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ARMENIA MAY NO LONGER FOLLOW U.S. LEAD ON SOME ISSUES AFTER AID CUT-OFF
By Harut Sassounian
NT
15:45 - 16.06.2009
For more than a year, Armenia's leaders have been operating under the
false impression that accommodating Washington on some issues would
provide economic and political benefits, shield them from accusations
of democratic shortcomings, and convince the West not to support
their domestic opponents.
Based on such wishful thinking, the Armenian government made repeated
efforts to please the United States. For example, last year, when
Marie Yovanovitch was nominated by Pres. Bush to become the next
Ambassador to Armenia, State Department officials asked Armenia to use
its contacts in Washington in order to facilitate her confirmation by
the U.S. Senate. They feared that she would suffer the same fate as
her predecessor, Richard Hoagland, whose nomination had been blocked
by the Senate at the urging of the Armenian-American community. The
Armenian government obliged, probably hoping that the new Ambassador
and the United States would reciprocate by showing goodwill towards
Yerevan on certain critical issues.
Another issue on which Armenia went to great lengths to accommodate
Washington was engaging in negotiations with its historic arch-enemy
Turkey in order to open the border and establish diplomatic
relations. While Yerevan believed that doing so was also in its own
best interest, U.S. officials were the driving force behind these
negotiations, particularly after it became apparent that the Turkish
government had no interest in carrying out honest discussions with
Armenia and no intention of opening the border. Both Turkey and the
United States benefited greatly from the false impression created by
these negotiations. Turkey managed to undermine Pres.
Obama's campaign pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide on April
24. In return, Washington was able to secure Turkey's commitment
to support U.S. policies in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Armenia, on the other hand, received no tangible benefits. In fact,
its repeated optimistic pronouncements regarding the progress of the
negotiations helped both Turkey and the United States to look good
in the eyes of the world. Besides not gaining anything, the Armenian
government jeopardized the support of its powerful Diaspora and large
segments of its own population. Furthermore, the ARF -- one of the
four parties constituting the Armenian government -- left the ruling
coalition following a joint public announcement by Armenia and Turkey
on the eve of April 24. Pres.
Obama cited the supposed progress made in Armenian-Turkish negotiations
in his April 24 statement in order to avoid making an explicit
reference to the Armenian Genocide.
It is now clear to the Armenian government that Washington had no
intention of accommodating Armenia either on economic and political
matters or on its democratic shortcomings. The amount of foreign aid
recently proposed by the Obama Administration for Armenia is 38%
less than last year's. Another U.S. aid program, provided by the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), was reduced by almost one
third -- million -- citing the country's failure to comply with its
eligibility criteria. The MCC bases its aid decision on 16 different
indicators which recipient countries are committed to uphold.
It is distressing that such standards have to be imposed on Armenia
by a foreign country. Raising the living standards of the population
is in the Armenian people's own interest. It is the obligation of
the Armenian government to make such improvements, without waiting
to do so, under the threat of losing foreign aid.
The most immediate impact of the cancellation of the MCC's rural
road program will be felt by Armenia's destitute farmers who need an
improved infrastructure to grow, transport and sell their produce.
It is not known what direction Armenia's leaders will follow as
a result of the above setbacks. Will they strive to improve their
compliance with the MCC criteria or will they completely give up on
that program?
This latest development may have far reaching and unintended
consequences beyond Armenia's farmers. Armenia's leaders may conclude
that catering to the U.S. is going to neither provide a cover for
the regime's sh ortcomings in the area of democratic governance nor
result in any tangible benefits to the country in terms of opening
the border with Turkey.
The negotiations with Turkey, already stalled due to unacceptable
pre-conditions advanced by Ankara, may now be completely disrupted.
The Armenian government may formally abandon its nominal policy of
complementarity between east and west and rely more heavily than ever
before on Russia and Iran.
Finally, it is unfortunate that the MCC decision comes on the eve
of Amb. Yovanovitch's first trip to Armenian communities in the
United States, later this month. During her visit, she is likely to
encounter public resentment that the U.S. government is practicing a
double-standard by lowering proposed foreign aid levels to Armenia
and increasing those of Azerbaijan which enjoys huge oil revenues
and is in no need of U.S. handouts. There is also a double-standard
vis-a-vis Georgia, as the latter remains the recipient of MCC aid
despite its lack of compliance with several MCC criteria.
Amb. Yovanovitch may also face criticism from large segments of the
Armenian-American community, given Pres. Obama's failure to keep
his campaign promise to recognize the Armenian Genocide. This is not
the Ambassador's fault. However, given the fact that she represents
the United States, she will automatically become the target of all
criticism directed at the Obama Administration.
By Harut Sassounian
NT
15:45 - 16.06.2009
For more than a year, Armenia's leaders have been operating under the
false impression that accommodating Washington on some issues would
provide economic and political benefits, shield them from accusations
of democratic shortcomings, and convince the West not to support
their domestic opponents.
Based on such wishful thinking, the Armenian government made repeated
efforts to please the United States. For example, last year, when
Marie Yovanovitch was nominated by Pres. Bush to become the next
Ambassador to Armenia, State Department officials asked Armenia to use
its contacts in Washington in order to facilitate her confirmation by
the U.S. Senate. They feared that she would suffer the same fate as
her predecessor, Richard Hoagland, whose nomination had been blocked
by the Senate at the urging of the Armenian-American community. The
Armenian government obliged, probably hoping that the new Ambassador
and the United States would reciprocate by showing goodwill towards
Yerevan on certain critical issues.
Another issue on which Armenia went to great lengths to accommodate
Washington was engaging in negotiations with its historic arch-enemy
Turkey in order to open the border and establish diplomatic
relations. While Yerevan believed that doing so was also in its own
best interest, U.S. officials were the driving force behind these
negotiations, particularly after it became apparent that the Turkish
government had no interest in carrying out honest discussions with
Armenia and no intention of opening the border. Both Turkey and the
United States benefited greatly from the false impression created by
these negotiations. Turkey managed to undermine Pres.
Obama's campaign pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide on April
24. In return, Washington was able to secure Turkey's commitment
to support U.S. policies in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Armenia, on the other hand, received no tangible benefits. In fact,
its repeated optimistic pronouncements regarding the progress of the
negotiations helped both Turkey and the United States to look good
in the eyes of the world. Besides not gaining anything, the Armenian
government jeopardized the support of its powerful Diaspora and large
segments of its own population. Furthermore, the ARF -- one of the
four parties constituting the Armenian government -- left the ruling
coalition following a joint public announcement by Armenia and Turkey
on the eve of April 24. Pres.
Obama cited the supposed progress made in Armenian-Turkish negotiations
in his April 24 statement in order to avoid making an explicit
reference to the Armenian Genocide.
It is now clear to the Armenian government that Washington had no
intention of accommodating Armenia either on economic and political
matters or on its democratic shortcomings. The amount of foreign aid
recently proposed by the Obama Administration for Armenia is 38%
less than last year's. Another U.S. aid program, provided by the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), was reduced by almost one
third -- million -- citing the country's failure to comply with its
eligibility criteria. The MCC bases its aid decision on 16 different
indicators which recipient countries are committed to uphold.
It is distressing that such standards have to be imposed on Armenia
by a foreign country. Raising the living standards of the population
is in the Armenian people's own interest. It is the obligation of
the Armenian government to make such improvements, without waiting
to do so, under the threat of losing foreign aid.
The most immediate impact of the cancellation of the MCC's rural
road program will be felt by Armenia's destitute farmers who need an
improved infrastructure to grow, transport and sell their produce.
It is not known what direction Armenia's leaders will follow as
a result of the above setbacks. Will they strive to improve their
compliance with the MCC criteria or will they completely give up on
that program?
This latest development may have far reaching and unintended
consequences beyond Armenia's farmers. Armenia's leaders may conclude
that catering to the U.S. is going to neither provide a cover for
the regime's sh ortcomings in the area of democratic governance nor
result in any tangible benefits to the country in terms of opening
the border with Turkey.
The negotiations with Turkey, already stalled due to unacceptable
pre-conditions advanced by Ankara, may now be completely disrupted.
The Armenian government may formally abandon its nominal policy of
complementarity between east and west and rely more heavily than ever
before on Russia and Iran.
Finally, it is unfortunate that the MCC decision comes on the eve
of Amb. Yovanovitch's first trip to Armenian communities in the
United States, later this month. During her visit, she is likely to
encounter public resentment that the U.S. government is practicing a
double-standard by lowering proposed foreign aid levels to Armenia
and increasing those of Azerbaijan which enjoys huge oil revenues
and is in no need of U.S. handouts. There is also a double-standard
vis-a-vis Georgia, as the latter remains the recipient of MCC aid
despite its lack of compliance with several MCC criteria.
Amb. Yovanovitch may also face criticism from large segments of the
Armenian-American community, given Pres. Obama's failure to keep
his campaign promise to recognize the Armenian Genocide. This is not
the Ambassador's fault. However, given the fact that she represents
the United States, she will automatically become the target of all
criticism directed at the Obama Administration.