Tweet
Diplomatic Traffic, DC
Feb 1 2009
Russian Arms to Armenia Could Change Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy
Fariz Ismailzade
The recent thaw in Russian-Azerbaijani relations seems to be coming to
a sudden end, as Azerbaijani media outlets circulate news of Russian
arms deliveries to Armenia in the amount of US$800 million. The news
sparked huge protests both among the Azerbaijani general public and
politicians. More importantly, it created a sense of treason among the
political leadership of Azerbaijan, which had been promised support
from Russia in the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian war. Such
disappointment could result in grave geopolitical shifts in the region
and changes in Azerbaijan's foreign policy course towards NATO.
BACKGROUND: On January 6, Azerbaijani media outlets reported that
Russian defense officials transferred weapons and other military
hardware worth US$ 800 million to Armenia in 2008. The evidence
consisted of a document containing the signature of a Russian defense
official and a detailed list of the transferred weapons. As becomes
clear from the document, the weapons used to belong to a Russian
military bases in Georgia, which was later withdrawn in accordance
with OSCE requirements and relocated to Armenia. At that time, Russian
political and military officials responded to Azerbaijani concerns
about the relocation by stating that the weapons and other military
equipment in the military base would remain the property of the
Russian Federation, and would not be transferred to Armenia. `Russia
promised Azerbaijan that the weapons would not be given to Armenia,'
says political analyst Rasim Musabekov.
The current news had the effect of a thunderstorm from a blue
sky. Azerbaijani officials immediately reacted to the news by harshly
condemning the Russian actions and citing its negative consequences
for peace and stability in the region. Various members of Parliament,
along with renowned public figures and policy analysts, have written
op-eds and spoken on TV about this incident. For instance, Anar
Mammadkhanov, a Member of Parliament and close loyalist of President
Ilham Aliyev, referred to the sale as `unexplainable Kremlin
boorishness.'
The Azerbaijani Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense have
launched an investigation of the issue, which concluded that an
illegal transfer of weapons from Russia to Armenia has indeed taken
place. The reaction was very harsh. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
summoned the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan and expressed deep
frustration with the incident. The press release of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs said, `The transferred weapons strengthen the military
capacity of Armenia, which occupies 20 percent of Azerbaijan's
territory. By doing this, Russia violated its own promises and the UN
General Assembly resolutions.'
It should be noted that it is not the first instance of Russian
`donations' of weapons and military equipment to Armenia, its
strategic ally and military outpost in the South Caucasus, which is a
the only member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the
South Caucasus. Back in 1997, a scandal erupted when the head of the
Defense Committee of the Russian Duma, Lev Rokhlin, discovered and
announced that Russia had illegally transferred weapons to Armenia in
the amount of US$1 billion. After Azerbaijan's fierce protests, the
Russian Defense Ministry launched an investigation, but has to date
failed to punish the officers responsible. Rokhlin himself was
subsequently killed in a mysterious accident and the issue was largely
forgotten.
After the recent incident, Azerbaijanis again recalled the incident of
the late 1990s. `Only God knows how many other transfers Russia has
made to Armenia, both legally and illegally,' says Ilgar Mammadov, a
Baku-based political analyst, in his blog. It is not clear where all
these weapons are stored. If they are stored in Armenia, it is
questionable how this corresponds to the limitations imposed by the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It seems that Armenia
has previously been exceeding the quotas of this treaty. One way to
circumvent this problem could be to transfer the weapons to
Nagorno-Karabakh, which continues to remain an soon after unmonitored
zone by international organizations. If this would be the case, the
conflict zone becomes even more militarized, significantly reducing
chances for a peaceful resolution.
Most government officials are convinced that despite all the peace
rhetoric, Russia continues to arm Armenia and remain interested in
maintaining the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict unresolved. The incident is
especially damaging since it was reported only one month after
President Aliyev signed the Moscow Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh
together with Russian President Medvedev and Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan. Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov phoned his
Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov to convince him that no such
transfer has taken place, the Azerbaijan side is convinced otherwise.
IMPLICATIONS: It is clear that the weapons transfer incident will play
an extremely damaging role in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. These
relations have been improving in the past several years, with
President Ilham Aliyev reaching out to Moscow and downplaying his NATO
aspirations in favor of accommodating Russian interests and building
pragmatic relations with the Kremlin. Economic cooperation and trade
between Russia and Azerbaijan reached its highest levels in
2008. President Medvedev visited Baku and expressed an interest in
buying all Azerbaijan's gas. President Aliyev visited Moscow on a
number of occasions and expressed an interest in building deeper and
more constructive relations with Moscow.
On the one hand, this was done to improve the chances for a peaceful
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Moscow is one of the
co-chairs of the Minsk group and an influential partner of
Armenia). On the other hand, Aliyev sincerely wanted to help Russia
improve its image on the international arena. For instance, during the
Georgian-Russian conflict, Aliyev refrained from accusing Russia of
aggression. He subsequently signed the Moscow Declaration ` not a
breakthrough in the peace negotiations as sometimes suggested, but
nevertheless a boost for the Kremlin's image as a peace broker in the
South Caucasus following its invasion of Georgia. All of these
gestures were aimed at winning Moscow's favor.
After this incident, frustration among the political leadership in
Baku is obvious. It is perhaps a wake-up call for the Azerbaijani
public and officials, who increasingly believe that Moscow will always
be guided by zero-sum games and interested in maintaining the
conflicts in the former Soviet space unresolved, and that Moscow will
continue to support Armenia despite the fact that it stands to gain
much more by acting as a neutral player in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.
After the Russian-Georgian war last August, there had been some hope
in Baku that Moscow might alter its blatant support for Armenia and
become more cooperative in seeking to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. In return, Azerbaijan would desist from following Georgia's
path to NATO membership, and Azerbaijan would deliver its gas to
Russia rather than to the Nabucco pipeline project. Importantly,
voices calling for that have now vanished. Indeed, the voices in Baku
promoting broader security arrangements with NATO and the EU, and
viewing Euro-Atlantic integration as the only way to ensure stability
in the South Caucasus are gaining ground. That in turn takes place
just as the U.S. has signed documents on strategic partnership with
both Georgia and Ukraine.
CONCLUSIONS: In the aftermath of the war in Georgia, Azerbaijani
officials were evidently greatly frustrated with the weak reaction of
the West and Turkey's submissive attitude to Moscow. (See 3 September
CACI Analyst) Briefly, Baku flirted with the idea of making a deal
with Russia on both gas supplies and the Karabakh conflict. Yet the
discovery of huge Russian arms deliveries to Armenia not only force
Azerbaijan to purchase more weapons and thus further militarize the
region ` it deals serious damage to Russian-Azerbaijani relations at a
personal level. Russia's actions are now interpreted as irrational,
emotional and unpredictable behavior. Baku's flirt with Moscow seems
resolutely over, which could rejuvenate its ties with the West ` if
the West is interested in investing in ties to Baku.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance analyst in Baku. He has
been a frequent contributor for Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
publications since 2002.
First published in the 01/28/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5021.
http://www.diplomatictraffic.com/debate.asp?ID=69 8
Feb 1 2009
Russian Arms to Armenia Could Change Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy
Fariz Ismailzade
The recent thaw in Russian-Azerbaijani relations seems to be coming to
a sudden end, as Azerbaijani media outlets circulate news of Russian
arms deliveries to Armenia in the amount of US$800 million. The news
sparked huge protests both among the Azerbaijani general public and
politicians. More importantly, it created a sense of treason among the
political leadership of Azerbaijan, which had been promised support
from Russia in the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian war. Such
disappointment could result in grave geopolitical shifts in the region
and changes in Azerbaijan's foreign policy course towards NATO.
BACKGROUND: On January 6, Azerbaijani media outlets reported that
Russian defense officials transferred weapons and other military
hardware worth US$ 800 million to Armenia in 2008. The evidence
consisted of a document containing the signature of a Russian defense
official and a detailed list of the transferred weapons. As becomes
clear from the document, the weapons used to belong to a Russian
military bases in Georgia, which was later withdrawn in accordance
with OSCE requirements and relocated to Armenia. At that time, Russian
political and military officials responded to Azerbaijani concerns
about the relocation by stating that the weapons and other military
equipment in the military base would remain the property of the
Russian Federation, and would not be transferred to Armenia. `Russia
promised Azerbaijan that the weapons would not be given to Armenia,'
says political analyst Rasim Musabekov.
The current news had the effect of a thunderstorm from a blue
sky. Azerbaijani officials immediately reacted to the news by harshly
condemning the Russian actions and citing its negative consequences
for peace and stability in the region. Various members of Parliament,
along with renowned public figures and policy analysts, have written
op-eds and spoken on TV about this incident. For instance, Anar
Mammadkhanov, a Member of Parliament and close loyalist of President
Ilham Aliyev, referred to the sale as `unexplainable Kremlin
boorishness.'
The Azerbaijani Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense have
launched an investigation of the issue, which concluded that an
illegal transfer of weapons from Russia to Armenia has indeed taken
place. The reaction was very harsh. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
summoned the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan and expressed deep
frustration with the incident. The press release of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs said, `The transferred weapons strengthen the military
capacity of Armenia, which occupies 20 percent of Azerbaijan's
territory. By doing this, Russia violated its own promises and the UN
General Assembly resolutions.'
It should be noted that it is not the first instance of Russian
`donations' of weapons and military equipment to Armenia, its
strategic ally and military outpost in the South Caucasus, which is a
the only member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the
South Caucasus. Back in 1997, a scandal erupted when the head of the
Defense Committee of the Russian Duma, Lev Rokhlin, discovered and
announced that Russia had illegally transferred weapons to Armenia in
the amount of US$1 billion. After Azerbaijan's fierce protests, the
Russian Defense Ministry launched an investigation, but has to date
failed to punish the officers responsible. Rokhlin himself was
subsequently killed in a mysterious accident and the issue was largely
forgotten.
After the recent incident, Azerbaijanis again recalled the incident of
the late 1990s. `Only God knows how many other transfers Russia has
made to Armenia, both legally and illegally,' says Ilgar Mammadov, a
Baku-based political analyst, in his blog. It is not clear where all
these weapons are stored. If they are stored in Armenia, it is
questionable how this corresponds to the limitations imposed by the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It seems that Armenia
has previously been exceeding the quotas of this treaty. One way to
circumvent this problem could be to transfer the weapons to
Nagorno-Karabakh, which continues to remain an soon after unmonitored
zone by international organizations. If this would be the case, the
conflict zone becomes even more militarized, significantly reducing
chances for a peaceful resolution.
Most government officials are convinced that despite all the peace
rhetoric, Russia continues to arm Armenia and remain interested in
maintaining the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict unresolved. The incident is
especially damaging since it was reported only one month after
President Aliyev signed the Moscow Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh
together with Russian President Medvedev and Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan. Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov phoned his
Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov to convince him that no such
transfer has taken place, the Azerbaijan side is convinced otherwise.
IMPLICATIONS: It is clear that the weapons transfer incident will play
an extremely damaging role in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. These
relations have been improving in the past several years, with
President Ilham Aliyev reaching out to Moscow and downplaying his NATO
aspirations in favor of accommodating Russian interests and building
pragmatic relations with the Kremlin. Economic cooperation and trade
between Russia and Azerbaijan reached its highest levels in
2008. President Medvedev visited Baku and expressed an interest in
buying all Azerbaijan's gas. President Aliyev visited Moscow on a
number of occasions and expressed an interest in building deeper and
more constructive relations with Moscow.
On the one hand, this was done to improve the chances for a peaceful
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Moscow is one of the
co-chairs of the Minsk group and an influential partner of
Armenia). On the other hand, Aliyev sincerely wanted to help Russia
improve its image on the international arena. For instance, during the
Georgian-Russian conflict, Aliyev refrained from accusing Russia of
aggression. He subsequently signed the Moscow Declaration ` not a
breakthrough in the peace negotiations as sometimes suggested, but
nevertheless a boost for the Kremlin's image as a peace broker in the
South Caucasus following its invasion of Georgia. All of these
gestures were aimed at winning Moscow's favor.
After this incident, frustration among the political leadership in
Baku is obvious. It is perhaps a wake-up call for the Azerbaijani
public and officials, who increasingly believe that Moscow will always
be guided by zero-sum games and interested in maintaining the
conflicts in the former Soviet space unresolved, and that Moscow will
continue to support Armenia despite the fact that it stands to gain
much more by acting as a neutral player in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.
After the Russian-Georgian war last August, there had been some hope
in Baku that Moscow might alter its blatant support for Armenia and
become more cooperative in seeking to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. In return, Azerbaijan would desist from following Georgia's
path to NATO membership, and Azerbaijan would deliver its gas to
Russia rather than to the Nabucco pipeline project. Importantly,
voices calling for that have now vanished. Indeed, the voices in Baku
promoting broader security arrangements with NATO and the EU, and
viewing Euro-Atlantic integration as the only way to ensure stability
in the South Caucasus are gaining ground. That in turn takes place
just as the U.S. has signed documents on strategic partnership with
both Georgia and Ukraine.
CONCLUSIONS: In the aftermath of the war in Georgia, Azerbaijani
officials were evidently greatly frustrated with the weak reaction of
the West and Turkey's submissive attitude to Moscow. (See 3 September
CACI Analyst) Briefly, Baku flirted with the idea of making a deal
with Russia on both gas supplies and the Karabakh conflict. Yet the
discovery of huge Russian arms deliveries to Armenia not only force
Azerbaijan to purchase more weapons and thus further militarize the
region ` it deals serious damage to Russian-Azerbaijani relations at a
personal level. Russia's actions are now interpreted as irrational,
emotional and unpredictable behavior. Baku's flirt with Moscow seems
resolutely over, which could rejuvenate its ties with the West ` if
the West is interested in investing in ties to Baku.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance analyst in Baku. He has
been a frequent contributor for Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
publications since 2002.
First published in the 01/28/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5021.
http://www.diplomatictraffic.com/debate.asp?ID=69 8