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GOVERNMENT'S STRENGTH IS IN THE TRUST OF ITS PEOPLE
Analysis / Armenia
Vartan Oskanian's interview to Lragir.am
The Civilitas Foundation
Monday, 06 July 2009 18:00
Mr. Oskanian, it's been a while since the Armenian leadership declared
that foreign policy should be pro-active and enterprising. In your
opinion, can we assess, albeit preliminarily, the results of that
approach, and generally what differences do you see between the
pro-active approach and the foreign policy that came before?
About being enterprising, I want to say two things. First, before
'initiating' something in foreign relations, we must be able to
calculate all steps from beginning to end, otherwise the initiative
may work against the initiator. Second, being enterprising must
be correctly understood. International relations are not static,
and at different times, a country is under pressure to take or not
take a step, to implement steps or counter other steps being taken
in the immediate environment. In such a situation, deciding not to
act requires as much initiative as deciding to act. For example,
if the April 22 joint statement by the Armenian and Turkish foreign
ministries was the product of a pro-active policy, then deciding
not to take such a step could also be called being pro-active. If
participating in NATO exercises is the result of a decision to be
pro-active, the decision not to participate is equally pro-active. It
is important to understand the nature of the initiative. The point
I want to make is if we think that it is only by initiating ever-new
steps that a policy or a country is pro-active, then, in the process
of reaching for that next step, we risk going down the wrong road,
as we've recently witnessed.
If we try to understand the situation through a specific example,
then the recent meeting between the Armenian and Georgian presidents
was quite telling. The meeting between Serzh Sargsyan and Mikheil
Saakashvili took place in such a friendly environment, with
announcements that sounded more like dinner toasts, and for a moment
it seemed that we are not talking about an Armenia and a Georgia
that in recent months have had political, cultural and religious
issues, rather that this was a meeting between the mayors of two
sister cities. In your opinion, does such a high-level meeting,
and one that is burdened with the all of the conditions surrounding
Armenia-Georgia relations, fit within the framework of Armenia's
enterprising and pro-active policy?
My impression is that it was quite a formal meeting. I would have
wanted to see as an outcome of this meeting a more concrete agreement
on projects of strategic importance and a serious exploration of
the problematic issues still pending. For example, documents that
preliminarily formalize the construction of a highway leading to
Batumi, or a decision on simplifying20border-crossing processes.
One cannot deny the importance of Georgia to Armenia. We've had a
big agenda and that must be deepened by the day. Each meeting must
contribute to the further deepening and institutionalization of
relations. The Russian-Georgian war demonstrated that Armenia, too,
has strategic importance for Georgia. There are more things that we
have in common today, than there are things that separate us. We must
focus on identifying those commonalities and through specific programs,
start work on areas of common interest. But at the same time, to have
the audacity, to explore the serious issues remaining between us and
find solutions to them.
Taking into consideration the existing problems and episodes in
Armenia-Georgia relations, what do you think about the award given
Mikhail Saakashvili, and the reactions from Russia?
This was, after all, Armenia's sovereign decision. Even if it was the
wrong decision, that's our internal matter. But the fact that there
indeed are such public and negative reactions from other countries is
unfortunate. In fact, this is not the first time that we find ourselves
in such a situation. The issue of participating or not participating
in NATO exercises in Georgia also put Armenia in such a, shall we say,
undesirable situation. I am convinced that the fundamental reason here
is that Armenia seems to have put aside the policy of complementarity
- we donE2t seem to believe that we should and that we can indeed
maintain complementary relations with all our neighbors and interested
countries. So, if we have retreated from complementarity, then other
countries' expectations of Armenia will change. That is why our actions
are met by very open and direct criticism from one or another side.
There are expert opinions that given the geopolitical changes that
took place in our region in 2008, a more careful and thought-through
foreign policy would be more appropriate for Armenia. What do you say?
It is indeed possible to summarize what I've said in that way, and so,
I agree with the assessment. After the Russian-Georgian war, after the
change of American administration, the situation is quite fluid. On the
one hand, we notice a certain rapprochement between the US and Russia,
on the other hand, these countries are to some extent consolidating
their positions in our region. In such an ever-changing environment,
Armenia's policies must remain very flexible in order to allow all
kinds of adjustments.
In your opinion, what triggered Russian President Dimitri Medvedev's
visit to Baku, especially if we note that it took place just days after
Saakashvili's visit to Yerevan, a visit during which he made several
serious anti-Russian statements. Plus, Medvedev made that visit days
before the G8 Summit, and before his meeting with US President Barack
Obama?20Why did he go to Baku?
Naturally, the main reason is Russia's own general interests. Russia
is engaged in consolidating its position in the region, especially in
the run-up to the Summit with Obama. Today, the situation is such that
a rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan may come at Armenia's
expense. This is one of the fundamental changes that has taken place
in our region.
How should we interpret the statement Medvedev made in Baku on Nagorno
Karabakh, on "imminent" resolution, a resolution within the framework
of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, one that can be seen on the
basis of decisions of the UN and other international organizations,
especially if we remember that those decisions are not beneficial
to Armenia. Aliev and Medvedev cited the Meindorf Declaration which
mentions those decisions and which Armenia has signed.
I had said months ago that Armenia ought to have done everything
to avoid signing that declaration last fall. That was a serious
diplomatic blunder.
That declaration has made it easier for Russia and other countries in
their relations with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make
pro-Azerbaijani statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia
must do everything to neutralize that declaration and diminish
its impact.
Armenia's position on Nagorno Karabakh has always been conditional on
Armenia's domestic situation. How do you assess that situation today?
There are always three factors that impact a country's political
positions: the interests of those countries who are active in the
region; the trends in international organizations at that point in
time; and a country's internal political and economic situation. In
all three of these directions, today there are changes. First, there
is a new Russian-American rapprochement, there is Turkey's greater
role in the Nagorno Karabakh issue, as a result of the Armenia-Turkey
public dialogue.
Second, trends in international organizations are not so favorable to
us following Kosovo, S. Ossetia and Abkhazia. And third, of course,
our internal political and economic situation is quite complicated. The
economic decline continues, we still don't see the end of it. Plus, the
unhealthy domestic political scene, the absence of checks and balances
in the country, the ever-deepening frustration and hopelessness in
our population, to put it mildly, don't help our active engagement
on the international stage. For a country to speak from a position
of strength internationally, its leaders must command a position of
strength internally. Controlling all the political and administrative
tools at its disposal does not translate to strength. A government's
strength is derived from the trust of its people, and that is most
important internationally as well.
How do you assess the Council of Europe Parliamentary A ssembly
Resolution 1667 which was just passed?
Aside from its content, so long as Armenia remains on the agenda of
PACE, we all lose. The recent PACE events, the internal skirmishes
that we've all witnessed simply come to reinforce my response to your
earlier question.
Our domestic problems don't allow us to be effective in the outside
world.
As you said, Armenia remains under OSCE monitoring. In your opinion,
does that serve Armenia's purposes or Europe's?
European structures should not be viewed as the solution to our
problems.
Neither opposition nor government should see them that way. The
European structures won't solve our problems, they will simply give
us the opportunity to bring the European experience to Armenia to
support democratization processes. If we don't want to take advantage
of that opportunity, no one will force us to do so. If European values
continue to be merely theoretical, Europe will do nothing to put them
into practice.
That's our task. Armenia has been a CoE member for eight years,
and it's shameful that we remain subject to monitoring.
Mr. Oskanian, in Armenia there is the impression that often we
confuse the primary and the secondary, and that perhaps that's done
intentionally.
Today, do you think there is the need to present the situation
thoroughly and clearly to the public, or is everything already obvious
to everyone?
Is20there a need to define, to articulate the problems between the
governed and the government, or does everyone already know what they
are, but no one's really interested?
In Armenia, political and public processes lack transparency. The
consistent distortion of reality, the absence of honesty both on
the part of the authorities and on the part of the opposition
in fact, has brought us to deep polarization and equally deep
indifference. Nevertheless, the significant segment of society which is
usually a majority, is disenchanted, and is passive between elections,
can see and accurately analyze what is going on, independently of
the efforts of the authorities or the opposition to veil it.
In your opinion, what steps must be taken to overcome that polarization
and indifference? What can serve as a unifying idea for the public to
rally around? What or who can prevail over the public's disenchantment?
There is no other way to create a healthy state than through a
political system that has at least two poles and is based on political
checks and balances. Today, in Armenia, we really have just one, the
ruling pole, which despite the existence of an opposition, really has
no countermeasure. We are speaking about not just about alternative
levers of influence, but also alternative ideology.
Especially now, after the Yerevan Council elections during which the
authorities' total control was so acutely manifested,=2 0it is time
for the establishment of such pole. The purpose of this must not be to
be rid of the authorities at all cost. Experience has shown that this
results in the authorities more tightly consolidating their resources
to hang on to power. The purpose must be to forge a strong second
pole which can create appropriate checks and balances mechanisms
within the branches of government. Such a second pole will become
an alternative to the existing power coalition. The authorities will
see that grabbing power will be more costly than sharing power.
Analysis / Armenia
Vartan Oskanian's interview to Lragir.am
The Civilitas Foundation
Monday, 06 July 2009 18:00
Mr. Oskanian, it's been a while since the Armenian leadership declared
that foreign policy should be pro-active and enterprising. In your
opinion, can we assess, albeit preliminarily, the results of that
approach, and generally what differences do you see between the
pro-active approach and the foreign policy that came before?
About being enterprising, I want to say two things. First, before
'initiating' something in foreign relations, we must be able to
calculate all steps from beginning to end, otherwise the initiative
may work against the initiator. Second, being enterprising must
be correctly understood. International relations are not static,
and at different times, a country is under pressure to take or not
take a step, to implement steps or counter other steps being taken
in the immediate environment. In such a situation, deciding not to
act requires as much initiative as deciding to act. For example,
if the April 22 joint statement by the Armenian and Turkish foreign
ministries was the product of a pro-active policy, then deciding
not to take such a step could also be called being pro-active. If
participating in NATO exercises is the result of a decision to be
pro-active, the decision not to participate is equally pro-active. It
is important to understand the nature of the initiative. The point
I want to make is if we think that it is only by initiating ever-new
steps that a policy or a country is pro-active, then, in the process
of reaching for that next step, we risk going down the wrong road,
as we've recently witnessed.
If we try to understand the situation through a specific example,
then the recent meeting between the Armenian and Georgian presidents
was quite telling. The meeting between Serzh Sargsyan and Mikheil
Saakashvili took place in such a friendly environment, with
announcements that sounded more like dinner toasts, and for a moment
it seemed that we are not talking about an Armenia and a Georgia
that in recent months have had political, cultural and religious
issues, rather that this was a meeting between the mayors of two
sister cities. In your opinion, does such a high-level meeting,
and one that is burdened with the all of the conditions surrounding
Armenia-Georgia relations, fit within the framework of Armenia's
enterprising and pro-active policy?
My impression is that it was quite a formal meeting. I would have
wanted to see as an outcome of this meeting a more concrete agreement
on projects of strategic importance and a serious exploration of
the problematic issues still pending. For example, documents that
preliminarily formalize the construction of a highway leading to
Batumi, or a decision on simplifying20border-crossing processes.
One cannot deny the importance of Georgia to Armenia. We've had a
big agenda and that must be deepened by the day. Each meeting must
contribute to the further deepening and institutionalization of
relations. The Russian-Georgian war demonstrated that Armenia, too,
has strategic importance for Georgia. There are more things that we
have in common today, than there are things that separate us. We must
focus on identifying those commonalities and through specific programs,
start work on areas of common interest. But at the same time, to have
the audacity, to explore the serious issues remaining between us and
find solutions to them.
Taking into consideration the existing problems and episodes in
Armenia-Georgia relations, what do you think about the award given
Mikhail Saakashvili, and the reactions from Russia?
This was, after all, Armenia's sovereign decision. Even if it was the
wrong decision, that's our internal matter. But the fact that there
indeed are such public and negative reactions from other countries is
unfortunate. In fact, this is not the first time that we find ourselves
in such a situation. The issue of participating or not participating
in NATO exercises in Georgia also put Armenia in such a, shall we say,
undesirable situation. I am convinced that the fundamental reason here
is that Armenia seems to have put aside the policy of complementarity
- we donE2t seem to believe that we should and that we can indeed
maintain complementary relations with all our neighbors and interested
countries. So, if we have retreated from complementarity, then other
countries' expectations of Armenia will change. That is why our actions
are met by very open and direct criticism from one or another side.
There are expert opinions that given the geopolitical changes that
took place in our region in 2008, a more careful and thought-through
foreign policy would be more appropriate for Armenia. What do you say?
It is indeed possible to summarize what I've said in that way, and so,
I agree with the assessment. After the Russian-Georgian war, after the
change of American administration, the situation is quite fluid. On the
one hand, we notice a certain rapprochement between the US and Russia,
on the other hand, these countries are to some extent consolidating
their positions in our region. In such an ever-changing environment,
Armenia's policies must remain very flexible in order to allow all
kinds of adjustments.
In your opinion, what triggered Russian President Dimitri Medvedev's
visit to Baku, especially if we note that it took place just days after
Saakashvili's visit to Yerevan, a visit during which he made several
serious anti-Russian statements. Plus, Medvedev made that visit days
before the G8 Summit, and before his meeting with US President Barack
Obama?20Why did he go to Baku?
Naturally, the main reason is Russia's own general interests. Russia
is engaged in consolidating its position in the region, especially in
the run-up to the Summit with Obama. Today, the situation is such that
a rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan may come at Armenia's
expense. This is one of the fundamental changes that has taken place
in our region.
How should we interpret the statement Medvedev made in Baku on Nagorno
Karabakh, on "imminent" resolution, a resolution within the framework
of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, one that can be seen on the
basis of decisions of the UN and other international organizations,
especially if we remember that those decisions are not beneficial
to Armenia. Aliev and Medvedev cited the Meindorf Declaration which
mentions those decisions and which Armenia has signed.
I had said months ago that Armenia ought to have done everything
to avoid signing that declaration last fall. That was a serious
diplomatic blunder.
That declaration has made it easier for Russia and other countries in
their relations with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make
pro-Azerbaijani statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia
must do everything to neutralize that declaration and diminish
its impact.
Armenia's position on Nagorno Karabakh has always been conditional on
Armenia's domestic situation. How do you assess that situation today?
There are always three factors that impact a country's political
positions: the interests of those countries who are active in the
region; the trends in international organizations at that point in
time; and a country's internal political and economic situation. In
all three of these directions, today there are changes. First, there
is a new Russian-American rapprochement, there is Turkey's greater
role in the Nagorno Karabakh issue, as a result of the Armenia-Turkey
public dialogue.
Second, trends in international organizations are not so favorable to
us following Kosovo, S. Ossetia and Abkhazia. And third, of course,
our internal political and economic situation is quite complicated. The
economic decline continues, we still don't see the end of it. Plus, the
unhealthy domestic political scene, the absence of checks and balances
in the country, the ever-deepening frustration and hopelessness in
our population, to put it mildly, don't help our active engagement
on the international stage. For a country to speak from a position
of strength internationally, its leaders must command a position of
strength internally. Controlling all the political and administrative
tools at its disposal does not translate to strength. A government's
strength is derived from the trust of its people, and that is most
important internationally as well.
How do you assess the Council of Europe Parliamentary A ssembly
Resolution 1667 which was just passed?
Aside from its content, so long as Armenia remains on the agenda of
PACE, we all lose. The recent PACE events, the internal skirmishes
that we've all witnessed simply come to reinforce my response to your
earlier question.
Our domestic problems don't allow us to be effective in the outside
world.
As you said, Armenia remains under OSCE monitoring. In your opinion,
does that serve Armenia's purposes or Europe's?
European structures should not be viewed as the solution to our
problems.
Neither opposition nor government should see them that way. The
European structures won't solve our problems, they will simply give
us the opportunity to bring the European experience to Armenia to
support democratization processes. If we don't want to take advantage
of that opportunity, no one will force us to do so. If European values
continue to be merely theoretical, Europe will do nothing to put them
into practice.
That's our task. Armenia has been a CoE member for eight years,
and it's shameful that we remain subject to monitoring.
Mr. Oskanian, in Armenia there is the impression that often we
confuse the primary and the secondary, and that perhaps that's done
intentionally.
Today, do you think there is the need to present the situation
thoroughly and clearly to the public, or is everything already obvious
to everyone?
Is20there a need to define, to articulate the problems between the
governed and the government, or does everyone already know what they
are, but no one's really interested?
In Armenia, political and public processes lack transparency. The
consistent distortion of reality, the absence of honesty both on
the part of the authorities and on the part of the opposition
in fact, has brought us to deep polarization and equally deep
indifference. Nevertheless, the significant segment of society which is
usually a majority, is disenchanted, and is passive between elections,
can see and accurately analyze what is going on, independently of
the efforts of the authorities or the opposition to veil it.
In your opinion, what steps must be taken to overcome that polarization
and indifference? What can serve as a unifying idea for the public to
rally around? What or who can prevail over the public's disenchantment?
There is no other way to create a healthy state than through a
political system that has at least two poles and is based on political
checks and balances. Today, in Armenia, we really have just one, the
ruling pole, which despite the existence of an opposition, really has
no countermeasure. We are speaking about not just about alternative
levers of influence, but also alternative ideology.
Especially now, after the Yerevan Council elections during which the
authorities' total control was so acutely manifested,=2 0it is time
for the establishment of such pole. The purpose of this must not be to
be rid of the authorities at all cost. Experience has shown that this
results in the authorities more tightly consolidating their resources
to hang on to power. The purpose must be to forge a strong second
pole which can create appropriate checks and balances mechanisms
within the branches of government. Such a second pole will become
an alternative to the existing power coalition. The authorities will
see that grabbing power will be more costly than sharing power.