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APA, Azerbaijan
Dec 31 2009
The Caspian region in 2010
[ 31 Dec 2009 15:11 ]
It is customary to assert that the past year ` in any context - was
turbulent and uncertain. But in much of the Caspian region, 2009 was
not particularly either of these.
By Alexander Jackson
Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA) and APA
It is customary to assert that the past year ` in any context - was
turbulent and uncertain. But in much of the Caspian region, 2009 was
not particularly either of these. Dramatic incidents, such as the
Mukhrovani rebellion in Georgia and the Nazran suicide bombing in
Ingushetia, were significant but have not affected the region's
course.
A relatively `quiet' year in the Caucasus should not detract from the
serious changes that may lie ahead in 2010. The most notable is the
triangular relationship between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Next
year will be critical: a common refrain ever since the 1994 ceasefire,
but this time justified. There are serious implications for the
domestic politics of Armenia, and to a lesser extent Turkey. Ankara
faces its own challenges with the Kurdish issue, and Georgia must deal
with the increasingly permanent reality of South Ossetian and
Abkhazian secession.
The rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey has reached critical
mass. The protocols which would open the border between them,
establish diplomatic relations, and address `the historical dimension'
of their relationship are being considered by both countries'
parliaments.
The process is currently in deadlock. Ankara insists that Armenia make
progress on withdrawing from the occupied regions of Azerbaijan
outside Nagorno-Karabakh, and Yerevan claims that it will not ratify
the protocols unless Turkey does so first, within a reasonable
timeframe and without linking the ratification to Karabakh (APA,
December 24).
There are several possibilities. Armenia may concede that linking the
two issues is inevitable, and commit to a full or partial withdrawal
pending a full settlement. Turkey itself is unlikely to break the
link. Senior officials have spent most of the autumn frantically
trying to reassure Baku that the motto of `one nation, two states'
still holds true. Reneging on these promises would be politically very
difficult.
Ratification may fail, or ` less likely - Armenia's President Serzh
Sarkisian may withdraw from the process under intense domestic
political opposition. So far, the opposition has failed to rally
around Levon Ter-Petrosian, ex-president and the one man capable of
seriously challenging the government. This is unlikely to change: the
suspicion with which the nationalist parties regard Mr Ter-Petrosian
is too great.
Although regional geopolitics would revert back to their familiar
pattern in the event of failure, the amount of political capital
invested and lost by the Turkish and Armenian governments would make
them look weak internationally. On the other hand, it would shore up
their domestic positions if they could blame it on the other party,
particularly for President Sarkisian. As the initiator of the thaw,
Turkey would have its image as a regional peacemaker damaged, but not
irreversibly.
International mediation efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group on the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may finally break the
deadlock, but the prospects are not encouraging given the Group's
track record in the current process. The only member with the ability
to use leverage is Russia, whose geopolitical intentions regarding the
rapprochement are still unclear. The most likely outcome is a
Russian-led settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under Minsk
Group auspices, working closely with Turkey, but there is no guarantee
that this will occur in 2010.
The resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will again dominate
the foreign political agenda of the government in Azerbaijan, which is
obliged to manoeuvre among major regional and global players in order
to achieve a conflict settlement that would guarantee the territorial
integrity of the country. However, 2010 could offer certain challenges
for Azerbaijan's balanced foreign policy.
Stronger pressure from the West (especially from the US), to acquiesce
in the reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border without any
significant progress on Nagorno-Karabakh, or to make greater
concessions on the conflict's resolution, would inevitably lead to the
increased reorientation of Azerbaijan towards Russia. In this case an
augmented level of cooperation with Russia, especially in the energy
field, could be expected. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan's participation
in certain planned energy and transport projects directly involving
Turkey, such as Nabucco and the BTK railway, would be undermined.
Turkey faces the ongoing Kurdish question, which has exposed deep
divisions within the ruling elite. After the government made some
significant progress on reaching out to the disaffected Kurdish
population, the Constitutional Court banned the Kurdish Democratic
Society Party, alleging it of links with the militant Kurdish PKK and
fomenting separatism. This will severely test the government's
attempts to engage with Kurdish moderates and increase the gulf of
suspicion between Turks and Kurds. 2010 may see the failure of the
government's efforts and a return to large-scale violence by the PKK.
For Georgia, 2010 will see the first vote since the war with Russia in
August 2008, the Tbilisi mayoral elections. They will be a litmus test
for the popularity of President Saakashvili's UNM party; recent polls
indicate that the UNM would lose, explaining its insistence on a new
electoral law which requires the winning candidate to gather just 30%
of the vote (RFE/RL, December 7). Inevitable splits in the opposition
vote will probably guarantee victory for the UNM's probable candidate,
incumbent Gigi Ugulava. Some protests may follow, but ` as in Armenia
` the opposition is still too divided amongst itself to seriously
challenge the government. President Saakashvili will see out 2010 in
office.
His more serious priority is re-evaluating Georgia's approach towards
Russia and the `independent' states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
This year's policy, of loud hostility towards Moscow and the regimes
in Tshkinvali and Sukhumi, is already fading. The new draft strategy
for Tbilisi's policy towards the separatist provinces is subtitled
`Engagement Through Cooperation' and prioritises `soft' measures such
as cultural projects and people-to-people contacts (Civil.ge, December
25). This suggests that Tbilisi is gradually coming to acknowledge the
loss, despite official rhetoric.
A softer approach towards Russia is also coming into focus, with the
re-opening of the land border between the two countries and the
possible resumption of direct flights (AFP, December 24). This thaw is
set to continue in 2010, although it is probably too optimistic to
anticipate a return to diplomatic relations. Russia is confident that
Georgia's NATO ambitions are dormant, partly because it knows that
President Obama values Moscow far more than Tbilisi, and therefore has
no reason to turn up the pressure for now.
The North Caucasus may become even more violent in 2009 if recent
events are any guide. Last year saw the apparent re-activation of the
Riyadus Salikhin suicide battalion by the self-styled Emir of the
Caucasian Emirate, Dokku Umarov, which has been responsible for
several high-profile terrorist attacks. The insurgents are also
believed to be behind the attack on the Nevsky Express in late
November, which killed 27. This sophisticated out-of-area operation
may indicate a planned return to the wave of attacks on metropolitan
targets which shook Russia in the early 2000s, which would herald an
equivalently violent Russian response.
Next week, this column will address the role of the Euro-Atlantic
community in the Caspian region next year, as well as the biggest
unknown: the future of Iran.
Dec 31 2009
The Caspian region in 2010
[ 31 Dec 2009 15:11 ]
It is customary to assert that the past year ` in any context - was
turbulent and uncertain. But in much of the Caspian region, 2009 was
not particularly either of these.
By Alexander Jackson
Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA) and APA
It is customary to assert that the past year ` in any context - was
turbulent and uncertain. But in much of the Caspian region, 2009 was
not particularly either of these. Dramatic incidents, such as the
Mukhrovani rebellion in Georgia and the Nazran suicide bombing in
Ingushetia, were significant but have not affected the region's
course.
A relatively `quiet' year in the Caucasus should not detract from the
serious changes that may lie ahead in 2010. The most notable is the
triangular relationship between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Next
year will be critical: a common refrain ever since the 1994 ceasefire,
but this time justified. There are serious implications for the
domestic politics of Armenia, and to a lesser extent Turkey. Ankara
faces its own challenges with the Kurdish issue, and Georgia must deal
with the increasingly permanent reality of South Ossetian and
Abkhazian secession.
The rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey has reached critical
mass. The protocols which would open the border between them,
establish diplomatic relations, and address `the historical dimension'
of their relationship are being considered by both countries'
parliaments.
The process is currently in deadlock. Ankara insists that Armenia make
progress on withdrawing from the occupied regions of Azerbaijan
outside Nagorno-Karabakh, and Yerevan claims that it will not ratify
the protocols unless Turkey does so first, within a reasonable
timeframe and without linking the ratification to Karabakh (APA,
December 24).
There are several possibilities. Armenia may concede that linking the
two issues is inevitable, and commit to a full or partial withdrawal
pending a full settlement. Turkey itself is unlikely to break the
link. Senior officials have spent most of the autumn frantically
trying to reassure Baku that the motto of `one nation, two states'
still holds true. Reneging on these promises would be politically very
difficult.
Ratification may fail, or ` less likely - Armenia's President Serzh
Sarkisian may withdraw from the process under intense domestic
political opposition. So far, the opposition has failed to rally
around Levon Ter-Petrosian, ex-president and the one man capable of
seriously challenging the government. This is unlikely to change: the
suspicion with which the nationalist parties regard Mr Ter-Petrosian
is too great.
Although regional geopolitics would revert back to their familiar
pattern in the event of failure, the amount of political capital
invested and lost by the Turkish and Armenian governments would make
them look weak internationally. On the other hand, it would shore up
their domestic positions if they could blame it on the other party,
particularly for President Sarkisian. As the initiator of the thaw,
Turkey would have its image as a regional peacemaker damaged, but not
irreversibly.
International mediation efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group on the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may finally break the
deadlock, but the prospects are not encouraging given the Group's
track record in the current process. The only member with the ability
to use leverage is Russia, whose geopolitical intentions regarding the
rapprochement are still unclear. The most likely outcome is a
Russian-led settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under Minsk
Group auspices, working closely with Turkey, but there is no guarantee
that this will occur in 2010.
The resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will again dominate
the foreign political agenda of the government in Azerbaijan, which is
obliged to manoeuvre among major regional and global players in order
to achieve a conflict settlement that would guarantee the territorial
integrity of the country. However, 2010 could offer certain challenges
for Azerbaijan's balanced foreign policy.
Stronger pressure from the West (especially from the US), to acquiesce
in the reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border without any
significant progress on Nagorno-Karabakh, or to make greater
concessions on the conflict's resolution, would inevitably lead to the
increased reorientation of Azerbaijan towards Russia. In this case an
augmented level of cooperation with Russia, especially in the energy
field, could be expected. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan's participation
in certain planned energy and transport projects directly involving
Turkey, such as Nabucco and the BTK railway, would be undermined.
Turkey faces the ongoing Kurdish question, which has exposed deep
divisions within the ruling elite. After the government made some
significant progress on reaching out to the disaffected Kurdish
population, the Constitutional Court banned the Kurdish Democratic
Society Party, alleging it of links with the militant Kurdish PKK and
fomenting separatism. This will severely test the government's
attempts to engage with Kurdish moderates and increase the gulf of
suspicion between Turks and Kurds. 2010 may see the failure of the
government's efforts and a return to large-scale violence by the PKK.
For Georgia, 2010 will see the first vote since the war with Russia in
August 2008, the Tbilisi mayoral elections. They will be a litmus test
for the popularity of President Saakashvili's UNM party; recent polls
indicate that the UNM would lose, explaining its insistence on a new
electoral law which requires the winning candidate to gather just 30%
of the vote (RFE/RL, December 7). Inevitable splits in the opposition
vote will probably guarantee victory for the UNM's probable candidate,
incumbent Gigi Ugulava. Some protests may follow, but ` as in Armenia
` the opposition is still too divided amongst itself to seriously
challenge the government. President Saakashvili will see out 2010 in
office.
His more serious priority is re-evaluating Georgia's approach towards
Russia and the `independent' states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
This year's policy, of loud hostility towards Moscow and the regimes
in Tshkinvali and Sukhumi, is already fading. The new draft strategy
for Tbilisi's policy towards the separatist provinces is subtitled
`Engagement Through Cooperation' and prioritises `soft' measures such
as cultural projects and people-to-people contacts (Civil.ge, December
25). This suggests that Tbilisi is gradually coming to acknowledge the
loss, despite official rhetoric.
A softer approach towards Russia is also coming into focus, with the
re-opening of the land border between the two countries and the
possible resumption of direct flights (AFP, December 24). This thaw is
set to continue in 2010, although it is probably too optimistic to
anticipate a return to diplomatic relations. Russia is confident that
Georgia's NATO ambitions are dormant, partly because it knows that
President Obama values Moscow far more than Tbilisi, and therefore has
no reason to turn up the pressure for now.
The North Caucasus may become even more violent in 2009 if recent
events are any guide. Last year saw the apparent re-activation of the
Riyadus Salikhin suicide battalion by the self-styled Emir of the
Caucasian Emirate, Dokku Umarov, which has been responsible for
several high-profile terrorist attacks. The insurgents are also
believed to be behind the attack on the Nevsky Express in late
November, which killed 27. This sophisticated out-of-area operation
may indicate a planned return to the wave of attacks on metropolitan
targets which shook Russia in the early 2000s, which would herald an
equivalently violent Russian response.
Next week, this column will address the role of the Euro-Atlantic
community in the Caspian region next year, as well as the biggest
unknown: the future of Iran.