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TOWARDS LONG-AWAITED BREAKTHROUGH: RESOLVING KARABAKH CONFLICT - NO RESULTS WITH SURVIVING HOPES
Today
Dec 29 2009
Azerbaijan
The year 2009 is nearing end. Contrary to expectations, this year
did not brought long-awaited breakthrough in the peaceful settlement
of Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But is unfair to
call negotiations imitation and mediating efforts of the OSCE Minsk
Group - failure. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave an adequate
assessment of the situation in his recent interview with a Russian TV
channel. He described this year in terms of the settlement "... as a
positive, but less positive than it might be", adding that "... we
hope it will be possible to agree on the basic positions in 2010,
but we oppose that negotiation will become a permanent process."
What the year 2009 was noted for in the context of the settlement
of the Karabakh conflict? First of all, perhaps, for intensified
negotiation process. The presidents of the conflicting parties held six
meetings. The foreign ministers met more often. The co-chairs of the
Minsk group visited the region together or individually almost every
month sometimes making the shuttle visits between Baku and Yerevan.
The support for a peaceful settlement was not limited to efforts of
Special representatives of Minsk Group co-chairing countries. Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev directly participated in the three
Armenian-Azerbaijani summit meetings. At the G-8 summit in L'Aquila
(Italy), Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, United States President
Barack Obama and French President Sarkozy issued a joint statement on
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 17th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial
Council Meeting held in Athens in December supported a statement by
the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as foreign
ministers of France, Russia and U.S. Undersecretary of State which
said efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict on the basis of three
principles of the Helsinki Final Act - non-use or threat of force,
equality and self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity -
was continuing.
Without exaggerating importance of this document, I draw attention
to the fact that for the first time the Armenian side agreed to
the document which called for resolving the Karabakh conflict under
territorial integrity. To be more exact, ten years ago Armenia refused
to accede to the document which stipulated self-determination for
Nagorno-Karabakh in the context of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity
at the OSCE summit in Lisbon. Even in last year's Mein Dorf Declaration
on political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict signed by
the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, due to conflicting
approaches of the conflicting parties they had to refer to general
principles and norms of international law and decisions and documents
adopted in this framework.
Negotiations were difficult and tough throughout 2009. The parties
made strides not only forward but backward, returning to matters
that seemed to be earlier coordinated. Presumably, the parties have
agreed on a phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied areas
outside Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku also signaled that it does not object
to a corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Evidence is a
visit of a special mission to the Lachin region to review possible
route and secure width of the corridor. The issue of "interim status"
also saw some progress, but a possibility to reconcile positions
of the sides on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, or rather,
a mechanism for determining have been elusive.
Azerbaijan insists that regardless of the will of the Nagorno-Karabakh
people, the legal power has been and should rest with Azerbaijan,
and, consequently, one can speak only about extent of autonomy and
self-government. Armenia required not to set boundaries for the will
of the Nagorno-Karabakh people (referring to the Armenian majority)
seeking to legalize secession from Azerbaijan through the referendum.
Offering a to define status of Nagorno-Karabakh through mechanism of a
delayed referendum, the Minsk Group co-chairs want to simultaneously
solve the difficult question of establishing cooperation between
Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists with Azerbaijan.
Armenians are interested in such cooperation to a great degree. Even
if to assume hypothetically that the great powers recognize secession
of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, no one can force Azerbaijan to
cooperate with Armenia. Deferred referendum to determine the permanent
status allows the mediating powers to push Baku to appease the Armenian
side with economic preferences, to demonstrate its willingness to
forget the past in every possible way, open communications and to make
investments in the hope that the Armenians will vote for a referendum
to remain within the borders of Azerbaijan.
However, we have closely studied history and behavioral patterns of
Armenians which leave no room for illusions about their "gratitude and
prudence." So, attempts to catch Baku in a trap of referendum failed.
Therefore, in response to requirement to formulate a question about
will of the people in the most general form and to postpone it for
a long-term perspective, Yerevan once again raised the issue of a
"transitional status".
Armenians want to fill in details which in practice means formation of
de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh without declaring it. Since,
"transitional status" in the Armenian interpretation is identical
to independence to be consolidated with international agreements and
guarantees. Nevertheless, one can try find a balance and to reach a
mutually acceptable compromise on the timing and time of a referendum
on one hand and the scope of powers defined by "transitional status"
on the other.
Meanwhile, mediators hope to move the negotiating process forward. The
official websites of the OSCE and the American White House released
part of the the Madrid Principles in summer to make public aware of
them. The co-chairs began to meet more with the leaders of public
opinion, NGO activists, representatives of political parties and
the media and to inform on the state of settlement of the Karabakh
conflict. Foreign donors began to fund more projects that involve
contacts and dialogue between civil society representatives of the
conflicting parties. The noteworthy is that Russia initiated the
meeting of parliamentarians from Armenia and Azerbaijan, later media
leaders and later that of independent experts and NGO leaders.
To prevent Armenian separatists monopolize the right to speak on behalf
of the Nagorno-Karabakh, finally steps were taken to strengthen and
grant an official status to the Azerbaijani community of Karabakh.
It is important to give an impetus to this community to ensure its
voice will be loudly sounded in Azerbaijan and abroad.
Negotiations within the Minsk Group are in homestretch. It is hard
to protract them indefinitely in a bid extend the existing status quo.
Azerbaijan is developing and growing while Armenia is stagnating
amid a blockade. The burden of sustaining its economy, finances and
armaments, which falls primarily on Russia is becoming harder.
An attempt to play against Azerbaijan a card of "historical
Armenian-Turkish reconciliation" developed by Armenians and
sponsored by their patrons failed. It true goal was to break
the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance to cause confusion and to
persuade Azerbaijan to make concessions, leading to secession of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan's leaders showed firmness, but the
Turkish government, after a little hesitation, unequivocally confirmed
that without progress in the settlement of the Karabakh ratification
conflict, Armenian-Turkish protocols will not be ratified and borders
between the two countries will not open. Moreover, Armenia and Turkey
have signed a deal according to which Turkey will provide assistance
and help strengthen defense capacity of Azerbaijan.
In these circumstances, there is only one way to avoid complications
of war in the region which greatly increases the risk in case the
negotiations fail - to bring Armenia to reason so that it will
lower its territorial ambitions. Hardness, realism and reliance on
interests rather than history and emotion leaves a chance to implement
long-awaited breakthrough in the negotiations within the OSCE Minsk
Group in the coming year.
Today
Dec 29 2009
Azerbaijan
The year 2009 is nearing end. Contrary to expectations, this year
did not brought long-awaited breakthrough in the peaceful settlement
of Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But is unfair to
call negotiations imitation and mediating efforts of the OSCE Minsk
Group - failure. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave an adequate
assessment of the situation in his recent interview with a Russian TV
channel. He described this year in terms of the settlement "... as a
positive, but less positive than it might be", adding that "... we
hope it will be possible to agree on the basic positions in 2010,
but we oppose that negotiation will become a permanent process."
What the year 2009 was noted for in the context of the settlement
of the Karabakh conflict? First of all, perhaps, for intensified
negotiation process. The presidents of the conflicting parties held six
meetings. The foreign ministers met more often. The co-chairs of the
Minsk group visited the region together or individually almost every
month sometimes making the shuttle visits between Baku and Yerevan.
The support for a peaceful settlement was not limited to efforts of
Special representatives of Minsk Group co-chairing countries. Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev directly participated in the three
Armenian-Azerbaijani summit meetings. At the G-8 summit in L'Aquila
(Italy), Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, United States President
Barack Obama and French President Sarkozy issued a joint statement on
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 17th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial
Council Meeting held in Athens in December supported a statement by
the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as foreign
ministers of France, Russia and U.S. Undersecretary of State which
said efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict on the basis of three
principles of the Helsinki Final Act - non-use or threat of force,
equality and self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity -
was continuing.
Without exaggerating importance of this document, I draw attention
to the fact that for the first time the Armenian side agreed to
the document which called for resolving the Karabakh conflict under
territorial integrity. To be more exact, ten years ago Armenia refused
to accede to the document which stipulated self-determination for
Nagorno-Karabakh in the context of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity
at the OSCE summit in Lisbon. Even in last year's Mein Dorf Declaration
on political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict signed by
the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, due to conflicting
approaches of the conflicting parties they had to refer to general
principles and norms of international law and decisions and documents
adopted in this framework.
Negotiations were difficult and tough throughout 2009. The parties
made strides not only forward but backward, returning to matters
that seemed to be earlier coordinated. Presumably, the parties have
agreed on a phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied areas
outside Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku also signaled that it does not object
to a corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Evidence is a
visit of a special mission to the Lachin region to review possible
route and secure width of the corridor. The issue of "interim status"
also saw some progress, but a possibility to reconcile positions
of the sides on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, or rather,
a mechanism for determining have been elusive.
Azerbaijan insists that regardless of the will of the Nagorno-Karabakh
people, the legal power has been and should rest with Azerbaijan,
and, consequently, one can speak only about extent of autonomy and
self-government. Armenia required not to set boundaries for the will
of the Nagorno-Karabakh people (referring to the Armenian majority)
seeking to legalize secession from Azerbaijan through the referendum.
Offering a to define status of Nagorno-Karabakh through mechanism of a
delayed referendum, the Minsk Group co-chairs want to simultaneously
solve the difficult question of establishing cooperation between
Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists with Azerbaijan.
Armenians are interested in such cooperation to a great degree. Even
if to assume hypothetically that the great powers recognize secession
of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, no one can force Azerbaijan to
cooperate with Armenia. Deferred referendum to determine the permanent
status allows the mediating powers to push Baku to appease the Armenian
side with economic preferences, to demonstrate its willingness to
forget the past in every possible way, open communications and to make
investments in the hope that the Armenians will vote for a referendum
to remain within the borders of Azerbaijan.
However, we have closely studied history and behavioral patterns of
Armenians which leave no room for illusions about their "gratitude and
prudence." So, attempts to catch Baku in a trap of referendum failed.
Therefore, in response to requirement to formulate a question about
will of the people in the most general form and to postpone it for
a long-term perspective, Yerevan once again raised the issue of a
"transitional status".
Armenians want to fill in details which in practice means formation of
de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh without declaring it. Since,
"transitional status" in the Armenian interpretation is identical
to independence to be consolidated with international agreements and
guarantees. Nevertheless, one can try find a balance and to reach a
mutually acceptable compromise on the timing and time of a referendum
on one hand and the scope of powers defined by "transitional status"
on the other.
Meanwhile, mediators hope to move the negotiating process forward. The
official websites of the OSCE and the American White House released
part of the the Madrid Principles in summer to make public aware of
them. The co-chairs began to meet more with the leaders of public
opinion, NGO activists, representatives of political parties and
the media and to inform on the state of settlement of the Karabakh
conflict. Foreign donors began to fund more projects that involve
contacts and dialogue between civil society representatives of the
conflicting parties. The noteworthy is that Russia initiated the
meeting of parliamentarians from Armenia and Azerbaijan, later media
leaders and later that of independent experts and NGO leaders.
To prevent Armenian separatists monopolize the right to speak on behalf
of the Nagorno-Karabakh, finally steps were taken to strengthen and
grant an official status to the Azerbaijani community of Karabakh.
It is important to give an impetus to this community to ensure its
voice will be loudly sounded in Azerbaijan and abroad.
Negotiations within the Minsk Group are in homestretch. It is hard
to protract them indefinitely in a bid extend the existing status quo.
Azerbaijan is developing and growing while Armenia is stagnating
amid a blockade. The burden of sustaining its economy, finances and
armaments, which falls primarily on Russia is becoming harder.
An attempt to play against Azerbaijan a card of "historical
Armenian-Turkish reconciliation" developed by Armenians and
sponsored by their patrons failed. It true goal was to break
the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance to cause confusion and to
persuade Azerbaijan to make concessions, leading to secession of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan's leaders showed firmness, but the
Turkish government, after a little hesitation, unequivocally confirmed
that without progress in the settlement of the Karabakh ratification
conflict, Armenian-Turkish protocols will not be ratified and borders
between the two countries will not open. Moreover, Armenia and Turkey
have signed a deal according to which Turkey will provide assistance
and help strengthen defense capacity of Azerbaijan.
In these circumstances, there is only one way to avoid complications
of war in the region which greatly increases the risk in case the
negotiations fail - to bring Armenia to reason so that it will
lower its territorial ambitions. Hardness, realism and reliance on
interests rather than history and emotion leaves a chance to implement
long-awaited breakthrough in the negotiations within the OSCE Minsk
Group in the coming year.