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The Civilitas Foundation
www.civilitasfoundation.org
One Northern Avenue, suit 30
Yerevan, Armenia
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Vartan Oskanian, president of the Civilitas Foundation board, Foreign
Minister of Armenia from 1998-2008, answers the questions of Lragir.am
*Mr. Oskanian, it's been a while since the Armenian leadership declared that
foreign policy should be pro-active and enterprising. In your opinion, can
we assess, albeit preliminarily, the results of that approach, and generally
what differences do you see between the pro-active approach and the foreign
policy that came before?*
About being enterprising, I want to say two things. First, before
`initiating' something in foreign relations, we must be able to calculate
all steps from beginning to end, otherwise the initiative may work against
the initiator. Second, being enterprising must be correctly understood.
International relations are not static, and at different times, a country is
under pressure to take or not take a step, to implement steps or counter
other steps being taken in the immediate environment. In such a situation,
deciding not to act requires as much initiative as deciding to act. For
example, if the April 22 joint statement by the Armenian and Turkish foreign
ministries was the product of a pro-active policy, then deciding not to take
such a step could also be called being pro-active. If participating in NATO
exercises is the result of a decision to be pro-active, the decision not to
participate is equally pro-active. It is important to understand the nature
of the initiative. The point I want to make is if we think that it is only
by initiating ever-new steps that a policy or a country is pro-active, then,
in the process of reaching for that next step, we risk going down the wrong
road, as we've recently witnessed.
*If we try to understand the situation through a specific example, then the
recent meeting between the Armenian and Georgian presidents was quite
telling. The meeting between Serzh Sargsyan and Mikheil Saakashvili took
place in such a friendly environment, with announcements that sounded more
like dinner toasts, and for a moment it seemed that we are not talking about
an Armenia and a Georgia that in recent months have had political, cultural
and religious issues, rather that this was a meeting between the mayors of
two sister cities. In your opinion, does such a high-level meeting, and one
that is burdened with the all of the conditions surrounding Armenia-Georgia
relations, fit within the framework of Armenia's enterprising and pro-active
policy?*
My impression is that it was quite a formal meeting. I would have wanted to
see as an outcome of this meeting a more concrete agreement on projects of
strategic importance and a serious exploration of the problematic issues
still pending. For example, documents that preliminarily formalize the
construction of a highway leading to Batumi, or a decision on simplifying
border-crossing processes.
One cannot deny the importance of Georgia to Armenia. We've had a big agenda
and that must be deepened by the day. Each meeting must contribute to the
further deepening and institutionalization of relations. The
Russian-Georgian war demonstrated that Armenia, too, has strategic
importance for Georgia. There are more things that we have in common today,
than there are things that separate us. We must focus on identifying those
commonalities and through specific programs, start work on areas of common
interest. But at the same time, to have the audacity, to explore the serious
issues remaining between us and find solutions to them.
*Taking into consideration the existing problems and episodes in
Armenia-Georgia relations, what do you think about the award given Mikhail
Saakashvili, and the reactions from Russia?*
This was, after all, Armenia's sovereign decision. Even if it was the wrong
decision, that's our internal matter. But the fact that there indeed are
such public and negative reactions from other countries is unfortunate. In
fact, this is not the first time that we find ourselves in such a situation.
The issue of participating or not participating in NATO exercises in Georgia
also put Armenia in such a, shall we say, undesirable situation. I am
convinced that the fundamental reason here is that Armenia seems to have put
aside the policy of complementarity - we don't seem to believe that we
should and that we can indeed maintain complementary relations with all our
neighbors and interested countries. So, if we have retreated from
complementarity, then other countries' expectations of Armenia will change.
That is why our actions are met by very open and direct criticism from one
or another side.
*There are expert opinions that given the geopolitical changes that took
place in our region in 2008, a more careful and thought-through foreign
policy would be more appropriate for Armenia. What do you say?*
It is indeed possible to summarize what I've said in that way, and so, I
agree with the assessment. After the Russian-Georgian war, after the change
of American administration, the situation is quite fluid. On the one hand,
we notice a certain rapprochement between the US and Russia, on the other
hand, these countries are to some extent consolidating their positions in
our region. In such an ever-changing environment, Armenia's policies must
remain very flexible in order to allow all kinds of adjustments.
*In your opinion, what triggered Russian President Dimitri Medvedev's visit
to Baku, especially if we note that it took place just days after
Saakashvili's visit to Yerevan, a visit during which he made several serious
anti-Russian statements. Plus, Medvedev made that visit days before the G8
Summit, and before his meeting with US President Barack Obama? Why did he go
to Baku?*
Naturally, the main reason is Russia's own general interests. Russia is
engaged in consolidating its position in the region, especially in the
run-up to the Summit with Obama. Today, the situation is such that a
rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan may come at Armenia's expense.
This is one of the fundamental changes that has taken place in our region.
*How should we interpret the statement Medvedev made in Baku on Nagorno
Karabakh, on `imminent' resolution, a resolution within the framework of
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, one that can be seen on the basis of
decisions of the UN and other international organizations, especially if we
remember that those decisions are not beneficial to Armenia. Aliev and
Medvedev cited the Meindorf Declaration which mentions those decisions and
which Armenia has signed.*
I had said months ago that Armenia ought to have done everything to avoid
signing that declaration last fall. That was a serious diplomatic blunder.
That declaration has made it easier for Russia and other countries in their
relations with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make
pro-Azerbaijani statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia must do
everything to neutralize that declaration and diminish its impact.
*Armenia's position on Nagorno Karabakh has always been conditional on
Armenia's domestic situation. How do you assess that situation today?*
There are always three factors that impact a country's political positions:
the interests of those countries who are active in the region; the trends in
international organizations at that point in time; and a country's internal
political and economic situation. In all three of these directions, today
there are changes. First, there is a new Russian-American rapprochement,
there is Turkey's greater role in the Nagorno Karabakh issue, as a result of
the Armenia-Turkey public dialogue. Second, trends in international
organizations are not so favorable to us following Kosovo, S. Ossetia and
Abkhazia. And third, of course, our internal political and economic
situation is quite complicated. The economic decline continues, we still
don't see the end of it. Plus, the unhealthy domestic political scene, the
absence of checks and balances in the country, the ever-deepening
frustration and hopelessness in our population, to put it mildly, don't help
our active engagement on the international stage. For a country to speak
from a position of strength internationally, its leaders must command a
position of strength internally. Controlling all the political and
administrative tools at its disposal does not translate to strength. A
government's strength is derived from the trust of its people, and that is
most important internationally as well.
*How do you assess the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution
1667 which was just passed?*
Aside from its content, so long as Armenia remains on the agenda of PACE, we
all lose. The recent PACE events, the internal skirmishes that we've all
witnessed simply come to reinforce my response to your earlier question. Our
domestic problems don't allow us to be effective in the outside world.
*As you said, Armenia remains under OSCE monitoring. In your opinion, does
that serve Armenia's purposes or Europe's?*
European structures should not be viewed as the solution to our problems.
Neither opposition nor government should see them that way. The European
structures won't solve our problems, they will simply give us the
opportunity to bring the European experience to Armenia to support
democratization processes. If we don't want to take advantage of that
opportunity, no one will force us to do so. If European values continue to
be merely theoretical, Europe will do nothing to put them into practice.
That's our task. Armenia has been a CoE member for eight years, and it's
shameful that we remain subject to monitoring.
*Mr. Oskanian, in Armenia there is the impression that often we confuse the
primary and the secondary, and that perhaps that's done intentionally.
Today, do you think there is the need to present the situation thoroughly
and clearly to the public, or is everything already obvious to everyone? Is
there a need to define, to articulate the problems between the governed and
the government, or does everyone already know what they are, but no one's
really interested?*
In Armenia, political and public processes lack transparency. The consistent
distortion of reality, the absence of honesty both on the part of the
authorities and on the part of the opposition in fact, has brought us to
deep polarization and equally deep indifference. Nevertheless, the
significant segment of society which is usually a majority, is disenchanted,
and is passive between elections, can see and accurately analyze what is
going on, independently of the efforts of the authorities or the opposition
to veil it.
*In your opinion, what steps must be taken to overcome that polarization and
indifference? What can serve as a unifying idea for the public to rally
around? What or who can prevail over the public's disenchantment?*
There is no other way to create a healthy state than through a political
system that has at least two poles and is based on political checks and
balances. Today, in Armenia, we really have just one, the ruling pole, which
despite the existence of an opposition, really has no countermeasure. We are
speaking about not just about alternative levers of influence, but also
alternative ideology.
Especially now, after the Yerevan Council elections during which the
authorities' total control was so acutely manifested, it is time for the
establishment of such pole. The purpose of this must not be to be rid of
the authorities at all cost. Experience has shown that this results in the
authorities more tightly consolidating their resources to hang on to power.
The purpose must be to forge a strong second pole which can create
appropriate checks and balances mechanisms within the branches of
government. Such a second pole will become an alternative to the existing
power coalition. The authorities will see that grabbing power will be more
costly than sharing power.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
The Civilitas Foundation
www.civilitasfoundation.org
One Northern Avenue, suit 30
Yerevan, Armenia
X-Sender: Asbed Bedrossian <[email protected]>
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d="scan'208";a="123606822"
X-L istprocessor-Version: 8.1 -- ListProcessor(tm) by CREN
tel: +37410500119
email: [email protected]
Vartan Oskanian, president of the Civilitas Foundation board, Foreign
Minister of Armenia from 1998-2008, answers the questions of Lragir.am
*Mr. Oskanian, it's been a while since the Armenian leadership declared that
foreign policy should be pro-active and enterprising. In your opinion, can
we assess, albeit preliminarily, the results of that approach, and generally
what differences do you see between the pro-active approach and the foreign
policy that came before?*
About being enterprising, I want to say two things. First, before
`initiating' something in foreign relations, we must be able to calculate
all steps from beginning to end, otherwise the initiative may work against
the initiator. Second, being enterprising must be correctly understood.
International relations are not static, and at different times, a country is
under pressure to take or not take a step, to implement steps or counter
other steps being taken in the immediate environment. In such a situation,
deciding not to act requires as much initiative as deciding to act. For
example, if the April 22 joint statement by the Armenian and Turkish foreign
ministries was the product of a pro-active policy, then deciding not to take
such a step could also be called being pro-active. If participating in NATO
exercises is the result of a decision to be pro-active, the decision not to
participate is equally pro-active. It is important to understand the nature
of the initiative. The point I want to make is if we think that it is only
by initiating ever-new steps that a policy or a country is pro-active, then,
in the process of reaching for that next step, we risk going down the wrong
road, as we've recently witnessed.
*If we try to understand the situation through a specific example, then the
recent meeting between the Armenian and Georgian presidents was quite
telling. The meeting between Serzh Sargsyan and Mikheil Saakashvili took
place in such a friendly environment, with announcements that sounded more
like dinner toasts, and for a moment it seemed that we are not talking about
an Armenia and a Georgia that in recent months have had political, cultural
and religious issues, rather that this was a meeting between the mayors of
two sister cities. In your opinion, does such a high-level meeting, and one
that is burdened with the all of the conditions surrounding Armenia-Georgia
relations, fit within the framework of Armenia's enterprising and pro-active
policy?*
My impression is that it was quite a formal meeting. I would have wanted to
see as an outcome of this meeting a more concrete agreement on projects of
strategic importance and a serious exploration of the problematic issues
still pending. For example, documents that preliminarily formalize the
construction of a highway leading to Batumi, or a decision on simplifying
border-crossing processes.
One cannot deny the importance of Georgia to Armenia. We've had a big agenda
and that must be deepened by the day. Each meeting must contribute to the
further deepening and institutionalization of relations. The
Russian-Georgian war demonstrated that Armenia, too, has strategic
importance for Georgia. There are more things that we have in common today,
than there are things that separate us. We must focus on identifying those
commonalities and through specific programs, start work on areas of common
interest. But at the same time, to have the audacity, to explore the serious
issues remaining between us and find solutions to them.
*Taking into consideration the existing problems and episodes in
Armenia-Georgia relations, what do you think about the award given Mikhail
Saakashvili, and the reactions from Russia?*
This was, after all, Armenia's sovereign decision. Even if it was the wrong
decision, that's our internal matter. But the fact that there indeed are
such public and negative reactions from other countries is unfortunate. In
fact, this is not the first time that we find ourselves in such a situation.
The issue of participating or not participating in NATO exercises in Georgia
also put Armenia in such a, shall we say, undesirable situation. I am
convinced that the fundamental reason here is that Armenia seems to have put
aside the policy of complementarity - we don't seem to believe that we
should and that we can indeed maintain complementary relations with all our
neighbors and interested countries. So, if we have retreated from
complementarity, then other countries' expectations of Armenia will change.
That is why our actions are met by very open and direct criticism from one
or another side.
*There are expert opinions that given the geopolitical changes that took
place in our region in 2008, a more careful and thought-through foreign
policy would be more appropriate for Armenia. What do you say?*
It is indeed possible to summarize what I've said in that way, and so, I
agree with the assessment. After the Russian-Georgian war, after the change
of American administration, the situation is quite fluid. On the one hand,
we notice a certain rapprochement between the US and Russia, on the other
hand, these countries are to some extent consolidating their positions in
our region. In such an ever-changing environment, Armenia's policies must
remain very flexible in order to allow all kinds of adjustments.
*In your opinion, what triggered Russian President Dimitri Medvedev's visit
to Baku, especially if we note that it took place just days after
Saakashvili's visit to Yerevan, a visit during which he made several serious
anti-Russian statements. Plus, Medvedev made that visit days before the G8
Summit, and before his meeting with US President Barack Obama? Why did he go
to Baku?*
Naturally, the main reason is Russia's own general interests. Russia is
engaged in consolidating its position in the region, especially in the
run-up to the Summit with Obama. Today, the situation is such that a
rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan may come at Armenia's expense.
This is one of the fundamental changes that has taken place in our region.
*How should we interpret the statement Medvedev made in Baku on Nagorno
Karabakh, on `imminent' resolution, a resolution within the framework of
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, one that can be seen on the basis of
decisions of the UN and other international organizations, especially if we
remember that those decisions are not beneficial to Armenia. Aliev and
Medvedev cited the Meindorf Declaration which mentions those decisions and
which Armenia has signed.*
I had said months ago that Armenia ought to have done everything to avoid
signing that declaration last fall. That was a serious diplomatic blunder.
That declaration has made it easier for Russia and other countries in their
relations with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make
pro-Azerbaijani statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia must do
everything to neutralize that declaration and diminish its impact.
*Armenia's position on Nagorno Karabakh has always been conditional on
Armenia's domestic situation. How do you assess that situation today?*
There are always three factors that impact a country's political positions:
the interests of those countries who are active in the region; the trends in
international organizations at that point in time; and a country's internal
political and economic situation. In all three of these directions, today
there are changes. First, there is a new Russian-American rapprochement,
there is Turkey's greater role in the Nagorno Karabakh issue, as a result of
the Armenia-Turkey public dialogue. Second, trends in international
organizations are not so favorable to us following Kosovo, S. Ossetia and
Abkhazia. And third, of course, our internal political and economic
situation is quite complicated. The economic decline continues, we still
don't see the end of it. Plus, the unhealthy domestic political scene, the
absence of checks and balances in the country, the ever-deepening
frustration and hopelessness in our population, to put it mildly, don't help
our active engagement on the international stage. For a country to speak
from a position of strength internationally, its leaders must command a
position of strength internally. Controlling all the political and
administrative tools at its disposal does not translate to strength. A
government's strength is derived from the trust of its people, and that is
most important internationally as well.
*How do you assess the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution
1667 which was just passed?*
Aside from its content, so long as Armenia remains on the agenda of PACE, we
all lose. The recent PACE events, the internal skirmishes that we've all
witnessed simply come to reinforce my response to your earlier question. Our
domestic problems don't allow us to be effective in the outside world.
*As you said, Armenia remains under OSCE monitoring. In your opinion, does
that serve Armenia's purposes or Europe's?*
European structures should not be viewed as the solution to our problems.
Neither opposition nor government should see them that way. The European
structures won't solve our problems, they will simply give us the
opportunity to bring the European experience to Armenia to support
democratization processes. If we don't want to take advantage of that
opportunity, no one will force us to do so. If European values continue to
be merely theoretical, Europe will do nothing to put them into practice.
That's our task. Armenia has been a CoE member for eight years, and it's
shameful that we remain subject to monitoring.
*Mr. Oskanian, in Armenia there is the impression that often we confuse the
primary and the secondary, and that perhaps that's done intentionally.
Today, do you think there is the need to present the situation thoroughly
and clearly to the public, or is everything already obvious to everyone? Is
there a need to define, to articulate the problems between the governed and
the government, or does everyone already know what they are, but no one's
really interested?*
In Armenia, political and public processes lack transparency. The consistent
distortion of reality, the absence of honesty both on the part of the
authorities and on the part of the opposition in fact, has brought us to
deep polarization and equally deep indifference. Nevertheless, the
significant segment of society which is usually a majority, is disenchanted,
and is passive between elections, can see and accurately analyze what is
going on, independently of the efforts of the authorities or the opposition
to veil it.
*In your opinion, what steps must be taken to overcome that polarization and
indifference? What can serve as a unifying idea for the public to rally
around? What or who can prevail over the public's disenchantment?*
There is no other way to create a healthy state than through a political
system that has at least two poles and is based on political checks and
balances. Today, in Armenia, we really have just one, the ruling pole, which
despite the existence of an opposition, really has no countermeasure. We are
speaking about not just about alternative levers of influence, but also
alternative ideology.
Especially now, after the Yerevan Council elections during which the
authorities' total control was so acutely manifested, it is time for the
establishment of such pole. The purpose of this must not be to be rid of
the authorities at all cost. Experience has shown that this results in the
authorities more tightly consolidating their resources to hang on to power.
The purpose must be to forge a strong second pole which can create
appropriate checks and balances mechanisms within the branches of
government. Such a second pole will become an alternative to the existing
power coalition. The authorities will see that grabbing power will be more
costly than sharing power.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress