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RUSSIA NOT INTERESTED IN SOONEST RESOLUTION OF KARABAKH CONFLICT
Kamala Mammadova
news.az
Dec 23 2009
Azerbaijan
Stepan Grigoryan News.Az interviews Stepan Grigoryan, head of the
Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation.
What can you say about the statement by Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan made during the meeting with the US president that
Ankara will normalize the Armenian-Turkish relations only after the
real progress in Karabakh settlement?
This is a well-known position of the Turkish side that has experienced
many changes in the past year. A year ago Turkey demanded withdrawal
of the Armenian armed formations from the five regions around Nagorno
Karabakh, while now it is just looking forward the progress in the
negotiation process within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. I
think this dynamics in Turkey's position is dictated with the logics
of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue (establishment of relations without
preliminary provisions), new accents in Turkey's external policy of
the recent 5-6 years and the realities produced by Russia's August
war against Georgia in 2008.
Thus, Tel-Aviv and Washington are outraged with Turkey's rapprochement
with Iran and Syria which in fact makes the recognition of "Armenian
genocide" a technical task. Therefore, the Turkish Premier was told
during the visit to the United States that if the Armenian-Turkish
protocols are not ratified by April 2010, Barack Obama's administration
will not be able to prevent recognition of the "Armenian genocide"
committed in the Osman Empire in 1915 by the US Congress.
Stepan GrigoryanIndeed, the Turkish foreign policy has experienced
significant changes in the past years. Turkey recognized Russia's
and Iran's interests in the South Caucasus, agreed on Russia's
construction of the South Stream gas pipeline, initiated dialogue
with Syria, signed serious contracts on gas projects with Iran,
recognized Kosovo's independence and sent its deputy foreign minister
to Abkhazia. Earlier in 2003 the Turkish parliament did not allow
US land offensive against Saddam Husein's regime from Turkey's
territory. In fact, Turkey has passed to the new external policy
rejecting the formula "everything that is good for the United States
in Middle East, South Caucasus and Central Asia is good for Turkey".
But, as you understand, when you play you have to pay. After this
process, the attitude of Turkey's traditional partners to this country
begins to change. Thus, Tel-Aviv and Washington are outraged with
Turkey's rapprochement with Iran and Syria which in fact makes the
recognition of "Armenian genocide" a technical task. Therefore, the
Turkish Premier was told during the visit to the United States that
if the Armenian-Turkish protocols are not ratified by April 2010,
Barack Obama's administration will not be able to prevent recognition
of the "Armenian genocide" committed in the Osman Empire in 1915 by
the US Congress. As is seen, this will be "double recognition". On
24 April 2010 the US president will make the due statement and a
little later the "Armenian genocide" will be recognized by the House
of Representatives of the US Congress.
We can continue this list of implications for Turkey. For example, one
can ask how Turkey can change its attitude to national and religious
minorities both inside the country and beyond its bounds (we have
already paid attention to the recognition of Kosovo's independence by
Turkey and open support to Abkhazs. Turkey has changed its attitude to
Kurdish language, opened radio programs in Armenian inside the country)
and not occupy a more impartial position in the Karabakh issue.
It would have been more effective if Turkey and Armenia ratify
protocols without preliminary provisions and settle all the accumulated
issues through a bilateral dialogue and not "act" via the third
countries and for the interests of the third countries.
I would also like to draw your attention to another aspect of
the Armenian-Turkish dialogue: I think the opening of borders and
normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations in the nearest future
will lead to Armenia's reorientation to the West and create conditions
for the trilateral South Caucasus regional cooperation. The settlement
of regional conflicts when the role of borders will significantly
change and the compromised resolution of these conflicts becomes
possible is seen in terms of the parallel European and Euroatlantic
integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Therefore, the
interests of Georgia and Azerbaijan are also implied in the process
of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.
Do you think the parliaments of both countries will ratify protocols
on normalizing the Turkish-Armenian ties in such a situation?
I think the Turkish and Armenian parliaments will ratify the
protocols. Thus, the progovernmental coalition consisting of three
parties in the National Assembly of Armenia controls about 75% of
deputies mandates which facilitates the ratification of protocols. The
situation in the Turkish parliament is more complicated but I am
confident that the Turkish parliament will ratify both protocols in
the coming 2-3 months. The thing is that Turkey is a country with
big state traditions and its political elite adheres to national
interests in taking important decisions.
Today Turkey is interested in normalizing relations with Armenia for
most including the aforementioned reasons. Moreover, normalization of
Turkey's relations with Armenia fully complies with its new external
policy. Thus, it cannot take into account the interests of Russia and
Iran in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, assist to Abkhazia and at
the same time keep borders with Armenia closed. Moreover, Turkey knows
that not only the United States and EU but also Russia are interested
in the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. All these factors will
finally lead to ratification of protocols by the Turkish parliament.
By results of the Munich meeting the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs
declared some breakthrough in the negotiation process. What do you
think is the script of the further development of the Karabakh issue?
The Karabakh conflict settlement depends on most factors, both internal
and external ones. As far as I understand, the negotiation process has
recently intensified and it should be welcomed. Yet it is difficult
to count on the quick settlement of the conflict at least for the
reason of high distrust existing in the Armenian and Azerbaijani
societies towards each other, absence of culture of compromise of
the elites of the two countries and the high level of intolerant
attitude towards each other. Therefore, I am against the artificial
acceleration of the Karabakh conflict settlement as it may raise
possibility of hostilities.
Are Moscow and Washington really interested in the complete settlement
of the Karabakh conflict?
It seems that Russia and the United States have a consensus in this
issue: both countries are unready and do not consider the quick
settlement of the Karabakh conflict possible. The difference here
lies in motivation of the sides. Thus, Russia is not interested in
the quick settlement of the problem as it understands that it might
lose the last "lever" of influence on Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the
United States do not see objective grounds for the quick settlement
of the conflict at least for the reason of a serious discrepancy in
the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan on basic issues (withdrawal
of troops from the lands around Nagorno Karabakh, problem of Nagorno
Karabakh's status, terms and order of refugees' return and so on).
Will the Karabakh conflict be settled next year?
Despite serious discrepancies in the positions of the sides, I do
not exclude possible signing of a certain framework agreement between
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the coming months. The agreement may be based
on the renewed Madrid principles that contain all elements (principle
of territorial integrity, rights of nations for self-determination
and peace settlement of the conflict) concerning all parties. Yet,
it would be difficult to attain the signing of a comprehensive peace
treaty as the parties still have significant discrepancies on a number
of principal issues and on the order of implementation of agreements.
Kamala Mammadova
news.az
Dec 23 2009
Azerbaijan
Stepan Grigoryan News.Az interviews Stepan Grigoryan, head of the
Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation.
What can you say about the statement by Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan made during the meeting with the US president that
Ankara will normalize the Armenian-Turkish relations only after the
real progress in Karabakh settlement?
This is a well-known position of the Turkish side that has experienced
many changes in the past year. A year ago Turkey demanded withdrawal
of the Armenian armed formations from the five regions around Nagorno
Karabakh, while now it is just looking forward the progress in the
negotiation process within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. I
think this dynamics in Turkey's position is dictated with the logics
of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue (establishment of relations without
preliminary provisions), new accents in Turkey's external policy of
the recent 5-6 years and the realities produced by Russia's August
war against Georgia in 2008.
Thus, Tel-Aviv and Washington are outraged with Turkey's rapprochement
with Iran and Syria which in fact makes the recognition of "Armenian
genocide" a technical task. Therefore, the Turkish Premier was told
during the visit to the United States that if the Armenian-Turkish
protocols are not ratified by April 2010, Barack Obama's administration
will not be able to prevent recognition of the "Armenian genocide"
committed in the Osman Empire in 1915 by the US Congress.
Stepan GrigoryanIndeed, the Turkish foreign policy has experienced
significant changes in the past years. Turkey recognized Russia's
and Iran's interests in the South Caucasus, agreed on Russia's
construction of the South Stream gas pipeline, initiated dialogue
with Syria, signed serious contracts on gas projects with Iran,
recognized Kosovo's independence and sent its deputy foreign minister
to Abkhazia. Earlier in 2003 the Turkish parliament did not allow
US land offensive against Saddam Husein's regime from Turkey's
territory. In fact, Turkey has passed to the new external policy
rejecting the formula "everything that is good for the United States
in Middle East, South Caucasus and Central Asia is good for Turkey".
But, as you understand, when you play you have to pay. After this
process, the attitude of Turkey's traditional partners to this country
begins to change. Thus, Tel-Aviv and Washington are outraged with
Turkey's rapprochement with Iran and Syria which in fact makes the
recognition of "Armenian genocide" a technical task. Therefore, the
Turkish Premier was told during the visit to the United States that
if the Armenian-Turkish protocols are not ratified by April 2010,
Barack Obama's administration will not be able to prevent recognition
of the "Armenian genocide" committed in the Osman Empire in 1915 by
the US Congress. As is seen, this will be "double recognition". On
24 April 2010 the US president will make the due statement and a
little later the "Armenian genocide" will be recognized by the House
of Representatives of the US Congress.
We can continue this list of implications for Turkey. For example, one
can ask how Turkey can change its attitude to national and religious
minorities both inside the country and beyond its bounds (we have
already paid attention to the recognition of Kosovo's independence by
Turkey and open support to Abkhazs. Turkey has changed its attitude to
Kurdish language, opened radio programs in Armenian inside the country)
and not occupy a more impartial position in the Karabakh issue.
It would have been more effective if Turkey and Armenia ratify
protocols without preliminary provisions and settle all the accumulated
issues through a bilateral dialogue and not "act" via the third
countries and for the interests of the third countries.
I would also like to draw your attention to another aspect of
the Armenian-Turkish dialogue: I think the opening of borders and
normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations in the nearest future
will lead to Armenia's reorientation to the West and create conditions
for the trilateral South Caucasus regional cooperation. The settlement
of regional conflicts when the role of borders will significantly
change and the compromised resolution of these conflicts becomes
possible is seen in terms of the parallel European and Euroatlantic
integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Therefore, the
interests of Georgia and Azerbaijan are also implied in the process
of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.
Do you think the parliaments of both countries will ratify protocols
on normalizing the Turkish-Armenian ties in such a situation?
I think the Turkish and Armenian parliaments will ratify the
protocols. Thus, the progovernmental coalition consisting of three
parties in the National Assembly of Armenia controls about 75% of
deputies mandates which facilitates the ratification of protocols. The
situation in the Turkish parliament is more complicated but I am
confident that the Turkish parliament will ratify both protocols in
the coming 2-3 months. The thing is that Turkey is a country with
big state traditions and its political elite adheres to national
interests in taking important decisions.
Today Turkey is interested in normalizing relations with Armenia for
most including the aforementioned reasons. Moreover, normalization of
Turkey's relations with Armenia fully complies with its new external
policy. Thus, it cannot take into account the interests of Russia and
Iran in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, assist to Abkhazia and at
the same time keep borders with Armenia closed. Moreover, Turkey knows
that not only the United States and EU but also Russia are interested
in the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. All these factors will
finally lead to ratification of protocols by the Turkish parliament.
By results of the Munich meeting the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs
declared some breakthrough in the negotiation process. What do you
think is the script of the further development of the Karabakh issue?
The Karabakh conflict settlement depends on most factors, both internal
and external ones. As far as I understand, the negotiation process has
recently intensified and it should be welcomed. Yet it is difficult
to count on the quick settlement of the conflict at least for the
reason of high distrust existing in the Armenian and Azerbaijani
societies towards each other, absence of culture of compromise of
the elites of the two countries and the high level of intolerant
attitude towards each other. Therefore, I am against the artificial
acceleration of the Karabakh conflict settlement as it may raise
possibility of hostilities.
Are Moscow and Washington really interested in the complete settlement
of the Karabakh conflict?
It seems that Russia and the United States have a consensus in this
issue: both countries are unready and do not consider the quick
settlement of the Karabakh conflict possible. The difference here
lies in motivation of the sides. Thus, Russia is not interested in
the quick settlement of the problem as it understands that it might
lose the last "lever" of influence on Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the
United States do not see objective grounds for the quick settlement
of the conflict at least for the reason of a serious discrepancy in
the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan on basic issues (withdrawal
of troops from the lands around Nagorno Karabakh, problem of Nagorno
Karabakh's status, terms and order of refugees' return and so on).
Will the Karabakh conflict be settled next year?
Despite serious discrepancies in the positions of the sides, I do
not exclude possible signing of a certain framework agreement between
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the coming months. The agreement may be based
on the renewed Madrid principles that contain all elements (principle
of territorial integrity, rights of nations for self-determination
and peace settlement of the conflict) concerning all parties. Yet,
it would be difficult to attain the signing of a comprehensive peace
treaty as the parties still have significant discrepancies on a number
of principal issues and on the order of implementation of agreements.