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Each Administration Is Responsible For The Documents It Signs

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  • Each Administration Is Responsible For The Documents It Signs

    EACH ADMINISTRATION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DOCUMENTS IT SIGNS

    Spotlight / Interviews

    Vartan Oskanian's interview to the Yerevan Daily, 168 Zham Newspaper
    Saturday, 18 July 2009 13:00

    Mr. Oskanian, the Madrid principles as they've been made public,
    are they more acceptable to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh or to
    Azerbaijan? In general, how do you assess that proposal?

    If we're speaking about the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
    conflict, public sentiment can theoretically be divided into two
    segments. For one segment, any sort of concession is unacceptable. For
    this segment then, any document that emerges from Armenian-Azerbaijani
    negotiations, is in and of itself unacceptable. This approach is
    understandable but then, in this case, we must accept that we do not
    need negotiations, and that option depends solely on the price that
    Armenians are prepared to pay.

    Nevertheless, if the issue is to reach a negotiated settlement, then
    it is important to understand that any document that is the product
    of Armenian-Azerbaijani talks must be viewed from two different
    perspectives.

    First, the principles on which the document is based. Second,
    the document itself in all its detail. For example, if one of
    the principles is that the people of Nagorno Karabakh have the
    right to self-determination, that principle is naturally considered
    acceptable. But in the final document, how this principle is actually
    formulated, 0Ais a different matter.

    Another example: If one of the principles is the return of
    territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, that, at first glance, is
    unacceptable. But if, as a result of negotiations, it is possible to
    reach an agreement that the return of those territories of strategic
    significance take places only after the right of self-determination is
    realized, and even then, not in their totality, that is an altogether
    different matter. Therefore, principles are an important basis,
    but the details are the determinants.

    During my years as minister, we couldn't reach an agreement with
    Azerbaijan over the document's details. There was a clear bar which
    we had set for ourselves, based on our national interest; we were
    not willing to lower that bar and we did not do so.

    In your view, compared to the earlier ones, is this a move in a
    positive direction or a negative one? Please cite concrete facts
    and examples.

    I don't know what this 'renewed' document is that they're talking
    about. But in the one I'm familiar with, the right of the people
    of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination has been codified, and
    so that document is more favorable in comparison to those that came
    before. But as negotiators say, nothing is agreed until everything
    is agreed, so whether this is a good or bad document depends largely
    on how effectively and prudently the Armenian side will conduct=2
    0the negotiations.

    Is it not a negative development for Armenians that the OSCE Minsk
    Group's prior language -- 'withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied
    territories' or 'contiguous land border' -- has been replaced by
    the phrases 'the return of territories adjacent to Nagorno Karabakh
    to Azerbaijani control' or 'land link'? And, in general, are the
    interests of the Minsk Group co-chair countries in the resolution
    of the Nagorno Karabakh issue more congruent with the interests of
    Armenians or Azerbaijanis?

    In general, the objective of the co-chairs has been to bring
    the positions of the two sides closer. For them, under normal
    circumstances, how and what kind of a resolution is reached is not
    as important as simply the fact of reaching a resolution. Of course,
    from time to time, the co-chairs will make an announcement which
    causes dissatisfaction for one or another side.

    But that shouldn't worry us so much as when co-chair countries, for
    whatever reason, feel the necessity to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh
    issue at all cost, in order to 'disentangle' another knot. In such
    a situation, other factors too will come into play. As I have often
    said, Turkey's masterful exploitation of Armenia-Turkey relations
    may provide such an excuse.

    How do you interpret the view that the current unfavorable situation
    of the Nagorno Karabakh process is th e product of your and former
    President Kocharian's policies?

    Each administration is responsible for its term in office and for
    documents it has signed. During the past 10 years, we had succeeded in
    moving away from the Lisbon principles which provided Nagorno Karabakh
    with a maximum of autonomy within Azerbaijan, to a point where the
    right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination was
    reinforced. Further, during this time, there were no concessions on
    the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. On the contrary. Nagorno Karabakh
    with its surrounding territories and with an unobstructed link
    with Armenia, not only survived but also registered noticeable
    development. Nevertheless, each new administration has a right to
    step back from what it has received from the former administration,
    if it so wishes. A change of administration offers such a historic
    opportunity. In 1998, that opportunity was used. So, today's processes
    are the responsibility of those in charge today. And we should judge
    the situation, not only based on the content of the document, but
    also on the circumstances which have been created around us as a
    result of our own foreign policy.

    In your view, is it necessary that Nagorno Karabakh become a full
    party to negotiations? If yes, then why was that presence not assured
    during the Kocharian years?

    Nagorno Karabakh's participation in the negotiations was disrupted in
    March 1997 whe n the Minsk group negotiations themselves were broken
    off. But Nagorno Karabakh has not been left out of the process. It
    was only in a rare instance that the co-chairs would visit the region
    and not go to Stepanakert or not visit with the Nagorno Karabakh
    authorities. Of course, taking into consideration the fact that
    there cannot be a resolution without the agreement of the authorities
    and people of Nagorno Karabakh, the direct participation of Nagorno
    Karabakh is desirable, and even essential, and that's always been
    acknowledged. Nevertheless in 1998 when the Republic of Armenia was
    faced with a dilemma - to carry out the negotiations inherited from
    the former administration, and to do so at the presidential level,
    or to generally withdraw from negotiations, the decision was made
    in favor of continuing negotiations. But again, any administration,
    faced with such a choice, can make a different determination.
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