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IT IS A MISTAKE TO PRETEND THAT KOSOVA IS UNIQUE
Bosnian Institute News
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?n ewsid=2597
June 8 2009
Article arguing that Kosova's independence was recognised as the
result of 'a confluence of multiple factors'; and that it is 'not
only pointless, but actually counter-productive to pander to the
opponents of recognition by reassuring them that Kosova is a unique
case and will not become a precedent'.
Most of us can probably remember, at least once in our lives, asking
some apparatchik something along the lines of 'Couldn't you please,
please make an exception, just this once ?' and getting the reply:
'I can't do that ! If I made an exception for you, I'd have to make
an exception for everybody. It'd be more than my job's worth.' You
and the apparatchik both know that he could perfectly well make an
exception for you if he wanted to. But you also both know that he is
right in saying that there is nothing special about you, and that
you are not uniquely worthy of being treated as an exception. The
question is: does he like you or doesn't he ?
Similarly, trying to pretend that recognising Kosova's unilateral
secession from Serbia is legitimate on the grounds that it is
wholly unique and without precedent in international relations is
unconvincing, firstly because it isn't true, and secondly because it
begs the question: if it can happen once, can it not happen twice or
multiple times ? To which the only reasonable answer is: yes. There may
very well be occasions in the future when the Western alliance will
be forced to recognise an act of unilateral secession by a subject
people and territory from the state that rules them. Everybody knows
this is entirely possible, and pretending it isn't simply destroys
the credibility of those who do.
Of course, the reason our officials and statesmen are pretending
that Kosova is a unique case is in order to avoid scaring away other
countries from recognising Kosova's independence; countries they fear
might otherwise worry a precedent were being established that could be
applied to a secessionist region or nationality of their own. But this
calculation, too, is misguided, because a) it rests upon a fallacy,
and b) it represents a bad geopolitical tactic. We shall briefly
explain the fallacy, before focusing on the bigger question of why
the tactic is a bad one.
a) It is fallacy to point to Kosova as a precedent, because if a
precedent has been established, it was established long before Kosova's
independence was recognised. It was certainly established by the early
1990s, when all the members of the former multinational federations of
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia who wanted independence
were granted it - except Kosova. This was despite the fact that in the
case of Yugoslavia, the federal members that declared independence
had done so unilaterally, without the consent of either the federal
centre, or of all other members of the federation. There is absolutely
no reason why the recognition of Kosova's independence should not
be treated as essentially the same as that of Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. In contrast to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, for example, which were not members of the Soviet Union but
simply autonomous entities within Georgia, Kosova was a full member of
the Yugoslav federation in its own right, independently of the fact
that it was also an entity within Serbia. As a member of the defunct
Yugoslav federation, Kosova was entitled to self-determination after
the dissolution of that federation had been internationally recognised,
and after other members of the federation had been accorded that right.
More generally, the former Yugoslav states are far from the first
unilaterally seceding entities to be accorded international recognition
- think of France's recognition of the US in 1778 and Britain's
recognition of Bangladesh in 1972.
b) There is no need to pretend that Kosova is a unique case to
avoid scaring other states away from recognising its independence,
for the simple reason that, when all is said and done, other states'
policies on whether or not to recognise Kosova are really are not
determined by fear of Kosova becoming a precedent - even if these
states are faced with separatist threats of their own. Turkey, faced
with a very real Kurdish separatist insurgency and bitterly opposed
to the secession of Nagorno Karabakh from its traditional ally,
Azerbaijan, was nevertheless one of the first states to recognise
Kosova's independence. Turkey has also promoted the break-up of Cyprus,
via the unilateral secession of the self-proclaimed 'Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus'. Russia, which vocally opposes the independence
of Kosova, which is faced with secessionist movements within its own
borders and which brutally crushed Chechnya's bid for independence,
has nevertheless simultaneously promoted the unilateral secession of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. India, which likewise opposes
Kosova's independence and likewise faces secessionist movements within
its own borders, was instrumental in achieving Bangladesh's unilateral
secession from Pakistan. In other words, states which might be seen
as having as much reason as most to fear a 'Kosovo precedent' being
established are quite ready to support unilateral acts of secession
when they feel it is in their interests to do so.
It might be objected that the states in question are all powerful
enough to feel confident that they can crush any secessionist movement
they face. Yet fragile Macedonia, which fought an armed conflict
with Albanian separatists earlier this decade, and which might have
more reason than almost any state to fear a 'Kosovo precedent', has
recognised Kosova. Fear of the 'Kosovo precedent' is not, therefore,
a decisive factor in a state's decision on whether or not to recognise
Kosova's independence (we can make an exception here for states such
as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova that are currently in a state of
territorial dismemberment, and that, were they to recognise Kosova,
might conceivably suffer retaliation in kind from Belgrade or Moscow)
It may be that, all things being equal, a state faced with a
secessionist movement of its own is more likely to sympathise with
Belgrade than with Pristina. In one or two cases, such as Spain's,
this sympathy may be electorally significant enough to sway the course
of its foreign policy. But so far as almost all non-recognisers
are concerned, other factors count for more: a state is likely to
oppose Kosova's independence if it is hostile to the West (Russia,
Iran, Venezuela); if it has traditionally enjoyed good relations with
Belgrade (Greece, Egypt, Indonesia); or if it simply sees no particular
interest in recognising it. All these factors are reasons why it is
not only pointless, but actually counter-productive to pander to the
opponents of recognition by reassuring them that Kosova is a unique
case and will not become a precedent.
As things stand, rogue states have no reason to fear that the
international community will ever grant independence to secessionist
territories. They therefore enjoy a virtual carte blanche to suppress
secessionist movements or other rebellions as brutally as they
wish. None of the forms of deterrent threatened against or exerted
on the Sudanese regime, from sanctions to international war-crimes
indictments, appears to have cooled its bloodlust with regard to
Darfur. But were Khartoum to fear that its genocidal actions might
potentially result in the loss of territory, it might be less inclined
to pursue them. The Western alliance would enjoy that much more leeway
in exerting pressure over a rogue state such as Sudan.
Conversely, a close ally such as Turkey, which faces a genuine
secessionist insurgency, knows very well that the Western states will
never make it the victim of such a precedent: everyone knows that
Turkish Kurdistan is not going to be liberated by NATO, as Kosova
was; a 'Kosovo precedent' will not frighten states like Turkey. But
this does not mean that such states can get away with indiscriminate
brutality with impunity. Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish population
has dramatically improved over the last ten years, as Ankara's goal of
EU membership has required it to improve its human rights record. Just
as NATO acted as the bad cop over Serbia and Kosova, so the EU has
acted as the good cop over Turkey and the Kurds. Western allies can
be guided toward ending repression and discrimination against national
minorities, reducing the appeal of violent separatist movements. Rogue
states, on the other hand, should have reason to fear that their
brutality may potentially result in a loss of territory. For all
states that abuse the human rights of their national minorities,
this is a healthy choice to be faced with.
This does not, of course, mean that the Western alliance should
indiscriminately threaten states that abuse human rights with
territorial penalties. Rather, the 'Kosovo precedent' could function
rather like the nuclear deterrent, i.e. deter more by its potential
than by its actual application, and by its occasional application
against only the worst offenders: as was Milosevic's Serbia; as is
Bashir's Sudan. Nor would a 'Kosovo precedent' mean a free-for-all
for all secessionist movements. There is a lot of space between
the untenable pretense that Kosova is 'unique' and the rather comic
nightmare-scenario threatened by Kosova's enemies: of innumerable
separatist territories all over the world responding to Kosova's
independence by trying to become Kosovas themselves. Kosova itself,
after all, was scarcely given red-carpet treatment by the Western
alliance in its move to independence: a decade elapsed between
Milosevic's brutal suppression of its autonomy and its liberation
by NATO; almost another decade elapsed between liberation and the
recognition of its independence, during which time it was forced
to endure international administration and engage in exhaustive
negotiations with its former oppressor. Even now, Kosova is still
faced with a very real threat of permanent territorial partition,
as the Serbs maintain their hold on the north of the country. The
Kosova model may not prove as straightforwardly attractive for other
potential secessionists as the Cassandras claim.
Kosova's independence was recognised as the result of a confluence of
multiple factors: its existence as an entity in its own right within
the Yugoslav federation; its overwhelmingly non-Serb, ethnic-Albanian
population; the brutality of Belgrade's treatment of this population;
the unwillingness of the Milosevic regime to reach an accommodation
with the Western alliance over the issue, following on from his
years of trouble-making in Croatia and Bosnia; the unwillingness or
inability of post-Milosevic Serbia in the 2000s to reach agreement
with the Kosovars; and the simple lack of any workable alternative to
independence. These were an exceptional set of circumstances. The truth
is, that it is possible to envisage a similar set of circumstances
leading the Western alliance to recognise the independence of another
secessionist territory in the future. Sometimes it is better to tell
the truth.
Article published 31 May 2009 on the website of the Henry Jackson
Society.
Bosnian Institute News
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?n ewsid=2597
June 8 2009
Article arguing that Kosova's independence was recognised as the
result of 'a confluence of multiple factors'; and that it is 'not
only pointless, but actually counter-productive to pander to the
opponents of recognition by reassuring them that Kosova is a unique
case and will not become a precedent'.
Most of us can probably remember, at least once in our lives, asking
some apparatchik something along the lines of 'Couldn't you please,
please make an exception, just this once ?' and getting the reply:
'I can't do that ! If I made an exception for you, I'd have to make
an exception for everybody. It'd be more than my job's worth.' You
and the apparatchik both know that he could perfectly well make an
exception for you if he wanted to. But you also both know that he is
right in saying that there is nothing special about you, and that
you are not uniquely worthy of being treated as an exception. The
question is: does he like you or doesn't he ?
Similarly, trying to pretend that recognising Kosova's unilateral
secession from Serbia is legitimate on the grounds that it is
wholly unique and without precedent in international relations is
unconvincing, firstly because it isn't true, and secondly because it
begs the question: if it can happen once, can it not happen twice or
multiple times ? To which the only reasonable answer is: yes. There may
very well be occasions in the future when the Western alliance will
be forced to recognise an act of unilateral secession by a subject
people and territory from the state that rules them. Everybody knows
this is entirely possible, and pretending it isn't simply destroys
the credibility of those who do.
Of course, the reason our officials and statesmen are pretending
that Kosova is a unique case is in order to avoid scaring away other
countries from recognising Kosova's independence; countries they fear
might otherwise worry a precedent were being established that could be
applied to a secessionist region or nationality of their own. But this
calculation, too, is misguided, because a) it rests upon a fallacy,
and b) it represents a bad geopolitical tactic. We shall briefly
explain the fallacy, before focusing on the bigger question of why
the tactic is a bad one.
a) It is fallacy to point to Kosova as a precedent, because if a
precedent has been established, it was established long before Kosova's
independence was recognised. It was certainly established by the early
1990s, when all the members of the former multinational federations of
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia who wanted independence
were granted it - except Kosova. This was despite the fact that in the
case of Yugoslavia, the federal members that declared independence
had done so unilaterally, without the consent of either the federal
centre, or of all other members of the federation. There is absolutely
no reason why the recognition of Kosova's independence should not
be treated as essentially the same as that of Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. In contrast to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, for example, which were not members of the Soviet Union but
simply autonomous entities within Georgia, Kosova was a full member of
the Yugoslav federation in its own right, independently of the fact
that it was also an entity within Serbia. As a member of the defunct
Yugoslav federation, Kosova was entitled to self-determination after
the dissolution of that federation had been internationally recognised,
and after other members of the federation had been accorded that right.
More generally, the former Yugoslav states are far from the first
unilaterally seceding entities to be accorded international recognition
- think of France's recognition of the US in 1778 and Britain's
recognition of Bangladesh in 1972.
b) There is no need to pretend that Kosova is a unique case to
avoid scaring other states away from recognising its independence,
for the simple reason that, when all is said and done, other states'
policies on whether or not to recognise Kosova are really are not
determined by fear of Kosova becoming a precedent - even if these
states are faced with separatist threats of their own. Turkey, faced
with a very real Kurdish separatist insurgency and bitterly opposed
to the secession of Nagorno Karabakh from its traditional ally,
Azerbaijan, was nevertheless one of the first states to recognise
Kosova's independence. Turkey has also promoted the break-up of Cyprus,
via the unilateral secession of the self-proclaimed 'Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus'. Russia, which vocally opposes the independence
of Kosova, which is faced with secessionist movements within its own
borders and which brutally crushed Chechnya's bid for independence,
has nevertheless simultaneously promoted the unilateral secession of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. India, which likewise opposes
Kosova's independence and likewise faces secessionist movements within
its own borders, was instrumental in achieving Bangladesh's unilateral
secession from Pakistan. In other words, states which might be seen
as having as much reason as most to fear a 'Kosovo precedent' being
established are quite ready to support unilateral acts of secession
when they feel it is in their interests to do so.
It might be objected that the states in question are all powerful
enough to feel confident that they can crush any secessionist movement
they face. Yet fragile Macedonia, which fought an armed conflict
with Albanian separatists earlier this decade, and which might have
more reason than almost any state to fear a 'Kosovo precedent', has
recognised Kosova. Fear of the 'Kosovo precedent' is not, therefore,
a decisive factor in a state's decision on whether or not to recognise
Kosova's independence (we can make an exception here for states such
as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova that are currently in a state of
territorial dismemberment, and that, were they to recognise Kosova,
might conceivably suffer retaliation in kind from Belgrade or Moscow)
It may be that, all things being equal, a state faced with a
secessionist movement of its own is more likely to sympathise with
Belgrade than with Pristina. In one or two cases, such as Spain's,
this sympathy may be electorally significant enough to sway the course
of its foreign policy. But so far as almost all non-recognisers
are concerned, other factors count for more: a state is likely to
oppose Kosova's independence if it is hostile to the West (Russia,
Iran, Venezuela); if it has traditionally enjoyed good relations with
Belgrade (Greece, Egypt, Indonesia); or if it simply sees no particular
interest in recognising it. All these factors are reasons why it is
not only pointless, but actually counter-productive to pander to the
opponents of recognition by reassuring them that Kosova is a unique
case and will not become a precedent.
As things stand, rogue states have no reason to fear that the
international community will ever grant independence to secessionist
territories. They therefore enjoy a virtual carte blanche to suppress
secessionist movements or other rebellions as brutally as they
wish. None of the forms of deterrent threatened against or exerted
on the Sudanese regime, from sanctions to international war-crimes
indictments, appears to have cooled its bloodlust with regard to
Darfur. But were Khartoum to fear that its genocidal actions might
potentially result in the loss of territory, it might be less inclined
to pursue them. The Western alliance would enjoy that much more leeway
in exerting pressure over a rogue state such as Sudan.
Conversely, a close ally such as Turkey, which faces a genuine
secessionist insurgency, knows very well that the Western states will
never make it the victim of such a precedent: everyone knows that
Turkish Kurdistan is not going to be liberated by NATO, as Kosova
was; a 'Kosovo precedent' will not frighten states like Turkey. But
this does not mean that such states can get away with indiscriminate
brutality with impunity. Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish population
has dramatically improved over the last ten years, as Ankara's goal of
EU membership has required it to improve its human rights record. Just
as NATO acted as the bad cop over Serbia and Kosova, so the EU has
acted as the good cop over Turkey and the Kurds. Western allies can
be guided toward ending repression and discrimination against national
minorities, reducing the appeal of violent separatist movements. Rogue
states, on the other hand, should have reason to fear that their
brutality may potentially result in a loss of territory. For all
states that abuse the human rights of their national minorities,
this is a healthy choice to be faced with.
This does not, of course, mean that the Western alliance should
indiscriminately threaten states that abuse human rights with
territorial penalties. Rather, the 'Kosovo precedent' could function
rather like the nuclear deterrent, i.e. deter more by its potential
than by its actual application, and by its occasional application
against only the worst offenders: as was Milosevic's Serbia; as is
Bashir's Sudan. Nor would a 'Kosovo precedent' mean a free-for-all
for all secessionist movements. There is a lot of space between
the untenable pretense that Kosova is 'unique' and the rather comic
nightmare-scenario threatened by Kosova's enemies: of innumerable
separatist territories all over the world responding to Kosova's
independence by trying to become Kosovas themselves. Kosova itself,
after all, was scarcely given red-carpet treatment by the Western
alliance in its move to independence: a decade elapsed between
Milosevic's brutal suppression of its autonomy and its liberation
by NATO; almost another decade elapsed between liberation and the
recognition of its independence, during which time it was forced
to endure international administration and engage in exhaustive
negotiations with its former oppressor. Even now, Kosova is still
faced with a very real threat of permanent territorial partition,
as the Serbs maintain their hold on the north of the country. The
Kosova model may not prove as straightforwardly attractive for other
potential secessionists as the Cassandras claim.
Kosova's independence was recognised as the result of a confluence of
multiple factors: its existence as an entity in its own right within
the Yugoslav federation; its overwhelmingly non-Serb, ethnic-Albanian
population; the brutality of Belgrade's treatment of this population;
the unwillingness of the Milosevic regime to reach an accommodation
with the Western alliance over the issue, following on from his
years of trouble-making in Croatia and Bosnia; the unwillingness or
inability of post-Milosevic Serbia in the 2000s to reach agreement
with the Kosovars; and the simple lack of any workable alternative to
independence. These were an exceptional set of circumstances. The truth
is, that it is possible to envisage a similar set of circumstances
leading the Western alliance to recognise the independence of another
secessionist territory in the future. Sometimes it is better to tell
the truth.
Article published 31 May 2009 on the website of the Henry Jackson
Society.