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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING TURKEY
by Dario D'Urso
Limes, rivista italia di geopolitica
http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartl and/the-importance-of-being-turkey/1248
July 22 2009
Italy
The Turkish position is pivotal in the relations of the Eu with
Asia and the Middle East. Ankara's foreign policy priorities have
shifted. The implications for the geopolitical order of the region.
HomeIn the recent months, a geopolitical actor has embarked on a series
of courageous initiatives ranging from the Caucasus to Central Asia,
passing through the Middle East, Iran, Iraq and Russia. An actor who
is trying to emerge as an important player in various scenarios -
also by courageously playing the energy card. Regrettably enough,
this actor is not the European Union, but one of its oldest bêtes
noires: we are talking about Turkey.
The AKP government, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has re-oriented
Ankara's foreign policy priorities from an absolute loyalty to the
Euro-Atlantic mantra to a more dynamic approach aimed at asserting
Ankara's role as a regional mediator in the Caucasus and in the
Middle East, while at the same time strengthening the Turkish links
with the gas-rich countries of Central Asia.
Erdogan - along with his party comrades, the former foreign minister
and now president Abdullah Gul and the current foreign minister Ali
Babacan - shifted Turkey's geopolitical orientation in an impressive
way. During the August war, the Prime minister visited Tbilisi and
Moscow proposing the establishment of the Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform, a regional mechanism to 'unfreeze' the various
frozen conflict of the area, while at the same time spreading the seeds
of a possible resolution of the triangular dispute between Turkey,
Azerbaijan and Armenia (including the Nagorno-Karabakh issue). During
the Israeli bombing of Gaza, an outraged Erdogan put at risk the
special relationship with Jerusalem touring the Arab capitals and
becoming the 'new Nasser' in the eyes of the Arab streets. The
Davos walkout made many think that Turkey was definitely shifting
to the East, interacting with Tehran and Moscow, while at the same
time trying to assume the role of energy hub by subtly blackmailing
Brussels on the Nabucco issue.
Although many labelled Ankara's 'multivectored' foreign policy as
irresponsible, the new US administration confirmed the opinion of
many Turks that Erdogan's international attitude was the right one.
In a matter of weeks Ankara became the destination of several senior
level visits from Washington: the Special envoy for the Middle
East Mitchell and the Secretary of State Clinton paid their visits
praising Turkey's leader role in the region, and assessing Ankara's
position as a possible facilitator of any future Washington - Tehran
talk. Moreover, Clinton announced that Turkey will be the first visit
of President Obama in a Muslim country (the visit should take place
at the beginning of April); in that occasion, Istanbul might be the
venue of the long awaited speech to Islam that Obama promised to
deliver within the first 100 days of his mandate.
Of course, contradictions within Turkey's actions are behind the
corner - especially concerning the relationships with Russia and
Iran. But the message is that Ankara's ultimate goal, membership
in the European Union, is losing appeal in both Turkish leadership
and people. Sadly enough, the main reason seems to be Brussels's
dilemma towards having Turkey onboard. The result is that Turkey is
set to become a very important geopolitical actor on several fronts,
so getting the deserved consideration of the Obama administration,
while the EU stands at the corner.
Brussels risks to lose its leverage on Ankara, whose patience is
strained by the lack of political consensus on its membership. And
that is not the only thing Brussels might lose: by speeding up the
accession talks and setting clearly the goal of membership, the EU
might finally increase its role in the Middle East, the Caucasus and
Central Asia. Several member states brought their net of privileged
international relationships when becoming EU member states - let's
just remember the role Poland and Lithuania played during the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine. With Turkey as a member state, the EU might
be able to strongly perform the role of mediator in those areas where
Ankara exerts an increasing influence.
Turkey should of course continue on the path of those internal reforms
necessary to fully comply with the Copenhagen criteria - especially
those concerning the rule of law, civil and minority rights. But, on
the other side, the EU and its member states cannot risk to 'lose'
Turkey and its geopolitical potential, neither to an 'excessive'
eastern orientation, nor to the increased attention of the US..
by Dario D'Urso
Limes, rivista italia di geopolitica
http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartl and/the-importance-of-being-turkey/1248
July 22 2009
Italy
The Turkish position is pivotal in the relations of the Eu with
Asia and the Middle East. Ankara's foreign policy priorities have
shifted. The implications for the geopolitical order of the region.
HomeIn the recent months, a geopolitical actor has embarked on a series
of courageous initiatives ranging from the Caucasus to Central Asia,
passing through the Middle East, Iran, Iraq and Russia. An actor who
is trying to emerge as an important player in various scenarios -
also by courageously playing the energy card. Regrettably enough,
this actor is not the European Union, but one of its oldest bêtes
noires: we are talking about Turkey.
The AKP government, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has re-oriented
Ankara's foreign policy priorities from an absolute loyalty to the
Euro-Atlantic mantra to a more dynamic approach aimed at asserting
Ankara's role as a regional mediator in the Caucasus and in the
Middle East, while at the same time strengthening the Turkish links
with the gas-rich countries of Central Asia.
Erdogan - along with his party comrades, the former foreign minister
and now president Abdullah Gul and the current foreign minister Ali
Babacan - shifted Turkey's geopolitical orientation in an impressive
way. During the August war, the Prime minister visited Tbilisi and
Moscow proposing the establishment of the Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform, a regional mechanism to 'unfreeze' the various
frozen conflict of the area, while at the same time spreading the seeds
of a possible resolution of the triangular dispute between Turkey,
Azerbaijan and Armenia (including the Nagorno-Karabakh issue). During
the Israeli bombing of Gaza, an outraged Erdogan put at risk the
special relationship with Jerusalem touring the Arab capitals and
becoming the 'new Nasser' in the eyes of the Arab streets. The
Davos walkout made many think that Turkey was definitely shifting
to the East, interacting with Tehran and Moscow, while at the same
time trying to assume the role of energy hub by subtly blackmailing
Brussels on the Nabucco issue.
Although many labelled Ankara's 'multivectored' foreign policy as
irresponsible, the new US administration confirmed the opinion of
many Turks that Erdogan's international attitude was the right one.
In a matter of weeks Ankara became the destination of several senior
level visits from Washington: the Special envoy for the Middle
East Mitchell and the Secretary of State Clinton paid their visits
praising Turkey's leader role in the region, and assessing Ankara's
position as a possible facilitator of any future Washington - Tehran
talk. Moreover, Clinton announced that Turkey will be the first visit
of President Obama in a Muslim country (the visit should take place
at the beginning of April); in that occasion, Istanbul might be the
venue of the long awaited speech to Islam that Obama promised to
deliver within the first 100 days of his mandate.
Of course, contradictions within Turkey's actions are behind the
corner - especially concerning the relationships with Russia and
Iran. But the message is that Ankara's ultimate goal, membership
in the European Union, is losing appeal in both Turkish leadership
and people. Sadly enough, the main reason seems to be Brussels's
dilemma towards having Turkey onboard. The result is that Turkey is
set to become a very important geopolitical actor on several fronts,
so getting the deserved consideration of the Obama administration,
while the EU stands at the corner.
Brussels risks to lose its leverage on Ankara, whose patience is
strained by the lack of political consensus on its membership. And
that is not the only thing Brussels might lose: by speeding up the
accession talks and setting clearly the goal of membership, the EU
might finally increase its role in the Middle East, the Caucasus and
Central Asia. Several member states brought their net of privileged
international relationships when becoming EU member states - let's
just remember the role Poland and Lithuania played during the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine. With Turkey as a member state, the EU might
be able to strongly perform the role of mediator in those areas where
Ankara exerts an increasing influence.
Turkey should of course continue on the path of those internal reforms
necessary to fully comply with the Copenhagen criteria - especially
those concerning the rule of law, civil and minority rights. But, on
the other side, the EU and its member states cannot risk to 'lose'
Turkey and its geopolitical potential, neither to an 'excessive'
eastern orientation, nor to the increased attention of the US..