humanitarian massacres in our region any more.
When the Kurds were massacred by Saddam, we defended them, and we will
defend them. Today I received a call that there were terrorist attacks
in Baghdad, after one hour we are calling, we gave them 100% of support
and told them, all Turkish facilities are at your disposal. We will
not tolerate any terrorist attack in Iraq. Against whom is not the
question. Sunni or Shiites, it is not important. This is our approach.
Then, there was a change of government in Israel. We hope that now,
there is an, in fact, President Obama's new approach is a great asset
for our region. I hope that everyone will understand this. There is
full coordination between Turkey and the US
on the Syrian-Israeli track, Israeli-Palestinian track. We will
do everything possible, that our region will not see tension, war,
or humanitarian tragedies in the future. We had some contacts with
Syrian, Israel on these issues. We hope both parties will be ready
to re-start these efforts. Similarly, we are working on Palestinian
reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Without this reconciliation
there will not be peace between Palestine and Israel. We will work
on all three of these fronts.
Abdullah Akyuz, TUSIAD US, President: Thank you very much, Mister
Minister for your remarks. My question is regarding Turkey's economic
dimension and soft power in the region. Can you elaborate on this
dimension. How does it work on the ground and what is the interaction
between Turkey's economic activities in the region and Turkish foreign
policy toward the region?
FM Ahmet Davutoglu: There are many dimensions but let me give you two.
In the last six years, the share of neighboring countries in Turkish
foreign trade has risen from 8 percent to 32 percent. For example,
what is the ultimate consequence of these? One of the reasons why
Turkish economy was less affected during the last world economic crisis
was because of the rise of trade with our neighboring countries was
because most of these countries were not integrated in the global
economy therefore they didn't have decline of demand, unlike the
European Union. The EU is part of the global economy, therefore the
demand from EU to Turkey commodities declined dramatically, it did
not decline between Turkey and Egypt and Iran, and Syria. This was
a concrete example of how important asset for us. And when we say
economic integration, we really want to integrate these economies.
Like, in Iraq we signed 48 agreements with Iraq. 11 of these were
transportation agreements. We want to have a railway from Basra,
through Iraq and Northern Iraq, to Turkey, then to Europe. We want to
have a road connection. We will have flights to all Iraqi cities, if
possible. So, it is to prepare the ground. Similarly, we signed 4-5
energy agreements with Iraq. We would like make the flow of energy
from Iraq, through Turkey, then to Europe. Similar with Syria, we
have many projects. After two weeks, we will go to Syria and
sign around 40 agreements, in all sectors. In health, Turkey will
modernize or rehabilitate health system in Iraq and Syria. We signed
agreements with Libya, on construction, because Libya has huge
projects for the future, almost 50 billion dollar projects. Turkish
construction companies are the second biggest sector in the world
after China, and the US is third. We are opening all these markets,
all of this potential, to our business. Turkey has a free market
economy. Our businesses sector will be active. So we are trying to
open the ways for our business sector.
Alan Makovsky, Senior Staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee: First
of all, the Prime Minister has made it a theme. He repeated it last
night. Ever since his Brookings talk last year...That there should
be no double standards regarding nuclear issues...that those states
that have nuclear arms don't really have the right to press others
not to get them. I assume he's talking about Israel here, not about
the US, France, UK, Russia. If I'm wrong about that please correct
me. He usually doesn't specify which country he has in mind. But,
I wanted to ask you which is more threatening to Turkey: A nuclear
Iran, or a nuclear Israel?
Question two, when you had your opening to Hamas, and I think
you've used similar language when you had your opening with Iran,
you said that you wanted to keep channels open for the West in order
to influence them to change. And I wondered if this is an open ended
concept? Will you always keep that channel open? Or will there be a
point, if there is no change when there is no change that you throw
your hands up and try a different approach?
FM Ahmet Davutoglu: Our PM has made it clear many times, but let
me try to identify three basic principles of Turkey regarding the
nuclear issue.
First, all nations have the right to obtain peaceful, nuclear
technology, because technology doesn't belong to one country, one
group, is the culmination of the knowledge of humanity, there cannot
be a monopoly on technology, therefore Iran, Israel, including Turkey
have the right to obtain peaceful nuclear technology. Secondly, we are
against nuclear weapons. I am saying this not only as a Minister, but
as a human being, as an intellectual, I am repeating the same thing:
there is no ethical justification for a nuclear weaponry system. No
justification at all. Wherever, and whoever has it. We had this in the
Second World War, although it was very primitive. But now we have all
of these experiences. We should not risk, I am sure you watched 2012,
the movie, it was a natural disaster, but a nuclear weapon would
create much more of a destructive atmosphere than that of a natural
disaster. Nobody can defend a nuclear weaponry system. We have an
IAEA system, non proliferation treaty; we have to be realistic and
work within this framework.
The objective should be, ultimately, a nuclear free world. If we cannot
achieve this objective now, with our zero problems with our neighbors,
what can we achieve, a nuclear free Middle East? The Middle East is
full of tension, it's full of disagreements, nuclear tensions within
the Middle East will add another additional element of tension.
Therefore we made this very clear to Iran.
We do not want a nuclear Iran. We don't want a nuclear Israel. You
should not give us two choices, and ask us which is the worst? Why
don't we have a good choice? No nuclear weapon anywhere. Why not none
of them? Why should we have to choose a nuclear Iran or a nuclear
Israel or both of them? The best is none of them. Which one is more
threatening to Turkey? Alan, you know nuclear war, nuclear technology.
In 1986, there was a nuclear accident in Chernobyl, even today, cancer
in some cities, in Antalya, because of the nuclear affect. Assume that
Israel uses a nuclear strike against Iran. This nuclear weapons system
is not intelligent to know where the Turkish and Iranian borders are.
It will come everywhere. Even if it only hits Iran, we would be against
it. Similarly if Iran had decided to attack Israel, the same problem
with the nuclear technology, to know the distance between Tel Aviv
and Jerusalem, 25 km. 25 km is the distance from these two cities. We
are living in such a common region.
As Turkey, in our vision, there is no nuclear weapon in the Middle
East. We will do everything possible to prevent this. The third
principal, how do you resolve this through diplomatic means? We have
to continue our efforts. Is it open ended
diplomacy as you suggested in your question? Diplomacy should be
seen as the only means to resolve our disputes. Iran says that they
don't have a nuclear weapon program. We cannot say anything. Which
institution has the authority? The IAEA. We want Iran to be transparent
to the IAEA. And we have an excellent cooperation with the IAEA. Turkey
will do everything possible to solve these issues though diplomatic
means, because if there is a military strike, we will be paying the
bill. If there are more sanctions on Iran, we know our experience
of Iraq, the sanctions of Saddam hurt Turkey more and the people
of Iraq. It is against our vision of the Middle East. We will not
tolerate such a condition in our region. I don't know if these are
clear answers, but this is our approach in our region.
Nuh Yılmaz: Thanks Foreign Minister Davutoglu and the audience.
END.
Transcribed by Hailey Cook, SETA Foundation.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress