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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Jan 5 2009
MONDAY TALK
KalaycıoÄ?lu: 2009 may be make-or-break year with EU
Sabancı University Professor Ersin KalaycıoÄ?lu
has said the government of Turkey should return to its reformist
agenda with the goal of membership in the European Union because `the
hour of reckoning is close.'
Evaluating the most pressing issues facing Turkey this year, he
stressed that the EU had notified the Turkish government in November
that it was high time to focus again on the stalled reform
efforts. Shrinking by the day, Turkey's friends in the EU expect
Ankara to restore its supporters' confidence by taking bold steps in
the political field, and there is much more to do for Turkey in terms
of democratization and human rights, he explained.Professor
KalaycıoÄ?lu shared his views with Monday Talk on the
most critical issues the Turkish government will have to address in
2009, from its relations with the United States to its role in the UN
Security Council.
What are your political and economic expectations for Turkey in the
year 2009?
First of all, we should expect to see financial problems resulting
from the global economic crisis dominate the scene. In addition, we
have the local elections approaching in March, and the results may
give us some idea about how well or poorly the political parties are
doing. As of Jan. 1, Turkey became a temporary member of the UN
Security Council [UNSC] and a lot of tough issues, including wars in
Congo and the Israeli-Hamas conflict, and others in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, are awaiting our attention. Then we have a number of
foreign policy issues, such as relations with the European Union,
which have become tied to the issue of Cyprus, where talks have been
continuing between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.
Are the Cyprus talks essential to easing Turkey-EU relations, since
many negotiation chapters remain suspended by the EU, which says
Turkey should first open its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot
traffic?
We don't know the details of the talks between the Turkish and Greek
sides on the island. However, if the EU expects Turkey to do
something, the feeling in Turkey -- the government included -- is that
Turkey has already done its share. Turkish Cypriots, supported by
Turkey, approved the UN-mediated Annan plan to reunify the island in
2004 just prior to the EU accession of Greek Cyprus as the official
government of the Republic of Cyprus. But the Greek Cypriots rejected
the Annan plan and, by extension, the reuniting of the island. Now,
having been accepted into the EU as a full member, the ball is in the
Greek Cypriots' court.
What do you think they should do?
The Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government alike expect the Greek
side to agree on a federal structure with two states and thereby unify
the island. In addition, the guarantee agreements of 1959-1960 should
continue. The rest would be about legal-technical details, which will
take some time to solve. The main issue is about the definition of the
structure of the state of Cyprus.
Can't Turkey open its ports to the Greek Cypriot traffic to show the
EU that it is willing to overcome deadlocks because it wants
membership?
It is possible. Turkey closed its ports after 1984, so Turkish ports
had been open to Greek Cypriot traffic before. But Turkey has had a
new political stance since 2004. In that case, why should Turkey take
another goodwill step without guaranteeing the Turkish Cypriots'
well-being is not so clear to Turks. There is a problem of trust
between the sides and, without establishing trust, Turkey will not
change its stance because we have had too many bad experiences.
Would you elaborate on this idea?
When we academics talk with our EU counterparts, we ask them if Turkey
would be accepted in the EU with full membership if it renounced its
right to Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and they still cannot say `yes.'
Such a relationship, in which, when one side says it is ready to do
anything to be accepted into the EU, but the other side is still not
sure, is hard to sustain. But if the EU is also ready to give credible
guarantees to Turkey about full membership, then Turkey can consider
changing its stance. Secondly, the problem was supposed to be solved
by the UN. It is not Turkey that asked the EU to make the Cyprus
problem a problem of the EU. That was done solely by the EU when it
admitted Cyprus into the union in 2004 as a representative of the
entire island, even though the island had been divided into a Greek
Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north. Currently the Turkish
Cypriots cannot take full advantage of the EU membership of the island
because their status is not clear. Since the EU has been willing to
make Cyprus a problem of its own, it is welcome to solve it as well
and improve the status of the Turkish Cypriots to the level of the
Greek Cypriots.
`Turkey would not like to trigger civil war in Iraq' As there are
growing relations between Turkey and the Kurdish administration in
northern Iraq, is there a possibility that Turkey could recognize the
regional government?
Turkey started to develop more relations with the northern Iraqi
administration in 2008, but it would not be an easy step to recognize
that administration officially, because such a move would jeopardize
Iraq's territorial integrity, which, in turn, may have negative
repercussions for the whole region.
Could you elaborate on this?
Iran has been trying to increase its influence in the region,
especially in parts of Baghdad and in southern Iraq. If Iraq's
territorial integrity is damaged, neighboring states could be drawn
into the Iraqi mess. Turkey would not want to trigger such a
development. Since the central administration of Iraq is not very
strong, they told Turkey to go and talk with the regional
administration to get support for the fight against terrorism. What
needs to be done is to strengthen the central administration in Iraq
while respecting and supporting the rights of the ethnic groups in the
country. This is what the United States tries to do, but it is very
difficult while the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north
are all armed. So a civil war is a possibility that must be
avoided. In addition, there has been a historic change in
Iraq. Throughout most of its history, Iraq has been governed by the
Sunnis even though the Shiites have been in the majority.
Now the Shiites, due to their sheer numbers, have the opportunity to
govern in a democratic Iraq. It's not an easy change for the country,
since Shiites have been sidelined in the history of the Middle East
and seen as a threat to most governments in the region.
`Turkey-Armenia rapprochement fragile'
Do you think Turkey will open its border with Armenia this year?
Turkey has traditionally made the opening of the border with Armenia
conditional on the development of good relations between Azerbaijan
and Armenia. But there is no such development in sight.
But Turkey has given some signs that it may remove its conditions¦
Then there would be a major Turkish foreign policy change, meaning
that Turkey would change the course of its relations with Azerbaijan,
as well. Turkey and Azerbaijan share the same culture. In addition,
Turkey has ties with Azerbaijan over the energy corridor in the
region. If Turkey can establish better relations with Armenia without
shattering its relations with Azerbaijan, then it could be achieved.
What can Turkey do to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan happy?
If President Abdullah Gül had been able to convince Azeri
President Ilham Aliyev to go along with him when he went to Yerevan
last year, a balancing act could have been possible. Remember the
protests by the Azerbaijani government when President Gül went
to Yerevan! Turkey needs to think of the negative repercussions of
abandoning Azerbaijan while approaching Armenia. On the other hand,
how Yerevan will be able to go forward with its relations with Ankara
is also questionable. There are influential factors outside of
Armenia. One of them is the Armenian diaspora. The other one is
Russia. Armenia is dependent on Russia, particularly when it comes to
security relations. And then there are the United States and, to some
extent, the European Union, both of which have influential relations
with Armenia. Additionally, President Gül implied recently that
the rapprochement could be hurt by the signature campaign from Turkish
intellectuals [apologizing for the killings and forced deportations of
Anatolian Armenians in the World War-I era]. That means that the
rapprochement is quite fragile.
`Middle East too hard for Turkey to deal with' Will Turkey be able to
follow up on its initiatives to solve the crisis in Gaza?
We first have to understand what is going on there, where several
forces have been clashing. First, there is a conflict between Hamas
and Fatah. Hamas is eyeing the seat of Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas. Hamas tries to thrive on the fact that Fatah recognizes Israel
and has a pro-peace stance, which has cost them dearly in popular
support. On the other side, Hamas props up the image of resistance to
Israel and presses for the rights of the Palestinians. So Hamas
provoked Israel with its attacks and Israel responded. That was the
explanation of Abbas, who blamed the rival Hamas group for triggering
Israel's deadly raids on Gaza by ending a six-month truce with
Israel. Moreover, there are more tensions between moderate and radical
rival camps in the Arab world.
What are those tensions?
Amid the recent Gaza bombings, Hezbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah
called on millions of Egyptians to take to the streets to protest
their government's response to the Israeli attack. He also called for
uprisings throughout the Arab and Islamic world and said he supported
a third Palestinian intifada. So the picture looks like this: Hamas is
supported by Hezbullah, Hezbullah is supported by Syria and Syria is
supported by Iran. Egypt officially barred aid from reaching Gaza from
its soil because it feels threatened by Iran and Syria, which seem to
be pressuring Egypt through their proxy Hamas. So there seems to be a
confrontation between Egypt and Iran.
What would you say about the US factor?
It is the third factor in this complicated equation. We don't know
what the new administration will do. Maybe Israel is trying to take
advantage of the lame-duck US presidency because the new
administration would stress diplomacy more than the use of force. And,
of course, Hamas is also trying to use the situation for its own
advantage.
So what about Turkey?
Under the circumstances, how Turkey could convince Egypt and Iran to
agree on a solution while at the same time getting together with
Israel and the Palestinians to have them start a cease-fire while
keeping the US out of this equation is a puzzle to solve.
Which camp do you think Turkey feels closer to in the region?
Turkey in the past has tried to help the Palestinians economically in
Gaza, even after Hamas took over the region. For example, it offered
to build a free-trade zone in Gaza. However, it seems like Hamas is
less interested in the economic development of Gaza and more
interested in a war of attrition and prefers to buy bombs and arms,
where Iran seems to come into the picture. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi
Arabia feel threatened by Iran's rising influence. Does the Turkish
government feel threatened by Iran, as well? We don't know. If Turkey
feels closer to Iran, then it would have to face negative reactions
from such traditional allies as the United States, NATO and the EU, as
well as the above-mentioned states in the region. In the end, Turkey
cannot afford to expend its energy and finite resources to convince
all sides and achieve a resolution in the very slippery Middle East.
Where do you think Turkey should expend its energy?
First, Turkey should invest more in its relations with the EU because
the hour of reckoning is close. Warning Turkey, the EU said it would
review the situation once again in 2009. Turkey has fallen behind in
some of its democratization and human rights reforms. It should revive
the reform process so the supporters of Turkey in the EU will find
ammunition in their hands to defend Turkey against the non-supporter
camp. Secondly, a new administration is coming to the United
States. Turkey needs to establish ties with the Obama
administration. There is another `genocide' resolution in the US
Congress waiting to come to light in April and it is full of claims,
such as massacres that took place in the 1920s, which are neither true
nor acceptable. I am sure the Turkish government will have its hands
full with such matters that need to be clarified with the Obama
administration.
`Stronger mandate in local elections does not mean more reforms' `The
ruling Justice and Development Party's [AK Party] performance at the
March 29 local elections will not provide motivation for it to follow
a more reformist course. What we have seen following the July 2007
election is that a stronger mandate does not correspond to a more
reformist approach, even though that's what the AK Party spokespersons
had promised. If they increase their support, such a record will only
reinforce their belief in what they had been doing and motivate them
to be complacent. If they have a drop in support at the polls, then
they may re-evaluate their policies.'
Ersin KalaycıoÄ?lu
A professor of political science at Sabancı University's
faculty of arts and social sciences, he was formerly the rector of
IÅ?ık University in Ä°stanbul from 2004 to
2007. Professor KalaycıoÄ?lu is a student of comparative
politics and specializes in political representation and
participation. He has published on those two fields
internationally. He has authored and co-edited six books in Turkish on
comparative political participation, including a textbook on
contemporary political science and several co-edited books on Turkish
politics. In English he co-edited `Turkey: Political, Social and
Economic Challenges in the 1990s' (1995), authored `Turkish Dynamics:
A Bridge across Troubled Lands' (2005) and co-authored, with Ali
CarkoÄ?lu of Sabancı University, `Turkish Democracy
Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society' (2007).
Jan 5 2009
MONDAY TALK
KalaycıoÄ?lu: 2009 may be make-or-break year with EU
Sabancı University Professor Ersin KalaycıoÄ?lu
has said the government of Turkey should return to its reformist
agenda with the goal of membership in the European Union because `the
hour of reckoning is close.'
Evaluating the most pressing issues facing Turkey this year, he
stressed that the EU had notified the Turkish government in November
that it was high time to focus again on the stalled reform
efforts. Shrinking by the day, Turkey's friends in the EU expect
Ankara to restore its supporters' confidence by taking bold steps in
the political field, and there is much more to do for Turkey in terms
of democratization and human rights, he explained.Professor
KalaycıoÄ?lu shared his views with Monday Talk on the
most critical issues the Turkish government will have to address in
2009, from its relations with the United States to its role in the UN
Security Council.
What are your political and economic expectations for Turkey in the
year 2009?
First of all, we should expect to see financial problems resulting
from the global economic crisis dominate the scene. In addition, we
have the local elections approaching in March, and the results may
give us some idea about how well or poorly the political parties are
doing. As of Jan. 1, Turkey became a temporary member of the UN
Security Council [UNSC] and a lot of tough issues, including wars in
Congo and the Israeli-Hamas conflict, and others in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, are awaiting our attention. Then we have a number of
foreign policy issues, such as relations with the European Union,
which have become tied to the issue of Cyprus, where talks have been
continuing between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.
Are the Cyprus talks essential to easing Turkey-EU relations, since
many negotiation chapters remain suspended by the EU, which says
Turkey should first open its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot
traffic?
We don't know the details of the talks between the Turkish and Greek
sides on the island. However, if the EU expects Turkey to do
something, the feeling in Turkey -- the government included -- is that
Turkey has already done its share. Turkish Cypriots, supported by
Turkey, approved the UN-mediated Annan plan to reunify the island in
2004 just prior to the EU accession of Greek Cyprus as the official
government of the Republic of Cyprus. But the Greek Cypriots rejected
the Annan plan and, by extension, the reuniting of the island. Now,
having been accepted into the EU as a full member, the ball is in the
Greek Cypriots' court.
What do you think they should do?
The Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government alike expect the Greek
side to agree on a federal structure with two states and thereby unify
the island. In addition, the guarantee agreements of 1959-1960 should
continue. The rest would be about legal-technical details, which will
take some time to solve. The main issue is about the definition of the
structure of the state of Cyprus.
Can't Turkey open its ports to the Greek Cypriot traffic to show the
EU that it is willing to overcome deadlocks because it wants
membership?
It is possible. Turkey closed its ports after 1984, so Turkish ports
had been open to Greek Cypriot traffic before. But Turkey has had a
new political stance since 2004. In that case, why should Turkey take
another goodwill step without guaranteeing the Turkish Cypriots'
well-being is not so clear to Turks. There is a problem of trust
between the sides and, without establishing trust, Turkey will not
change its stance because we have had too many bad experiences.
Would you elaborate on this idea?
When we academics talk with our EU counterparts, we ask them if Turkey
would be accepted in the EU with full membership if it renounced its
right to Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and they still cannot say `yes.'
Such a relationship, in which, when one side says it is ready to do
anything to be accepted into the EU, but the other side is still not
sure, is hard to sustain. But if the EU is also ready to give credible
guarantees to Turkey about full membership, then Turkey can consider
changing its stance. Secondly, the problem was supposed to be solved
by the UN. It is not Turkey that asked the EU to make the Cyprus
problem a problem of the EU. That was done solely by the EU when it
admitted Cyprus into the union in 2004 as a representative of the
entire island, even though the island had been divided into a Greek
Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north. Currently the Turkish
Cypriots cannot take full advantage of the EU membership of the island
because their status is not clear. Since the EU has been willing to
make Cyprus a problem of its own, it is welcome to solve it as well
and improve the status of the Turkish Cypriots to the level of the
Greek Cypriots.
`Turkey would not like to trigger civil war in Iraq' As there are
growing relations between Turkey and the Kurdish administration in
northern Iraq, is there a possibility that Turkey could recognize the
regional government?
Turkey started to develop more relations with the northern Iraqi
administration in 2008, but it would not be an easy step to recognize
that administration officially, because such a move would jeopardize
Iraq's territorial integrity, which, in turn, may have negative
repercussions for the whole region.
Could you elaborate on this?
Iran has been trying to increase its influence in the region,
especially in parts of Baghdad and in southern Iraq. If Iraq's
territorial integrity is damaged, neighboring states could be drawn
into the Iraqi mess. Turkey would not want to trigger such a
development. Since the central administration of Iraq is not very
strong, they told Turkey to go and talk with the regional
administration to get support for the fight against terrorism. What
needs to be done is to strengthen the central administration in Iraq
while respecting and supporting the rights of the ethnic groups in the
country. This is what the United States tries to do, but it is very
difficult while the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north
are all armed. So a civil war is a possibility that must be
avoided. In addition, there has been a historic change in
Iraq. Throughout most of its history, Iraq has been governed by the
Sunnis even though the Shiites have been in the majority.
Now the Shiites, due to their sheer numbers, have the opportunity to
govern in a democratic Iraq. It's not an easy change for the country,
since Shiites have been sidelined in the history of the Middle East
and seen as a threat to most governments in the region.
`Turkey-Armenia rapprochement fragile'
Do you think Turkey will open its border with Armenia this year?
Turkey has traditionally made the opening of the border with Armenia
conditional on the development of good relations between Azerbaijan
and Armenia. But there is no such development in sight.
But Turkey has given some signs that it may remove its conditions¦
Then there would be a major Turkish foreign policy change, meaning
that Turkey would change the course of its relations with Azerbaijan,
as well. Turkey and Azerbaijan share the same culture. In addition,
Turkey has ties with Azerbaijan over the energy corridor in the
region. If Turkey can establish better relations with Armenia without
shattering its relations with Azerbaijan, then it could be achieved.
What can Turkey do to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan happy?
If President Abdullah Gül had been able to convince Azeri
President Ilham Aliyev to go along with him when he went to Yerevan
last year, a balancing act could have been possible. Remember the
protests by the Azerbaijani government when President Gül went
to Yerevan! Turkey needs to think of the negative repercussions of
abandoning Azerbaijan while approaching Armenia. On the other hand,
how Yerevan will be able to go forward with its relations with Ankara
is also questionable. There are influential factors outside of
Armenia. One of them is the Armenian diaspora. The other one is
Russia. Armenia is dependent on Russia, particularly when it comes to
security relations. And then there are the United States and, to some
extent, the European Union, both of which have influential relations
with Armenia. Additionally, President Gül implied recently that
the rapprochement could be hurt by the signature campaign from Turkish
intellectuals [apologizing for the killings and forced deportations of
Anatolian Armenians in the World War-I era]. That means that the
rapprochement is quite fragile.
`Middle East too hard for Turkey to deal with' Will Turkey be able to
follow up on its initiatives to solve the crisis in Gaza?
We first have to understand what is going on there, where several
forces have been clashing. First, there is a conflict between Hamas
and Fatah. Hamas is eyeing the seat of Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas. Hamas tries to thrive on the fact that Fatah recognizes Israel
and has a pro-peace stance, which has cost them dearly in popular
support. On the other side, Hamas props up the image of resistance to
Israel and presses for the rights of the Palestinians. So Hamas
provoked Israel with its attacks and Israel responded. That was the
explanation of Abbas, who blamed the rival Hamas group for triggering
Israel's deadly raids on Gaza by ending a six-month truce with
Israel. Moreover, there are more tensions between moderate and radical
rival camps in the Arab world.
What are those tensions?
Amid the recent Gaza bombings, Hezbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah
called on millions of Egyptians to take to the streets to protest
their government's response to the Israeli attack. He also called for
uprisings throughout the Arab and Islamic world and said he supported
a third Palestinian intifada. So the picture looks like this: Hamas is
supported by Hezbullah, Hezbullah is supported by Syria and Syria is
supported by Iran. Egypt officially barred aid from reaching Gaza from
its soil because it feels threatened by Iran and Syria, which seem to
be pressuring Egypt through their proxy Hamas. So there seems to be a
confrontation between Egypt and Iran.
What would you say about the US factor?
It is the third factor in this complicated equation. We don't know
what the new administration will do. Maybe Israel is trying to take
advantage of the lame-duck US presidency because the new
administration would stress diplomacy more than the use of force. And,
of course, Hamas is also trying to use the situation for its own
advantage.
So what about Turkey?
Under the circumstances, how Turkey could convince Egypt and Iran to
agree on a solution while at the same time getting together with
Israel and the Palestinians to have them start a cease-fire while
keeping the US out of this equation is a puzzle to solve.
Which camp do you think Turkey feels closer to in the region?
Turkey in the past has tried to help the Palestinians economically in
Gaza, even after Hamas took over the region. For example, it offered
to build a free-trade zone in Gaza. However, it seems like Hamas is
less interested in the economic development of Gaza and more
interested in a war of attrition and prefers to buy bombs and arms,
where Iran seems to come into the picture. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi
Arabia feel threatened by Iran's rising influence. Does the Turkish
government feel threatened by Iran, as well? We don't know. If Turkey
feels closer to Iran, then it would have to face negative reactions
from such traditional allies as the United States, NATO and the EU, as
well as the above-mentioned states in the region. In the end, Turkey
cannot afford to expend its energy and finite resources to convince
all sides and achieve a resolution in the very slippery Middle East.
Where do you think Turkey should expend its energy?
First, Turkey should invest more in its relations with the EU because
the hour of reckoning is close. Warning Turkey, the EU said it would
review the situation once again in 2009. Turkey has fallen behind in
some of its democratization and human rights reforms. It should revive
the reform process so the supporters of Turkey in the EU will find
ammunition in their hands to defend Turkey against the non-supporter
camp. Secondly, a new administration is coming to the United
States. Turkey needs to establish ties with the Obama
administration. There is another `genocide' resolution in the US
Congress waiting to come to light in April and it is full of claims,
such as massacres that took place in the 1920s, which are neither true
nor acceptable. I am sure the Turkish government will have its hands
full with such matters that need to be clarified with the Obama
administration.
`Stronger mandate in local elections does not mean more reforms' `The
ruling Justice and Development Party's [AK Party] performance at the
March 29 local elections will not provide motivation for it to follow
a more reformist course. What we have seen following the July 2007
election is that a stronger mandate does not correspond to a more
reformist approach, even though that's what the AK Party spokespersons
had promised. If they increase their support, such a record will only
reinforce their belief in what they had been doing and motivate them
to be complacent. If they have a drop in support at the polls, then
they may re-evaluate their policies.'
Ersin KalaycıoÄ?lu
A professor of political science at Sabancı University's
faculty of arts and social sciences, he was formerly the rector of
IÅ?ık University in Ä°stanbul from 2004 to
2007. Professor KalaycıoÄ?lu is a student of comparative
politics and specializes in political representation and
participation. He has published on those two fields
internationally. He has authored and co-edited six books in Turkish on
comparative political participation, including a textbook on
contemporary political science and several co-edited books on Turkish
politics. In English he co-edited `Turkey: Political, Social and
Economic Challenges in the 1990s' (1995), authored `Turkish Dynamics:
A Bridge across Troubled Lands' (2005) and co-authored, with Ali
CarkoÄ?lu of Sabancı University, `Turkish Democracy
Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society' (2007).