Tweet
Agenda For National Mobilization
Vartan Oskanian's analysis based on his speech at a conference in
Stepanakert
Civilitas, 14 July 2009 12:35
The topic of national mobilization is urgent today. Of course, given
our size ` small territory, small population ` and given Turkey's and
Azerbaijan's enormous capabilities and sophisticated machinery, we have
always used all national and international resources albeit with
varying intensity, scope, depth and effectiveness, but nevertheless we
have used them.
Today, the changing circumstances around us, and the new challenges
emerging before us, make the need for this kind of new mobilization
more timely and necessary.
Let me cite four major reasons for this kind of mobilization at this
time.
First, the new global and regional developments and changes that have
taken place over the past year and half and continue to evolve.
Second, our own policies and the complications that have been created
as a result of our short-sighted, miscalculated policies.
Third, the wedge that has been driven between the Diaspora and
Armenia's leadership as a result of that policy, particularly the
statement issued on April 22 by the foreign ministries of Armenia and
Turkey.
Finally, the issues of legitimacy, fragmentation, and increased tension
among different layers of our society and the deepened distrust between
society and government, as a consequence of th
e lack of
democratization, repeated bad elections, March 1 and its consequences.
With all this in mind, and in order for us to understand what a renewed
mobilization of resources means, we must answer a few questions.
First, what are we trying to mobilize? Where are our resources, how do
we go about revealing and identifying them, beyond the usual core, and
how do we bring them together for the common good?
Second, for what purpose do we want to mobilize and with whom would we
work to pursue our common goals? What are the centers of power and
influence that we want to target and what or where are the levers that
need to be influenced?
Finally, and most importantly, what is the ideological premise around
which we will rally our resources? What is it that the Armenian people
as a nation, as one people ` in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia and Diaspora
` together want to achieve?
This is the all important question on which I'd like to focus ` our
common goals and our vulnerabilities.
To understand better our vulnerabilities and the ultimate challenges,
let me give you a quick rundown of what has changed in this past year
and a half, and what are the new threats that face us:
First, at the global level, there is the changing US-Russia
relationship. There is an attempt at reconciliation and a new détente
between the powers. In a reconciled environment, these two20countries
will view global issues differently, the scope of interests that must
be shared or divided will be enlarged, and the opportunities, the gain,
the benefits for both sides will be greater. In this kind of situation,
where all problematic issues, all sources of potential discord are on
the table ` energy, arms control, nuclear safety, security, conflicts `
Nagorno Karabakh will clearly be on the table, too, as we witnessed
just today by the statement issued at the G8 meeting, by the presidents
of the three Minsk Group co-chair countries ` US, Russia and France.
Under such circumstances, the possibility for trade-offs is greater,
and even greater is the risk that they will come at our expense. We
can't ignore or merely observe these changes. We must be persistent,
vigilant and prevent detrimental developments for Armenia.
Second, the Georgia-Russia war last year changed the balance that had
been maintained between the principles of self-determination and
territorial integrity. Prior to that war, the West had recognized
Kosovo's independence, despite Russia's deep opposition. Although
Russia had threatened to counter the Kosovo decision by making a
similar unilateral move by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it
could not do so easily. That would have presented a serious political
problem. But the Georgia-Russia war changed the environment, and
provided the necessary cover for them to do s
o. They did. Russia
responded to the West's unacceptable, unilateral recognition of
Kosovo's independence by a similar move itself. Now that this
tit-for-tat recognition is over, there seems to be a general internal
understanding that this series of recognitions of self-determination
efforts has ended, that others who aspire to the same will be viewed
differently. It goes without saying that this concept of quotas on
self-determination is a problem that will require attention and must be
countered.
Third, all this comes in the context of Turkey's emerging role in the
region, and in regard to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. As a result of
the Russia-Georgia war, and even more, as a result of the very public
Turkey-Armenia diplomatic engagement, we are facing an unnecessary but
significant problem. Look what we have today. Because of their
attention and expectations of the very visible and very high-level
process, because of their concerns over the genocide recognition
process, the US, the EU, Russia too, and certainly Turkey and Armenia
all put their prestige on the line, expecting to succeed in opening the
Turkey-Armenia border. This did not happen and everyone came to
understand what they should have seen at the beginning that Turkey will
not move until Azerbaijan is satisfied on the Nagorno Karabakh
situation. What started out as a Turkey-Armenia bilateral process,
ended up with Nagorno Karabakh resolution becom
ing a condition for
progress in Turkey-Armenia relations. We all understand that under
these circumstances, with huge international pressure on Armenia most
of all, an accelerated Nagorno Karabakh process, not only for its own
sake, but to resolve another political knot, can lead to lots of bad
decisions, especially and particularly for us.
Fourth, we have signed the Moscow declaration last November, and that
declaration includes a stipulation which is going to continue to haunt
us ` that the conflict must be resolved based on not only international
principles but also the decisions adopted by international
organizations. That was a serious diplomatic blunder. That declaration
has made it easier for Russia and other countries in their relations
with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make pro-Azerbaijani
statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia must do everything
to neutralize that declaration and diminish its impact.
Fifth, the military and political equilibrium between Nagorno Karabakh
and Azerbaijan has changed. The ceasefire has held for 15 years. This
can't be explained by simple goodwill or by the existence of ongoing
negotiations. An effective buffer zone, an equality in the balance of
the opposing forces, the Azerbaijani army's insufficient capacity to
mount a serious strike ` these have played an important role in
encouraging the sides to maintain the ceasefire.
Today, this com
ponent of the balance has been dislodged. The security
of the buffer zone is effected because there is increased pressure on
Armenians to return territories. Azerbaijan is massively building up
its military. Our confidence in our military has not changed. But
Azerbaijan's decision whether to go to war or not, will be based solely
on their own perception of the military balance. At the same time, the
negotiations process too is vulnerable. The document under discussion
is the fifth document in 10 years. If the sides lose confidence in the
negotiations process, this loss of faith, coupled with a perceived
change in the military balance, is extremely dangerous and can bring on
the great and imminent danger of war.
I have just enumerated five areas of great vulnerability for us. These
must be at the basis of all our mobilization efforts.
We must ensure that Nagorno Karabakh does not become the object of
trade among the great powers. We must not accept quotas on
self-determination or independence. We must not allow Turkey to exploit
the existing deadlocked situation between us and divert their
responsibility by putting the blame on Armenians for not making
concessions in Nagorno Karabakh. We must clearly articulate that a
decision by a small group of countries at the UN cannot pretend to
resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Finally, because we who have
won the military battles know full well that there is
no military
solution to this conflict, we must do all we can to avoid war, to
encourage compromise on all sides, compromise that respects the
realities on the ground and that offers real, historical, legal, human
justice.
These objectives form the basis for our mobilization effort, an effort
that has as its ideology and purpose the right of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh to safety and security and a future of dignity.
This is where the history of the last two decades brings us ` to a
claim that the world acknowledge this universal right for the people of
Nagorno Karabakh, who have themselves voted for it, fought for it and
developed institutional frameworks to consolidate it. A lasting
resolution must be based on the realities of these last 20 years and
look forward, with realism again, to a future of peace.
Vartan Oskanian's analysis based on his speech at a conference in
Stepanakert
Civilitas, 14 July 2009 12:35
The topic of national mobilization is urgent today. Of course, given
our size ` small territory, small population ` and given Turkey's and
Azerbaijan's enormous capabilities and sophisticated machinery, we have
always used all national and international resources albeit with
varying intensity, scope, depth and effectiveness, but nevertheless we
have used them.
Today, the changing circumstances around us, and the new challenges
emerging before us, make the need for this kind of new mobilization
more timely and necessary.
Let me cite four major reasons for this kind of mobilization at this
time.
First, the new global and regional developments and changes that have
taken place over the past year and half and continue to evolve.
Second, our own policies and the complications that have been created
as a result of our short-sighted, miscalculated policies.
Third, the wedge that has been driven between the Diaspora and
Armenia's leadership as a result of that policy, particularly the
statement issued on April 22 by the foreign ministries of Armenia and
Turkey.
Finally, the issues of legitimacy, fragmentation, and increased tension
among different layers of our society and the deepened distrust between
society and government, as a consequence of th
e lack of
democratization, repeated bad elections, March 1 and its consequences.
With all this in mind, and in order for us to understand what a renewed
mobilization of resources means, we must answer a few questions.
First, what are we trying to mobilize? Where are our resources, how do
we go about revealing and identifying them, beyond the usual core, and
how do we bring them together for the common good?
Second, for what purpose do we want to mobilize and with whom would we
work to pursue our common goals? What are the centers of power and
influence that we want to target and what or where are the levers that
need to be influenced?
Finally, and most importantly, what is the ideological premise around
which we will rally our resources? What is it that the Armenian people
as a nation, as one people ` in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia and Diaspora
` together want to achieve?
This is the all important question on which I'd like to focus ` our
common goals and our vulnerabilities.
To understand better our vulnerabilities and the ultimate challenges,
let me give you a quick rundown of what has changed in this past year
and a half, and what are the new threats that face us:
First, at the global level, there is the changing US-Russia
relationship. There is an attempt at reconciliation and a new détente
between the powers. In a reconciled environment, these two20countries
will view global issues differently, the scope of interests that must
be shared or divided will be enlarged, and the opportunities, the gain,
the benefits for both sides will be greater. In this kind of situation,
where all problematic issues, all sources of potential discord are on
the table ` energy, arms control, nuclear safety, security, conflicts `
Nagorno Karabakh will clearly be on the table, too, as we witnessed
just today by the statement issued at the G8 meeting, by the presidents
of the three Minsk Group co-chair countries ` US, Russia and France.
Under such circumstances, the possibility for trade-offs is greater,
and even greater is the risk that they will come at our expense. We
can't ignore or merely observe these changes. We must be persistent,
vigilant and prevent detrimental developments for Armenia.
Second, the Georgia-Russia war last year changed the balance that had
been maintained between the principles of self-determination and
territorial integrity. Prior to that war, the West had recognized
Kosovo's independence, despite Russia's deep opposition. Although
Russia had threatened to counter the Kosovo decision by making a
similar unilateral move by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it
could not do so easily. That would have presented a serious political
problem. But the Georgia-Russia war changed the environment, and
provided the necessary cover for them to do s
o. They did. Russia
responded to the West's unacceptable, unilateral recognition of
Kosovo's independence by a similar move itself. Now that this
tit-for-tat recognition is over, there seems to be a general internal
understanding that this series of recognitions of self-determination
efforts has ended, that others who aspire to the same will be viewed
differently. It goes without saying that this concept of quotas on
self-determination is a problem that will require attention and must be
countered.
Third, all this comes in the context of Turkey's emerging role in the
region, and in regard to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. As a result of
the Russia-Georgia war, and even more, as a result of the very public
Turkey-Armenia diplomatic engagement, we are facing an unnecessary but
significant problem. Look what we have today. Because of their
attention and expectations of the very visible and very high-level
process, because of their concerns over the genocide recognition
process, the US, the EU, Russia too, and certainly Turkey and Armenia
all put their prestige on the line, expecting to succeed in opening the
Turkey-Armenia border. This did not happen and everyone came to
understand what they should have seen at the beginning that Turkey will
not move until Azerbaijan is satisfied on the Nagorno Karabakh
situation. What started out as a Turkey-Armenia bilateral process,
ended up with Nagorno Karabakh resolution becom
ing a condition for
progress in Turkey-Armenia relations. We all understand that under
these circumstances, with huge international pressure on Armenia most
of all, an accelerated Nagorno Karabakh process, not only for its own
sake, but to resolve another political knot, can lead to lots of bad
decisions, especially and particularly for us.
Fourth, we have signed the Moscow declaration last November, and that
declaration includes a stipulation which is going to continue to haunt
us ` that the conflict must be resolved based on not only international
principles but also the decisions adopted by international
organizations. That was a serious diplomatic blunder. That declaration
has made it easier for Russia and other countries in their relations
with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make pro-Azerbaijani
statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia must do everything
to neutralize that declaration and diminish its impact.
Fifth, the military and political equilibrium between Nagorno Karabakh
and Azerbaijan has changed. The ceasefire has held for 15 years. This
can't be explained by simple goodwill or by the existence of ongoing
negotiations. An effective buffer zone, an equality in the balance of
the opposing forces, the Azerbaijani army's insufficient capacity to
mount a serious strike ` these have played an important role in
encouraging the sides to maintain the ceasefire.
Today, this com
ponent of the balance has been dislodged. The security
of the buffer zone is effected because there is increased pressure on
Armenians to return territories. Azerbaijan is massively building up
its military. Our confidence in our military has not changed. But
Azerbaijan's decision whether to go to war or not, will be based solely
on their own perception of the military balance. At the same time, the
negotiations process too is vulnerable. The document under discussion
is the fifth document in 10 years. If the sides lose confidence in the
negotiations process, this loss of faith, coupled with a perceived
change in the military balance, is extremely dangerous and can bring on
the great and imminent danger of war.
I have just enumerated five areas of great vulnerability for us. These
must be at the basis of all our mobilization efforts.
We must ensure that Nagorno Karabakh does not become the object of
trade among the great powers. We must not accept quotas on
self-determination or independence. We must not allow Turkey to exploit
the existing deadlocked situation between us and divert their
responsibility by putting the blame on Armenians for not making
concessions in Nagorno Karabakh. We must clearly articulate that a
decision by a small group of countries at the UN cannot pretend to
resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Finally, because we who have
won the military battles know full well that there is
no military
solution to this conflict, we must do all we can to avoid war, to
encourage compromise on all sides, compromise that respects the
realities on the ground and that offers real, historical, legal, human
justice.
These objectives form the basis for our mobilization effort, an effort
that has as its ideology and purpose the right of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh to safety and security and a future of dignity.
This is where the history of the last two decades brings us ` to a
claim that the world acknowledge this universal right for the people of
Nagorno Karabakh, who have themselves voted for it, fought for it and
developed institutional frameworks to consolidate it. A lasting
resolution must be based on the realities of these last 20 years and
look forward, with realism again, to a future of peace.