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MASIS MAYILIAN: ADOPTION OF PUBLISHED BASIC PRINCIPLES CONTRADICTS INTERESTS OF NKR AND ARMENIA
NOYAN TAPAN
JULY 13, 2009
YEREVAN
Presidents of Russia, U.S. and France adopted a statement on the
Nagorno Karabakh problem on July 10 at the G8 Summit in the city of
L'Aquila, Italy. Noyan Tapan received a commentary by Chairman of
Public Council on Foreign Policy and Security, former Deputy Foreign
Minister of NKR Masis Mayilian concerning that statement and basic
principles of settlement. Below is the commentary completely:
"The text of the joint statement on Nagorno Karabakh conflict by
RF President D. Medvedev, U.S. President Barack Obama, and French
President Nicolas Sarkozy hardly differs from other statements
made earlier at various levels and within the framework of various
international structures in support of the OSCE Minsk process. It is
noteworthy that now the Presidents of the three countries call the
Armenian and Azeri authorities for finishing coordination of concrete
principles of settlement that were published on the official website
of OSCE (http://www.osce.org/item/38731.html).
We will try to shortly comment upon each principle:
1. Return of territories around Nagorno Karabakh under Azerbaijan's
control
Ceding any territory under NKR's control to Azerbaijan will mean first
of all violation of the basic law, Constitution of NKR, where the
given territories are fixed. Secondly, withdrawal of the subdivisions
of NKR army from even if part of liberated territories will undermine
the military and food security of NKR.
The published principles have even no hint at return to NKR control
of more than 1000 sq/m Karabakh lands occupied by Azerbaijan.
Not territories, but borders between NKR and Azerbaijan should be
spoken about at the negotiations. Only after the recognition of
the NKR statehood by Azerbaijan the bilateral intergovernmental
commission should attend to delimitation and demarcation of the
state frontiers. It is the international practice of solving frontier
arguments.
2. Giving an interim status to Nagorno Karabakh, providing security
and autonomy guarantees
Indeed this principle means an attempt to limit NKR sovereignty casting
doubt on its independent status and to deprive the republic of its
own security system. Recognition of NKR independence would really
ensure security of NKR that would give Artsakh new possibilities for
maintaining its own security, including with political-diplomatic
means.
3. Corridor between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh
The land communication between NKR and Armenia was established in
1992 May and was enlarged during the operations of 1993. It would be
naive to limit the current full-value land communication of NKR with
Armenia to the vulnerable "corridor." It is noteworthy that the given
principle is proposed as a concession to the Armenians.
4. Determination of the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh in
the future on the basis of juridically obligatory will
The legal status of NKR has been already determined on the basis of
juridically obligatory will on December 10, 1991 and was confirmed
by another referendum on adoption of NKR Constitution on December
10, 2006. Besides, the NKR people for eight times has expressed its
adherence to independent statehood in republican presidential and
parliamentary elections by voting for programs of political parties
and individual candidates, in which the necessity of international
recognition and strengthening of NKR statehood was mentioned. Thus,
over the past 18 years citizens of NKR for ten times expressed their
being for independent status of NKR.
5. Ensuring the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees
to return to places of their former residence
The given principle can be discussed by all three sides after
recognition of NKR independence by Azerbaijan. A positive moment is
the use of the word "all" and not only Azeri refugees. Though it is
not understandable who and how can ensure the rights and guarantee
the security of hundreds of thousands of people, who can appear in
the territory of the opposite side.
6. International guarantees of security, including operations on
maintaining peace
In essence, we are suggested replacing the current own system
of military security by an inefficient mechanism of "blue
helmets." Possible appearance of foreign armed forces in the
territory of NKR, even under the flag of authoritative international
organizations, will immediately result in abrupt limitation of
republic's sovereignty. The circumstance that the NKR sovereignty
has not received yet a recognition by the international community
and the country is not represented at the above mentioned structures
can result in Karabakh's having no levers of influence on these
forces guaranteed by the international law. Under the circumstances a
possible withdrawal of peacekeeping forces will radically contradict
our national interests. NKR cannot limit its state sovereignty without
receiving its all-embracing international juridical recognition.
Passage of direct obligations on maintaining security and
simultaneously of concrete territories to the third side do not
guarantee strengthening of the very security and poses new threats.
Karabakh residents have their own experience of communicating with
the "peacekeepers of the Soviet period, when troops from the end
of the 1980-s sent for keeping population's security chronically
did not cope with their duties and failed to protect the Armenian
population of Azerbaijani SSR from massacres and violence. In 1991
by the order of the USSR leadership the very troops banished the
Armenian population from some parts of Artsakh (operation Koltso/
Ring). The peacekeeping operations demonstrated low efficiency in
other conlfict zones, as well.
For governments sending peacekeepers to a conflict region, their
interests and the immediate security of the very peacekeepers will
be always more important than the security of the local population.
The published basic principles in case of their adoption and
realization will damage irreparably the national interests of NKR
and RA. The inadmissibility of the basic principles of Nagorno
Karabakh conflict settlement was fixed in the Resolution of the
All-Armenian Conference held on July 10-11, 2009 in the capital
city of NKR. Participants of the conference from Armenia, Artsakh,
and Diaspora demanded from the RA authorities not to sign the
offered document. Obviously, there is an understanding that ceding
territories to the enemy, in which the Armenian people has juridical
and political, as well as historic rights, will be a strong moral blow
for the Armenian people, which can deprive for years of the will of
resistance and motivation of building their own statehood."
NOYAN TAPAN
JULY 13, 2009
YEREVAN
Presidents of Russia, U.S. and France adopted a statement on the
Nagorno Karabakh problem on July 10 at the G8 Summit in the city of
L'Aquila, Italy. Noyan Tapan received a commentary by Chairman of
Public Council on Foreign Policy and Security, former Deputy Foreign
Minister of NKR Masis Mayilian concerning that statement and basic
principles of settlement. Below is the commentary completely:
"The text of the joint statement on Nagorno Karabakh conflict by
RF President D. Medvedev, U.S. President Barack Obama, and French
President Nicolas Sarkozy hardly differs from other statements
made earlier at various levels and within the framework of various
international structures in support of the OSCE Minsk process. It is
noteworthy that now the Presidents of the three countries call the
Armenian and Azeri authorities for finishing coordination of concrete
principles of settlement that were published on the official website
of OSCE (http://www.osce.org/item/38731.html).
We will try to shortly comment upon each principle:
1. Return of territories around Nagorno Karabakh under Azerbaijan's
control
Ceding any territory under NKR's control to Azerbaijan will mean first
of all violation of the basic law, Constitution of NKR, where the
given territories are fixed. Secondly, withdrawal of the subdivisions
of NKR army from even if part of liberated territories will undermine
the military and food security of NKR.
The published principles have even no hint at return to NKR control
of more than 1000 sq/m Karabakh lands occupied by Azerbaijan.
Not territories, but borders between NKR and Azerbaijan should be
spoken about at the negotiations. Only after the recognition of
the NKR statehood by Azerbaijan the bilateral intergovernmental
commission should attend to delimitation and demarcation of the
state frontiers. It is the international practice of solving frontier
arguments.
2. Giving an interim status to Nagorno Karabakh, providing security
and autonomy guarantees
Indeed this principle means an attempt to limit NKR sovereignty casting
doubt on its independent status and to deprive the republic of its
own security system. Recognition of NKR independence would really
ensure security of NKR that would give Artsakh new possibilities for
maintaining its own security, including with political-diplomatic
means.
3. Corridor between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh
The land communication between NKR and Armenia was established in
1992 May and was enlarged during the operations of 1993. It would be
naive to limit the current full-value land communication of NKR with
Armenia to the vulnerable "corridor." It is noteworthy that the given
principle is proposed as a concession to the Armenians.
4. Determination of the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh in
the future on the basis of juridically obligatory will
The legal status of NKR has been already determined on the basis of
juridically obligatory will on December 10, 1991 and was confirmed
by another referendum on adoption of NKR Constitution on December
10, 2006. Besides, the NKR people for eight times has expressed its
adherence to independent statehood in republican presidential and
parliamentary elections by voting for programs of political parties
and individual candidates, in which the necessity of international
recognition and strengthening of NKR statehood was mentioned. Thus,
over the past 18 years citizens of NKR for ten times expressed their
being for independent status of NKR.
5. Ensuring the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees
to return to places of their former residence
The given principle can be discussed by all three sides after
recognition of NKR independence by Azerbaijan. A positive moment is
the use of the word "all" and not only Azeri refugees. Though it is
not understandable who and how can ensure the rights and guarantee
the security of hundreds of thousands of people, who can appear in
the territory of the opposite side.
6. International guarantees of security, including operations on
maintaining peace
In essence, we are suggested replacing the current own system
of military security by an inefficient mechanism of "blue
helmets." Possible appearance of foreign armed forces in the
territory of NKR, even under the flag of authoritative international
organizations, will immediately result in abrupt limitation of
republic's sovereignty. The circumstance that the NKR sovereignty
has not received yet a recognition by the international community
and the country is not represented at the above mentioned structures
can result in Karabakh's having no levers of influence on these
forces guaranteed by the international law. Under the circumstances a
possible withdrawal of peacekeeping forces will radically contradict
our national interests. NKR cannot limit its state sovereignty without
receiving its all-embracing international juridical recognition.
Passage of direct obligations on maintaining security and
simultaneously of concrete territories to the third side do not
guarantee strengthening of the very security and poses new threats.
Karabakh residents have their own experience of communicating with
the "peacekeepers of the Soviet period, when troops from the end
of the 1980-s sent for keeping population's security chronically
did not cope with their duties and failed to protect the Armenian
population of Azerbaijani SSR from massacres and violence. In 1991
by the order of the USSR leadership the very troops banished the
Armenian population from some parts of Artsakh (operation Koltso/
Ring). The peacekeeping operations demonstrated low efficiency in
other conlfict zones, as well.
For governments sending peacekeepers to a conflict region, their
interests and the immediate security of the very peacekeepers will
be always more important than the security of the local population.
The published basic principles in case of their adoption and
realization will damage irreparably the national interests of NKR
and RA. The inadmissibility of the basic principles of Nagorno
Karabakh conflict settlement was fixed in the Resolution of the
All-Armenian Conference held on July 10-11, 2009 in the capital
city of NKR. Participants of the conference from Armenia, Artsakh,
and Diaspora demanded from the RA authorities not to sign the
offered document. Obviously, there is an understanding that ceding
territories to the enemy, in which the Armenian people has juridical
and political, as well as historic rights, will be a strong moral blow
for the Armenian people, which can deprive for years of the will of
resistance and motivation of building their own statehood."