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MEMBERS OF THE US CONGRESS ARE NEITHER HISTORIANS NOR LEGAL EXPERTS
Leyla Tagiyeva
news.az
Dec 23 2009
Azerbaijan
Nigar Göksel News.Az interviews Nigar Göksel, ESI Senior Analyst,
the European Stability Initiative (ESI).
Don't you think that from now on Baku will feel some kind distrust in
relations with Ankara after the recent "diplomatic dispute" between
Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenian issue?
It is true that there has been a souring in the relations but it is
not only because of the Armenian issue. Both countries have naturally
been changing in various ways and there may have been communication
disconnects along the way. In the 90s, a vision to link Azerbaijan
to the transatlantic world in as many ways as possible was shared
widely and was the overarching priority.
Today the picture is more complex. Turkey has more of its own
ambitions, is developing stronger partnerships with countries that
do not share its transatlantic vocation, and in a sense is more
"adventurous."
A culmination of the perception in Baku that Turkey's priorities were
being reshuffled may have caused the eruption over the Armenian issue
to be as strong as it was.
However, to remedy this sense of distrust in Baku, the Turkish
decision makers have gone out of their way to emphasize the crucial
importance of a just solution to the Karabakh conflict. We witnessed
this most recently during the Turkish Prime Minister's meeting with
President Obama.
Will, despite this effort on Turkey's part, the distrust continue? At
some level, yes. Theoretically, the relationship should be back on
track. But the human dimension should not be neglected. A tinge of
bitterness and suspicion seems likely to remain, at least among the
actors in the forefront of the recent tensions.
How strong is Turkey to overcome the pressure from the West in
"genocide" and "border" issues?
We hear from Washington that if Turkey normalizes relations with
Armenia (which would include opening the border), this would make
it more likely that the word genocide would not be pronounced from
Washington (Congress and/or President) in April this year. This is
how the two issues are linked.
However, many key figures in Ankara seem confident that a genocide
resolution in Washington will not be passed this year in any case. It
is assumed, based on a strategic calculation, that the US would
not risk the blow a genocide resolution would have on the Turkey-US
relationship. Turkey is playing a critical role in issues high on
the agenda of the West. It is by now a widely shared perception that
the positions Turkey takes regarding Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or the
"Arab street," can effect the course of events.
Members of the US Congress are neither historians nor legal experts
- just like members of the Russian Duma in 1995 were not when they
recognized the events of 1915 as genocide. Which brings me to the fact
that up to 20 countries have done so. I would hope - for the sake of
both Turkish citizens and Turkey's influence on global affairs- that
even if the US Congress were to one day pass a genocide resolution,
the Turkish leadership would not allow this to change the entire
course of the country's foreign policy.
Turkey is one of the members of OSCE Minsk group. Are there
possibilities to involve Turkey in the Karabakh settlement as a fourth
co-chair (with U.S., Russia and France)?
Armenia would object to Turkey joining the group of co-chairs, as
Turkey is seen as favoring Azerbaijan. Realistically, it would not
be possible with the current realities.
Of course I do not know whether Turkey could be accepted as a co-chair
in return for normalizing relations with Armenia (establishing
diplomatic relations and opening borders). Even if so, it is debatable
that Turkey would have more influence on the process as a co-chair
than it does by leveraging the border option.
Leyla Tagiyeva
news.az
Dec 23 2009
Azerbaijan
Nigar Göksel News.Az interviews Nigar Göksel, ESI Senior Analyst,
the European Stability Initiative (ESI).
Don't you think that from now on Baku will feel some kind distrust in
relations with Ankara after the recent "diplomatic dispute" between
Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenian issue?
It is true that there has been a souring in the relations but it is
not only because of the Armenian issue. Both countries have naturally
been changing in various ways and there may have been communication
disconnects along the way. In the 90s, a vision to link Azerbaijan
to the transatlantic world in as many ways as possible was shared
widely and was the overarching priority.
Today the picture is more complex. Turkey has more of its own
ambitions, is developing stronger partnerships with countries that
do not share its transatlantic vocation, and in a sense is more
"adventurous."
A culmination of the perception in Baku that Turkey's priorities were
being reshuffled may have caused the eruption over the Armenian issue
to be as strong as it was.
However, to remedy this sense of distrust in Baku, the Turkish
decision makers have gone out of their way to emphasize the crucial
importance of a just solution to the Karabakh conflict. We witnessed
this most recently during the Turkish Prime Minister's meeting with
President Obama.
Will, despite this effort on Turkey's part, the distrust continue? At
some level, yes. Theoretically, the relationship should be back on
track. But the human dimension should not be neglected. A tinge of
bitterness and suspicion seems likely to remain, at least among the
actors in the forefront of the recent tensions.
How strong is Turkey to overcome the pressure from the West in
"genocide" and "border" issues?
We hear from Washington that if Turkey normalizes relations with
Armenia (which would include opening the border), this would make
it more likely that the word genocide would not be pronounced from
Washington (Congress and/or President) in April this year. This is
how the two issues are linked.
However, many key figures in Ankara seem confident that a genocide
resolution in Washington will not be passed this year in any case. It
is assumed, based on a strategic calculation, that the US would
not risk the blow a genocide resolution would have on the Turkey-US
relationship. Turkey is playing a critical role in issues high on
the agenda of the West. It is by now a widely shared perception that
the positions Turkey takes regarding Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or the
"Arab street," can effect the course of events.
Members of the US Congress are neither historians nor legal experts
- just like members of the Russian Duma in 1995 were not when they
recognized the events of 1915 as genocide. Which brings me to the fact
that up to 20 countries have done so. I would hope - for the sake of
both Turkish citizens and Turkey's influence on global affairs- that
even if the US Congress were to one day pass a genocide resolution,
the Turkish leadership would not allow this to change the entire
course of the country's foreign policy.
Turkey is one of the members of OSCE Minsk group. Are there
possibilities to involve Turkey in the Karabakh settlement as a fourth
co-chair (with U.S., Russia and France)?
Armenia would object to Turkey joining the group of co-chairs, as
Turkey is seen as favoring Azerbaijan. Realistically, it would not
be possible with the current realities.
Of course I do not know whether Turkey could be accepted as a co-chair
in return for normalizing relations with Armenia (establishing
diplomatic relations and opening borders). Even if so, it is debatable
that Turkey would have more influence on the process as a co-chair
than it does by leveraging the border option.