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BAYKAL IS RIGHT: TURKEY'S REGIME IS CHANGING
www.worldbulletin.net
Jan 12 2009
Turkey
The harshest reaction to the latest wave of detentions of suspected
members of the Ergenekon terrorist organization, as it was preparing
for a series of assassinations of several Alevi and Armenian leaders
and a number of intellectuals, came, as expected, from Republican
People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal.
Soon after the detentions, Baykal held a press conference to divulge
his assessments about the Ergenekon investigation: "It is very clear
that such pictures are seen only in countries that have undergone a
regime change or are in the process of a regime change. ... There
is no doubt that Turkey is on the verge of a historical turning
point. ... We see that the ongoing events have taken us to a new
stage. ... This course of events is ominous to those who silently watch
this project as it unfolds. In a sense, I want to sound an alarm in
society. Everyone must assess their stances and ask themselves whether
they act according to their responsibilities. Those who keep silent
will be a party to this responsibility."
Baykal is right in saying that Turkey is going through a regime
change. Indeed, Turkey is seeing a change that is as important as
a regime change. This change is made possible by the Ergenekon
investigation, which is a first in Turkish history and which
touches the very untouchable thanks to the rule of law; however,
the direction of the change is not like that of change seen before
Hitler or Khomeini, as claimed by Baykal. In other words, Turkey
is rapidly changing from an oligarchic deep state structure -- that
always regards the popular will as a threat and consists of people
holding top state positions who have no respect for the law and who
see themselves as deserving to be able to do everything as they wish
-- to a more transparent and more democratic structure. Thanks to
the Ergenekon investigation, Turkey has the opportunity to question
its past 40 or 50 years, which are rife with mysterious murders,
dark social provocation, military coups and terrorists attacks.
But, Baykal tends to sing the same tune after every Ergenekon
operation. He claims that detaining "respected figures of society"
and people who have secured top state positions within the scope of
the probe into the Ergenekon terrorist organization is an attempt to
confront the republic, i.e., a counterrevolutionary move. He does not
hesitate for a moment when calling on everyone, including the army,
to take action and prevent this confrontation. In his words, he wants
to "alarm" these groups. The bombs, weapons and abundant ammunition
seized before or after every operation against Ergenekon do not
seem sufficient to Baykal. It is really impossible to understand the
reaction voiced by Baykal, who labels as "unlawful" or "political"
operations that have been approved by courts of law upon evidence
submitted by prosecutors.
Doesn't Baykal know the kind of anti-democratic and unlawful actions
the Ergenekon suspects whom he describes as "respected figures of
society" have been involved in for decades? Why does he insist on
defending them despite knowing this? Is it because Baykal sees himself
as part of the web of dark plots made by these groups, with whom he
rowed in the same boat during the presidential elections in 2007,
the closure case against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK
Party) and the constitutional amendments lifting the ban on headscarf?
How these "respected" people have managed to secure top state positions
is fuel for another discussion, but how does Baykal reconcile his
suggestion that laws which are applicable to ordinary citizens cannot
be applied to people who hold high positions with the principle of
"the rule of law"? If we are supposed to have a perspective in the
same vein as the logic of Sabih Kanadoglu, honorary president of
the Supreme Court of Appeals, whose house was searched during the
latest operation against Ergenekon, the fact that the members of the
Ergenekon terrorist organization have secured top state positions
does not increase their respectability but the level of threat they
pose. As you might remember, during the closure case against the AK
Party, Kanadoglu, the mastermind behind the legal oddity of the 367
decision, and his peers argued constantly that the fact that the AK
Party is not a marginal party but a ruling party that has received
the support of one out of every two people makes its closure much
more vital and necessary as this high level of electoral support
implies the magnitude of the threat it poses.
Some of those detained (some were released to be tried without
arrest) and some of those arrested include top army commanders,
the secretary-general of the National Security Council (MGK), the
president of the Higher Education Board (YOK) and people who held
other critical positions in the past, and this does not imply that
they are exempt from committing crimes or that they do not violate the
law or that they are above the law. In the final analysis, this is
not the first time we have seen shadowy networks like Ergenekon. As
you may remember, Italy underwent a similar process just after the
end of the Cold War, i.e., in the early 1990s, and the investigation
there involved many "respected and high-ranking" public officials,
including a president and a prime minister. Having served as a prime
minister seven times and as a minister 21 times, Giulio Andreotti was
sentenced to 24 years in prison at the age of 83. If Baykal had been
living in Italy, he would not have allowed these detentions because
of the caste system in his mind, which differentiates between "those
who can be tried and those who are untouchables."
The number and diversity of those who were investigated under the
Gladio and Clean Hands operations in Italy give important hints
about the future course of the Ergenekon investigation. In Italy,
622 people who had been trained by the US and UK secret services were
detained; 139 weapons and ammunition depots were unearthed; it was
demanded that the immunity of 463 deputies be lifted; complaints
were filed regarding 7,147 people; and 911 businessmen and 2,993
public officials were tried. Twelve former ministers and deputies,
including former Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, were arrested.
As the state in Turkey is no cleaner than the state in Italy, no one
should overlook the Ergenekon investigation. Yet, Baykal is still
right. Turkey's regime is really changing. Baykal is also right in
being extremely uneasy. This is because even if, in the most optimistic
prediction, the Ergenekon investigation does not include him as he
suspects, Turkey will attain a fully democratic state governed by
the rule of law and a true republic at the end of this process of
change. And when this happens, Baykal's CHP will lose its power and
luxury to act as if it is the real political power in this country
although it secures a mere 20 percent of the vote. And the army will
attain the position it deserves in contemporary democracies. The regime
will no longer be a bureaucratic state that occasionally resorts to
extra-judicial methods to commit murders or cause provocation or
back terrorism and will transform into a democratic republic. So,
in the face of this change, who, other than Baykal, would have the
greatest concern about the Ergenekon investigation?
www.worldbulletin.net
Jan 12 2009
Turkey
The harshest reaction to the latest wave of detentions of suspected
members of the Ergenekon terrorist organization, as it was preparing
for a series of assassinations of several Alevi and Armenian leaders
and a number of intellectuals, came, as expected, from Republican
People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal.
Soon after the detentions, Baykal held a press conference to divulge
his assessments about the Ergenekon investigation: "It is very clear
that such pictures are seen only in countries that have undergone a
regime change or are in the process of a regime change. ... There
is no doubt that Turkey is on the verge of a historical turning
point. ... We see that the ongoing events have taken us to a new
stage. ... This course of events is ominous to those who silently watch
this project as it unfolds. In a sense, I want to sound an alarm in
society. Everyone must assess their stances and ask themselves whether
they act according to their responsibilities. Those who keep silent
will be a party to this responsibility."
Baykal is right in saying that Turkey is going through a regime
change. Indeed, Turkey is seeing a change that is as important as
a regime change. This change is made possible by the Ergenekon
investigation, which is a first in Turkish history and which
touches the very untouchable thanks to the rule of law; however,
the direction of the change is not like that of change seen before
Hitler or Khomeini, as claimed by Baykal. In other words, Turkey
is rapidly changing from an oligarchic deep state structure -- that
always regards the popular will as a threat and consists of people
holding top state positions who have no respect for the law and who
see themselves as deserving to be able to do everything as they wish
-- to a more transparent and more democratic structure. Thanks to
the Ergenekon investigation, Turkey has the opportunity to question
its past 40 or 50 years, which are rife with mysterious murders,
dark social provocation, military coups and terrorists attacks.
But, Baykal tends to sing the same tune after every Ergenekon
operation. He claims that detaining "respected figures of society"
and people who have secured top state positions within the scope of
the probe into the Ergenekon terrorist organization is an attempt to
confront the republic, i.e., a counterrevolutionary move. He does not
hesitate for a moment when calling on everyone, including the army,
to take action and prevent this confrontation. In his words, he wants
to "alarm" these groups. The bombs, weapons and abundant ammunition
seized before or after every operation against Ergenekon do not
seem sufficient to Baykal. It is really impossible to understand the
reaction voiced by Baykal, who labels as "unlawful" or "political"
operations that have been approved by courts of law upon evidence
submitted by prosecutors.
Doesn't Baykal know the kind of anti-democratic and unlawful actions
the Ergenekon suspects whom he describes as "respected figures of
society" have been involved in for decades? Why does he insist on
defending them despite knowing this? Is it because Baykal sees himself
as part of the web of dark plots made by these groups, with whom he
rowed in the same boat during the presidential elections in 2007,
the closure case against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK
Party) and the constitutional amendments lifting the ban on headscarf?
How these "respected" people have managed to secure top state positions
is fuel for another discussion, but how does Baykal reconcile his
suggestion that laws which are applicable to ordinary citizens cannot
be applied to people who hold high positions with the principle of
"the rule of law"? If we are supposed to have a perspective in the
same vein as the logic of Sabih Kanadoglu, honorary president of
the Supreme Court of Appeals, whose house was searched during the
latest operation against Ergenekon, the fact that the members of the
Ergenekon terrorist organization have secured top state positions
does not increase their respectability but the level of threat they
pose. As you might remember, during the closure case against the AK
Party, Kanadoglu, the mastermind behind the legal oddity of the 367
decision, and his peers argued constantly that the fact that the AK
Party is not a marginal party but a ruling party that has received
the support of one out of every two people makes its closure much
more vital and necessary as this high level of electoral support
implies the magnitude of the threat it poses.
Some of those detained (some were released to be tried without
arrest) and some of those arrested include top army commanders,
the secretary-general of the National Security Council (MGK), the
president of the Higher Education Board (YOK) and people who held
other critical positions in the past, and this does not imply that
they are exempt from committing crimes or that they do not violate the
law or that they are above the law. In the final analysis, this is
not the first time we have seen shadowy networks like Ergenekon. As
you may remember, Italy underwent a similar process just after the
end of the Cold War, i.e., in the early 1990s, and the investigation
there involved many "respected and high-ranking" public officials,
including a president and a prime minister. Having served as a prime
minister seven times and as a minister 21 times, Giulio Andreotti was
sentenced to 24 years in prison at the age of 83. If Baykal had been
living in Italy, he would not have allowed these detentions because
of the caste system in his mind, which differentiates between "those
who can be tried and those who are untouchables."
The number and diversity of those who were investigated under the
Gladio and Clean Hands operations in Italy give important hints
about the future course of the Ergenekon investigation. In Italy,
622 people who had been trained by the US and UK secret services were
detained; 139 weapons and ammunition depots were unearthed; it was
demanded that the immunity of 463 deputies be lifted; complaints
were filed regarding 7,147 people; and 911 businessmen and 2,993
public officials were tried. Twelve former ministers and deputies,
including former Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, were arrested.
As the state in Turkey is no cleaner than the state in Italy, no one
should overlook the Ergenekon investigation. Yet, Baykal is still
right. Turkey's regime is really changing. Baykal is also right in
being extremely uneasy. This is because even if, in the most optimistic
prediction, the Ergenekon investigation does not include him as he
suspects, Turkey will attain a fully democratic state governed by
the rule of law and a true republic at the end of this process of
change. And when this happens, Baykal's CHP will lose its power and
luxury to act as if it is the real political power in this country
although it secures a mere 20 percent of the vote. And the army will
attain the position it deserves in contemporary democracies. The regime
will no longer be a bureaucratic state that occasionally resorts to
extra-judicial methods to commit murders or cause provocation or
back terrorism and will transform into a democratic republic. So,
in the face of this change, who, other than Baykal, would have the
greatest concern about the Ergenekon investigation?