THE GAZA STRIP MYSTERY
Igor Muradian (Armenia)
en.fondsk.ru
23.01.2009
The end of Israeli military operation in Gaza Strip right on the
eve of the official office-taking by Barack Obama could not fail to
make the world have a sigh of relief. Representatives of Arab and
European countries are taking steps to consolidate the fragile truce,
but apparently it may take long before the lasting peace can become
a reality in the Middle East (if at all)...
The response of politicians and analysts as well as European public
at large and especially the French during the final days of the US
election campaign could produce the impression that the vote was all
about the president of France. Many countries of the continental
Europe there was a s urge of enthusiasm, and even Nicola Sarkozy
made an attempt to combine his pro-US attitude with rhetoric that
emphasised his commitment to traditional French and European values.
The European "vote" for Barack Obama and even a certain substitute
of the Clinton-Biden team for Obama did not spoiled the day for
Europe. With the exception of certain rightist conservative groups
actually all responsible European forces express their hopes that a
more balanced and equal "Trans-Atlantic relations" in such areas as
the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Russia, China, Iran and terrorist
threats.
For quite some time Europeans have been concerned o ver the problem
of Arab-Israel relations, but they realise that they do not have at
their disposal enough potential to really influence the Middle East
processes. To a degree Europeans are hopeful that a certain success,
which they think they have achieved in their relations with the
United States on Iran (meaning that the US stance has become closer
to that of Europe). The leading capitals of the continental Europe,
and possibly London count on the correction by Obama of the US policies
and his country's involvement in some EU foreign policy projects.
However, such prospects would hardly suit Israel that views Europe
as its ontological adversary, as it were. Politicians in Tel-Aviv
think that Europeans are ready to sacrifice Israel's interests,
acting with an eye at depriving Israel of many strategic territories
(including Jerusalem) in accordance with the unspoken plans of the
European Catholic community.
Prevention of formation of the anti-Israel front in the West has become
a general line of Israel's foreign policies. The team of ideologues
in the Obama administration will apparently be made up of people
who were top officials in the former Bill Clinton's administration,
many of whom are now languishing at Brookings Institute while others
sit in the Foreign Relations Council. A reminder: the "Bill Clinton"
plan of the Middle East settlement envisaged a transfer to Palestinians
of 22% of 0territories", including part of Jerusalem.
The now defunct George W.Bush administration had original notions
about ways to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict (as well as other
regional conflicts).
With a focus on Middle East the plan aside from intensive
military-technical and political support of Israel, did not
envisage active interference. That course was suggested by a team of
neo-Conservatives and was implemented throughout both presidential
terms of George W. Bush. Bill Clinton's policies that envisaged "a
comprehensive settlement" in the Middle East were substituted for by
the "limited interference" policies.
Even though both lines guaranteed total support of Israel, they
did not fail to provoke acute debates in the US-Israeli public and
political medium.
No matter how much observers accused Bill Clinton's administration
being pro-Israeli (and it had unprecedented close and obliging ties
with US-based Jewish NGOs that were the collective principal initiator
of Clinton's settlement plan), many Israelis cried wolf at its concepts
as murderous for Israel. Clinton-Rabin relations did not disappear
after the killing of Itzhak Rabin. In Israel itself the leftist and
other political forces including the Ehud Barak group supported Bill
Clinton's plan. Jewish voters in the USA continued to demonstrate their
allegiance to Democrats, regardless of the fact that for 8 years now
Israel's le adership is made up of the rightist partners of the US
Republican party. The policies and ideology B.Netaniahu and A.Sharon
pursue presuppose negation of extreme compromises (essentially,
any compromises at all), especially on the "territorial" issue.
Under the circumstances, when Israel is facing the problem of ensuring
influence on the new democratic US administration, Europe's role may
appear very important and absolutely not positive from the point of
view of the Israeli elite in power. Is a new stage of US-European
relations possible? And how willing is the new administration to
resume the previous Clinton course in relation to the Arab-Israeli
conflict that was oriented at significant territorial concessions to
Arabs, so was it worth waiting for the growth of European influence
on the United States? All these issues cannot fail to cause concern
with the leaders of the Jewish state. Israelis are concerned over
the fact that George Bush's Middle East heritage would either be
forgotten or would have but insignificant influence on the policies
of the new administration. In this case Israel could face a problem
of authority given that the current administration at the helm and
politicians who are about to make their entrance on the arenas of
the European and American policies can find themselves in isolation.
Positions of the alliance of the rightist conservative forces in the
USA and Israel are at presen t weak, but the rightist conservatives
have enough resources to make life harder for the Obama administration
not only in the Middle East. The political struggle in the USA that
aimed at gaining the needed results in the Congress and presidential
elections is already underway.
Hence the conclusion about a virtually inevitable enhancement of
tension in the Arab-Israeli relations, or plainly speaking, only war
can prevent US attempts to orient itself more on Europe.
It seems that Israeli leaders have realised the need to take measures
with an eye at preventing the US administration from pursuing a
"more moderate" course towards Iran (the policies that can easily
turn into a form of a set of American-European-Russian agreements.
*** Acording to different valuations, this narrow band of land 25 by
8 kilometres with insignificant use of water and agricultural land is
inhabited by 750,000 to 1,2 million people. Easy to understand that
such a tiny isolated piece of land cannot provide conditions for at
least satisfactory living standards.
Gaza is no Singapore or Hong-Kong, and not even the Jordan's West Bank.
The stereotype of lifetime of Gaza population is significantly
different from the residents of the other part of the Palestinian
autonomy, which caused the predominance of Islamic political
organisations there.
The two separate Palestinian territories are significantly different
also in terms of politi cal priorities of their elites, so much so
that some analysts even ponder establishing two Arab-Palestinian
states. The elites of the Western Bank are distinctly westernized,
which can be accounted for by their intensive communication with other
religious and ethnic groups, a situation almost not registered in Gaza,
where, for example Christians account for a fraction of a percent of
the total population.
>From communication with politicians and experts in Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria and Egypt a conclusion can be drawn that the present-day
leadership of the Palestinian autonomy (de-facto - the Western Bank) is
quite "ripe" to perceive the idea of establishing two Arab-Palestinian
states. Should this happen, the Western Bank's public would soon be
subjected to Europesation and "Levantisation."
Quite a few US leading specialist institutions and research centres
have been discussing this project for a long time. Discussions on
this score were going on at the seminars and conferences held by the
Council for Foreign Relations, the Washington Institute for Middle East
Research, the Institute for the Middle East, the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, Heritage Foundation and others over the
last several years. The issue caught the sight of Richard Pearle,
one of the Pentagon's neo-Conservative "Big Three"during the first
presidential term of president G.Bush.
George Friedman, the leading ana lyst of think-tank Stratfor also
spoke about that.
With an eye at preventing the creation of a single Palestinian state
and territorial concessions to Palestinians the Israeli elite may
soon pick up the idea of separation of the Palestinian problem into
two parts aiming to disrupt the Palestinian movement.
Presumably, Israel might take a less adamant stance in regard of West
Bank and a harder one towards the Gaza Strip, simultaneously shifting
its emphasis from the Palestinian problem towards "international
terrorism" to vindicate its tough line and unpreparedness to
compromises (by the way, many analysts think that HAMAS appeared as an
"Israeli project" to counteract FATH).
Israel is now playing for time. Probably, disguised by its plans of
solving the Palestinian problem the Israeli elite is trying to solve
other problems, too, possibly prolongation of US troops stay in Iraq,
installation of new NATO military bases in the region and even about
some form of Israel's integration into NATO. But most urgently,
it is all about the undermining of potential attempts of the Obama
administration to settle the Arab-Israelu conflict and conservation
of G.Bush's heritage in the US Middle East policies, including the
creation of a front of anti-Iranian struggle.
What is currently needed the most to achieve this is permanent military
operations in the Gaza Strip.
Igor Muradian (Armenia)
en.fondsk.ru
23.01.2009
The end of Israeli military operation in Gaza Strip right on the
eve of the official office-taking by Barack Obama could not fail to
make the world have a sigh of relief. Representatives of Arab and
European countries are taking steps to consolidate the fragile truce,
but apparently it may take long before the lasting peace can become
a reality in the Middle East (if at all)...
The response of politicians and analysts as well as European public
at large and especially the French during the final days of the US
election campaign could produce the impression that the vote was all
about the president of France. Many countries of the continental
Europe there was a s urge of enthusiasm, and even Nicola Sarkozy
made an attempt to combine his pro-US attitude with rhetoric that
emphasised his commitment to traditional French and European values.
The European "vote" for Barack Obama and even a certain substitute
of the Clinton-Biden team for Obama did not spoiled the day for
Europe. With the exception of certain rightist conservative groups
actually all responsible European forces express their hopes that a
more balanced and equal "Trans-Atlantic relations" in such areas as
the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Russia, China, Iran and terrorist
threats.
For quite some time Europeans have been concerned o ver the problem
of Arab-Israel relations, but they realise that they do not have at
their disposal enough potential to really influence the Middle East
processes. To a degree Europeans are hopeful that a certain success,
which they think they have achieved in their relations with the
United States on Iran (meaning that the US stance has become closer
to that of Europe). The leading capitals of the continental Europe,
and possibly London count on the correction by Obama of the US policies
and his country's involvement in some EU foreign policy projects.
However, such prospects would hardly suit Israel that views Europe
as its ontological adversary, as it were. Politicians in Tel-Aviv
think that Europeans are ready to sacrifice Israel's interests,
acting with an eye at depriving Israel of many strategic territories
(including Jerusalem) in accordance with the unspoken plans of the
European Catholic community.
Prevention of formation of the anti-Israel front in the West has become
a general line of Israel's foreign policies. The team of ideologues
in the Obama administration will apparently be made up of people
who were top officials in the former Bill Clinton's administration,
many of whom are now languishing at Brookings Institute while others
sit in the Foreign Relations Council. A reminder: the "Bill Clinton"
plan of the Middle East settlement envisaged a transfer to Palestinians
of 22% of 0territories", including part of Jerusalem.
The now defunct George W.Bush administration had original notions
about ways to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict (as well as other
regional conflicts).
With a focus on Middle East the plan aside from intensive
military-technical and political support of Israel, did not
envisage active interference. That course was suggested by a team of
neo-Conservatives and was implemented throughout both presidential
terms of George W. Bush. Bill Clinton's policies that envisaged "a
comprehensive settlement" in the Middle East were substituted for by
the "limited interference" policies.
Even though both lines guaranteed total support of Israel, they
did not fail to provoke acute debates in the US-Israeli public and
political medium.
No matter how much observers accused Bill Clinton's administration
being pro-Israeli (and it had unprecedented close and obliging ties
with US-based Jewish NGOs that were the collective principal initiator
of Clinton's settlement plan), many Israelis cried wolf at its concepts
as murderous for Israel. Clinton-Rabin relations did not disappear
after the killing of Itzhak Rabin. In Israel itself the leftist and
other political forces including the Ehud Barak group supported Bill
Clinton's plan. Jewish voters in the USA continued to demonstrate their
allegiance to Democrats, regardless of the fact that for 8 years now
Israel's le adership is made up of the rightist partners of the US
Republican party. The policies and ideology B.Netaniahu and A.Sharon
pursue presuppose negation of extreme compromises (essentially,
any compromises at all), especially on the "territorial" issue.
Under the circumstances, when Israel is facing the problem of ensuring
influence on the new democratic US administration, Europe's role may
appear very important and absolutely not positive from the point of
view of the Israeli elite in power. Is a new stage of US-European
relations possible? And how willing is the new administration to
resume the previous Clinton course in relation to the Arab-Israeli
conflict that was oriented at significant territorial concessions to
Arabs, so was it worth waiting for the growth of European influence
on the United States? All these issues cannot fail to cause concern
with the leaders of the Jewish state. Israelis are concerned over
the fact that George Bush's Middle East heritage would either be
forgotten or would have but insignificant influence on the policies
of the new administration. In this case Israel could face a problem
of authority given that the current administration at the helm and
politicians who are about to make their entrance on the arenas of
the European and American policies can find themselves in isolation.
Positions of the alliance of the rightist conservative forces in the
USA and Israel are at presen t weak, but the rightist conservatives
have enough resources to make life harder for the Obama administration
not only in the Middle East. The political struggle in the USA that
aimed at gaining the needed results in the Congress and presidential
elections is already underway.
Hence the conclusion about a virtually inevitable enhancement of
tension in the Arab-Israeli relations, or plainly speaking, only war
can prevent US attempts to orient itself more on Europe.
It seems that Israeli leaders have realised the need to take measures
with an eye at preventing the US administration from pursuing a
"more moderate" course towards Iran (the policies that can easily
turn into a form of a set of American-European-Russian agreements.
*** Acording to different valuations, this narrow band of land 25 by
8 kilometres with insignificant use of water and agricultural land is
inhabited by 750,000 to 1,2 million people. Easy to understand that
such a tiny isolated piece of land cannot provide conditions for at
least satisfactory living standards.
Gaza is no Singapore or Hong-Kong, and not even the Jordan's West Bank.
The stereotype of lifetime of Gaza population is significantly
different from the residents of the other part of the Palestinian
autonomy, which caused the predominance of Islamic political
organisations there.
The two separate Palestinian territories are significantly different
also in terms of politi cal priorities of their elites, so much so
that some analysts even ponder establishing two Arab-Palestinian
states. The elites of the Western Bank are distinctly westernized,
which can be accounted for by their intensive communication with other
religious and ethnic groups, a situation almost not registered in Gaza,
where, for example Christians account for a fraction of a percent of
the total population.
>From communication with politicians and experts in Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria and Egypt a conclusion can be drawn that the present-day
leadership of the Palestinian autonomy (de-facto - the Western Bank) is
quite "ripe" to perceive the idea of establishing two Arab-Palestinian
states. Should this happen, the Western Bank's public would soon be
subjected to Europesation and "Levantisation."
Quite a few US leading specialist institutions and research centres
have been discussing this project for a long time. Discussions on
this score were going on at the seminars and conferences held by the
Council for Foreign Relations, the Washington Institute for Middle East
Research, the Institute for the Middle East, the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, Heritage Foundation and others over the
last several years. The issue caught the sight of Richard Pearle,
one of the Pentagon's neo-Conservative "Big Three"during the first
presidential term of president G.Bush.
George Friedman, the leading ana lyst of think-tank Stratfor also
spoke about that.
With an eye at preventing the creation of a single Palestinian state
and territorial concessions to Palestinians the Israeli elite may
soon pick up the idea of separation of the Palestinian problem into
two parts aiming to disrupt the Palestinian movement.
Presumably, Israel might take a less adamant stance in regard of West
Bank and a harder one towards the Gaza Strip, simultaneously shifting
its emphasis from the Palestinian problem towards "international
terrorism" to vindicate its tough line and unpreparedness to
compromises (by the way, many analysts think that HAMAS appeared as an
"Israeli project" to counteract FATH).
Israel is now playing for time. Probably, disguised by its plans of
solving the Palestinian problem the Israeli elite is trying to solve
other problems, too, possibly prolongation of US troops stay in Iraq,
installation of new NATO military bases in the region and even about
some form of Israel's integration into NATO. But most urgently,
it is all about the undermining of potential attempts of the Obama
administration to settle the Arab-Israelu conflict and conservation
of G.Bush's heritage in the US Middle East policies, including the
creation of a front of anti-Iranian struggle.
What is currently needed the most to achieve this is permanent military
operations in the Gaza Strip.