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GEORGIA'S NEW GEOPOLITICAL PATRON
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?page id=International&articleid=a1232643804
Jan 22 2009
Russia
The United States and Georgia Sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement
Contrary to the Americans' desire, Georgia recently failed to secure a
Membership Action Plan in NATO. But this doesn't mean that the United
States has abandoned its policy of spreading democracy in the Southern
Caucasus region. On the contrary, some historic examples demonstrate
that the country is willing and ready to form cooperative relationships
with non-NATO member states whenever its interests so demand.
For the Southern Caucasus region, the new (political and calendar)
year started with the signing of the Charter on Strategic Partnership
between the United States and Georgia. The six-page-long document was
signed by the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on behalf of the
United States, and by the Foreign Affairs Minister Grigol Vashadze
on the part of Georgia.
In the grand scheme of things, the appearance of such a document
was not a sensation. It is no secret that by now, Washington has
been patronizing Tbilisi for a few years. Georgia (just like other
countries of the Southern Caucasus) is a part of America's ambitious
geopolitical project titled "The Greater Middle East." A special role
in it has been assigned to Georgia, for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it is due to geographic and strategic factors. Georgia is
the only country in the Caucasus that borders all other states in
the region (Armenia, for example, has no joint borders with Russia,
and its borders with Azerbaijan are closed because of the Karabakh
conflict). Georgia's relationships with Azerbaijan and Armenia are
equally positive, which means that Georgia is the state that could
theoretically become the "connecting link" for Transcaucasia. This
is the country that the "political pipes" pass through (the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines); and soon
the strategically important railroad, Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars,
will pass through it as well.
Secondly, there is the ideological factor. Compared to the failure of
the projects of democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan, Georgia could
be seen as an example of the American political and economic standards
being implemented successfully, especially since the 2003 "revolution
of roses" is still seen in the United States as a "breakthrough toward
freedom and the market." Naturally, in this case we are not talking
about the reality, but about the image sold to the mass media and to
the electorate.
This is exactly why the United States has been a consistent lobbyist of
Georgia's North Atlantic aspirations. Let's recall that as early as in
November of 2006, a law draft titled "The NATO Freedom Consolidation
Act of 2007" was approved in the upper house of Congress - the
Senate. In March of 2007 it was supported by the members of the
lower house of Congress by a simple majority of votes. In April
of 2007 it was signed by the U.S. President George Bush. This law
draft recommended providing support (including financial support)
for Georgia's and Ukraine's desire to speed up the process of their
admission into NATO. On February 13, 2008, the U.S. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations unanimously passed a resolution supporting a
speedy entrance for Georgia and Ukraine into a Membership Action Plan
at NATO. This is the position that Washington also actively promoted
at the Bucharest Summit in April of last year, despite the fact that
this initiative did not arouse great enthusiasm, to say the least,
among the United States' allies in "old Europe" (Germany, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium). Virtually on the eve of the
"five-day war," in July of 2008, during her official visit to Tbilisi,
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that her country will
"fight for its friends."
The situation changed in August of 2008. The tragic evens in South
Ossetia forced Washington to make some adjustments to its plans
and views. Firstly, Mikheil Saakashvili's "Tskhinvali Blitzkrieg"
came as a surprise to the United States. Of course, Washington was
interested in redefining the status quo both in Abkhazia and in South
Ossetia. Moreover, American diplomacy took a lot of action in this
direction (in particular by supporting the Georgian authorities on
the international level, turning a blind eye even to such obvious
"violations of democracy" as the events in Tbilisi on November 7,
2007). Washington was interested in exerting political pressure
on Russia's positions in Transcaucasia. At the same time, however,
the United States was far from enthused by the military methods of
resolving conflicts, realizing the inevitable involvement of Russia
in a military confrontation with all the possible consequences. And
in August of 2008 these consequences were quick to appear.
Russia's 58th Army participated in providing military support for
the de facto state of South Ossetia. Then Russia formally - legally
- recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus
demonstrating its readiness to play the role of a state that is the
revisionist in the post-Soviet area, as well as clearly declaring
the Caucasus as a zone of its vital, essential interests. Washington
understood quite well that if this doesn't mean a strategic victory
for Moscow (in a situation of a global crisis, many of the Kremlin's
moves and decisions during the "hot August" are ambivalent at least),
it seriously complicates both Georgia and Ukraine's advancement into
the North Atlantic Alliance. An open military confrontation with
Russia (with all of Russia's miscalculations and mistakes in the
planning and realization of the operation in South Ossetia) is not
among the West's priorities. Thus, serious changes have been made in
the Georgian (or, in a wider sense, in the Caucasian) direction of
American foreign policy.
Washington continued to patronize Georgia within the scope of the
Geneva talks, which were essentially meant to determine the new
status quo following the "five-day war." On the eve of the NATO
foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels in December, the United States
acknowledged the fact that Georgia cannot yet become a part of the
alliance, and moved on to implement the practice of developing a
bilateral ally relationship outside of the North Atlantic structures--a
practice that it is well acquainted with.
The United States has a lot of experience in interacting with
particular countries without NATO's "cover" when necessary. The fact
that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Israel, Japan, Egypt or Spain (before it
was accepted in 1982) were not NATO members never stopped and does not
stop the United States from having effective military and political
partnerships with the countries and regions of the world that can be
placed in the realm of U.S. national interests. Perhaps the brightest
example of such a partnership is the American-Spanish relationship
from 1953 to 1982. After World War II, the regime of Francisco Franco
had an ambiguous reputation, and members of the Alliance could not
come to a consensus in regard to accepting his country into NATO,
even in view of a "threat from the East."
Nevertheless, in 1953 Washington and Madrid signed the Pact of Madrid
on military partnership, which allowed Spain to avoid many sharp
corners connected to the reputation of its leader. Until May 30, 1982
(the official date of Spain's entry into NATO) this country was able
to successfully develop relations with the Alliance's strongest member
outside of NATO's bureaucratic structures.
In January of 2009 Georgia started on the Spanish path. It formally
secured something that had already become reality--the geopolitical
patronage on the part of the United States. Without having any chances
of being accepted into NATO (but at the same time having a rather
specific reputation), Tbilisi will work on developing its strategic
relationship with Washington. This is exactly why the Georgian State
Minister for Reintegration, Temuri Iakobashvili, has already compared
the January 9 Washington Charter with the Georgievsk Treaty signed
on July 24 (August 4) of 1783 between Russia and the most powerful
Georgian kingdom of that time, Kartli-Kakheti. The comparison pointed
to the fact that his country once again has a geopolitical patron. This
role used to be played by Russia, and now it has been taken over by the
United States. Although, the Georgievsk Treaty has also been mentioned
in a different context. In the New Year's Eve address to his nation,
Georgia's president Mikheil Saakashvili declared that the document
on Georgian-American strategic partnership will actually become "an
exit from the Georgievsk Treaty" and "a farewell to the era of the
big and the little brother."
At the same time, if we compare the Treaty of the 18th century
with the Charter of the 21st, we can't help but note a fundamental
difference. The former document, which is now being demonstratively
renounced by modern Georgia, was legally binding (although it
had been violated both by the Russian Empire and by the Tsar of
Kartli-Kakheti). If we talk about the Washington charter, even a
quick glance at its text is enough to realize that what we have is
a set of propaganda clichés from the dictionary of the "builder of
international democracy," without any specific legal or political
obligations. The preamble of the Charter says: "Emphasize that this
cooperation between our two democracies is based on shared values
and common interests. These include expanding democracy and economic
freedom, protecting security and territorial integrity, strengthening
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the right of
dignified, secure and voluntary return of all internally displaced
persons and refugees, supporting innovation and technological advances,
and bolstering Eurasian energy security."
Here is a loaded question - who and how will ensure the realization
of the rights of "all internally displaced persons and refugees?" Are
the U.S. marines willing and ready to take on the obligation, in
addition to their Afghanistan and Iraq duties, to carry out this
compulsory yet seemingly voluntary return of the Georgian population
to the whole territory of Abkhazia (not only the Gal district) and
to the four villages of the Liakhv corridor of South Ossetia?
The items listed in Section 1 of the Charter, titled Principles
of Partnership, also can't but evoke a smile. The first item
of the section states: "Support for each other's sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders
constitutes the foundation of our bilateral relations." Now, this
is truly a revelation! Does the United States really have problems
with inviolability of borders or territorial integrity? Does anyone,
except for the obvious, open marginals and the professional "enemies
of America," really doubt the state affiliations of Alaska, Texas or
the Hawaiian Islands?
The third item of this section also creates associations with the
blessed memories of the "stagnation period." "Cooperation between
democracies on defense and security is essential to respond effectively
to threats to peace and security." It resembles the partnership between
the states of the "world socialist system." Didn't - and doesn't -
the United States have experience of forming military and political
partnerships with non-democratic states (from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan)
if its national interests so require?!
The new document about the Georgian-American strategic partnership
will probably strengthen the opinions of those who see Saakashvili as
"a puppet of the United States." However, in reality, practically
all members of the Georgian expert and political community would
have to be considered as puppets, and this would be a significant
simplification. Georgia's American choice today is a reaction to
Russia's position; and Russia, for reasons that have been described
many times (and primarily due to the issues of security in the
North Caucasus), is not really prepared to participate in "bringing
the Caucasian state together." It's nothing personal, as they say;
it's only a process of forming of a "nation state." But will the
transatlantic power really help in this process? This is a rhetorical
question that neither the Charter signed on January 9, 2009, nor any
following memorandums and communiqués can answer. Meanwhile, as long
as the United States still has to deal with such unsolved problems as
Iraq and especially Afghanistan, there is a chance that pragmatism will
prevail over the ideology and practice of "international democracy."
Sergey Markedonov, Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
--Boundary_(ID_yj5IapLeOjcba07Podj1Hw)- -
By Sergei Markedonov
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?page id=International&articleid=a1232643804
Jan 22 2009
Russia
The United States and Georgia Sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement
Contrary to the Americans' desire, Georgia recently failed to secure a
Membership Action Plan in NATO. But this doesn't mean that the United
States has abandoned its policy of spreading democracy in the Southern
Caucasus region. On the contrary, some historic examples demonstrate
that the country is willing and ready to form cooperative relationships
with non-NATO member states whenever its interests so demand.
For the Southern Caucasus region, the new (political and calendar)
year started with the signing of the Charter on Strategic Partnership
between the United States and Georgia. The six-page-long document was
signed by the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on behalf of the
United States, and by the Foreign Affairs Minister Grigol Vashadze
on the part of Georgia.
In the grand scheme of things, the appearance of such a document
was not a sensation. It is no secret that by now, Washington has
been patronizing Tbilisi for a few years. Georgia (just like other
countries of the Southern Caucasus) is a part of America's ambitious
geopolitical project titled "The Greater Middle East." A special role
in it has been assigned to Georgia, for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it is due to geographic and strategic factors. Georgia is
the only country in the Caucasus that borders all other states in
the region (Armenia, for example, has no joint borders with Russia,
and its borders with Azerbaijan are closed because of the Karabakh
conflict). Georgia's relationships with Azerbaijan and Armenia are
equally positive, which means that Georgia is the state that could
theoretically become the "connecting link" for Transcaucasia. This
is the country that the "political pipes" pass through (the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines); and soon
the strategically important railroad, Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars,
will pass through it as well.
Secondly, there is the ideological factor. Compared to the failure of
the projects of democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan, Georgia could
be seen as an example of the American political and economic standards
being implemented successfully, especially since the 2003 "revolution
of roses" is still seen in the United States as a "breakthrough toward
freedom and the market." Naturally, in this case we are not talking
about the reality, but about the image sold to the mass media and to
the electorate.
This is exactly why the United States has been a consistent lobbyist of
Georgia's North Atlantic aspirations. Let's recall that as early as in
November of 2006, a law draft titled "The NATO Freedom Consolidation
Act of 2007" was approved in the upper house of Congress - the
Senate. In March of 2007 it was supported by the members of the
lower house of Congress by a simple majority of votes. In April
of 2007 it was signed by the U.S. President George Bush. This law
draft recommended providing support (including financial support)
for Georgia's and Ukraine's desire to speed up the process of their
admission into NATO. On February 13, 2008, the U.S. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations unanimously passed a resolution supporting a
speedy entrance for Georgia and Ukraine into a Membership Action Plan
at NATO. This is the position that Washington also actively promoted
at the Bucharest Summit in April of last year, despite the fact that
this initiative did not arouse great enthusiasm, to say the least,
among the United States' allies in "old Europe" (Germany, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium). Virtually on the eve of the
"five-day war," in July of 2008, during her official visit to Tbilisi,
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that her country will
"fight for its friends."
The situation changed in August of 2008. The tragic evens in South
Ossetia forced Washington to make some adjustments to its plans
and views. Firstly, Mikheil Saakashvili's "Tskhinvali Blitzkrieg"
came as a surprise to the United States. Of course, Washington was
interested in redefining the status quo both in Abkhazia and in South
Ossetia. Moreover, American diplomacy took a lot of action in this
direction (in particular by supporting the Georgian authorities on
the international level, turning a blind eye even to such obvious
"violations of democracy" as the events in Tbilisi on November 7,
2007). Washington was interested in exerting political pressure
on Russia's positions in Transcaucasia. At the same time, however,
the United States was far from enthused by the military methods of
resolving conflicts, realizing the inevitable involvement of Russia
in a military confrontation with all the possible consequences. And
in August of 2008 these consequences were quick to appear.
Russia's 58th Army participated in providing military support for
the de facto state of South Ossetia. Then Russia formally - legally
- recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus
demonstrating its readiness to play the role of a state that is the
revisionist in the post-Soviet area, as well as clearly declaring
the Caucasus as a zone of its vital, essential interests. Washington
understood quite well that if this doesn't mean a strategic victory
for Moscow (in a situation of a global crisis, many of the Kremlin's
moves and decisions during the "hot August" are ambivalent at least),
it seriously complicates both Georgia and Ukraine's advancement into
the North Atlantic Alliance. An open military confrontation with
Russia (with all of Russia's miscalculations and mistakes in the
planning and realization of the operation in South Ossetia) is not
among the West's priorities. Thus, serious changes have been made in
the Georgian (or, in a wider sense, in the Caucasian) direction of
American foreign policy.
Washington continued to patronize Georgia within the scope of the
Geneva talks, which were essentially meant to determine the new
status quo following the "five-day war." On the eve of the NATO
foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels in December, the United States
acknowledged the fact that Georgia cannot yet become a part of the
alliance, and moved on to implement the practice of developing a
bilateral ally relationship outside of the North Atlantic structures--a
practice that it is well acquainted with.
The United States has a lot of experience in interacting with
particular countries without NATO's "cover" when necessary. The fact
that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Israel, Japan, Egypt or Spain (before it
was accepted in 1982) were not NATO members never stopped and does not
stop the United States from having effective military and political
partnerships with the countries and regions of the world that can be
placed in the realm of U.S. national interests. Perhaps the brightest
example of such a partnership is the American-Spanish relationship
from 1953 to 1982. After World War II, the regime of Francisco Franco
had an ambiguous reputation, and members of the Alliance could not
come to a consensus in regard to accepting his country into NATO,
even in view of a "threat from the East."
Nevertheless, in 1953 Washington and Madrid signed the Pact of Madrid
on military partnership, which allowed Spain to avoid many sharp
corners connected to the reputation of its leader. Until May 30, 1982
(the official date of Spain's entry into NATO) this country was able
to successfully develop relations with the Alliance's strongest member
outside of NATO's bureaucratic structures.
In January of 2009 Georgia started on the Spanish path. It formally
secured something that had already become reality--the geopolitical
patronage on the part of the United States. Without having any chances
of being accepted into NATO (but at the same time having a rather
specific reputation), Tbilisi will work on developing its strategic
relationship with Washington. This is exactly why the Georgian State
Minister for Reintegration, Temuri Iakobashvili, has already compared
the January 9 Washington Charter with the Georgievsk Treaty signed
on July 24 (August 4) of 1783 between Russia and the most powerful
Georgian kingdom of that time, Kartli-Kakheti. The comparison pointed
to the fact that his country once again has a geopolitical patron. This
role used to be played by Russia, and now it has been taken over by the
United States. Although, the Georgievsk Treaty has also been mentioned
in a different context. In the New Year's Eve address to his nation,
Georgia's president Mikheil Saakashvili declared that the document
on Georgian-American strategic partnership will actually become "an
exit from the Georgievsk Treaty" and "a farewell to the era of the
big and the little brother."
At the same time, if we compare the Treaty of the 18th century
with the Charter of the 21st, we can't help but note a fundamental
difference. The former document, which is now being demonstratively
renounced by modern Georgia, was legally binding (although it
had been violated both by the Russian Empire and by the Tsar of
Kartli-Kakheti). If we talk about the Washington charter, even a
quick glance at its text is enough to realize that what we have is
a set of propaganda clichés from the dictionary of the "builder of
international democracy," without any specific legal or political
obligations. The preamble of the Charter says: "Emphasize that this
cooperation between our two democracies is based on shared values
and common interests. These include expanding democracy and economic
freedom, protecting security and territorial integrity, strengthening
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the right of
dignified, secure and voluntary return of all internally displaced
persons and refugees, supporting innovation and technological advances,
and bolstering Eurasian energy security."
Here is a loaded question - who and how will ensure the realization
of the rights of "all internally displaced persons and refugees?" Are
the U.S. marines willing and ready to take on the obligation, in
addition to their Afghanistan and Iraq duties, to carry out this
compulsory yet seemingly voluntary return of the Georgian population
to the whole territory of Abkhazia (not only the Gal district) and
to the four villages of the Liakhv corridor of South Ossetia?
The items listed in Section 1 of the Charter, titled Principles
of Partnership, also can't but evoke a smile. The first item
of the section states: "Support for each other's sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders
constitutes the foundation of our bilateral relations." Now, this
is truly a revelation! Does the United States really have problems
with inviolability of borders or territorial integrity? Does anyone,
except for the obvious, open marginals and the professional "enemies
of America," really doubt the state affiliations of Alaska, Texas or
the Hawaiian Islands?
The third item of this section also creates associations with the
blessed memories of the "stagnation period." "Cooperation between
democracies on defense and security is essential to respond effectively
to threats to peace and security." It resembles the partnership between
the states of the "world socialist system." Didn't - and doesn't -
the United States have experience of forming military and political
partnerships with non-democratic states (from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan)
if its national interests so require?!
The new document about the Georgian-American strategic partnership
will probably strengthen the opinions of those who see Saakashvili as
"a puppet of the United States." However, in reality, practically
all members of the Georgian expert and political community would
have to be considered as puppets, and this would be a significant
simplification. Georgia's American choice today is a reaction to
Russia's position; and Russia, for reasons that have been described
many times (and primarily due to the issues of security in the
North Caucasus), is not really prepared to participate in "bringing
the Caucasian state together." It's nothing personal, as they say;
it's only a process of forming of a "nation state." But will the
transatlantic power really help in this process? This is a rhetorical
question that neither the Charter signed on January 9, 2009, nor any
following memorandums and communiqués can answer. Meanwhile, as long
as the United States still has to deal with such unsolved problems as
Iraq and especially Afghanistan, there is a chance that pragmatism will
prevail over the ideology and practice of "international democracy."
Sergey Markedonov, Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
--Boundary_(ID_yj5IapLeOjcba07Podj1Hw)- -