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Georgian Daily, NY
Jan 25 2009
North-South Energy Routes More Attractive than East-West Ones, Moscow
Analyst Says
January 24, 2009
WINDOW ON EURASIA
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 24 ` Many Western analysts have suggested that one
reason Russian aviators dropped a bomb only 50 meters from the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline during Moscow's invasion of Georgia in
August was to highlight how insecure that link between the Caspian and
the West which bypasses Russian territory has become.
But without acknowledging that sending such a message was among the
Kremlin's war aims, Moscow commentator Aleksandr Shustov argues that
"one of the important consequences of the war" has been growing
recognition by all parties of just how "insecure" all pipelines and
other transportation arteries through Georgia are.
And that forceful demonstration has renewed interest in the
north-south route despite American opposition to any pipeline across
Iran and the desire of both the US and the EU that Moscow not be in a
position to control all hydrocarbon exports from the region and thus
use gas and oil as a political weapon against both exporters and
importers.
In his article, Shustov traces the history of TRACECA, the group of
countries committed to the transit of gas and oil and other goods over
what some have called a revived "Great Silk Road," the key role that
Georgia and Azerbaijan have played as transit states for these
hydrocarbons, and the way in which Armenia and Iran have been largely
excluded this project.
Shustov acknowledges that "despite the technical, geographic and legal
complexities" of the east-west route, its backers and participants
"have been able to achieve [some] definite successes," including the
development of a network of logistical centers, the training of
support personnel, and the construction of the pipelines themselves.
But not even all these very real achievements were able to transcend
geography or bring stability to Georgia, the Moscow analyst continues,
and that reality, one that many supporters of the east-west route
typically have been unwilling to acknowledge, was brought home to them
as a most unpleasant "surprise" by the five-day way between Moscow and
Tbilisi.
Not only did the conflict force several exporting countries to suspend
shipments during the war, but earlier this month, Azerbaijani
officials announced that they were putting off until March the
construction of their part of the railroad that was to supplement the
work of the pipelines.
Baku blamed "complex weather conditions in winter and the need to
conduct additional geological studies of the route," but Shustov
suggests that its decision reflected a growing awareness in the
Azerbaijan capital that no transit route across Georgia is going to be
entirely secure for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, the Moscow analyst argues, plans to establish a North-South
transportation corridor "received a new impulse" after the war. This
corridor has a long history. In September 2000, Russia, India and Iran
signed an agreement to promote it, an agreement later acceded to by
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Oman and Syria.
The agreement calls for the development of three major north-south
routes that would link Russia with Iran, Shustov notes: via the
Caspian Sea, via a railroad through Azerbaijan, and via pipelines from
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The chief economic attraction of this corridor is that it is only half
as long as the traditional sea route via the Suez Canal between the
producing and exporting countries of the Caspian Basin and the Persian
Gulf, on the one hand, and the importing and consuming countries of
Western Europe, on the other.
But its political attractions not only to Moscow but also to Tehran
and Yerevan are almost certainly an even greater selling point. For
Moscow, it would mean that much of the Caspian Basin oil and gas would
flow across its territory and at the very least would not flow through
pipelines sponsored by the United States.
That would enhance Moscow's influence not only in the countries
directly benefiting from exports and transit of oil and gas via this
route but also in other countries, such as Azerbaijan, which would
likely conclude that coming to terms with Russian preferences is a
better strategy than waiting for the West to back them up.
For Tehran, it would help it project power into the region and
represent a serious end run around American efforts to isolate it
economically and politically. And for Yerevan, it would represent not
only a major source of income from transit fees but reduce pressure on
Armenia to settle the Karabakh dispute on terms it does not find
acceptable.
Armenia, Shustov continues, hoped to benefit from a rail line crossing
its territory from Russia to Iran. But because such a route would pass
through and thus require approval from Georgia and Abkhazia, it is
probably "impossible," at least at present. But the north-south
corridor would give Armenia another route out ` via Iran to the
Persian Gulf.
The Russian invasion of Georgia did not end interest in the east-west
corridor, but the conflict made the problems of this route more
obvious. And consequently, while this outcome may not have been a
Russian war aim, it is, as Shustov's article makes clear, very much
one that the Russian government is pleased with.
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_con tent&task=view&id=9532&Itemid=132
Jan 25 2009
North-South Energy Routes More Attractive than East-West Ones, Moscow
Analyst Says
January 24, 2009
WINDOW ON EURASIA
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 24 ` Many Western analysts have suggested that one
reason Russian aviators dropped a bomb only 50 meters from the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline during Moscow's invasion of Georgia in
August was to highlight how insecure that link between the Caspian and
the West which bypasses Russian territory has become.
But without acknowledging that sending such a message was among the
Kremlin's war aims, Moscow commentator Aleksandr Shustov argues that
"one of the important consequences of the war" has been growing
recognition by all parties of just how "insecure" all pipelines and
other transportation arteries through Georgia are.
And that forceful demonstration has renewed interest in the
north-south route despite American opposition to any pipeline across
Iran and the desire of both the US and the EU that Moscow not be in a
position to control all hydrocarbon exports from the region and thus
use gas and oil as a political weapon against both exporters and
importers.
In his article, Shustov traces the history of TRACECA, the group of
countries committed to the transit of gas and oil and other goods over
what some have called a revived "Great Silk Road," the key role that
Georgia and Azerbaijan have played as transit states for these
hydrocarbons, and the way in which Armenia and Iran have been largely
excluded this project.
Shustov acknowledges that "despite the technical, geographic and legal
complexities" of the east-west route, its backers and participants
"have been able to achieve [some] definite successes," including the
development of a network of logistical centers, the training of
support personnel, and the construction of the pipelines themselves.
But not even all these very real achievements were able to transcend
geography or bring stability to Georgia, the Moscow analyst continues,
and that reality, one that many supporters of the east-west route
typically have been unwilling to acknowledge, was brought home to them
as a most unpleasant "surprise" by the five-day way between Moscow and
Tbilisi.
Not only did the conflict force several exporting countries to suspend
shipments during the war, but earlier this month, Azerbaijani
officials announced that they were putting off until March the
construction of their part of the railroad that was to supplement the
work of the pipelines.
Baku blamed "complex weather conditions in winter and the need to
conduct additional geological studies of the route," but Shustov
suggests that its decision reflected a growing awareness in the
Azerbaijan capital that no transit route across Georgia is going to be
entirely secure for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, the Moscow analyst argues, plans to establish a North-South
transportation corridor "received a new impulse" after the war. This
corridor has a long history. In September 2000, Russia, India and Iran
signed an agreement to promote it, an agreement later acceded to by
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Oman and Syria.
The agreement calls for the development of three major north-south
routes that would link Russia with Iran, Shustov notes: via the
Caspian Sea, via a railroad through Azerbaijan, and via pipelines from
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The chief economic attraction of this corridor is that it is only half
as long as the traditional sea route via the Suez Canal between the
producing and exporting countries of the Caspian Basin and the Persian
Gulf, on the one hand, and the importing and consuming countries of
Western Europe, on the other.
But its political attractions not only to Moscow but also to Tehran
and Yerevan are almost certainly an even greater selling point. For
Moscow, it would mean that much of the Caspian Basin oil and gas would
flow across its territory and at the very least would not flow through
pipelines sponsored by the United States.
That would enhance Moscow's influence not only in the countries
directly benefiting from exports and transit of oil and gas via this
route but also in other countries, such as Azerbaijan, which would
likely conclude that coming to terms with Russian preferences is a
better strategy than waiting for the West to back them up.
For Tehran, it would help it project power into the region and
represent a serious end run around American efforts to isolate it
economically and politically. And for Yerevan, it would represent not
only a major source of income from transit fees but reduce pressure on
Armenia to settle the Karabakh dispute on terms it does not find
acceptable.
Armenia, Shustov continues, hoped to benefit from a rail line crossing
its territory from Russia to Iran. But because such a route would pass
through and thus require approval from Georgia and Abkhazia, it is
probably "impossible," at least at present. But the north-south
corridor would give Armenia another route out ` via Iran to the
Persian Gulf.
The Russian invasion of Georgia did not end interest in the east-west
corridor, but the conflict made the problems of this route more
obvious. And consequently, while this outcome may not have been a
Russian war aim, it is, as Shustov's article makes clear, very much
one that the Russian government is pleased with.
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_con tent&task=view&id=9532&Itemid=132