SINCERELY YOURS, MATTHEW BRYZA
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir.am
08:22:16 - 20/01/2009
Perhaps this visit is the last visit of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair
Matthew Bryza to the region together with the Minsk Group. Although it
should not be ruled out that Barack Obama will not separate Bryza from
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, and even if he is dismissed
from the post of the deputy assistant secretary, he will remain
co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. However, his stay is as probable as
his departure, therefore perhaps this is really Bryza's last visit to
the region in the capacity of the co-chair. At least his statements in
Baku are evidence that he has this feeling and in the end he wanted to
say something from the bottom of his heart to the societies of the two
countries. Bryza said that the publics must trust their presidents and
believe that they negotiate proceeding from their national interests.
One does not know whether Bryza is trying to catch the publics of
the presidents in a trap before his departure. And obviously it is
a trap. The point is that Bryza had stated several months before
when Aliyev and Sargsyan had just met for the first time that their
approach towards the basic issues are more harmonious than in the
time of Kocharyan and Aliyev.
Then there were mostly optimistic statements about agreement on the
basic issues. Now Bryza says that each of them negotiat es proceeding
from their national interests. This is the trap, it is only uncertain
whether it is for the presidents or the publics.
The point is that the national interests of Armenia and Azerbaijan
regarding the settlement of the Karabakh conflict contradict to one
another. They contradict at least with regard to the proposals on
the table of the talks and are called the proposal or principles of
Madrid. Although it has not been released officially, it is clear
from different statements by the co-chairs and conflict sides what
the proposal or principles of Madrid are.
It involves pullout of the Armenian force from the territories which
we refer to as liberated and Azerbaijan refers to as occupied, and
Azerbaijan must agree to hold a referendum on the status of Karabakh
at some time, the details of which are uncertain for the time being.
This option itself contradicts to the national interests of Armenia,
although there is no doubt that to Serge Sargsyan's thought there
is no controversy, and the territories could be exchanged with
status. However, even if the Armenian side gets a status for Karabakh
rather than agreement to a referendum on the status, in addition,
if this status is independence, the return of the territories already
contradicts to the national interests of Armenia and Karabakh because
it greatly weakens the Armenian factor in the region.
Consequently, the question occurs that if Aliyev and Serge Sargsyan
negotiate proceeding from the national interests, and Matthew Bryza
assures their publics that they really do and they should be trusted,
how can the co-chairs be optimistic regarding the principles? Hence,
either Bryza does not have a clear idea of the situation and the
nuances of the Karabakh issue for both Armenia and Azerbaijan or he
is consciously trying to trap either the presidents or the publics.
Of course, it is difficult to imagine that a serious country such
as the United States would have an official who would not imagine
the situation with all the nuances. Meanwhile, obviously at least in
the past few years the government trusted Bryza not only with regard
to the Karabakh issue but also other regional political and economic
issues. Consequently, it is more probable that Bryza is merely weaving
a web. One only needs to see who will get caught in it, the presidents
or the societies. Or maybe one of the presidents or societies.
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir.am
08:22:16 - 20/01/2009
Perhaps this visit is the last visit of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair
Matthew Bryza to the region together with the Minsk Group. Although it
should not be ruled out that Barack Obama will not separate Bryza from
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, and even if he is dismissed
from the post of the deputy assistant secretary, he will remain
co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. However, his stay is as probable as
his departure, therefore perhaps this is really Bryza's last visit to
the region in the capacity of the co-chair. At least his statements in
Baku are evidence that he has this feeling and in the end he wanted to
say something from the bottom of his heart to the societies of the two
countries. Bryza said that the publics must trust their presidents and
believe that they negotiate proceeding from their national interests.
One does not know whether Bryza is trying to catch the publics of
the presidents in a trap before his departure. And obviously it is
a trap. The point is that Bryza had stated several months before
when Aliyev and Sargsyan had just met for the first time that their
approach towards the basic issues are more harmonious than in the
time of Kocharyan and Aliyev.
Then there were mostly optimistic statements about agreement on the
basic issues. Now Bryza says that each of them negotiat es proceeding
from their national interests. This is the trap, it is only uncertain
whether it is for the presidents or the publics.
The point is that the national interests of Armenia and Azerbaijan
regarding the settlement of the Karabakh conflict contradict to one
another. They contradict at least with regard to the proposals on
the table of the talks and are called the proposal or principles of
Madrid. Although it has not been released officially, it is clear
from different statements by the co-chairs and conflict sides what
the proposal or principles of Madrid are.
It involves pullout of the Armenian force from the territories which
we refer to as liberated and Azerbaijan refers to as occupied, and
Azerbaijan must agree to hold a referendum on the status of Karabakh
at some time, the details of which are uncertain for the time being.
This option itself contradicts to the national interests of Armenia,
although there is no doubt that to Serge Sargsyan's thought there
is no controversy, and the territories could be exchanged with
status. However, even if the Armenian side gets a status for Karabakh
rather than agreement to a referendum on the status, in addition,
if this status is independence, the return of the territories already
contradicts to the national interests of Armenia and Karabakh because
it greatly weakens the Armenian factor in the region.
Consequently, the question occurs that if Aliyev and Serge Sargsyan
negotiate proceeding from the national interests, and Matthew Bryza
assures their publics that they really do and they should be trusted,
how can the co-chairs be optimistic regarding the principles? Hence,
either Bryza does not have a clear idea of the situation and the
nuances of the Karabakh issue for both Armenia and Azerbaijan or he
is consciously trying to trap either the presidents or the publics.
Of course, it is difficult to imagine that a serious country such
as the United States would have an official who would not imagine
the situation with all the nuances. Meanwhile, obviously at least in
the past few years the government trusted Bryza not only with regard
to the Karabakh issue but also other regional political and economic
issues. Consequently, it is more probable that Bryza is merely weaving
a web. One only needs to see who will get caught in it, the presidents
or the societies. Or maybe one of the presidents or societies.