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AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IS UNSURE OF SAAKASHVILI
by Andrei Terekhov
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
February 19, 2009 Thursday
Russia
US INTELLIGENCE EVALUATED RUSSIA'S ACTIONS AND GLOBAL CRISIS; The
latest US National Intelligence Estimate
Analysis of most important challenges to US security was published
in Washington, the first document of this sort drawn for President
Barack Obama.
The National Intelligence Estimate covers the whole world with a
special emphasis on the situation in Pakistan, Iran, and Middle
East. A special paragraph of the document deals with Russia.
Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence who monitors all 16
American intelligence services, said work of thousands professionals
had gone into the document.
Russia is first mentioned in the National Intelligence Estimate in
the Estimates part. Authors of the document refrained from calling
it America's enemy (they do not think that any foreign country has
the military capacity to threaten the United States) but listed all
aspects of the Kremlin's foreign policy that had been disturbing
Washington. These included advancement of relations with China, Iran,
and Venezuela. They also included attempts to establish control over
deliveries of energy to Europe and East Asia and efforts to protect
and expand presence in European markets (through establishment of a
gas cartel together with other major exporters, among other things).
"Moscow strengthened its conventional armed forces so as to turn
them into a reliable instrument of foreign policy and proclaim its
own political restoration, so as to dominate nearby countries like
Georgia," the document pointed out. Triumph over the Georgian army
in August 2008 was acknowledged with certain astonishment since
it happened "despite the extended period of reduction-in-force,
deteriorating quality of conscripts, and difficulties with
modernization."
The National Intelligence Estimate emphasized Russian leaders'
positive attitude toward the possibility of improvement of the
Russian-American relations. Unlike other parts of the document,
however, this one included no recommendations on how to go about
this improvement. "Matters like NATO's expansion, conflict over
the Georgian separatist regions, and ABM will keep complicating the
relations," the authors stated. "Even insisting on negotiations over a
new agreement to replace the START I, Moscow points out that Georgia's
and Ukraine's entry into NATO will compromise the existing arms control
regimes and negotiations (over the future ones - Nezavisimaya Gazeta)
and may occasion Russian military counter-measures and an increase
of pressure on Tbilisi and Kiev."
Neither did the document anticipate abatement of tension over the so
called latent conflicts. On the contrary, its authors acknowledged
the increasing risk of provocations and erroneous decisions that could
renew the hostilities over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. US intelligence
offered no real insight into how the confrontation between President
of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili and the opposition would continue or
what it would result in - reinforcement of democracy in this country
or digression from it.
Authors of the document anticipated appearance of another conflict
area in the Caucasus, namely in Nagorno-Karabakh. "Declaration of
independence of Kosovo and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
by Russia, as well as improvement of the Armenian-Turkish relations
foment fears of isolation in Azerbaijan," the document stated.
The National Intelligence Estimate was quite pessimistic with regard
to the future of Central Asian states. Falling oil and gas prices
might foment social tension in Kazakhstan. Financial crisis could
further undermine domestic stability in Tajikistan heavily relying
as it was on what its nationals were transacting from Russia.
By and large, American intelligence anticipated settlement of no
existing conflicts in 2009. As for appearance of new ones, authors
of the document were clearly upset by prospects of the confrontation
between Israel and Iran over nuclear aspirations of the latter.
Threats to American interests were recognized originating in Pakistan
were Al-Qaeda leaders were suspected to be hiding and in North Africa
where European and local terrorists were thought to be charting new
terrorist acts against the United States.
Recognizing the financial crisis under way as the primary threat to
the United States, US intelligence never even ventured a guess on
when the recovery could or should be expected to begin.
by Andrei Terekhov
WPS Agency
What the Papers Say (Russia)
February 19, 2009 Thursday
Russia
US INTELLIGENCE EVALUATED RUSSIA'S ACTIONS AND GLOBAL CRISIS; The
latest US National Intelligence Estimate
Analysis of most important challenges to US security was published
in Washington, the first document of this sort drawn for President
Barack Obama.
The National Intelligence Estimate covers the whole world with a
special emphasis on the situation in Pakistan, Iran, and Middle
East. A special paragraph of the document deals with Russia.
Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence who monitors all 16
American intelligence services, said work of thousands professionals
had gone into the document.
Russia is first mentioned in the National Intelligence Estimate in
the Estimates part. Authors of the document refrained from calling
it America's enemy (they do not think that any foreign country has
the military capacity to threaten the United States) but listed all
aspects of the Kremlin's foreign policy that had been disturbing
Washington. These included advancement of relations with China, Iran,
and Venezuela. They also included attempts to establish control over
deliveries of energy to Europe and East Asia and efforts to protect
and expand presence in European markets (through establishment of a
gas cartel together with other major exporters, among other things).
"Moscow strengthened its conventional armed forces so as to turn
them into a reliable instrument of foreign policy and proclaim its
own political restoration, so as to dominate nearby countries like
Georgia," the document pointed out. Triumph over the Georgian army
in August 2008 was acknowledged with certain astonishment since
it happened "despite the extended period of reduction-in-force,
deteriorating quality of conscripts, and difficulties with
modernization."
The National Intelligence Estimate emphasized Russian leaders'
positive attitude toward the possibility of improvement of the
Russian-American relations. Unlike other parts of the document,
however, this one included no recommendations on how to go about
this improvement. "Matters like NATO's expansion, conflict over
the Georgian separatist regions, and ABM will keep complicating the
relations," the authors stated. "Even insisting on negotiations over a
new agreement to replace the START I, Moscow points out that Georgia's
and Ukraine's entry into NATO will compromise the existing arms control
regimes and negotiations (over the future ones - Nezavisimaya Gazeta)
and may occasion Russian military counter-measures and an increase
of pressure on Tbilisi and Kiev."
Neither did the document anticipate abatement of tension over the so
called latent conflicts. On the contrary, its authors acknowledged
the increasing risk of provocations and erroneous decisions that could
renew the hostilities over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. US intelligence
offered no real insight into how the confrontation between President
of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili and the opposition would continue or
what it would result in - reinforcement of democracy in this country
or digression from it.
Authors of the document anticipated appearance of another conflict
area in the Caucasus, namely in Nagorno-Karabakh. "Declaration of
independence of Kosovo and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
by Russia, as well as improvement of the Armenian-Turkish relations
foment fears of isolation in Azerbaijan," the document stated.
The National Intelligence Estimate was quite pessimistic with regard
to the future of Central Asian states. Falling oil and gas prices
might foment social tension in Kazakhstan. Financial crisis could
further undermine domestic stability in Tajikistan heavily relying
as it was on what its nationals were transacting from Russia.
By and large, American intelligence anticipated settlement of no
existing conflicts in 2009. As for appearance of new ones, authors
of the document were clearly upset by prospects of the confrontation
between Israel and Iran over nuclear aspirations of the latter.
Threats to American interests were recognized originating in Pakistan
were Al-Qaeda leaders were suspected to be hiding and in North Africa
where European and local terrorists were thought to be charting new
terrorist acts against the United States.
Recognizing the financial crisis under way as the primary threat to
the United States, US intelligence never even ventured a guess on
when the recovery could or should be expected to begin.