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EurasiaNet, NY
Jan 5 2009
CAUCASUS: THE EU SEEKS BROADER TIES WITH ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN AND
GEORGIA IN 2009
Lili Di Puppo 1/05/09
Brussels wants to enhance the European Union's relations with Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia in the coming year. In the absence of solid
membership prospects, the question remains, however, whether the EU's
ideas about enhanced relations will meet the expectations of leaders
of the three Caucasus states, as well as create a framework that can
improve Brussels' capabilities to address regional issues.
The EU's vision for expanded cooperation was contained in a blueprint
document distributed in early December by the European Commission. The
report deals with the three Caucasus states, along with Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova. The so-called Eastern Partnership Proposal is
expected to be formally adopted during a summit meeting of the EU and
the partner countries in March 2009.
The blueprint envisions expanded free trade and visa
arrangements. Whether these will satisfy all the Caucasus states
remains an open question. This question is particularly relevant for
Georgia after the Georgian-Russian conflict in the summer of
2008. Georgia is the most keen to integrate with Western institutions,
while Russia is steadfastly opposed to such a Westward drift. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The Georgian-Russian crisis served as a catalyst for the partnership
proposal, which was initially presented by Poland and Sweden last
May. Pawel Swieboda, director of the demosEuropa think-tank in Warsaw,
believes that the initiative is "partly aimed to accommodate Georgia's
expectations, which cannot be realized by quick NATO accession. The
EU's engagement is meant to fill the gap."
While Tbilisi is sure to welcome stronger economic ties, Georgian
leaders are anxious to bolster security cooperation. Georgian State
Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Giorgi Baramidze, says that
"it is important not to overlook the security issues, because without
durable security and stability, it will be extremely difficult to
reach the goals that the Eastern partnership has."
The challenge of promoting stability and security in Georgia through
soft power instruments has long posed a dilemma for the EU. "What you
need if you want to help Georgia is to de-securitize the Eastern
European agenda. Because the more security is on the agenda, the fewer
opportunities for the EU to work with soft power," says Alexander
Duleba, director of the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy
Association.
Another question is whether the partnership will prove an efficient
tool for enhancing EU influence in the region. Duleba explains that
the partnership offer is "a reflection of the very fact that the EU's
interests in Eastern Europe are of a regional nature." These interests
include energy supplies, developing a trans-European transport
network, protecting the environment and dealing with illegal
migration.
In this light, Russia's exclusion from the Eastern partnership appears
problematic, Duleba suggested, adding that it will be impossible to
"develop an efficient regional policy framework if Russia is not in
it. Baramidze also remarked that "it is very important that the
Eastern partnership includes issues of conflict resolution, such as
the conflict between Russia and Georgia."
Swieboda said the partnership plan is "mainly about strengthening the
EU's presence in the neighborhood" -- a geopolitical development that
will not be welcomed by Russia. "We have already heard from the
Foreign Ministry that Russia examines with due attention what the
Eastern partnership constitutes. And this is a signal of possible
tension to come," he said.
During a news conference following the release of the proposal,
European Commission president Jos�© Manuel Barroso told
journalists that the EU's intention is not to build a sphere of
influence. "We don't want a Cold War, but cool heads," Barroso said.
With the Czech Republic assuming the EU presidency for the first half
of 2009, to be followed by Sweden, "this will be the year of the
Eastern partnership", says Swieboda. Beyond the signal that the EU
wants to reinforce its presence in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions,
the success of the initiative depends on concrete achievements. "The
ground is prepared, but a lot depends on what happens in tangible
terms," Swieboda said.
Editor's Note: Lili Di Puppo is the editor-in-chief of the online
magazine Caucaz.com and a PhD candidate at the European Viadrina
University (Frankfurt/Oder) in Germany.
Jan 5 2009
CAUCASUS: THE EU SEEKS BROADER TIES WITH ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN AND
GEORGIA IN 2009
Lili Di Puppo 1/05/09
Brussels wants to enhance the European Union's relations with Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia in the coming year. In the absence of solid
membership prospects, the question remains, however, whether the EU's
ideas about enhanced relations will meet the expectations of leaders
of the three Caucasus states, as well as create a framework that can
improve Brussels' capabilities to address regional issues.
The EU's vision for expanded cooperation was contained in a blueprint
document distributed in early December by the European Commission. The
report deals with the three Caucasus states, along with Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova. The so-called Eastern Partnership Proposal is
expected to be formally adopted during a summit meeting of the EU and
the partner countries in March 2009.
The blueprint envisions expanded free trade and visa
arrangements. Whether these will satisfy all the Caucasus states
remains an open question. This question is particularly relevant for
Georgia after the Georgian-Russian conflict in the summer of
2008. Georgia is the most keen to integrate with Western institutions,
while Russia is steadfastly opposed to such a Westward drift. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The Georgian-Russian crisis served as a catalyst for the partnership
proposal, which was initially presented by Poland and Sweden last
May. Pawel Swieboda, director of the demosEuropa think-tank in Warsaw,
believes that the initiative is "partly aimed to accommodate Georgia's
expectations, which cannot be realized by quick NATO accession. The
EU's engagement is meant to fill the gap."
While Tbilisi is sure to welcome stronger economic ties, Georgian
leaders are anxious to bolster security cooperation. Georgian State
Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Giorgi Baramidze, says that
"it is important not to overlook the security issues, because without
durable security and stability, it will be extremely difficult to
reach the goals that the Eastern partnership has."
The challenge of promoting stability and security in Georgia through
soft power instruments has long posed a dilemma for the EU. "What you
need if you want to help Georgia is to de-securitize the Eastern
European agenda. Because the more security is on the agenda, the fewer
opportunities for the EU to work with soft power," says Alexander
Duleba, director of the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy
Association.
Another question is whether the partnership will prove an efficient
tool for enhancing EU influence in the region. Duleba explains that
the partnership offer is "a reflection of the very fact that the EU's
interests in Eastern Europe are of a regional nature." These interests
include energy supplies, developing a trans-European transport
network, protecting the environment and dealing with illegal
migration.
In this light, Russia's exclusion from the Eastern partnership appears
problematic, Duleba suggested, adding that it will be impossible to
"develop an efficient regional policy framework if Russia is not in
it. Baramidze also remarked that "it is very important that the
Eastern partnership includes issues of conflict resolution, such as
the conflict between Russia and Georgia."
Swieboda said the partnership plan is "mainly about strengthening the
EU's presence in the neighborhood" -- a geopolitical development that
will not be welcomed by Russia. "We have already heard from the
Foreign Ministry that Russia examines with due attention what the
Eastern partnership constitutes. And this is a signal of possible
tension to come," he said.
During a news conference following the release of the proposal,
European Commission president Jos�© Manuel Barroso told
journalists that the EU's intention is not to build a sphere of
influence. "We don't want a Cold War, but cool heads," Barroso said.
With the Czech Republic assuming the EU presidency for the first half
of 2009, to be followed by Sweden, "this will be the year of the
Eastern partnership", says Swieboda. Beyond the signal that the EU
wants to reinforce its presence in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions,
the success of the initiative depends on concrete achievements. "The
ground is prepared, but a lot depends on what happens in tangible
terms," Swieboda said.
Editor's Note: Lili Di Puppo is the editor-in-chief of the online
magazine Caucaz.com and a PhD candidate at the European Viadrina
University (Frankfurt/Oder) in Germany.