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WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 25, 2009 Friday
IRANIAN EXPANSION INTO SOUTH CAUCASUS
By Yuri Simonjan
2010 WILL BE A YEAR OF IRANIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION INTO
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS; Offering all sorts of economic projects to the
countries of the South Caucasus, Iran gradually develops political
clout.
Commenting on the efforts to have Abkhazia recognized by the
international community, President Sergei Bagapsh said that official
Sukhumi was closely working with the Middle East and Caribbean
countries. "We maintain active contacts with Iran whose
representatives actually visited Abkhazia. Besides, certain meetings
were organized in Moscow," he said. "By and large, Iran is prepared to
take part in economic processes in Abkhazia." The Abkhazian leader
said, however, that recognition of the republic by Tehran was out of
the question for the time being.
As a matter of fact, this state of affairs suits Sukhumi fine. Tehran
emulates the Turkish-Abkhazian arrangement - active economic contacts
without political recognition. Considering that years of Georgian
blockade left Abkhazia impoverished, importance of its economic ties
with Turkey and Iran, each a serious regional player, cannot be
overestimated.
Political aspects of the arrangement, something Sukhumi does not
comment on for the time being, are important as well. Should Turkey
and Iran go for major investment projects indeed, this development
will greatly allay Abkhazian fears to be assimilated by Russia, its
powerful neighbor and primary patron.
Turkey and Iran in their turn perceive Abkhazia as a convenient tool
for political manipulations at all levels from the regional to the
global - in the relations with Russia promoting Abkhazia and the
United States supporting Georgia. Moreover, it is also a tool for
maneuvering in the relations with Georgia itself and with Azerbaijan
that experiences analogous problems. And even with Armenia, a country
directly involved in the problems that exasperate Azerbaijan.
Tehran's genuine interests in Abkhazia are not known at this time.
Considering Iranian aspirations for regional leadership, however, they
may turn out to be considerable indeed. Official Tehran reiterated its
ambitions in the South Caucasus eighteen months ago when it proclaimed
investments plans regarding Armenia and Georgia to the total amount of
$4 billion. Yerevan was offered construction of a gas pipeline and
power lines between the two countries, refinery, and connection of
railroad networks. As for Tbilisi, it was merely promised $1 billion
and told to use the money the way it saw fit. What with Georgia's
special kind of relations with the United States, it was all Tehran
could do.
The Georgian authorities were spared the necessity to decide how to
use the Iranian financial aid. Official Washington promptly made its
displeasure known, reminded Tbilisi of its duties as America's
partner, and strongly advised it to keep boycotting the Iranian
regime. Point was taken.
As a matter of fact, the United States was displeased even with the
Armenian-Iranian cooperation but knew better than object or try to
circumvent it. All but isolated from the rest of the world, Armenia
would have ignored objections anyway. The joint plans Yerevan and
Tehran charted were impressive but never proceeded beyond the gas
pipeline and power lines. Armenian Minister of Transport and
Communications Gurgen Sarkisjan said at the press conference last
Tuesday that the Asian Bank of Development had loaned Armenia $1
million for the feasibility study of a railroad to connect Armenia
with Iran.
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Armen Movsesjan in the
meantime reiterated firm resolve on the part of Armenia and Iran to
bring the joint energy projects already launched to their logical
conclusion. Movsesjan acknowledged that these projects had been
impaired by "certain domestic political processes in Iran." The
projects in question concerned construction of a pipeline from Tebriz
in Iran to a refinery in the Armenian Yeraskh, said refinery to be
built yet. "Work will begin next year," Movsesjan said.
Putting out economic feelers and offering all sorts of projects to
countries of the South Caucasus region, Iran developed sufficient
clout that earned it an invitation to join political processes under
way there. Eager to use the Iranian expansion to its own benefit,
official Baku expressed willingness to see Tehran among intermediaries
grappling with the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani Foreign
Minister Elmar Mamedjarov met with his Iranian counterpart Manouchehr
Mottaki in Tehran earlier this week. Once the meeting was over,
Mottaki said Iran was ready for this mission.
Azerbaijan clearly aimed to impress Turkey. Baku had been enraged by
the signing of the Turkish-Armenian protocols on normalization which
it condemned as treachery. The impression is that Azerbaijan no longer
trusts Turkey's assurances of friendship. On the other hand, it should
know that Iran cannot just up and become one of the intermediaries. At
the very least, consent of the directly involved parties will be
needed first, and perhaps even the consent of other intermediaries as
well. These latter in the meantime include the United States, a
country Iran is traditionally at odds with. Still, there is no law
saying that there could be no parallel processes seeking a solution to
the problem.
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 24, 2009, pp. 1, 6
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 25, 2009 Friday
IRANIAN EXPANSION INTO SOUTH CAUCASUS
By Yuri Simonjan
2010 WILL BE A YEAR OF IRANIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION INTO
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS; Offering all sorts of economic projects to the
countries of the South Caucasus, Iran gradually develops political
clout.
Commenting on the efforts to have Abkhazia recognized by the
international community, President Sergei Bagapsh said that official
Sukhumi was closely working with the Middle East and Caribbean
countries. "We maintain active contacts with Iran whose
representatives actually visited Abkhazia. Besides, certain meetings
were organized in Moscow," he said. "By and large, Iran is prepared to
take part in economic processes in Abkhazia." The Abkhazian leader
said, however, that recognition of the republic by Tehran was out of
the question for the time being.
As a matter of fact, this state of affairs suits Sukhumi fine. Tehran
emulates the Turkish-Abkhazian arrangement - active economic contacts
without political recognition. Considering that years of Georgian
blockade left Abkhazia impoverished, importance of its economic ties
with Turkey and Iran, each a serious regional player, cannot be
overestimated.
Political aspects of the arrangement, something Sukhumi does not
comment on for the time being, are important as well. Should Turkey
and Iran go for major investment projects indeed, this development
will greatly allay Abkhazian fears to be assimilated by Russia, its
powerful neighbor and primary patron.
Turkey and Iran in their turn perceive Abkhazia as a convenient tool
for political manipulations at all levels from the regional to the
global - in the relations with Russia promoting Abkhazia and the
United States supporting Georgia. Moreover, it is also a tool for
maneuvering in the relations with Georgia itself and with Azerbaijan
that experiences analogous problems. And even with Armenia, a country
directly involved in the problems that exasperate Azerbaijan.
Tehran's genuine interests in Abkhazia are not known at this time.
Considering Iranian aspirations for regional leadership, however, they
may turn out to be considerable indeed. Official Tehran reiterated its
ambitions in the South Caucasus eighteen months ago when it proclaimed
investments plans regarding Armenia and Georgia to the total amount of
$4 billion. Yerevan was offered construction of a gas pipeline and
power lines between the two countries, refinery, and connection of
railroad networks. As for Tbilisi, it was merely promised $1 billion
and told to use the money the way it saw fit. What with Georgia's
special kind of relations with the United States, it was all Tehran
could do.
The Georgian authorities were spared the necessity to decide how to
use the Iranian financial aid. Official Washington promptly made its
displeasure known, reminded Tbilisi of its duties as America's
partner, and strongly advised it to keep boycotting the Iranian
regime. Point was taken.
As a matter of fact, the United States was displeased even with the
Armenian-Iranian cooperation but knew better than object or try to
circumvent it. All but isolated from the rest of the world, Armenia
would have ignored objections anyway. The joint plans Yerevan and
Tehran charted were impressive but never proceeded beyond the gas
pipeline and power lines. Armenian Minister of Transport and
Communications Gurgen Sarkisjan said at the press conference last
Tuesday that the Asian Bank of Development had loaned Armenia $1
million for the feasibility study of a railroad to connect Armenia
with Iran.
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Armen Movsesjan in the
meantime reiterated firm resolve on the part of Armenia and Iran to
bring the joint energy projects already launched to their logical
conclusion. Movsesjan acknowledged that these projects had been
impaired by "certain domestic political processes in Iran." The
projects in question concerned construction of a pipeline from Tebriz
in Iran to a refinery in the Armenian Yeraskh, said refinery to be
built yet. "Work will begin next year," Movsesjan said.
Putting out economic feelers and offering all sorts of projects to
countries of the South Caucasus region, Iran developed sufficient
clout that earned it an invitation to join political processes under
way there. Eager to use the Iranian expansion to its own benefit,
official Baku expressed willingness to see Tehran among intermediaries
grappling with the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani Foreign
Minister Elmar Mamedjarov met with his Iranian counterpart Manouchehr
Mottaki in Tehran earlier this week. Once the meeting was over,
Mottaki said Iran was ready for this mission.
Azerbaijan clearly aimed to impress Turkey. Baku had been enraged by
the signing of the Turkish-Armenian protocols on normalization which
it condemned as treachery. The impression is that Azerbaijan no longer
trusts Turkey's assurances of friendship. On the other hand, it should
know that Iran cannot just up and become one of the intermediaries. At
the very least, consent of the directly involved parties will be
needed first, and perhaps even the consent of other intermediaries as
well. These latter in the meantime include the United States, a
country Iran is traditionally at odds with. Still, there is no law
saying that there could be no parallel processes seeking a solution to
the problem.
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 24, 2009, pp. 1, 6