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Kurdish Globe
Dec 19 2009
Shallow opening vis-Ã-vis dark relations
By Azad Aslan
Globe Editorial
Turkey's democratic opening, essentially a Kurdish opening, has been
derailed by recent political developments ignited by PKK sympathizers'
actions--the PKK's provocative attack against a military post in
Resadiye, Tokat, which ended with the killing of seven Turkish
soldiers--and the Turkish constitutional court's controversial
decision to ban the only Kurdish party, DTP (Democratic Society
Party), which had seats at the Turkish National Assembly.
Despite the fact that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
insistence that the democratic opening would go ahead, it is clear
that the opening has already been wrecked. It is clear that the
AKP-led government must develop a much more radical and detailed
program in order to accomplish a proper and just opening. The question
is whether the AKP has apathy or vision for such an initiative.
The upheaval over the last two weeks in Turkey that radiates around
the Kurdish opening, prison conditions of PKK's arrested leader,
Abdullah Ocalan, and DTP closure signifies the complex nature of the
Kurdish national question in Turkey and the power struggle within the
Turkish political establishment. These complex questions and the
internal hegemonic struggle within Turkey must be analyzed within the
framework of international relations and global power struggle.
With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the global status quo, the
capitalist system needed to reorganize itself according to the new
post-Soviet conditions. Initiated by the U.S., the "New World Order"
has created more confusion and disorganization throughout the last two
decades. The U.S. had to face challenges to its hegemonic global power
status by the growing new power centers, particularly by the EU,
China, and recently Russia. Bipolar world politics has been
transformed into multi-polar politics followed by the intensified race
for economic and political interests.
Turkey, with its border with the former Soviet Union and being a
member of NATO, had strategic position within the Western political
dominion. However, this strategic position has been challenged with
the demise of the Soviet Union. The U.S. position in the Middle East
and in Afghanistan brought new opportunities for Turkey to be a
regional player associated closely with the U.S. When Turkish
Parliament refused to open its borders for the U.S. to open a northern
front in March 2003, the relations between the two seemed to reach a
breaking point. The disharmony between Turkey and the U.S., however,
was short-lived, and both sides came to understand the need to
cooperate in the region. For Turkey to be a strong regional player,
particularly in the field of energy corridors (Nabucco being an
example), it needed to resolve its problematic relations both with
Armenia and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is not a
coincidence that Turkey coordinated in parallel to improve its
relations both with Armenia and the KRG. Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmed Davutoglu visited Erbil, the capital city of Kurdistan, and
stated that Turkey is going to open a consulate in Erbil. This move
was a confirmation of Turkey's recognition of the KRG. At the same
space of time, Turkey and Armenia signed a protocol in Switzerland.
It was also necessary for Turkey to deal with its own Kurdish and PKK
question in order to create a safe and stable region in its Kurdish
region, which was necessary both for its proper relations with the KRG
and safe flow of energy sources through the region.
The AKP-led democratic opening thus was a necessary and strategic move
for Turkey. In reality, the democratic opening does not really address
the Kurdish national question in its entirety. The opening was shallow
and reduced the question to a sub-identity issue rather than a genuine
national issue. Despite its shortcomings, nonetheless, the opening was
a historic move given the background of the Turkish policy of denial
and forceful assimilation of Kurdish identity.
Necessitated by Turkey's new regional power role, the democratic
initiative was tossed into the internal power struggle within Turkey.
The traditional political elite, mainly the Kemalist and the army,
fiercly opposed the opening and considered it as a threat against the
unity and integrity of Turkey. Since the early 20th-century, the
military-bureaucratic elite ruled both the Ottoman Empire and Turkish
Republic. The policy of Committee of Union and Progress, famously
known as Ittihadi Teraqqi, who got the power in 1908 in the Ottoman
Empire, changed its name to Kemalism following the dismemberment of
the Empire and formed the new Turkish Republic with the aim of
Turkification of non-Turkish elements to create an artificial national
identity, in effect, the Turkish nation. Due to the fact that the
Armenians were considerably reduced as a result of the 1915 Armenian
Genocide, the only element seen as a threat to the Republic was the
Kurds who constituted a second majority group in the newly established
Republic. For decades, the Kemalist clique constituted by the army and
bureaucratic elite attempted to deny the very existence of Kurdish
identity and used any means necessary to assimilate and eliminate the
Kurdish national identity.
However, with the opening of the Turkish economy and radical policy
changes from the 1980s, the Turkish economy integrated closely with
the global capitalist market; as a result, a new Turkish entrepreneur
and capitalist class grew that is now challenging the traditional
elite, mainly Kemalist, and the Kemalist-bureaucratic and statist
system of the Turkish political and economic establishment. The AKP is
their representative. Through the discourse of democracy they aim to
reduce political and economic privileges of the traditional elite,
including the army. The Ergenekon case in that sense is indicative of
this internal struggle. Having been in power without any serious
challenges, the Kemalist elite does not seem willing to give up their
position so easily, and further dramatic conflicts between them is
imminent.
The Kurdish national question in Turkey for long has been used as an
instrument by both sides in their struggle for power. While the
Kemalist elite and army uses it as a threat to the existence of the
Turkish Republic, the opposite side uses it as an instrument for their
democratic rhetoric.
>From the Kurdish perspective, there is a thin line between the two
sides' policy with regard to the Kurdish national question. While the
traditional Turkish elite insist in its initial "Turkification" policy
of the Kurdish identity, the AKP's democratic opening aims for
"Turkeyfication" of the Kurds. While the former denies the very
existence of Kurdish identity, the latter recognizes it only as
sub-identity within the unitary Turkish state. While the former forces
the Kurds to claim "we are all Turk," the latter forces the Kurds to
claim "we are all for Turkey," shying away from the identity issue.
Both sides uniquely refuse to recognize Kurds as a distinct national
identity entitled to national rights.
The Kurdish position to the both sides is confusing. Two main
representatives, though not entirely, of the Kurds, PKK and DTP, have
the same rhetoric as that of AKP, and thus one rationally expects them
to support AKP; in practice, they attack AKP policy. Both PKK and DTP
have not claimed the Kurds to be recognized as a national identity by
the Turkish Constitution. Both enthusiastically claim they are for
Turkey and reduce the Kurdish national question to a sub-identity
issue as that of AKP. Both PKK and DTP failed to produce alternative
policies with regard to the Kurdish question. It is not clear why they
do not support AKP against the traditional Kemalist elite and Turkish
military.
PKK's recent military attack against Turkish soldiers at this
particular period is considered rightly by so many as a provocative
attack, which only strengthened the hands of the military and Kemalist
clique against the AKP's democratic opening. Similarly, DTP
persistently refused to be a main collocutor to the AKP's Kurdish
initiative and provocatively referred PKK to be the collocutor. As the
only legal Kurdish party represented in the Turkish Assembly, it
should have been DTP's role to be collocutor in this opening, not PKK
as a clandestine organization. The peace process in Ireland and the
role played by Sein Fein provides a good example of this. This fatal
mistake weakened DTP's credibility and reduced its representative
role. DTP should have liberated itself from the shadow of PKK.
PKK's attack in Resadiye and killing of Turkish soldiers at this
sensitive period created serious doubts of PKK's connection with or
its manipulation by the traditional Kemalist elite and the army. The
Kemalist elite in Turkey try to contain the Kurdish question within
the framework of terrorism and do not want it to be politicized. With
the "threat" of terrorism, they can sustain not only their position
and privileges in the establishment, but more importantly, they
prevent the discussion of the Kurdish question in the political arena.
The Kurdish political actors should have criticized AKP's shallow
opening with regards to the Kurds and produced alternative policies,
while at the same time they should have supported AKP against the
Kemalist elite. Both PKK and DTP did the opposite.
Kurdish political actors in Kurdistan of Turkey must seriously
reconsider their policy and discourse, and it is time for them to come
up with an informed and coherent national political program to elevate
the Kurdish national issue to higher standards.
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArt icle.jsp?id=357117D3A4BA25BBCDC4B6089377A278
Dec 19 2009
Shallow opening vis-Ã-vis dark relations
By Azad Aslan
Globe Editorial
Turkey's democratic opening, essentially a Kurdish opening, has been
derailed by recent political developments ignited by PKK sympathizers'
actions--the PKK's provocative attack against a military post in
Resadiye, Tokat, which ended with the killing of seven Turkish
soldiers--and the Turkish constitutional court's controversial
decision to ban the only Kurdish party, DTP (Democratic Society
Party), which had seats at the Turkish National Assembly.
Despite the fact that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
insistence that the democratic opening would go ahead, it is clear
that the opening has already been wrecked. It is clear that the
AKP-led government must develop a much more radical and detailed
program in order to accomplish a proper and just opening. The question
is whether the AKP has apathy or vision for such an initiative.
The upheaval over the last two weeks in Turkey that radiates around
the Kurdish opening, prison conditions of PKK's arrested leader,
Abdullah Ocalan, and DTP closure signifies the complex nature of the
Kurdish national question in Turkey and the power struggle within the
Turkish political establishment. These complex questions and the
internal hegemonic struggle within Turkey must be analyzed within the
framework of international relations and global power struggle.
With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the global status quo, the
capitalist system needed to reorganize itself according to the new
post-Soviet conditions. Initiated by the U.S., the "New World Order"
has created more confusion and disorganization throughout the last two
decades. The U.S. had to face challenges to its hegemonic global power
status by the growing new power centers, particularly by the EU,
China, and recently Russia. Bipolar world politics has been
transformed into multi-polar politics followed by the intensified race
for economic and political interests.
Turkey, with its border with the former Soviet Union and being a
member of NATO, had strategic position within the Western political
dominion. However, this strategic position has been challenged with
the demise of the Soviet Union. The U.S. position in the Middle East
and in Afghanistan brought new opportunities for Turkey to be a
regional player associated closely with the U.S. When Turkish
Parliament refused to open its borders for the U.S. to open a northern
front in March 2003, the relations between the two seemed to reach a
breaking point. The disharmony between Turkey and the U.S., however,
was short-lived, and both sides came to understand the need to
cooperate in the region. For Turkey to be a strong regional player,
particularly in the field of energy corridors (Nabucco being an
example), it needed to resolve its problematic relations both with
Armenia and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is not a
coincidence that Turkey coordinated in parallel to improve its
relations both with Armenia and the KRG. Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmed Davutoglu visited Erbil, the capital city of Kurdistan, and
stated that Turkey is going to open a consulate in Erbil. This move
was a confirmation of Turkey's recognition of the KRG. At the same
space of time, Turkey and Armenia signed a protocol in Switzerland.
It was also necessary for Turkey to deal with its own Kurdish and PKK
question in order to create a safe and stable region in its Kurdish
region, which was necessary both for its proper relations with the KRG
and safe flow of energy sources through the region.
The AKP-led democratic opening thus was a necessary and strategic move
for Turkey. In reality, the democratic opening does not really address
the Kurdish national question in its entirety. The opening was shallow
and reduced the question to a sub-identity issue rather than a genuine
national issue. Despite its shortcomings, nonetheless, the opening was
a historic move given the background of the Turkish policy of denial
and forceful assimilation of Kurdish identity.
Necessitated by Turkey's new regional power role, the democratic
initiative was tossed into the internal power struggle within Turkey.
The traditional political elite, mainly the Kemalist and the army,
fiercly opposed the opening and considered it as a threat against the
unity and integrity of Turkey. Since the early 20th-century, the
military-bureaucratic elite ruled both the Ottoman Empire and Turkish
Republic. The policy of Committee of Union and Progress, famously
known as Ittihadi Teraqqi, who got the power in 1908 in the Ottoman
Empire, changed its name to Kemalism following the dismemberment of
the Empire and formed the new Turkish Republic with the aim of
Turkification of non-Turkish elements to create an artificial national
identity, in effect, the Turkish nation. Due to the fact that the
Armenians were considerably reduced as a result of the 1915 Armenian
Genocide, the only element seen as a threat to the Republic was the
Kurds who constituted a second majority group in the newly established
Republic. For decades, the Kemalist clique constituted by the army and
bureaucratic elite attempted to deny the very existence of Kurdish
identity and used any means necessary to assimilate and eliminate the
Kurdish national identity.
However, with the opening of the Turkish economy and radical policy
changes from the 1980s, the Turkish economy integrated closely with
the global capitalist market; as a result, a new Turkish entrepreneur
and capitalist class grew that is now challenging the traditional
elite, mainly Kemalist, and the Kemalist-bureaucratic and statist
system of the Turkish political and economic establishment. The AKP is
their representative. Through the discourse of democracy they aim to
reduce political and economic privileges of the traditional elite,
including the army. The Ergenekon case in that sense is indicative of
this internal struggle. Having been in power without any serious
challenges, the Kemalist elite does not seem willing to give up their
position so easily, and further dramatic conflicts between them is
imminent.
The Kurdish national question in Turkey for long has been used as an
instrument by both sides in their struggle for power. While the
Kemalist elite and army uses it as a threat to the existence of the
Turkish Republic, the opposite side uses it as an instrument for their
democratic rhetoric.
>From the Kurdish perspective, there is a thin line between the two
sides' policy with regard to the Kurdish national question. While the
traditional Turkish elite insist in its initial "Turkification" policy
of the Kurdish identity, the AKP's democratic opening aims for
"Turkeyfication" of the Kurds. While the former denies the very
existence of Kurdish identity, the latter recognizes it only as
sub-identity within the unitary Turkish state. While the former forces
the Kurds to claim "we are all Turk," the latter forces the Kurds to
claim "we are all for Turkey," shying away from the identity issue.
Both sides uniquely refuse to recognize Kurds as a distinct national
identity entitled to national rights.
The Kurdish position to the both sides is confusing. Two main
representatives, though not entirely, of the Kurds, PKK and DTP, have
the same rhetoric as that of AKP, and thus one rationally expects them
to support AKP; in practice, they attack AKP policy. Both PKK and DTP
have not claimed the Kurds to be recognized as a national identity by
the Turkish Constitution. Both enthusiastically claim they are for
Turkey and reduce the Kurdish national question to a sub-identity
issue as that of AKP. Both PKK and DTP failed to produce alternative
policies with regard to the Kurdish question. It is not clear why they
do not support AKP against the traditional Kemalist elite and Turkish
military.
PKK's recent military attack against Turkish soldiers at this
particular period is considered rightly by so many as a provocative
attack, which only strengthened the hands of the military and Kemalist
clique against the AKP's democratic opening. Similarly, DTP
persistently refused to be a main collocutor to the AKP's Kurdish
initiative and provocatively referred PKK to be the collocutor. As the
only legal Kurdish party represented in the Turkish Assembly, it
should have been DTP's role to be collocutor in this opening, not PKK
as a clandestine organization. The peace process in Ireland and the
role played by Sein Fein provides a good example of this. This fatal
mistake weakened DTP's credibility and reduced its representative
role. DTP should have liberated itself from the shadow of PKK.
PKK's attack in Resadiye and killing of Turkish soldiers at this
sensitive period created serious doubts of PKK's connection with or
its manipulation by the traditional Kemalist elite and the army. The
Kemalist elite in Turkey try to contain the Kurdish question within
the framework of terrorism and do not want it to be politicized. With
the "threat" of terrorism, they can sustain not only their position
and privileges in the establishment, but more importantly, they
prevent the discussion of the Kurdish question in the political arena.
The Kurdish political actors should have criticized AKP's shallow
opening with regards to the Kurds and produced alternative policies,
while at the same time they should have supported AKP against the
Kemalist elite. Both PKK and DTP did the opposite.
Kurdish political actors in Kurdistan of Turkey must seriously
reconsider their policy and discourse, and it is time for them to come
up with an informed and coherent national political program to elevate
the Kurdish national issue to higher standards.
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArt icle.jsp?id=357117D3A4BA25BBCDC4B6089377A278