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The Armenian Reporter
Can Turkey become a deal-maker in the Karabakh conflict?
by Masis Mayilian
Published: Friday January 09, 2009
Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh - The resolution of the Karabakh conflict is a
key to making substantial progress in ensuring security and cooperation in
the South Caucasus. This conflict directly involves one unrecognized and two
recognized state entities - or fully half of the region's six state
entities. A sustainable peace arrangement would have to take into account
the priority interests of all parties to the conflict.
What concerns Karabakh Armenians most of all? The secure existence of the
Armenian population of the region in its own homeland.
Background
The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh first emerged in 1918 after the collapse of
the Czarist Empire - in connection with territorial delimitation between
newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan. This dispute became an issue of
consideration for the League of Nations.
But in 1921, with the Sovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Bolshevik
Party made a unilateral decision establishing the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region inside Soviet Azerbaijan. That decision ignored the will
of the majority of Karabakh Armenians, who then made up more than 90 percent
of the population.
In Karabakh, the older generation remembers how in the Soviet period,
Azerbaijani authorities systematically violated the rights of Karabakh
Armenians, pursuing a repressive policy aimed at changing the demographic
make-up of Artsakh in favor of ethnic Azerbaijanis.
Armenians suffered murders, disappearances and abuse, arrests, show trials
of political prisoners, exile, suppression of dissidents, and deportation of
residents of dozens of populated settlements.
The present generation of the Karabakh people faced a real threat of
complete annihilation in the course of the large-scale armed aggression
launched by Azerbaijan in 1992. Only at the expense of huge human and
material losses did the people of Karabakh manage to stop the war, which
directly affected practically each Karabakh family, resulting in thousands
of deaths.
In Soviet times, mindful of the Kremlin, Azerbaijan behaved relatively
cautiously. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijani
political leadership embraced more openly violent measures and direct armed
aggression against Karabakh.
Priorities today
Since its first appearance on the political map in 1918, Azerbaijan, under
all its regimes, has aimed to expel or physically annihilate the Armenians
of Artsakh. That is why ensuring the external security of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and its people remains an urgent task.
On the other hand, NKR does not threaten Azerbaijan's secure existence and
development. On the contrary, since Karabakh's secession from Azerbaijan and
signing the cease-fire agreement, Azerbaijan's macro-economic indicators -
driven by Caspian energy - are showing rapid growth.
For Azerbaijan claims on the Karabakh territories are in category of
political ambition rather than an existential matter, as they are for
Karabakh Armenians.
De facto borders established as a result of the 1994 cease-fire are one of
the key elements providing for stability, and by extension security and
development of all the regional countries. For NKR especially, they ensure
its military, food, energy, and ecological security.
Karabakh's long-term security can be provided only through recognition of
the independent statehood of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Attaining
international recognition is not a goal in itself; rather it is a mechanism
for ensuring Karabakh's security.
At the same time, recognition of NKR by global and regional powers could
help prod Azerbaijan to overcome the existing psychological barriers and
begin to shed its hostile policies.
Western recognition of Kosovo helped Serbia moved toward integration with
the European Union. A similar scenario with international recognition of
Karabakh would help the Caucasus region's long-term stability and contribute
to energy security of Europe.
Turkey's role in Karabakh: history
The tempo of official contacts between Armenia and Turkey has intensified in
the last several months. Ankara has also expressed interest in stepping up
its role in the Karabakh peace process.
What role has Turkey played in the Karabakh conflict so far and how can this
role evolve?
Throughout the conflict between Karabakh and Azerbaijan, Turkey always
supported Azerbaijan. Turkish forces played the leading military role in the
first stage of the conflict in 1918-20.
And in the last two decades, we have witnessed the strategic
Azerbaijani-Turkish partnership, including Turkish military aid to
Azerbaijan in the process of its armed aggression against NKR, and
continuing participation of Turkey in the hostile land blockade of Armenia
and NKR.
At the same time, since 1992 Turkey has been a member of the OSCE Minsk
Group, which is mediating the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Thus, in our conflict with Azerbaijan, Turkey has attempted to play a dual
role of indirect participant and mediator.
According to regional experts, including representatives of the Turkish
expert community, there is a perception in Ankara that the policy toward
Armenia and NKR to date has not been effective.
Additionally, the new configuration of forces in the South Caucasus after
the recent war in Georgia stimulated Turkey to consider correcting its
approach.
A series of visits by Turkish leaders to the countries of the region and
Moscow and the initiative to create a "security platform" in the Caucasus
show evolution in Ankara's regional role.
Turkey's potential role
Will Turkey be able to find a new place in the region and play a positive
role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
This is possible only if Turkey abandons its unconditional support for
Azerbaijan and establishes its neutrality, as would be appropriate for a
member of an international mediation mission.
Turkey remains influential in Azerbaijan and it could potentially make a
constructive contribution to settling the Karabakh conflict.
Only Turkey is capable of persuading Azerbaijan to give up claims on a small
part of Soviet Azerbaijani territory for the sake of preserving Azerbaijan's
real sovereignty. Turkey itself did something similar a century ago,
relinquishing its territorial demands in the Middle East and earlier in the
Balkans.
Otherwise, continuation of Azerbaijan's current line of conduct will make
this energy-rich country into a dependent source of raw materials for other
states. If it remains hostage to its ungrounded ambitions, Azerbaijan risks
further setbacks, including loss of key transportation routes.
The history of Armenian-Turkish relations for the last century is burdened
by tragic pages. The Armenian Genocide, support for Azerbaijan's aggression
against Karabakh Armenians, and the blockade of Armenia contribute to strong
mistrust of the sincerity of Turkish initiatives.
But through practical steps like giving up demands for Armenian territorial
concessions to Azerbaijan, the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Armenia, and the opening of the land border, a new page in Armenian-Turkish
relations could be opened.
These steps will demonstrate to us that we are dealing with a modern Turkey
rather than one still following outdated racialist pan-Turkic doctrine.
If we find that we are dealing with a progressive country, then perhaps in
the 21st century our generation of Armenians and Turks will be able to focus
their dialogue on subjects that bring us together around mutual interests
rather than serve to push the two neighboring nations apart.
The Karabakh and Cyprus conflicts, Kurdish issues and Euro-integration
provide opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.
Honest dialogue, building up of economic and humanitarian contacts,
realization of scientific, educational and cultural cooperation will
contribute to elimination of tension between our two peoples and help add to
regional peace and security.
This article is based on the author's presentation at the "Armenia-Turkey
Dialogue Series" seminar organized by the Caucasus Institute (Armenia) and
TESEV (Turkey) in Yerevan on November 21, 2008.
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Can Turkey become a deal-maker in the Karabakh conflict?
by Masis Mayilian
Published: Friday January 09, 2009
Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh - The resolution of the Karabakh conflict is a
key to making substantial progress in ensuring security and cooperation in
the South Caucasus. This conflict directly involves one unrecognized and two
recognized state entities - or fully half of the region's six state
entities. A sustainable peace arrangement would have to take into account
the priority interests of all parties to the conflict.
What concerns Karabakh Armenians most of all? The secure existence of the
Armenian population of the region in its own homeland.
Background
The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh first emerged in 1918 after the collapse of
the Czarist Empire - in connection with territorial delimitation between
newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan. This dispute became an issue of
consideration for the League of Nations.
But in 1921, with the Sovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Bolshevik
Party made a unilateral decision establishing the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region inside Soviet Azerbaijan. That decision ignored the will
of the majority of Karabakh Armenians, who then made up more than 90 percent
of the population.
In Karabakh, the older generation remembers how in the Soviet period,
Azerbaijani authorities systematically violated the rights of Karabakh
Armenians, pursuing a repressive policy aimed at changing the demographic
make-up of Artsakh in favor of ethnic Azerbaijanis.
Armenians suffered murders, disappearances and abuse, arrests, show trials
of political prisoners, exile, suppression of dissidents, and deportation of
residents of dozens of populated settlements.
The present generation of the Karabakh people faced a real threat of
complete annihilation in the course of the large-scale armed aggression
launched by Azerbaijan in 1992. Only at the expense of huge human and
material losses did the people of Karabakh manage to stop the war, which
directly affected practically each Karabakh family, resulting in thousands
of deaths.
In Soviet times, mindful of the Kremlin, Azerbaijan behaved relatively
cautiously. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijani
political leadership embraced more openly violent measures and direct armed
aggression against Karabakh.
Priorities today
Since its first appearance on the political map in 1918, Azerbaijan, under
all its regimes, has aimed to expel or physically annihilate the Armenians
of Artsakh. That is why ensuring the external security of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and its people remains an urgent task.
On the other hand, NKR does not threaten Azerbaijan's secure existence and
development. On the contrary, since Karabakh's secession from Azerbaijan and
signing the cease-fire agreement, Azerbaijan's macro-economic indicators -
driven by Caspian energy - are showing rapid growth.
For Azerbaijan claims on the Karabakh territories are in category of
political ambition rather than an existential matter, as they are for
Karabakh Armenians.
De facto borders established as a result of the 1994 cease-fire are one of
the key elements providing for stability, and by extension security and
development of all the regional countries. For NKR especially, they ensure
its military, food, energy, and ecological security.
Karabakh's long-term security can be provided only through recognition of
the independent statehood of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Attaining
international recognition is not a goal in itself; rather it is a mechanism
for ensuring Karabakh's security.
At the same time, recognition of NKR by global and regional powers could
help prod Azerbaijan to overcome the existing psychological barriers and
begin to shed its hostile policies.
Western recognition of Kosovo helped Serbia moved toward integration with
the European Union. A similar scenario with international recognition of
Karabakh would help the Caucasus region's long-term stability and contribute
to energy security of Europe.
Turkey's role in Karabakh: history
The tempo of official contacts between Armenia and Turkey has intensified in
the last several months. Ankara has also expressed interest in stepping up
its role in the Karabakh peace process.
What role has Turkey played in the Karabakh conflict so far and how can this
role evolve?
Throughout the conflict between Karabakh and Azerbaijan, Turkey always
supported Azerbaijan. Turkish forces played the leading military role in the
first stage of the conflict in 1918-20.
And in the last two decades, we have witnessed the strategic
Azerbaijani-Turkish partnership, including Turkish military aid to
Azerbaijan in the process of its armed aggression against NKR, and
continuing participation of Turkey in the hostile land blockade of Armenia
and NKR.
At the same time, since 1992 Turkey has been a member of the OSCE Minsk
Group, which is mediating the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Thus, in our conflict with Azerbaijan, Turkey has attempted to play a dual
role of indirect participant and mediator.
According to regional experts, including representatives of the Turkish
expert community, there is a perception in Ankara that the policy toward
Armenia and NKR to date has not been effective.
Additionally, the new configuration of forces in the South Caucasus after
the recent war in Georgia stimulated Turkey to consider correcting its
approach.
A series of visits by Turkish leaders to the countries of the region and
Moscow and the initiative to create a "security platform" in the Caucasus
show evolution in Ankara's regional role.
Turkey's potential role
Will Turkey be able to find a new place in the region and play a positive
role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
This is possible only if Turkey abandons its unconditional support for
Azerbaijan and establishes its neutrality, as would be appropriate for a
member of an international mediation mission.
Turkey remains influential in Azerbaijan and it could potentially make a
constructive contribution to settling the Karabakh conflict.
Only Turkey is capable of persuading Azerbaijan to give up claims on a small
part of Soviet Azerbaijani territory for the sake of preserving Azerbaijan's
real sovereignty. Turkey itself did something similar a century ago,
relinquishing its territorial demands in the Middle East and earlier in the
Balkans.
Otherwise, continuation of Azerbaijan's current line of conduct will make
this energy-rich country into a dependent source of raw materials for other
states. If it remains hostage to its ungrounded ambitions, Azerbaijan risks
further setbacks, including loss of key transportation routes.
The history of Armenian-Turkish relations for the last century is burdened
by tragic pages. The Armenian Genocide, support for Azerbaijan's aggression
against Karabakh Armenians, and the blockade of Armenia contribute to strong
mistrust of the sincerity of Turkish initiatives.
But through practical steps like giving up demands for Armenian territorial
concessions to Azerbaijan, the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Armenia, and the opening of the land border, a new page in Armenian-Turkish
relations could be opened.
These steps will demonstrate to us that we are dealing with a modern Turkey
rather than one still following outdated racialist pan-Turkic doctrine.
If we find that we are dealing with a progressive country, then perhaps in
the 21st century our generation of Armenians and Turks will be able to focus
their dialogue on subjects that bring us together around mutual interests
rather than serve to push the two neighboring nations apart.
The Karabakh and Cyprus conflicts, Kurdish issues and Euro-integration
provide opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.
Honest dialogue, building up of economic and humanitarian contacts,
realization of scientific, educational and cultural cooperation will
contribute to elimination of tension between our two peoples and help add to
regional peace and security.
This article is based on the author's presentation at the "Armenia-Turkey
Dialogue Series" seminar organized by the Caucasus Institute (Armenia) and
TESEV (Turkey) in Yerevan on November 21, 2008.
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