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TURKEY-ARMENIA RAPPROCHEMENT: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK
Georgian Daily
Dec 28 2009
Georgia
With considerable ado, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian
and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met in Zurich October
10 to sign an agreement that would establish diplomatic relations
and re-open the border between their two countries.
Turkey closed that border in 1993 when Armenia invaded neighboring
Azerbaijan, occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories.
Some feted the new agreement as an epochal breakthrough for peace
and understanding. Others fretted over possible unintended negative
consequences. But a couple of months later, the agreement has hit
the brick wall of reality, which is blocking legislative approval in
both countries. Now, the western leaders who comprised the backdrop
to the Zurich signing ceremony must engage in a serious diplomatic
effort to salvage the agreement and then channel it in a positive
direction--Caucasus politics is a full time endeavor.
The Zurich agreement also establishes a joint commission of historians
to examine killings that took place between 1915 and 1918, which
Armenians claim constituted genocide.
External actors worked the issue hard. The US State Department let
it be known that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made 29 telephone
calls to leaders of the two countries. Then, in a car parked in front
of her Swiss hotel, Clinton undertook a round of last-minute cell
phone diplomacy--it seemed Nalbandian balked at Davutoglu's plan
to mention Nagorno-Karabakh in his signing ceremony speech. Clinton
resolved the matter by nixing speeches altogether.
Even the Russians pitched in. As Nalbandian appeared to freeze just
before signing, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, according to the
Russian newspaper Kommersant, sent him a note that read, "Sign it
easily and go."
What brought all these forces together--in the Caucasus of all places?
Just 14 months earlier, Russia wantonly attacked western interests
along the East-West Corridor that leads through Georgia from the
Black Sea to the Caspian. Was Moscow now joining with Washington and
Brussels to build a wider East-West Corridor running through Armenia?
Did diplomats believe that re-opening the Turkish-Armenian border
could be divorced from the continued occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh,
which was the proximate cause of its closing?
It is likelier that the external actors came together in Zurich by a
mixture of domestic politics, photo-opportunity diplomacy and belief
in each capital that the apparent confluence of short-term interests
could be used as a next step in the Caucasian geopolitical game.
Whatever the ingredients of the Zurich signing and however clever
Clinton's no speech solution, geopolitical reality soon boiled over.
In Baku, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said, "The normalization of
relations between Turkey and Armenia before the withdrawal of Armenian
troops from occupied Azeri territory is in direct contradiction to
the national interests of Azerbaijan."
Two days after the signing, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip
Erdogan said in Ankara what Davutoglu had intended to say in Zurich:
"We want all the borders to be opened at the same time...but as long
as Armenia has not withdrawn from Azerbaijani territory that it is
occupying, Turkey cannot have a positive attitude on this subject.
Azerbaijan will not quietly watch its territorial integrity slip into
diplomatic limbo. And Turkey can ill afford to ignore Azerbaijan.
Erdogan's December visit to Washington and Ankara's desire to sidestep
an American Congressional resolution next spring labeling the World
War I era killings as "genocide" may result in some action, maybe
even Turkish Grand National Assembly approval. However, there will
be no meaningful progress on the October agreement until there is
meaningful progress on Nagorno-Karabakh.
Today, the biggest risk is that the Zurich agreement may amount to
nothing--in an atmosphere of heightened expectations, posturing and
western distraction.
One of the lessons of Russia's August 2008 attack on Georgia is that
if the west wants conflict resolution in the Caucasus, it must abandon
stale mid-level diplomatic formats like the Group of Friends that
addressed the conflict over Abkhazia and the Minsk Group charged with
resolving the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in favor of sustained
high-level engagement.
Regrettably--but realistically--such engagement may reveal that
the clash of interests among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey is more
fundamental than was hoped and that there is also a clash of interests
among the external actors--Russia versus the west.
Then, even if a big diplomatic push succeeds in getting the agreement
back on track, many underlying issues and years of mistrust will
remain. Consequently, western leaders must remain engaged to channel
the agreement in a positive direction. The main danger will remain
geopolitical.
Every effort must be made to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and to guarantee Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and security. If
this is done, Baku will stick to peaceful means of conflict resolution,
continue to balance the sway of its large neighbors and remain free to
participate in energy projects like the prospective Nabucco pipeline.
Meanwhile, this process must encourage the constructive elements
in Armenian society to take courageous steps, including working
constructively with Georgia on issues pertaining to ethnic Armenians
living in regions like Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli.
All this would nudge Moscow into dealing even-handedly with Baku and
allowing Yerevan to steer a more independent course, thereby foregoing
the option of using the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement to generate
greater pressure on Georgia.
Partisans of photo-opportunity diplomacy may scoff that all these
requirements will simply sink the Zurich agreement. They may. However,
experienced diplomats understand that cause and effect must both be
addressed. If it works, the peace and economic growth that would
seize the South Caucasus would be tremendous--far outweighing any
emergent downsides.
*David J. Smith is Director, Georgian Security Analysis Center,
Tbilisi, and Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,
Washington.
Georgian Daily
Dec 28 2009
Georgia
With considerable ado, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian
and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met in Zurich October
10 to sign an agreement that would establish diplomatic relations
and re-open the border between their two countries.
Turkey closed that border in 1993 when Armenia invaded neighboring
Azerbaijan, occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories.
Some feted the new agreement as an epochal breakthrough for peace
and understanding. Others fretted over possible unintended negative
consequences. But a couple of months later, the agreement has hit
the brick wall of reality, which is blocking legislative approval in
both countries. Now, the western leaders who comprised the backdrop
to the Zurich signing ceremony must engage in a serious diplomatic
effort to salvage the agreement and then channel it in a positive
direction--Caucasus politics is a full time endeavor.
The Zurich agreement also establishes a joint commission of historians
to examine killings that took place between 1915 and 1918, which
Armenians claim constituted genocide.
External actors worked the issue hard. The US State Department let
it be known that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made 29 telephone
calls to leaders of the two countries. Then, in a car parked in front
of her Swiss hotel, Clinton undertook a round of last-minute cell
phone diplomacy--it seemed Nalbandian balked at Davutoglu's plan
to mention Nagorno-Karabakh in his signing ceremony speech. Clinton
resolved the matter by nixing speeches altogether.
Even the Russians pitched in. As Nalbandian appeared to freeze just
before signing, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, according to the
Russian newspaper Kommersant, sent him a note that read, "Sign it
easily and go."
What brought all these forces together--in the Caucasus of all places?
Just 14 months earlier, Russia wantonly attacked western interests
along the East-West Corridor that leads through Georgia from the
Black Sea to the Caspian. Was Moscow now joining with Washington and
Brussels to build a wider East-West Corridor running through Armenia?
Did diplomats believe that re-opening the Turkish-Armenian border
could be divorced from the continued occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh,
which was the proximate cause of its closing?
It is likelier that the external actors came together in Zurich by a
mixture of domestic politics, photo-opportunity diplomacy and belief
in each capital that the apparent confluence of short-term interests
could be used as a next step in the Caucasian geopolitical game.
Whatever the ingredients of the Zurich signing and however clever
Clinton's no speech solution, geopolitical reality soon boiled over.
In Baku, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said, "The normalization of
relations between Turkey and Armenia before the withdrawal of Armenian
troops from occupied Azeri territory is in direct contradiction to
the national interests of Azerbaijan."
Two days after the signing, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip
Erdogan said in Ankara what Davutoglu had intended to say in Zurich:
"We want all the borders to be opened at the same time...but as long
as Armenia has not withdrawn from Azerbaijani territory that it is
occupying, Turkey cannot have a positive attitude on this subject.
Azerbaijan will not quietly watch its territorial integrity slip into
diplomatic limbo. And Turkey can ill afford to ignore Azerbaijan.
Erdogan's December visit to Washington and Ankara's desire to sidestep
an American Congressional resolution next spring labeling the World
War I era killings as "genocide" may result in some action, maybe
even Turkish Grand National Assembly approval. However, there will
be no meaningful progress on the October agreement until there is
meaningful progress on Nagorno-Karabakh.
Today, the biggest risk is that the Zurich agreement may amount to
nothing--in an atmosphere of heightened expectations, posturing and
western distraction.
One of the lessons of Russia's August 2008 attack on Georgia is that
if the west wants conflict resolution in the Caucasus, it must abandon
stale mid-level diplomatic formats like the Group of Friends that
addressed the conflict over Abkhazia and the Minsk Group charged with
resolving the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in favor of sustained
high-level engagement.
Regrettably--but realistically--such engagement may reveal that
the clash of interests among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey is more
fundamental than was hoped and that there is also a clash of interests
among the external actors--Russia versus the west.
Then, even if a big diplomatic push succeeds in getting the agreement
back on track, many underlying issues and years of mistrust will
remain. Consequently, western leaders must remain engaged to channel
the agreement in a positive direction. The main danger will remain
geopolitical.
Every effort must be made to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and to guarantee Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and security. If
this is done, Baku will stick to peaceful means of conflict resolution,
continue to balance the sway of its large neighbors and remain free to
participate in energy projects like the prospective Nabucco pipeline.
Meanwhile, this process must encourage the constructive elements
in Armenian society to take courageous steps, including working
constructively with Georgia on issues pertaining to ethnic Armenians
living in regions like Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli.
All this would nudge Moscow into dealing even-handedly with Baku and
allowing Yerevan to steer a more independent course, thereby foregoing
the option of using the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement to generate
greater pressure on Georgia.
Partisans of photo-opportunity diplomacy may scoff that all these
requirements will simply sink the Zurich agreement. They may. However,
experienced diplomats understand that cause and effect must both be
addressed. If it works, the peace and economic growth that would
seize the South Caucasus would be tremendous--far outweighing any
emergent downsides.
*David J. Smith is Director, Georgian Security Analysis Center,
Tbilisi, and Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,
Washington.