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WHY ARABS FEAR IRAN
Ali Younes
Al-Arabiya
http://www.alarabiya.net/views/ 2009/02/16/66562.html
Feb 16 2009
United Arab Emirates
Iranians are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Islamic revolution
in 1979,for many in the Arab World, however, Iran is a strategic threat
that ought to be dealt with and put in check. Recent moves by Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, the traditional centers of power in the Arab World,
toward isolating Iran, especially in the aftermath of the Gaza war, is
aimed at ending Iran's influence in the region. The surprise meeting
of nine Arab foreign ministers last week in Abu Dhabi was a clear
and direct signal to Iran that its involvement in the Arab world is
unwanted. The foreign minister of UAE said in a calculated rebuke to
Iran that "unwelcomed non- Arab parties are not to get involved in
our affairs."
There are two prevailing opinions in the Arab World that both see
Iran from its own angle and according to its world view.
The Arab street which is one of them, views Iran with a sense of
admiration as a strategic powerful Muslim country and an asset to the
Arabs, and that it is a country that sets its policies and goals based
on the strategic long term vision of its leaders. Iranian leaders,
this view continues, are calculated and shrewd politicians of a
country that has made leaps in science and technology that enabled it
to manufacture its own indigent weapons systems, space technology and
nuclear power. Iranian advances in those areas are contrasted with the
Arab World stagnation and lack worthy scientific or industrial base.
Supporters also point out that Iran is keen on helping the resistance
movements of Hamas, Hezbollah and other organizations which, as they
point out, is in line with its Pan-Islamic policy of being on the
side of oppressed Muslims.
The other view which is mostly held by the Arab regimes, particularly
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, sees Iran as a belligerent "Shia" country
with hegemonic designs over the Arab and Muslim world with an eye to
assume leadership of the Muslim world, the Arab World included. For
those who hold this view, Iran is a mortal threat that should not be
allowed to have a free rein in the region.
Both perceptions and stereotypes are of course inaccurate; however
there is an element of truth in both of them.
The way the political system in Iran works is different than any
other political system in the Arab world and certainly different
from the stereotype Arabs hold. Iran has a comparative measure
of democracy within the boundaries of its overall theocratic
system. Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme leader is the ultimate
ruler of Iran and functions as a mediator between competing levers
of power within Iran's political elites. Iran is not a utopian or
Islamo-centric country as one might imagine, its politics are best
described as improvised and "realist" contrary to its perception of
being strategic. For example, Iran who now treats the issue of its
nuclear program as central to its "national sovereignty", a "red
line", and an "honor" has in 2004 suspended its nuclear program and
ratified the Additional Protocol of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which gives the IAEA' inspectors the right to conduct unannounced and
intrusive inspections of the Iranian facilities. This is a far cry
from Iran's current hard-line position on the issue. In 2004 while
the EU- 3 (France, Germany, Britain) were making progress in the
negotiations with Iran, George Bush, went on and branded Iran as part
of the Axis of Evil and continued to use threatening rhetoric against
it. This U.S. saber rattling made the Iranian leadership nervous and
to question the wisdom of abandoning their prized program given the
U.S. administration's treatment of Iran as its next target after Iraq
with or without its nuclear program and having witnessed the fate
of Iraq versus North Korea. Iran as we have seen in this case was
willing to abandon its nuclear program when it thought it is rational
to do so. Moreover, in looking after its interests at the expense
of ideology and principles, Iran sided with Christian Armenia during
its war in the eighties and nineties with Muslim Azerbaijan who is,
like Iran, a Shia Muslim country. During this war, Iranian leadership
felt it was safer to be on the side of Armenia as opposed to Muslim
Azerbaijan whose victory might revive the nationalistic feelings of
its own Azerbaijani minority and rekindle the idea of 'unification"
between South Azerbaijan which is part of Iran and North Azerbaijan
which is the country of Azerbaijan. Turkey on the other hand who is
decidedly secular and Muslim had actively supported Azerbaijan during
the conflict with Armenia. This trend did not stop there; Iran has
also chose its immediate interests over its Islamic bonds with other
Muslims as in the case of the Russian-Chechen war throughout the
nineties during which Iran sided with Russia who is its main partner
in trade and weapons supplier. The same could be said on the issue
of Kashmir, where the plight of Muslims in Kashmir did not prevent
Iran from having strong relations with India.
Therefore, one can safely conclude that Ahmadinejad's rhetoric against
Israel might not be as strategic as it appears to be and so is the
nature of relations with Hezbollah and Hamas. While Iran's relation
with Hamas and Hezbollah have the appearance of being strategic and
solid, it is possible according to some of Iran's analysts, to envision
Iran abandoning its allies if it is in Iran's best interest. For Hamas,
Iran is an ally who provided much needed financial support after it
faced a total isolation from the international community and the Arab
countries in the wake of its electoral victory in 2006. In Hezbollah's
case, it might be complicated to drop the organization completely
given the competing interests within the Iranian political system,
however, if the Iranian regime is faced an existential threat, it
will not hesitate to act in a rational way and even drop Hezbollah.
Iran's "rational" thinking and ultimate political decisions did not
win her any friends among the main Arab governments particularly
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This animosity toward Iran started ever since
Egypt's signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Since then, the
official Arab World took a dive toward a peaceful settlement with
Israel that was not reciprocated with a mutual dive toward peace
from Israel. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in light of this "peaceful"
shift toward Israel, have come to view Iran as their mortal enemy
particularly when considering the combustive rhetoric of Ayatollah
Khomeini of "exporting the revolution" or the slogans of "the march
to Jerusalem had to go through Karbala", and later of exporting the
'Islamic Revolution" through religion and supporting the Palestinians
in their struggle against Israel. Arab governments, particularly
the Gulf governments, feared Iran's influence within their borders
through their indigent Shia citizens or through Iranians living and
working in their countries. These fears, whether justified or not,
propelled some Arab governments, in a clear shift of strategy towards
Iran post its 1979 Islamic revolution to ignite the Shia-Sunni divide
in order to cast Iran as the Shia enemy, or the outsider who wants to
convert the Muslim Sunnis to their Shia faith. The Arab street however
sees things different from their governments. For the overwhelming
majority of the Arab peoples there is no illusion of who the enemy is,
certainly not Iran.
Written for Al Arabiya. Ali Younes is a Washington based writer and
political analyst. He can be reached at: [email protected]
Ali Younes
Al-Arabiya
http://www.alarabiya.net/views/ 2009/02/16/66562.html
Feb 16 2009
United Arab Emirates
Iranians are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Islamic revolution
in 1979,for many in the Arab World, however, Iran is a strategic threat
that ought to be dealt with and put in check. Recent moves by Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, the traditional centers of power in the Arab World,
toward isolating Iran, especially in the aftermath of the Gaza war, is
aimed at ending Iran's influence in the region. The surprise meeting
of nine Arab foreign ministers last week in Abu Dhabi was a clear
and direct signal to Iran that its involvement in the Arab world is
unwanted. The foreign minister of UAE said in a calculated rebuke to
Iran that "unwelcomed non- Arab parties are not to get involved in
our affairs."
There are two prevailing opinions in the Arab World that both see
Iran from its own angle and according to its world view.
The Arab street which is one of them, views Iran with a sense of
admiration as a strategic powerful Muslim country and an asset to the
Arabs, and that it is a country that sets its policies and goals based
on the strategic long term vision of its leaders. Iranian leaders,
this view continues, are calculated and shrewd politicians of a
country that has made leaps in science and technology that enabled it
to manufacture its own indigent weapons systems, space technology and
nuclear power. Iranian advances in those areas are contrasted with the
Arab World stagnation and lack worthy scientific or industrial base.
Supporters also point out that Iran is keen on helping the resistance
movements of Hamas, Hezbollah and other organizations which, as they
point out, is in line with its Pan-Islamic policy of being on the
side of oppressed Muslims.
The other view which is mostly held by the Arab regimes, particularly
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, sees Iran as a belligerent "Shia" country
with hegemonic designs over the Arab and Muslim world with an eye to
assume leadership of the Muslim world, the Arab World included. For
those who hold this view, Iran is a mortal threat that should not be
allowed to have a free rein in the region.
Both perceptions and stereotypes are of course inaccurate; however
there is an element of truth in both of them.
The way the political system in Iran works is different than any
other political system in the Arab world and certainly different
from the stereotype Arabs hold. Iran has a comparative measure
of democracy within the boundaries of its overall theocratic
system. Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme leader is the ultimate
ruler of Iran and functions as a mediator between competing levers
of power within Iran's political elites. Iran is not a utopian or
Islamo-centric country as one might imagine, its politics are best
described as improvised and "realist" contrary to its perception of
being strategic. For example, Iran who now treats the issue of its
nuclear program as central to its "national sovereignty", a "red
line", and an "honor" has in 2004 suspended its nuclear program and
ratified the Additional Protocol of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which gives the IAEA' inspectors the right to conduct unannounced and
intrusive inspections of the Iranian facilities. This is a far cry
from Iran's current hard-line position on the issue. In 2004 while
the EU- 3 (France, Germany, Britain) were making progress in the
negotiations with Iran, George Bush, went on and branded Iran as part
of the Axis of Evil and continued to use threatening rhetoric against
it. This U.S. saber rattling made the Iranian leadership nervous and
to question the wisdom of abandoning their prized program given the
U.S. administration's treatment of Iran as its next target after Iraq
with or without its nuclear program and having witnessed the fate
of Iraq versus North Korea. Iran as we have seen in this case was
willing to abandon its nuclear program when it thought it is rational
to do so. Moreover, in looking after its interests at the expense
of ideology and principles, Iran sided with Christian Armenia during
its war in the eighties and nineties with Muslim Azerbaijan who is,
like Iran, a Shia Muslim country. During this war, Iranian leadership
felt it was safer to be on the side of Armenia as opposed to Muslim
Azerbaijan whose victory might revive the nationalistic feelings of
its own Azerbaijani minority and rekindle the idea of 'unification"
between South Azerbaijan which is part of Iran and North Azerbaijan
which is the country of Azerbaijan. Turkey on the other hand who is
decidedly secular and Muslim had actively supported Azerbaijan during
the conflict with Armenia. This trend did not stop there; Iran has
also chose its immediate interests over its Islamic bonds with other
Muslims as in the case of the Russian-Chechen war throughout the
nineties during which Iran sided with Russia who is its main partner
in trade and weapons supplier. The same could be said on the issue
of Kashmir, where the plight of Muslims in Kashmir did not prevent
Iran from having strong relations with India.
Therefore, one can safely conclude that Ahmadinejad's rhetoric against
Israel might not be as strategic as it appears to be and so is the
nature of relations with Hezbollah and Hamas. While Iran's relation
with Hamas and Hezbollah have the appearance of being strategic and
solid, it is possible according to some of Iran's analysts, to envision
Iran abandoning its allies if it is in Iran's best interest. For Hamas,
Iran is an ally who provided much needed financial support after it
faced a total isolation from the international community and the Arab
countries in the wake of its electoral victory in 2006. In Hezbollah's
case, it might be complicated to drop the organization completely
given the competing interests within the Iranian political system,
however, if the Iranian regime is faced an existential threat, it
will not hesitate to act in a rational way and even drop Hezbollah.
Iran's "rational" thinking and ultimate political decisions did not
win her any friends among the main Arab governments particularly
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This animosity toward Iran started ever since
Egypt's signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Since then, the
official Arab World took a dive toward a peaceful settlement with
Israel that was not reciprocated with a mutual dive toward peace
from Israel. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in light of this "peaceful"
shift toward Israel, have come to view Iran as their mortal enemy
particularly when considering the combustive rhetoric of Ayatollah
Khomeini of "exporting the revolution" or the slogans of "the march
to Jerusalem had to go through Karbala", and later of exporting the
'Islamic Revolution" through religion and supporting the Palestinians
in their struggle against Israel. Arab governments, particularly
the Gulf governments, feared Iran's influence within their borders
through their indigent Shia citizens or through Iranians living and
working in their countries. These fears, whether justified or not,
propelled some Arab governments, in a clear shift of strategy towards
Iran post its 1979 Islamic revolution to ignite the Shia-Sunni divide
in order to cast Iran as the Shia enemy, or the outsider who wants to
convert the Muslim Sunnis to their Shia faith. The Arab street however
sees things different from their governments. For the overwhelming
majority of the Arab peoples there is no illusion of who the enemy is,
certainly not Iran.
Written for Al Arabiya. Ali Younes is a Washington based writer and
political analyst. He can be reached at: [email protected]