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Today.Az, Azerbaijan
Jan 5 2009
Looking forward to 2009 in the Caucasus and beyond
05 January 2009 [09:58] - Today.Az
By Alexander Jackson, Caucasian Review of International Affairs.
2008 was, without doubt, a dramatic year in the Caucasus. The sight of
Russian tanks rolling into South Ossetia is the most obvious example,
but the August war should not obscure the region's other, less
headline-grabbing developments. The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement,
the slow slide of the North Caucasian republic of Ingushetia into
chaos, and the post-election bloodshed in Yerevan in early March
(amongst others) were all, in different ways, very significant. Will
2009 be so dramatic? Accepting in advance the futility of predictions
` hardly anyone saw the Russia-Georgia war coming in January 2008 `
the Caucasian Review of International Affairs presents a tentative
assessment of the year ahead.
Firstly, and perhaps most unpredictably, Georgia. The security
situation in around Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains volatile `
shootings and ceasefire violations are common. We can expect this
state of affairs to settle down, but certainly not become stable in
any real sense. Russia blocked an extension of the OSCE's 16 year old
monitoring mission on December 22, insisting that the organisation
must maintain a separate office for the `independent' region of South
Ossetia. The withdrawal of these monitors, and the possible expulsion
of UN observers after their mandate expires in February, will
undermine the already precarious security situation and make it almost
impossible to verify the military situation in the provinces. In this
context, the resettlement of refugees will remain a distant prospect
for most of the year.
Progress on settling refugees within Georgia itself will hinge largely
on Georgian domestic politics. As previous Caucasus Updates have
noted, President Saakashvili's position is increasingly precarious in
the face of gathering political opposition. He has recently made
efforts to deflect accusations of authoritarianism, but calls for
early elections are likely to continue. Popular anger, boosted by the
worsening effects of the economic crisis, may manifest itself as
large-scale street protests, raising the spectre of further state
crackdowns and a new cycle of political uncertainty. A change of
government in Tbilisi is a very plausible development in 2009. Amidst
all this, an upcoming security pact with the US is one of the few
reasons for President Saakashvili to be cheerful. However, as David
Kakabadze at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty notes, the pact is
non-binding, and therefore not enormously useful as a shield against
Russia.
The other big question in the Caucasus is Nagorno-Karabakh. The Moscow
Declaration of early November was arguably lacking in concrete
proposals, but it was symbolically significant as the first joint
declaration by the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders since the end of
the conflict in 1994. Peace is still a long way off, but war is fairly
unlikely in 2009. A continuation of the thaw in relations between
Turkey - Azerbaijan's strongest backer - and Armenia may persuade Baku
to make a deal sooner rather than later, whilst international
commitment remains high and it can secure a relatively beneficial
resolution. To be sure, this thaw is not guaranteed, and in any case
Azerbaijan may simply ignore Turkey's change in position. Despite the
opportunities provided by renewed world attention, 2009 may well be no
different to 2008, or any other year since 1994. A key factor in any
change will be Armenia's domestic scene.
Political instability in Yerevan will continue to simmer, exacerbated
by the world recession. The grievances of opposition figures, notably
Levon Ter-Petrosian, will remain. Rapid progress towards any Karabakh
resolution, or a deal with Turkey, deemed too soft by the nationalist
opposition will galvanise public sentiment against the administration
of President Serzh Sarkisian, already on the back foot over the
post-election violence last year and a faltering economy.
As far as pipeline politics are concerned, 2009 should see some
concrete progress finally being made on the Nabucco project to bring
Caspian gas to Europe. The gas row between Ukraine and Russia has
highlighted, yet again, the EU's vulnerability to Russian energy
policy, which should serve as a wake-up call. However, given that the
hyper-energetic President Sarkozy of France could not push through a
unified approach to Nabucco during his time in the rotating EU
presidency, it is unlikely that Vaclav Klaus ` the abrasive,
Eurosceptic Czech leader and the new EU president from January 1 `
will be able to. The principal obstacle will be enticing Turkmenistan
into formal negotiations on supplying the project. This courtship,
along with ongoing efforts to establish a supply corridor to NATO's
Afghan operations through Turkmen territory, should make 2009
President Berdimuhammedov's year, with an unprecedented level of
international attention paid to his country. Broader EU policy towards
the region is likely to remain patchy. The Union's monitoring mission
in Georgia (EUMM) is due to remain until October 2009, although in
light of their limited access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, their
ability to keep the peace is strictly limited. A new flare-up of
violence would severely test the commitment of the EU to the ceasefire
in Georgia.
Turkey's course in 2009 is likely to be similar to 2008: political and
economic deadlock at home, an increasingly successful foreign policy
abroad. In 2009 and 2010 Ankara will sit on the UN Security Council
(with a chairmanship in June 2009), where it is expected to push for
greater dialogue in the Middle East and also, perhaps, the
Caucasus. It will vocally lobby for its Caucasus Stability and
Co-operation Platform (CSCP), a suggested dialogue mechanism which may
be formally signed in early 2009. One should not expect too much from
the Platform. If any progress is made on Karabakh it will be through
the Minsk Group; on Georgia, through the EU and potentially the
US. CSCP's main role will probably be to institutionalise the
Turkish-Armenian thaw.
However, a diplomatic breakthrough here risks provoking a nationalist
backlash at home, which could feed into the wider struggle between
secularists (represented by the army) and the ruling ex-Islamist AK
Party. Any such backlash would force the government to slow down the
process ` it is entirely conceivable that Turkish-Armenian relations
could fall back into deep freeze in 2009. On the economic front, the
International Monetary Fund is expected to approve a $25 billion loan
to Ankara in early January. This will help to stabilise the economy
somewhat, although the country will remain highly vulnerable to
further financial shocks.
Drawing a tentative conclusion from the above, we can predict a year
of problems (potential disorder in Georgia; rising nationalism in
Armenia and Turkey) and opportunities (Nabucco; Turkey's CSCP). In
truth such predictions are shots in the dark. Focusing on the core
issues leads one to exclude possibilities which at the time seem
remote and implausible ` state collapse in Central Asia? Secessionism
amongst Iranian Azerbaijanis? A surge in regional terrorism? As is so
often the case, the region's only certainty is its uncertainty.
/ www.cria-online.org /
URL: http://www.today.az/news/politics/49921.html
Jan 5 2009
Looking forward to 2009 in the Caucasus and beyond
05 January 2009 [09:58] - Today.Az
By Alexander Jackson, Caucasian Review of International Affairs.
2008 was, without doubt, a dramatic year in the Caucasus. The sight of
Russian tanks rolling into South Ossetia is the most obvious example,
but the August war should not obscure the region's other, less
headline-grabbing developments. The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement,
the slow slide of the North Caucasian republic of Ingushetia into
chaos, and the post-election bloodshed in Yerevan in early March
(amongst others) were all, in different ways, very significant. Will
2009 be so dramatic? Accepting in advance the futility of predictions
` hardly anyone saw the Russia-Georgia war coming in January 2008 `
the Caucasian Review of International Affairs presents a tentative
assessment of the year ahead.
Firstly, and perhaps most unpredictably, Georgia. The security
situation in around Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains volatile `
shootings and ceasefire violations are common. We can expect this
state of affairs to settle down, but certainly not become stable in
any real sense. Russia blocked an extension of the OSCE's 16 year old
monitoring mission on December 22, insisting that the organisation
must maintain a separate office for the `independent' region of South
Ossetia. The withdrawal of these monitors, and the possible expulsion
of UN observers after their mandate expires in February, will
undermine the already precarious security situation and make it almost
impossible to verify the military situation in the provinces. In this
context, the resettlement of refugees will remain a distant prospect
for most of the year.
Progress on settling refugees within Georgia itself will hinge largely
on Georgian domestic politics. As previous Caucasus Updates have
noted, President Saakashvili's position is increasingly precarious in
the face of gathering political opposition. He has recently made
efforts to deflect accusations of authoritarianism, but calls for
early elections are likely to continue. Popular anger, boosted by the
worsening effects of the economic crisis, may manifest itself as
large-scale street protests, raising the spectre of further state
crackdowns and a new cycle of political uncertainty. A change of
government in Tbilisi is a very plausible development in 2009. Amidst
all this, an upcoming security pact with the US is one of the few
reasons for President Saakashvili to be cheerful. However, as David
Kakabadze at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty notes, the pact is
non-binding, and therefore not enormously useful as a shield against
Russia.
The other big question in the Caucasus is Nagorno-Karabakh. The Moscow
Declaration of early November was arguably lacking in concrete
proposals, but it was symbolically significant as the first joint
declaration by the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders since the end of
the conflict in 1994. Peace is still a long way off, but war is fairly
unlikely in 2009. A continuation of the thaw in relations between
Turkey - Azerbaijan's strongest backer - and Armenia may persuade Baku
to make a deal sooner rather than later, whilst international
commitment remains high and it can secure a relatively beneficial
resolution. To be sure, this thaw is not guaranteed, and in any case
Azerbaijan may simply ignore Turkey's change in position. Despite the
opportunities provided by renewed world attention, 2009 may well be no
different to 2008, or any other year since 1994. A key factor in any
change will be Armenia's domestic scene.
Political instability in Yerevan will continue to simmer, exacerbated
by the world recession. The grievances of opposition figures, notably
Levon Ter-Petrosian, will remain. Rapid progress towards any Karabakh
resolution, or a deal with Turkey, deemed too soft by the nationalist
opposition will galvanise public sentiment against the administration
of President Serzh Sarkisian, already on the back foot over the
post-election violence last year and a faltering economy.
As far as pipeline politics are concerned, 2009 should see some
concrete progress finally being made on the Nabucco project to bring
Caspian gas to Europe. The gas row between Ukraine and Russia has
highlighted, yet again, the EU's vulnerability to Russian energy
policy, which should serve as a wake-up call. However, given that the
hyper-energetic President Sarkozy of France could not push through a
unified approach to Nabucco during his time in the rotating EU
presidency, it is unlikely that Vaclav Klaus ` the abrasive,
Eurosceptic Czech leader and the new EU president from January 1 `
will be able to. The principal obstacle will be enticing Turkmenistan
into formal negotiations on supplying the project. This courtship,
along with ongoing efforts to establish a supply corridor to NATO's
Afghan operations through Turkmen territory, should make 2009
President Berdimuhammedov's year, with an unprecedented level of
international attention paid to his country. Broader EU policy towards
the region is likely to remain patchy. The Union's monitoring mission
in Georgia (EUMM) is due to remain until October 2009, although in
light of their limited access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, their
ability to keep the peace is strictly limited. A new flare-up of
violence would severely test the commitment of the EU to the ceasefire
in Georgia.
Turkey's course in 2009 is likely to be similar to 2008: political and
economic deadlock at home, an increasingly successful foreign policy
abroad. In 2009 and 2010 Ankara will sit on the UN Security Council
(with a chairmanship in June 2009), where it is expected to push for
greater dialogue in the Middle East and also, perhaps, the
Caucasus. It will vocally lobby for its Caucasus Stability and
Co-operation Platform (CSCP), a suggested dialogue mechanism which may
be formally signed in early 2009. One should not expect too much from
the Platform. If any progress is made on Karabakh it will be through
the Minsk Group; on Georgia, through the EU and potentially the
US. CSCP's main role will probably be to institutionalise the
Turkish-Armenian thaw.
However, a diplomatic breakthrough here risks provoking a nationalist
backlash at home, which could feed into the wider struggle between
secularists (represented by the army) and the ruling ex-Islamist AK
Party. Any such backlash would force the government to slow down the
process ` it is entirely conceivable that Turkish-Armenian relations
could fall back into deep freeze in 2009. On the economic front, the
International Monetary Fund is expected to approve a $25 billion loan
to Ankara in early January. This will help to stabilise the economy
somewhat, although the country will remain highly vulnerable to
further financial shocks.
Drawing a tentative conclusion from the above, we can predict a year
of problems (potential disorder in Georgia; rising nationalism in
Armenia and Turkey) and opportunities (Nabucco; Turkey's CSCP). In
truth such predictions are shots in the dark. Focusing on the core
issues leads one to exclude possibilities which at the time seem
remote and implausible ` state collapse in Central Asia? Secessionism
amongst Iranian Azerbaijanis? A surge in regional terrorism? As is so
often the case, the region's only certainty is its uncertainty.
/ www.cria-online.org /
URL: http://www.today.az/news/politics/49921.html