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CENTRAL ASIA: GREAT GAME OR GRAVEYARD?
ISN
1 Jul 2009
Could it be that the Great Game Rudyard Kipling described a century
ago in Central Asia is back? Jon Haron-Feiertag asks for Diplomatic
Courier. By Jon Haron-Feiertag for Diplomatic Courier
Awash in oil and gas. Congested by the traffic of diplomats. The scene
of endless intrigue. Great powers rival for influence. No this is not
an essay on the Middle East but rather Central Asia. Draw a circle
around the Caucasus states, the seven Stans, Turkey, and Iran and you
capture much of the action in international affairs today. Could it be
that the Great Game Rudyard Kipling described a century ago in Central
Asia is back? It is not hard to think why. The diplomacy of gas is
itself a game of its own. Swings in allegiance, pipeline explosions,
invitations to outsider powers-these are all the hallmarks of classic
real politik. The contest for control and transit of gas out of Central
Asia, particularly around the Caspian Sea, has come to rule regional
politics. Putin made it a first priority to lock-in neighboring
states, and create a Caspian gas monopoly. The targets of his policy
were principally Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Gazprom,
at the behest of Russia, paid high prices to secure Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan's gas supplies. Azerbaijan held out. Now with the world
economy sinking, and Russia reeling from the financial crisis, the
Central Asian states are nervous Russia can't pay the high price it
offered for their gas. Kazakhstan has turned toward China. Turkmenistan
is in a furor, and has quickly sent negotiators to Iran and Europe to
look for alternate buyers. It looks as though Putin's gas monopoly
is coming undone, and a window is opening for U.S., European, and
Chinese infiltration. The gas diplomacy is exhilarating, but focus on
that would only tell part of the story. The raging war in Afghanistan
and Pakistan has become a feature of its own. No one knows where this
war is going, or what will be the consequences in the aftermath. But
it is already having major effects in the region. Pakistan's star
is perceived to be receding. Other states that had been checked
by Pakistan, like India and Iran, may now have an opportunity to
exercise new influence. It could be that the old Pashtu policy of
Pakistan will give way to the new designs of the Hindus and Persians
in Asia's heartland. Be that as it may, in the near term the U.S. has
been compelled to create a Central Asian policy-it never had one
before. The U.S. first relied on bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
to support the Afghan War. First the Uzbeks forced the U.S. out,
then followed the Kyrgyz-in exchange for Russian money. Since then
the U.S. has labored hard to reacquire bases. Base agreements imply
political agreements. And negotiations with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Azerbaijan, and perhaps others, all suggest possible future allies
of the US in Central Asia. Gas and the Afghan War explain most of
Central Asia's politics today. But it would be remiss to omit the
Russia-Georgia War from the summer of last year. The War was swift,
the military outcome decisive, but the political consequences are
still uncertain. President Mikheil Saakashvili has survived in power
in Georgia, despite all the efforts and intrigues of the Russians to
undermine him. As a price for his defeat, two important regions in
Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were allowed to secede under
Russian protection. The result was a humiliation for Georgia. The
violent partition has caused Europe to recoil in horror at the thought
of enlarging NATO to the Caucuses. But the consequences may be greater
than just Georgian integrity. Europe's modern economy is dependent on
foreign oil. States like Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia, et al,
are all very reliant on gas imports. Pipelines that traverse their
way through Georgia, from Azerbaijan, into Turkey, now appear a risky
venture. The stakes do not only include Europe's energy independence,
they also implicate the orientation of the Caucasus states and the
direction of Turkey. Azerbaijan is vulnerable to Russian coercion just
like Georgia. It has a mutinous district, similar to South Ossetia,
under the protection of Armenian influence, a state in close alliance
with Russia. Turkey has tried to negotiate a resolution to the impasse,
but so far without avail. The Georgian War may have reversed the
drift of these small Caucasus statelets toward the West.
Central Asia therefore is alive with politics and diplomacy. That said,
does it really resemble the Great Game of yester year? The answer is,
not quite. Consider a few reasons. Then, the locus of conflict was
centered in Afghanistan. The slow creep of empires had slowly brought
the outer borders of the British and Russian empires into contact. The
North Western Frontier, as the British named it was the main place
for confrontation. The British had conquered the Sindh in 1847 and
the Punjab in 1849. But the Tsar's armies were coming closer. They
captured Samarkand, then Bokhara, and then Merv. The old Khanates,
which had been the buffer between the two were nearly gone, only
the Afghan emirate remained. India, the crown jewel of the empire,
was in jeopardy. A policy of "masterly inactivity" would no longer
suffice. The British took action. They first captured Quetta, then
Kabul. This was the Great Game at its zenith. The British strategy
then was essentially one of denial: protect the mountain passes that
lead into India; keep the Russians at bay. But the conflicts today
seem to be the opposite. They are not characterized by denial so
much as control-control of pipelines, control of the gas supply,
control of territory against insurgents. And the conflicts are no
longer centered in the Afghan emirate, they have diffused. Georgia has
become a war ground. So has Pakistan. The geopolitics are different
too. The Great Game, like the Scramble for Africa, and the Far Eastern
Question, were all the unintended consequence of a static peace in
Europe. Bismarck had orchestrated one of the great bargains in the
history of diplomacy. The Russo-Ottoman War, which ended decisively
for Russia and had threatened to upset the delicate balance of
power, was parlayed masterfully into a comprehensive peace. Nearly
every major state of Europe received a slice of territory from the
moribund Ottoman Empire-all but for France. At the Berlin Conference
of 1878, Bismarck essentially fixed the map of Europe until the First
World War. The ambitions of the European states were cast outward,
in Africa, China, and Central Asia. That was then. Now things
are different. Central Asia has not two great powers jousting for
influence, but three-Russia, the US, and China. Central Asia has not
had united rule since the age of Tamerlane and his Timurid Empire. The
fractured politics of the region draw gas-hungry outside powers into
the divide. Central Asia is not the only such place in the world,
but it does possess a lot of gas. It is interesting then to ask why
some states are lured in, while others remain out. The U.S., Russia,
and China clearly are large and growing players for influence in the
region. But that doesn't explain why other states, like India, Iran,
Turkey, and Ukraine are not. These are large and influential states
within their own regions, each with history of dominance across the
vast Steppes. Why not them? The reasons can only be speculative.
Indian identity has been scarred by her colonial experience. The
leadership of Gandhi and Nehru both espoused that India not indulge in
the vulgar imperial ambitions like those of the British. India rather
should mark out a different way. She would keep herself unaligned
and distant from vain-glories of empire. In any case, India has found
another route to the Caspian: Iran. She has maintained the policy of
content customer for Persian oil, and so far shown no desire to rule
the routes herself. Why pay more when you can pay less? Besides, the
conflict with Pakistan effectively checks India's influence into the
region. And in the past, Pakistan has out-played India in Afghanistan.
Of course that was then, this is now. And nothing is changing today
so much as the circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But even
supposing the rosiest scenario, it's hard to imagine how India could
leapfrog Pakistan into Central Asia. Iran more than India is the truly
odd case. Iran would seem the country most suited to rule the inner
Asian oases. Why doesn't it? The Safavids and the Sassanids commanded
wide swathes of Central Asia-both the Caucasus and the watersheds
of the Oxus. Conquerors into Central Asia, like Alexander the Great,
passed first through Persia. Conquerors out of Central Asia, like the
Turks and the Mongols, made Iran their point of debut. She, before
anyone seems the prime contestant for influence. Perhaps once. But
Russia has affected a change of mind. Led by Peter the Great, Persia
was driven from the Caucasus. Later she would lose control of Ashgabat,
the last outpost before the abyss of the Karakum desert. As Russian
power multiplied she was forced from the Caspian, and her northern
reaches were occupied by Russian troops. Concessions, capitulations,
occupations. Some Azeri districts were nearly severed from Iran
at the end of the Second World War. Iranian foreign policy has been
disfigured ever since. Her attention now focuses on the Gulf and Middle
East. Russia it appears has permanently bent Iran away from the center
of Asia. What does it all mean? Some say the Great Game in Central
Asia is a fools errand. The region has been the graveyard of empires,
not the secret source of riches. It is a really a poisoned chalice,
they say. These arguments have merit to them, but they are also half
wrong. Britain and Russia were surely distracted by their voyage into
inner Asia, but they were not ruined by it. It is doubtful states will
be again. But that does not mean the intrigues and combative diplomacy
are prudent, or the Great Game in Central Asia is really a game that
can be won. Nevertheless the regions located at the intersection
of empires eventually draw into them all the force that powerful
states can deploy. The situation was similar with the Balkans at the
turn of the 19th century, or the Middle East at the latter of the
20th. The stress applied by great powers is tremendous. The outcome
of their efforts is often the splintering of states. Because Central
Asia sits atop an ocean of oil and gas, the stakes are too high for
outside ambitions to relax. Expect the diplomacy to intensify. Already
Georgia may have had to two districts carved away. Azerbaijan seems
to have lost a province. Afghanistan and Pakistan look suspiciously
fragile. Watch for splits in the other Stans.
ISN
1 Jul 2009
Could it be that the Great Game Rudyard Kipling described a century
ago in Central Asia is back? Jon Haron-Feiertag asks for Diplomatic
Courier. By Jon Haron-Feiertag for Diplomatic Courier
Awash in oil and gas. Congested by the traffic of diplomats. The scene
of endless intrigue. Great powers rival for influence. No this is not
an essay on the Middle East but rather Central Asia. Draw a circle
around the Caucasus states, the seven Stans, Turkey, and Iran and you
capture much of the action in international affairs today. Could it be
that the Great Game Rudyard Kipling described a century ago in Central
Asia is back? It is not hard to think why. The diplomacy of gas is
itself a game of its own. Swings in allegiance, pipeline explosions,
invitations to outsider powers-these are all the hallmarks of classic
real politik. The contest for control and transit of gas out of Central
Asia, particularly around the Caspian Sea, has come to rule regional
politics. Putin made it a first priority to lock-in neighboring
states, and create a Caspian gas monopoly. The targets of his policy
were principally Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Gazprom,
at the behest of Russia, paid high prices to secure Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan's gas supplies. Azerbaijan held out. Now with the world
economy sinking, and Russia reeling from the financial crisis, the
Central Asian states are nervous Russia can't pay the high price it
offered for their gas. Kazakhstan has turned toward China. Turkmenistan
is in a furor, and has quickly sent negotiators to Iran and Europe to
look for alternate buyers. It looks as though Putin's gas monopoly
is coming undone, and a window is opening for U.S., European, and
Chinese infiltration. The gas diplomacy is exhilarating, but focus on
that would only tell part of the story. The raging war in Afghanistan
and Pakistan has become a feature of its own. No one knows where this
war is going, or what will be the consequences in the aftermath. But
it is already having major effects in the region. Pakistan's star
is perceived to be receding. Other states that had been checked
by Pakistan, like India and Iran, may now have an opportunity to
exercise new influence. It could be that the old Pashtu policy of
Pakistan will give way to the new designs of the Hindus and Persians
in Asia's heartland. Be that as it may, in the near term the U.S. has
been compelled to create a Central Asian policy-it never had one
before. The U.S. first relied on bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
to support the Afghan War. First the Uzbeks forced the U.S. out,
then followed the Kyrgyz-in exchange for Russian money. Since then
the U.S. has labored hard to reacquire bases. Base agreements imply
political agreements. And negotiations with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Azerbaijan, and perhaps others, all suggest possible future allies
of the US in Central Asia. Gas and the Afghan War explain most of
Central Asia's politics today. But it would be remiss to omit the
Russia-Georgia War from the summer of last year. The War was swift,
the military outcome decisive, but the political consequences are
still uncertain. President Mikheil Saakashvili has survived in power
in Georgia, despite all the efforts and intrigues of the Russians to
undermine him. As a price for his defeat, two important regions in
Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were allowed to secede under
Russian protection. The result was a humiliation for Georgia. The
violent partition has caused Europe to recoil in horror at the thought
of enlarging NATO to the Caucuses. But the consequences may be greater
than just Georgian integrity. Europe's modern economy is dependent on
foreign oil. States like Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia, et al,
are all very reliant on gas imports. Pipelines that traverse their
way through Georgia, from Azerbaijan, into Turkey, now appear a risky
venture. The stakes do not only include Europe's energy independence,
they also implicate the orientation of the Caucasus states and the
direction of Turkey. Azerbaijan is vulnerable to Russian coercion just
like Georgia. It has a mutinous district, similar to South Ossetia,
under the protection of Armenian influence, a state in close alliance
with Russia. Turkey has tried to negotiate a resolution to the impasse,
but so far without avail. The Georgian War may have reversed the
drift of these small Caucasus statelets toward the West.
Central Asia therefore is alive with politics and diplomacy. That said,
does it really resemble the Great Game of yester year? The answer is,
not quite. Consider a few reasons. Then, the locus of conflict was
centered in Afghanistan. The slow creep of empires had slowly brought
the outer borders of the British and Russian empires into contact. The
North Western Frontier, as the British named it was the main place
for confrontation. The British had conquered the Sindh in 1847 and
the Punjab in 1849. But the Tsar's armies were coming closer. They
captured Samarkand, then Bokhara, and then Merv. The old Khanates,
which had been the buffer between the two were nearly gone, only
the Afghan emirate remained. India, the crown jewel of the empire,
was in jeopardy. A policy of "masterly inactivity" would no longer
suffice. The British took action. They first captured Quetta, then
Kabul. This was the Great Game at its zenith. The British strategy
then was essentially one of denial: protect the mountain passes that
lead into India; keep the Russians at bay. But the conflicts today
seem to be the opposite. They are not characterized by denial so
much as control-control of pipelines, control of the gas supply,
control of territory against insurgents. And the conflicts are no
longer centered in the Afghan emirate, they have diffused. Georgia has
become a war ground. So has Pakistan. The geopolitics are different
too. The Great Game, like the Scramble for Africa, and the Far Eastern
Question, were all the unintended consequence of a static peace in
Europe. Bismarck had orchestrated one of the great bargains in the
history of diplomacy. The Russo-Ottoman War, which ended decisively
for Russia and had threatened to upset the delicate balance of
power, was parlayed masterfully into a comprehensive peace. Nearly
every major state of Europe received a slice of territory from the
moribund Ottoman Empire-all but for France. At the Berlin Conference
of 1878, Bismarck essentially fixed the map of Europe until the First
World War. The ambitions of the European states were cast outward,
in Africa, China, and Central Asia. That was then. Now things
are different. Central Asia has not two great powers jousting for
influence, but three-Russia, the US, and China. Central Asia has not
had united rule since the age of Tamerlane and his Timurid Empire. The
fractured politics of the region draw gas-hungry outside powers into
the divide. Central Asia is not the only such place in the world,
but it does possess a lot of gas. It is interesting then to ask why
some states are lured in, while others remain out. The U.S., Russia,
and China clearly are large and growing players for influence in the
region. But that doesn't explain why other states, like India, Iran,
Turkey, and Ukraine are not. These are large and influential states
within their own regions, each with history of dominance across the
vast Steppes. Why not them? The reasons can only be speculative.
Indian identity has been scarred by her colonial experience. The
leadership of Gandhi and Nehru both espoused that India not indulge in
the vulgar imperial ambitions like those of the British. India rather
should mark out a different way. She would keep herself unaligned
and distant from vain-glories of empire. In any case, India has found
another route to the Caspian: Iran. She has maintained the policy of
content customer for Persian oil, and so far shown no desire to rule
the routes herself. Why pay more when you can pay less? Besides, the
conflict with Pakistan effectively checks India's influence into the
region. And in the past, Pakistan has out-played India in Afghanistan.
Of course that was then, this is now. And nothing is changing today
so much as the circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But even
supposing the rosiest scenario, it's hard to imagine how India could
leapfrog Pakistan into Central Asia. Iran more than India is the truly
odd case. Iran would seem the country most suited to rule the inner
Asian oases. Why doesn't it? The Safavids and the Sassanids commanded
wide swathes of Central Asia-both the Caucasus and the watersheds
of the Oxus. Conquerors into Central Asia, like Alexander the Great,
passed first through Persia. Conquerors out of Central Asia, like the
Turks and the Mongols, made Iran their point of debut. She, before
anyone seems the prime contestant for influence. Perhaps once. But
Russia has affected a change of mind. Led by Peter the Great, Persia
was driven from the Caucasus. Later she would lose control of Ashgabat,
the last outpost before the abyss of the Karakum desert. As Russian
power multiplied she was forced from the Caspian, and her northern
reaches were occupied by Russian troops. Concessions, capitulations,
occupations. Some Azeri districts were nearly severed from Iran
at the end of the Second World War. Iranian foreign policy has been
disfigured ever since. Her attention now focuses on the Gulf and Middle
East. Russia it appears has permanently bent Iran away from the center
of Asia. What does it all mean? Some say the Great Game in Central
Asia is a fools errand. The region has been the graveyard of empires,
not the secret source of riches. It is a really a poisoned chalice,
they say. These arguments have merit to them, but they are also half
wrong. Britain and Russia were surely distracted by their voyage into
inner Asia, but they were not ruined by it. It is doubtful states will
be again. But that does not mean the intrigues and combative diplomacy
are prudent, or the Great Game in Central Asia is really a game that
can be won. Nevertheless the regions located at the intersection
of empires eventually draw into them all the force that powerful
states can deploy. The situation was similar with the Balkans at the
turn of the 19th century, or the Middle East at the latter of the
20th. The stress applied by great powers is tremendous. The outcome
of their efforts is often the splintering of states. Because Central
Asia sits atop an ocean of oil and gas, the stakes are too high for
outside ambitions to relax. Expect the diplomacy to intensify. Already
Georgia may have had to two districts carved away. Azerbaijan seems
to have lost a province. Afghanistan and Pakistan look suspiciously
fragile. Watch for splits in the other Stans.