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WILL THE CHARTER ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP DEFEAT RUSSIAN-ORCHESTRATED THREATS?
Daily Georgian Times
Jan 12 2009
Georgia
Georgia's independence is precarious because the country is next to a
powerful neighbour, Russia. Since independence, Tbilisi has feared a
Moscow-led military operation on its territory. That finally happened
last August in a battle that Georgia lost and which will have lasting
effects on Georgian politics.
Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, at the end of the
1990s and in the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), first
asked the United States to step up Washington's security assistance to
Georgia. The signing of a Charter on Strategic Partnership on January 9
in Washington is another sign of the U.S. commitment to helping Georgia
face new-type security threats and defeat threats to "global peace and
stability" (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
arms and drug trafficking, energy security, environmental degradation,
strengthening democratic institutions, and related phenomena).
However, the nonbinding strategic partnership will not be viable in the
long run as long as Georgia - and other South Caucasus states - and
its breakaway territories remain vulnerable to Russian-orchestrated
threats and pressures. To secure strategic security, Georgia and
the U.S. have to focus on addressing the "traditional-type threats,"
including military ones, to Georgia and the South Caucasus. Contrary to
"new-type security threats," traditional threats are actual, potent and
constantly present. Russia's troop entrenchment in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, illegal border changes, ethnic cleansing, "peacekeeping"
that cements territorial annexations and guerilla-type fighting;
these are the real, external and traditional-type threats to Georgia.
Russia represents this external and traditional-type threat. The
real security issue for Georgia is Russia. Moscow has recently
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "independent states." So
it now officially controls the Georgian side of the Georgia-Russia
border in both of these breakaway regions. In the wake of the "five
days war" Russia is also stepping up its direct trade relations and
transportation links with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, it
is at a quick pace transferring Georgian state and private properties
to the Russian state and a minority of powerful individuals. Finally,
it is stationing Russian troops and building military bases in those
breakaway areas. In many ways, then, the Kremlin is breaching most
international laws and nobody seems able to restrain its unlawful
actions in Georgia. None of these Russian moves have anything to do
with providing security or defending its "citizens."
A mythical and irrational intention to restore and preserve the
empire is Russia's main goal, something quite popular among the
Russian political elite and the broader public. Russian imperial
logic identifies the prosperity of the nation with a need to preserve
a former Soviet or even earlier territorial legacy. It has nothing
to do with an aspiration to care for the integrity of the historic
homeland. It looks more like a mythical belief that permanent expansion
is Russia's specific feature, and has done no harm to incorporated
ethnic groups but rather brought them civilization and security. Such
views contain a still-active messianic element.
Right after the collapse of Soviet Union, the "managed conflict" in
Georgia - and the ones in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh - were used
to justify the indefinite stationing of Russian troops on Georgian
territory. That provided Moscow with security leverage over Georgia
through the breakaway enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This
logic suggests that to settle the conflict, all conflicting parties
(Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) should return to the Russian
domain. For as long as this is not achieved, supporters of Russia's
myth have to use a wait-and-see policy in order to drag out these
conflict settlements.
The mythical image of the state still rooted in the Russian public
mentality regards "Derzhava" (a Russian historical term that refers
to imperial power) as its main value, while geostrategic thinking
remains a primary issue of foreign policy. Most of the Russian military
and some politicians view international relations as an existential
confrontation or balance of hostile forces. That is why such issues as
solutions to particular international problems, international law and
morale, confidence building, dialogue of cultures and peace are given
lower priority in comparison to "access to the sea", military bases,
zones of influence and "the fifth column" or a policy that must feed
the "Derzhava". As long as such a situation persists, there is no use
hoping that Russia will abandon its double standards and different
approaches towards Georgia and the South Caucasus. The logic of the
double-standard policy is simple: to preserve positions everywhere
with the use of military force and different political tactics.
Geostrategic and irrational-mythological thinking leaves little room
for ideas about the economic development of the Russian nation and
the southern Caucasus. Such a policy as Russia's cannot be regarded
as economically justifiable, especially in a country with immense
socio-economic problems. Russia's overall goal is to thwart or slow
down Georgia's economic and security integration with the West. More
specifically, Moscow's goals include: preserving a Russian-controlled
outpost in Georgia to dissuade NATO and the EU from expanding further
east and consolidating a land bridge between Russia and Iran via
Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Georgia's strategic partnership with the U.S. could bring plenty of
benefits to Georgian society and better protect Georgians against
Russia's bullying. Under pressure from the U.S., the EU and NATO, the
Georgian Government, in a period of only four years, has significantly
reduced smuggling, improved revenue collection, repaid pensions and
wage arrears, reformed the tax and education system and streamlined
commercial licensing procedures. This has been stimulated by Georgia's
western anchorage. These improvements would not have been achievable
should Georgia have stayed under Russia's sphere of influence.
Georgia's participation in international military or peacekeeping
operations (more than a thousand officers are in Kosovo and some
50 military personnel in Afghanistan) is often the subject of
criticism from opposition parties and Georgian citizens. This is
a shortsighted view, and this Government policy should never be
reversed. Participation in international military operations, which
the U.S. has encouraged, provides Georgian troops with the best field
experience and peacekeeping operations are occasions for Georgia to
get recognition and respect from other nations.
The new charter basically reiterates the partnership that already
exists between the two countries. That is not negligible.
Richard Rousseau is Assistant Professor and Director of the Masters
Programme in International Relations ([email protected]) at the
Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics & Strategic Research
(KIMEP)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Daily Georgian Times
Jan 12 2009
Georgia
Georgia's independence is precarious because the country is next to a
powerful neighbour, Russia. Since independence, Tbilisi has feared a
Moscow-led military operation on its territory. That finally happened
last August in a battle that Georgia lost and which will have lasting
effects on Georgian politics.
Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, at the end of the
1990s and in the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), first
asked the United States to step up Washington's security assistance to
Georgia. The signing of a Charter on Strategic Partnership on January 9
in Washington is another sign of the U.S. commitment to helping Georgia
face new-type security threats and defeat threats to "global peace and
stability" (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
arms and drug trafficking, energy security, environmental degradation,
strengthening democratic institutions, and related phenomena).
However, the nonbinding strategic partnership will not be viable in the
long run as long as Georgia - and other South Caucasus states - and
its breakaway territories remain vulnerable to Russian-orchestrated
threats and pressures. To secure strategic security, Georgia and
the U.S. have to focus on addressing the "traditional-type threats,"
including military ones, to Georgia and the South Caucasus. Contrary to
"new-type security threats," traditional threats are actual, potent and
constantly present. Russia's troop entrenchment in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, illegal border changes, ethnic cleansing, "peacekeeping"
that cements territorial annexations and guerilla-type fighting;
these are the real, external and traditional-type threats to Georgia.
Russia represents this external and traditional-type threat. The
real security issue for Georgia is Russia. Moscow has recently
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "independent states." So
it now officially controls the Georgian side of the Georgia-Russia
border in both of these breakaway regions. In the wake of the "five
days war" Russia is also stepping up its direct trade relations and
transportation links with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, it
is at a quick pace transferring Georgian state and private properties
to the Russian state and a minority of powerful individuals. Finally,
it is stationing Russian troops and building military bases in those
breakaway areas. In many ways, then, the Kremlin is breaching most
international laws and nobody seems able to restrain its unlawful
actions in Georgia. None of these Russian moves have anything to do
with providing security or defending its "citizens."
A mythical and irrational intention to restore and preserve the
empire is Russia's main goal, something quite popular among the
Russian political elite and the broader public. Russian imperial
logic identifies the prosperity of the nation with a need to preserve
a former Soviet or even earlier territorial legacy. It has nothing
to do with an aspiration to care for the integrity of the historic
homeland. It looks more like a mythical belief that permanent expansion
is Russia's specific feature, and has done no harm to incorporated
ethnic groups but rather brought them civilization and security. Such
views contain a still-active messianic element.
Right after the collapse of Soviet Union, the "managed conflict" in
Georgia - and the ones in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh - were used
to justify the indefinite stationing of Russian troops on Georgian
territory. That provided Moscow with security leverage over Georgia
through the breakaway enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This
logic suggests that to settle the conflict, all conflicting parties
(Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) should return to the Russian
domain. For as long as this is not achieved, supporters of Russia's
myth have to use a wait-and-see policy in order to drag out these
conflict settlements.
The mythical image of the state still rooted in the Russian public
mentality regards "Derzhava" (a Russian historical term that refers
to imperial power) as its main value, while geostrategic thinking
remains a primary issue of foreign policy. Most of the Russian military
and some politicians view international relations as an existential
confrontation or balance of hostile forces. That is why such issues as
solutions to particular international problems, international law and
morale, confidence building, dialogue of cultures and peace are given
lower priority in comparison to "access to the sea", military bases,
zones of influence and "the fifth column" or a policy that must feed
the "Derzhava". As long as such a situation persists, there is no use
hoping that Russia will abandon its double standards and different
approaches towards Georgia and the South Caucasus. The logic of the
double-standard policy is simple: to preserve positions everywhere
with the use of military force and different political tactics.
Geostrategic and irrational-mythological thinking leaves little room
for ideas about the economic development of the Russian nation and
the southern Caucasus. Such a policy as Russia's cannot be regarded
as economically justifiable, especially in a country with immense
socio-economic problems. Russia's overall goal is to thwart or slow
down Georgia's economic and security integration with the West. More
specifically, Moscow's goals include: preserving a Russian-controlled
outpost in Georgia to dissuade NATO and the EU from expanding further
east and consolidating a land bridge between Russia and Iran via
Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Georgia's strategic partnership with the U.S. could bring plenty of
benefits to Georgian society and better protect Georgians against
Russia's bullying. Under pressure from the U.S., the EU and NATO, the
Georgian Government, in a period of only four years, has significantly
reduced smuggling, improved revenue collection, repaid pensions and
wage arrears, reformed the tax and education system and streamlined
commercial licensing procedures. This has been stimulated by Georgia's
western anchorage. These improvements would not have been achievable
should Georgia have stayed under Russia's sphere of influence.
Georgia's participation in international military or peacekeeping
operations (more than a thousand officers are in Kosovo and some
50 military personnel in Afghanistan) is often the subject of
criticism from opposition parties and Georgian citizens. This is
a shortsighted view, and this Government policy should never be
reversed. Participation in international military operations, which
the U.S. has encouraged, provides Georgian troops with the best field
experience and peacekeeping operations are occasions for Georgia to
get recognition and respect from other nations.
The new charter basically reiterates the partnership that already
exists between the two countries. That is not negligible.
Richard Rousseau is Assistant Professor and Director of the Masters
Programme in International Relations ([email protected]) at the
Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics & Strategic Research
(KIMEP)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress