Tweet
DIPLOMATIC HIDE AND SEEK GAMES OF THE CO-CHAIRS CANNOT LAST LONG
news.az
Dec 24 2009
Azerbaijan
Tigran Torosyan News.Az interviews Tigran Torosyan, deputy of the
National Assembly of Armenia.
How do you evaluate the meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents in Munich? Do you consider a progress in negotiation
process on the Karabakh conflict was really reached during the meeting?
This meeting was of special importance not only for Armenia and
Azerbaijan but also for Russia, the United States and Turkey. Yet
the expectations were not justified. An unprecedented situation that
deteriorated the confrontation between the United States and Russia
for zones of influence has been produced in the region by the August
war between Georgia and Russia. Georgia completely fell under the US
influence and the latter had a chance to seize full control over the
situation in the region. To this end, it was necessary to implement
the Georgia-2 plan for Armenia and Azerbaijan to attract one of
these countries to West's side. Obviously, the implementation of this
plan required a maximally strained situation around a very sensitive
process like in case with Georgia. There are two processes of this
kind in case of Armenia and Azerbaijan. These are the resolution of the
Karabakh conflict and normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations.
As for ratification of protocols, certainly the US pressure on Turkey
will grow close to 24 April - the Day of Commemoration of victims of
Armenian genocide. Washington will threaten with adoption of the due
resolution about the Armenian genocide by the Senate and say Obama
will use the word "genocide" in a traditional appeal on 24 April.
Tigran Torosyan This is why, the unprecedented developments in these
two directions including the declaration of the presidents of the
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries, publication of the draft
Madrid principles, signing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols and other
events occurred in the past year . One can easily get convinced that
the United States is not only the most concerned but also the most
insolent party in this process. It is also obvious that after signing
protocols and the statement of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan that
the protocols will be ratified only after a significant breakthrough
in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, the process entered the
stage of stagnation.
Theoretically, there are two ways of overcoming it: either there
will be a significant progress in the Karabakh conflict settlement
or Turkey will ratify the protocols under growing US influence. It
is clear that such a progress is important not only for the conflict
parties and the public will be informed in case this progress is
reached. The ratification of protocols will be an indirect but a
very important sign of this. But the problem is that none of these
two variants have a guaranteed solution today.
The diplomatic hide and seek games of the co-chairs cannot continue
for long and it is time to define the notion of Madrid principles,
primarily, regarding the status of Nagorno Karabakh. Those who are
concerned with the conflict settlement understand that these situations
will either end in frustration of this stage of negotiations (like
it occurred after Key West) or in emergency processes in one of the
countries. As for ratification of protocols, certainly the US pressure
on Turkey will grow close to 24 April - the Day of Commemoration of
victims of Armenian genocide. Washington will threaten with adoption
of the due resolution about the Armenian genocide by the Senate and
say Obama will use the word "genocide" in a traditional appeal on 24
April. Yet Ankara realizes the need to resist the growing pressure
and none of these threats will come true because the United States
and Turkey are bound with other no less important issues. On the
other hand, Ankara cannot disavow the provisions of ratification put
forward by Erdogan without any serious grounds.
Do you know anything about the details of the negotiation process,
in particular, the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from seven
regions adjacent to Nagorno Karabakh? Is the release of the seven
regions realistic? If yes, when may it happen?
The details of negotiations can be spoken of by those who are holding
negotiations. The seven regions are mentioned in the first paragraph of
the draft Madrid principles released in July. The Armenian authorities
state that this document is just a draft and the formulation of each
paragraph will be unclear before the end of negotiations. According
to them, the status of Nagorno Karabakh is under discussion at
present. Official Baku says the main issue is the release of the
seven regions after which it will agree on the status of autonomy
for Nagorno Karabakh. This mutually exclusive interpretation of
the negotiation process is possible due to the uncertainties fixed
in the draft Madrid principles. Yet, it cannot last long as these
uncertainties reduce during the negotiations.
Moreover, it becomes clear that mutually profitable solutions are
almost impossible on the two issues of status and territory considering
the positions of the parties. It is not by accident that more is spoken
of a framework agreement that can preserve uncertainties and pretend
to have progress. The real settlement of the conflict is possible
only with participation of the representatives of Nagorno Karabakh,
which is recognized as a party. In these frameworks and in line with
the definitions of the basic documents of UN and OSCE, the issues
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as the UN and OSCE members, must be
settled on the basis of the principle of territorial integrity while
the issues between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh must be settled
on the basis of the right for self-determination.
Moreover, all UN members including Armenia and Azerbaijan should
respect the right of Karabakh people for self-determination within
the framework of international law.
The settlement of any issues related to the conflict will not be
realistic without participation of Nagorno Karabakh and without
consideration of norms of international law.
Tigran TorosyanMoreover, there is the only possibility to use this
right - only the self-determining people, in this case-the people of
Nagorno Karabakh- shall decide which of the three possible variants
to choose as a status-separation and proclamation of independence,
separation and annexation to an independent state or any other
political status chosen by this people which is clearly fixed in
the declaration (A/8082, 2625XXV) "Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".
Meanwhile, though the draft Madrid principles are fixing these points,
the steps to reach solution have been formulated not in line with
these principles but as the co-chairs found it fitting. The settlement
of any issues related to the conflict will not be realistic without
participation of Nagorno Karabakh and without consideration of norms
of international law.
You are quite an experienced politician. Do you think Armenia's current
President Serzh Sargsyan may fail on the Armenian-Turkish card like
former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan did on the Karabakh trump card?
The current situation does not set preconditions for such
developments. First, there are no groups of influential people
in powers like it was in 1997 who would be able to set principal
demands before President Sargsyan. Oppositional powers are too weak
so far. As for the public, it is waiting for the developments. The
thing is that this issue is often presented from different sides as an
issue of setting normal relations with a neighbor state, as an issue
connected with a strong emotional subtext, as an issue related to the
implications of the ratification of the signed protocols. Certainly,
absolutely everyone in our society wants the normalization of relations
with a neighbor state and the settlement of existing issues.
Yet the "cost" of the settlement of these issues is of utmost
importance. The specialists view the issue of protocols ratification
in this sense. The main issues in the relations of Turkey and Armenia
include Turkey's participation in Armenia's isolation since 1993,
genocide of Armenians, issue of Western Armenia and recognition of
the currently existing border between Turkey and Armenia. It is clear
that these issues emerged not at Armenia's initiative. Moreover,
due to these issues Armenia had great human, material and moral
losses. Yet the definitions fixed in protocols regarding these issues
do not ensure their solution and are just worsening the situation.
This is why, a greater part of the Armenian population does not support
the ratification of protocols. But the destiny of the protocols is
unclear yet and most are waiting for further developments. It is
clear that the process of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation is
proceeding on par with the Karabakh conflict settlement and Turkey
binds these two processes to each other. If the development of these
two processes continues like that, they may have the most unexpected
implications both in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Neither Armenia nor the Azerbaijani authorities can stay calm due
to the weakness of the opposition parties. The cost of the issue is
too high and the processes may develop rapidly against the logic of
every-day happenings.
Do you think Yerevan's positions in the Armenian-Turkish negotiation
process are strong? Are Armenia's positions weakening or strengthening
in the negotiation process?
Armenia's positions are strong but they are used ineffectively
while Turkey takes advantage of even weak positions. Armenia is
misusing the unprecedented growth of its role in the region in
terms of confrontation between Russia and the United States for the
areas of influence and the moral superiority over Turkey. It lacks
professionalism. The further developments will mostly depend on
whether this blank is filled.
Does the Armenian Diaspora support Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan
the way it supported him before the signing of the Armenian-Turkish
protocols? What can be the implications of the loss of support of
Armenia's Diaspora for the Armenian president?
Certainly, many in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora are
discontented with the protocols and someone may review his plans. But
on the whole, the Armenian Diaspora has always support its homeland
regardless of the personality of the president and his actions.
news.az
Dec 24 2009
Azerbaijan
Tigran Torosyan News.Az interviews Tigran Torosyan, deputy of the
National Assembly of Armenia.
How do you evaluate the meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents in Munich? Do you consider a progress in negotiation
process on the Karabakh conflict was really reached during the meeting?
This meeting was of special importance not only for Armenia and
Azerbaijan but also for Russia, the United States and Turkey. Yet
the expectations were not justified. An unprecedented situation that
deteriorated the confrontation between the United States and Russia
for zones of influence has been produced in the region by the August
war between Georgia and Russia. Georgia completely fell under the US
influence and the latter had a chance to seize full control over the
situation in the region. To this end, it was necessary to implement
the Georgia-2 plan for Armenia and Azerbaijan to attract one of
these countries to West's side. Obviously, the implementation of this
plan required a maximally strained situation around a very sensitive
process like in case with Georgia. There are two processes of this
kind in case of Armenia and Azerbaijan. These are the resolution of the
Karabakh conflict and normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations.
As for ratification of protocols, certainly the US pressure on Turkey
will grow close to 24 April - the Day of Commemoration of victims of
Armenian genocide. Washington will threaten with adoption of the due
resolution about the Armenian genocide by the Senate and say Obama
will use the word "genocide" in a traditional appeal on 24 April.
Tigran Torosyan This is why, the unprecedented developments in these
two directions including the declaration of the presidents of the
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries, publication of the draft
Madrid principles, signing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols and other
events occurred in the past year . One can easily get convinced that
the United States is not only the most concerned but also the most
insolent party in this process. It is also obvious that after signing
protocols and the statement of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan that
the protocols will be ratified only after a significant breakthrough
in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, the process entered the
stage of stagnation.
Theoretically, there are two ways of overcoming it: either there
will be a significant progress in the Karabakh conflict settlement
or Turkey will ratify the protocols under growing US influence. It
is clear that such a progress is important not only for the conflict
parties and the public will be informed in case this progress is
reached. The ratification of protocols will be an indirect but a
very important sign of this. But the problem is that none of these
two variants have a guaranteed solution today.
The diplomatic hide and seek games of the co-chairs cannot continue
for long and it is time to define the notion of Madrid principles,
primarily, regarding the status of Nagorno Karabakh. Those who are
concerned with the conflict settlement understand that these situations
will either end in frustration of this stage of negotiations (like
it occurred after Key West) or in emergency processes in one of the
countries. As for ratification of protocols, certainly the US pressure
on Turkey will grow close to 24 April - the Day of Commemoration of
victims of Armenian genocide. Washington will threaten with adoption
of the due resolution about the Armenian genocide by the Senate and
say Obama will use the word "genocide" in a traditional appeal on 24
April. Yet Ankara realizes the need to resist the growing pressure
and none of these threats will come true because the United States
and Turkey are bound with other no less important issues. On the
other hand, Ankara cannot disavow the provisions of ratification put
forward by Erdogan without any serious grounds.
Do you know anything about the details of the negotiation process,
in particular, the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from seven
regions adjacent to Nagorno Karabakh? Is the release of the seven
regions realistic? If yes, when may it happen?
The details of negotiations can be spoken of by those who are holding
negotiations. The seven regions are mentioned in the first paragraph of
the draft Madrid principles released in July. The Armenian authorities
state that this document is just a draft and the formulation of each
paragraph will be unclear before the end of negotiations. According
to them, the status of Nagorno Karabakh is under discussion at
present. Official Baku says the main issue is the release of the
seven regions after which it will agree on the status of autonomy
for Nagorno Karabakh. This mutually exclusive interpretation of
the negotiation process is possible due to the uncertainties fixed
in the draft Madrid principles. Yet, it cannot last long as these
uncertainties reduce during the negotiations.
Moreover, it becomes clear that mutually profitable solutions are
almost impossible on the two issues of status and territory considering
the positions of the parties. It is not by accident that more is spoken
of a framework agreement that can preserve uncertainties and pretend
to have progress. The real settlement of the conflict is possible
only with participation of the representatives of Nagorno Karabakh,
which is recognized as a party. In these frameworks and in line with
the definitions of the basic documents of UN and OSCE, the issues
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as the UN and OSCE members, must be
settled on the basis of the principle of territorial integrity while
the issues between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh must be settled
on the basis of the right for self-determination.
Moreover, all UN members including Armenia and Azerbaijan should
respect the right of Karabakh people for self-determination within
the framework of international law.
The settlement of any issues related to the conflict will not be
realistic without participation of Nagorno Karabakh and without
consideration of norms of international law.
Tigran TorosyanMoreover, there is the only possibility to use this
right - only the self-determining people, in this case-the people of
Nagorno Karabakh- shall decide which of the three possible variants
to choose as a status-separation and proclamation of independence,
separation and annexation to an independent state or any other
political status chosen by this people which is clearly fixed in
the declaration (A/8082, 2625XXV) "Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".
Meanwhile, though the draft Madrid principles are fixing these points,
the steps to reach solution have been formulated not in line with
these principles but as the co-chairs found it fitting. The settlement
of any issues related to the conflict will not be realistic without
participation of Nagorno Karabakh and without consideration of norms
of international law.
You are quite an experienced politician. Do you think Armenia's current
President Serzh Sargsyan may fail on the Armenian-Turkish card like
former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan did on the Karabakh trump card?
The current situation does not set preconditions for such
developments. First, there are no groups of influential people
in powers like it was in 1997 who would be able to set principal
demands before President Sargsyan. Oppositional powers are too weak
so far. As for the public, it is waiting for the developments. The
thing is that this issue is often presented from different sides as an
issue of setting normal relations with a neighbor state, as an issue
connected with a strong emotional subtext, as an issue related to the
implications of the ratification of the signed protocols. Certainly,
absolutely everyone in our society wants the normalization of relations
with a neighbor state and the settlement of existing issues.
Yet the "cost" of the settlement of these issues is of utmost
importance. The specialists view the issue of protocols ratification
in this sense. The main issues in the relations of Turkey and Armenia
include Turkey's participation in Armenia's isolation since 1993,
genocide of Armenians, issue of Western Armenia and recognition of
the currently existing border between Turkey and Armenia. It is clear
that these issues emerged not at Armenia's initiative. Moreover,
due to these issues Armenia had great human, material and moral
losses. Yet the definitions fixed in protocols regarding these issues
do not ensure their solution and are just worsening the situation.
This is why, a greater part of the Armenian population does not support
the ratification of protocols. But the destiny of the protocols is
unclear yet and most are waiting for further developments. It is
clear that the process of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation is
proceeding on par with the Karabakh conflict settlement and Turkey
binds these two processes to each other. If the development of these
two processes continues like that, they may have the most unexpected
implications both in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Neither Armenia nor the Azerbaijani authorities can stay calm due
to the weakness of the opposition parties. The cost of the issue is
too high and the processes may develop rapidly against the logic of
every-day happenings.
Do you think Yerevan's positions in the Armenian-Turkish negotiation
process are strong? Are Armenia's positions weakening or strengthening
in the negotiation process?
Armenia's positions are strong but they are used ineffectively
while Turkey takes advantage of even weak positions. Armenia is
misusing the unprecedented growth of its role in the region in
terms of confrontation between Russia and the United States for the
areas of influence and the moral superiority over Turkey. It lacks
professionalism. The further developments will mostly depend on
whether this blank is filled.
Does the Armenian Diaspora support Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan
the way it supported him before the signing of the Armenian-Turkish
protocols? What can be the implications of the loss of support of
Armenia's Diaspora for the Armenian president?
Certainly, many in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora are
discontented with the protocols and someone may review his plans. But
on the whole, the Armenian Diaspora has always support its homeland
regardless of the personality of the president and his actions.