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December 7, 2009 Monday 11:17 AM EST
Opinion: Explaining Turkeys high-risk activism
BYLINE: Ronald H. Linden
Dec. 7, 2009 (GlobalPost delivered by Newstex) --
WASHINGTON ' On Monday, Prime Minister Recip Erdogan of Turkey arrived
in Washingtontrailing a list of actions designed to achieve Å`zero
problems with his countrys neighbors. Considering how many immediate
neighbors there are (seven) and who they are (e.g. Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Armenia) this is a tall order. Ankaras activism has raised the stakes
in its own neighborhood and eyebrows in the United States.
Turkey has long been a valuable member of NATO and supporter of U.S.
initiatives, e.g. the first Gulf War, Afghanistan. Its application to
join the EU has been in Brussels mailbox for more than 20 years. Now,
several developments in the region ' an erosion of U.S. interest and
power, the rise of an assertive Russia and Iran, a nonexistent Å`peace
process in the Middle East and the emergence of the Black Sea as a
central energy corridor ' have spurred Turkey to carve out its own
distinctive role.
Turkey is poor in energy resources but rich in strategic location.
Russia is now its largest trading partner and energy supplier. Ankara
has agreed to let the Russians build the Å`South Stream pipeline across
Turkish territorial waters. Last year Turkish reaction to Russian
dismemberment of Georgia ' with whom Turkey had extensive ties ' was
muted and U.S. attempts to put more naval forces in the Black Sea at
the time were rebuffed. When the foreign minister visited Georgia, a
deputy undersecretary simultaneously visited the breakaway Abkhazia
region.
But it would be misleading to see this as an East-West choice. Turkey
has not retreated from involvement in European energy plans and signed
the long-delayed agreement on the Nabucco Pipeline the same month as
that on South Stream. It rapidly recognized the new state of Kosovo,
which the EU and U.S. wanted and Russia did not. President Obamas
visit in April, 2009 produced a jump in favorable views of the U.S.
but suspicions linger from years of being other countries instrument.
What we are seeing is a Turkish foreign policy that is viewing its
neighborhood through Turkish lenses unrestrained by allies views or
old paradigms. As such, Turkeys search for its own path is accompanied
by significant risks. In October the government signed protocols with
Armenia pledging to open a border that has been closed for more than
15 years in support of Azerbaijans position in Nagorno-Karabakh. This
has infuriated the Azerbaijani public and government, which has
threatened Turkeys privileged access to Azeri energy supplies. If
Turkish-Armenian normalization goes ahead without progress on
Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey will have traded longstanding and much needed
ties with resource-rich Azerbaijan for a new uncertain level of
involvement with landlocked, Russian-dominated and quite poor Armenia.
This risk is minor compared to those in the Middle East. American
desires to isolate and pressure Iran run directly counter Turkeys $10
billion annual trade with the Islamic Republic. The same prime
minister who is coming to Washington has sharply criticized talk of
sanctions and proclaimed Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to be
Å`our friend. A friend he may be, but if he persists with uranium
enrichment and threatens others in the region, Turkey will seem an
enabler.
Probably no change of direction has been as dramatic as Turkeys
courting of good relations with its Arab neighbors, Iraq and Syria,
combined with its simultaneous slaps at Israel, a long time ally. An
emotional outburst by Prime Minister Erdogan at Davos in January was
followed by visceral criticism of Israeli action in Gaza and, most
recently, cancelling of Israeli participation in the Å`Anatolian Eagle
military exercises. The gains are substantial for Turkeys image among
Arab states and with Iran.
But the risks are great. Ankara risks losing the valuable military and
technological cooperation it had enjoyed with Israel, not to mention
the $300 million annually derived from Israeli visitors ' some 500,000
last year. It has raised great suspicions among Americans concerned
about the fate of Israel and forfeited its role as an Å`honest broker
in the Middle East ' a role that almost succeeded in creating direct
Israeli-Syrian talks. Instead, Turkey now has a Å`strategic partnership
with Syria, another Å`trade that may bring it closer to a much poorer,
weaker and more isolated country.
More broadly, virtually all of the Turkish moves strengthen the hand
of Russia in the region, already boosted by its actions in Georgia.
Turkish-Azeri tension over the Armenian overture, for example, rebound
to Russias advantage, as the major gas supplier to Turkey and
alternative market for Azerbaijan.
Why would Turkey pursue such policies, especially given recent failed
gambles? In 2004 it reversed decades-long policy to back an
EU-brokered settlement in Cyprus. The result? Greek-Cypriots rejected
the plan, northern Cyprus is still isolated and Cyprus has been
admitted to the EU while its own prospects languish.
Domestically, Turkish policies resonate positively with an important
part of the public. Changes in Turkey in the last decade have brought
to influence more conservative and more Islamic actors from Anatolia
and eastern Turkey, a newly empowered elite no longer as interested in
getting the Wests approval. Ironically, the very democratization that
the West has pushed has given this group more influence over foreign
policy.
Internationally, Turkey is asserting ' or reasserting ' itself in a
region that was once under its sway. This is not a revival of the
Ottoman Empire, but a move to fill the vacuum created by missing U.S.
influence in the Middle East and a weak, uncoordinated European
response to Russia in the Black Sea. Given history and the countrys
geostrategic position, it seems to the Erdogan government both natural
and obligatory to fill this vacuum. The aim is to create a less
turbulent region and a more secure energy supply while satisfying an
important domestic constituency. But internationally there is another
constituency, here in Washington, that needs some reassuring.
Ronald H. Linden is a Senior Fellow of the Transatlantic Academy based
at the German Marshall Fund in Washington D.C.
December 7, 2009 Monday 11:17 AM EST
Opinion: Explaining Turkeys high-risk activism
BYLINE: Ronald H. Linden
Dec. 7, 2009 (GlobalPost delivered by Newstex) --
WASHINGTON ' On Monday, Prime Minister Recip Erdogan of Turkey arrived
in Washingtontrailing a list of actions designed to achieve Å`zero
problems with his countrys neighbors. Considering how many immediate
neighbors there are (seven) and who they are (e.g. Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Armenia) this is a tall order. Ankaras activism has raised the stakes
in its own neighborhood and eyebrows in the United States.
Turkey has long been a valuable member of NATO and supporter of U.S.
initiatives, e.g. the first Gulf War, Afghanistan. Its application to
join the EU has been in Brussels mailbox for more than 20 years. Now,
several developments in the region ' an erosion of U.S. interest and
power, the rise of an assertive Russia and Iran, a nonexistent Å`peace
process in the Middle East and the emergence of the Black Sea as a
central energy corridor ' have spurred Turkey to carve out its own
distinctive role.
Turkey is poor in energy resources but rich in strategic location.
Russia is now its largest trading partner and energy supplier. Ankara
has agreed to let the Russians build the Å`South Stream pipeline across
Turkish territorial waters. Last year Turkish reaction to Russian
dismemberment of Georgia ' with whom Turkey had extensive ties ' was
muted and U.S. attempts to put more naval forces in the Black Sea at
the time were rebuffed. When the foreign minister visited Georgia, a
deputy undersecretary simultaneously visited the breakaway Abkhazia
region.
But it would be misleading to see this as an East-West choice. Turkey
has not retreated from involvement in European energy plans and signed
the long-delayed agreement on the Nabucco Pipeline the same month as
that on South Stream. It rapidly recognized the new state of Kosovo,
which the EU and U.S. wanted and Russia did not. President Obamas
visit in April, 2009 produced a jump in favorable views of the U.S.
but suspicions linger from years of being other countries instrument.
What we are seeing is a Turkish foreign policy that is viewing its
neighborhood through Turkish lenses unrestrained by allies views or
old paradigms. As such, Turkeys search for its own path is accompanied
by significant risks. In October the government signed protocols with
Armenia pledging to open a border that has been closed for more than
15 years in support of Azerbaijans position in Nagorno-Karabakh. This
has infuriated the Azerbaijani public and government, which has
threatened Turkeys privileged access to Azeri energy supplies. If
Turkish-Armenian normalization goes ahead without progress on
Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey will have traded longstanding and much needed
ties with resource-rich Azerbaijan for a new uncertain level of
involvement with landlocked, Russian-dominated and quite poor Armenia.
This risk is minor compared to those in the Middle East. American
desires to isolate and pressure Iran run directly counter Turkeys $10
billion annual trade with the Islamic Republic. The same prime
minister who is coming to Washington has sharply criticized talk of
sanctions and proclaimed Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to be
Å`our friend. A friend he may be, but if he persists with uranium
enrichment and threatens others in the region, Turkey will seem an
enabler.
Probably no change of direction has been as dramatic as Turkeys
courting of good relations with its Arab neighbors, Iraq and Syria,
combined with its simultaneous slaps at Israel, a long time ally. An
emotional outburst by Prime Minister Erdogan at Davos in January was
followed by visceral criticism of Israeli action in Gaza and, most
recently, cancelling of Israeli participation in the Å`Anatolian Eagle
military exercises. The gains are substantial for Turkeys image among
Arab states and with Iran.
But the risks are great. Ankara risks losing the valuable military and
technological cooperation it had enjoyed with Israel, not to mention
the $300 million annually derived from Israeli visitors ' some 500,000
last year. It has raised great suspicions among Americans concerned
about the fate of Israel and forfeited its role as an Å`honest broker
in the Middle East ' a role that almost succeeded in creating direct
Israeli-Syrian talks. Instead, Turkey now has a Å`strategic partnership
with Syria, another Å`trade that may bring it closer to a much poorer,
weaker and more isolated country.
More broadly, virtually all of the Turkish moves strengthen the hand
of Russia in the region, already boosted by its actions in Georgia.
Turkish-Azeri tension over the Armenian overture, for example, rebound
to Russias advantage, as the major gas supplier to Turkey and
alternative market for Azerbaijan.
Why would Turkey pursue such policies, especially given recent failed
gambles? In 2004 it reversed decades-long policy to back an
EU-brokered settlement in Cyprus. The result? Greek-Cypriots rejected
the plan, northern Cyprus is still isolated and Cyprus has been
admitted to the EU while its own prospects languish.
Domestically, Turkish policies resonate positively with an important
part of the public. Changes in Turkey in the last decade have brought
to influence more conservative and more Islamic actors from Anatolia
and eastern Turkey, a newly empowered elite no longer as interested in
getting the Wests approval. Ironically, the very democratization that
the West has pushed has given this group more influence over foreign
policy.
Internationally, Turkey is asserting ' or reasserting ' itself in a
region that was once under its sway. This is not a revival of the
Ottoman Empire, but a move to fill the vacuum created by missing U.S.
influence in the Middle East and a weak, uncoordinated European
response to Russia in the Black Sea. Given history and the countrys
geostrategic position, it seems to the Erdogan government both natural
and obligatory to fill this vacuum. The aim is to create a less
turbulent region and a more secure energy supply while satisfying an
important domestic constituency. But internationally there is another
constituency, here in Washington, that needs some reassuring.
Ronald H. Linden is a Senior Fellow of the Transatlantic Academy based
at the German Marshall Fund in Washington D.C.