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PRESS RELEASE
The Civilitas Foundation
www.civilitasfoundation.org
One Northern Avenue, suit 30
Yerevan, Armenia
tel: +37410500119
email: [email protected]
Vartan Oskanian, head of the board and founder of the Civilitas Foundation
was invited by the ANC of the Eastern Region and other American-Armenian
organizations to speak at Fordham University Law School on recent
developments in Armenia-Turkey relations.
*Vartan Oskanian: Armeno-Tukish Relations: Pitfalls and Possibilities.
June 18, 2009, New York*
I want to thank you for this invitation to speak here today, about a topic
that is at the center of Armenia's foreign policy, Armenia's international
relations, Armenia's relations with the Diaspora, and of course, also at
the
center of the Diaspora's own agenda. That is Armenia-Turkey relations.
In my book SPEAKING TO BE HEARD where I have a long introduction about the
foreign policy considerations that are reflected in my decade of speeches,
one of the points I make is that with any natural change of administration
anywhere, in any country, it is natural that there be both continuity and
change in a country's foreign policy.
In the case of Armenia's policy regarding Turkey, since independence, it
can
be said that the policies of each succeeding administration have indeed been
both the same, and different.
Armenia's interests dictate that we have normal relations with our
neighbors, all of them, including Turkey. And we have tried to achieve that
these 17 years. But it is also true that each administration has done so
differently, given the imperatives of the day and the philosophies of the
individuals in charge.
In Armenian society, too, over time there has been some evolution in
thinking about what we want from Armenia-Turkey relations, but again, by and
large, the thinking has been consistent - we are ready for normal relations,
despite deep and sometimes grave misgivings.
On the Turkish side, I think it's fair to say that there are four layers
of
thought, four types of groupings, that we have had to and that we continue
to have to reckon with.
The first, the most difficult to contend with, the deepest and most
pervasive level is the contingent that feeds and nurtures the xenophobia,
paranoia, racism and exclusion. That segment of society that has been raised
in a vacuum, with no historical information about their past or ours, that
level is at best ignorant of the causes and consequences of a lack of
relations between us, or, worse, wants them to stay that way because of a
cynical fear of a demonized Armenian neighbor. You and I still hear, too
often, the frightening statements by such extremist elements in Turkish
society, who, unfortunately, are not a minority, and whose actions are
dangerous, especially for Armenians, friends of Armenians, and other
minorities living in Turkey.
The second is the Kemalist elite - those who represent the deep state, the
military, the old guard who are more interested in protecting Turkey's honor
and image than in confronting history, acknowledging geography, accepting
responsibility and appreciating neighbors. The first two Turkish foreign
ministers I dealt with were part of this elite. Today, you and I continue to
hear ambassadors and other representatives of the Turkish Republic who have
made it their mission to distort, deny and dismiss Armenians and Armenia.
Fortunately, there is a third and more promising segment with whom I've also
dealt, and have come away from our meetings moved and hopeful. These are
those members of Turkish society from the press, academia, cultural and
other spheres who can best be described as personal and philosophical
friends and allies of Hrant Dink, those who acknowledge a responsibility for
our open wounds, and are ready to engage in a deep and meaningful dialogue.
This is the segment we need to work with, to reciprocate if need to be;
because if ever a change is to come in Turkish society, and create a
bottom-up pressure on their government for some kind of recognition in the
future, it will come from this group.
Finally, there is the fourth group - those in power in Turkey today - more
westward looking, more democratic, more pragmatic in foreign policy, more
cognizant of Turkey's potential role in the region. When this government
first was elected to office, they clearly articulated an intention to review
their policies towards all neighbors, including Armenia. They aimed for zero
problems with neighbors and a greater role in the swiftly changing
geopolitical dynamic. In my first meeting with then foreign minister Gul, he
clearly articulated a desire to distinguish Armenia-Turkey relations from
Azerbaijan. But Azerbaijani pressure prevailed and Turkey's policy did not
change.
At that time, Turkey's own interests were not what they are today. Accession
talks with the EU had not yet begun; Turkey wanted an oil pipeline from
Azerbaijan; the Armenian genocide resolution process around the world had
not gathered steam; Turkey's economy was not in crisis mode; and
Georgia-Russia tensions were not consequential.
In the end, Turkey did not find the political will to make a move that would
anger Azerbaijan. We continued to talk to Turkey's leaders, however, but
we
did so quietly, confidentially, in order not to allow Turkey to benefit from
the fact that it was talking. Turkey, as I've explained, did not have the
intention or ability to implement the results that they themselves had said
they needed.
But the world had changed greatly by 2008. And that, in part, can explain
the public daring of the new Armenian administration, who conducted
negotiations with Turkey in public, for all to see. My own brief optimism
that perhaps there really was something to this high-profile dialogue can
also be explained by how the new geopolitical deck of cards is being played.
The world is so different in fact that the necessity of opening the
Turkish-Armenian border is something about which both Russia and the US
agree. In fact, in the face of Russia-Georgia strains, Turkey can benefit
from a new role in the Caucasus. That is why it proposed the Platform for
Cooperation and Security in the Caucasus right after the Russia-Georgia war.
But Turkey let this opportunity go by. Just as it missed the chance in 1991,
with the collapse of the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations with
Armenia. Just as in 2004, with the beginning of EU accession talks. So, in
2009, too, although everyone -- Russia, Europe, the US, and Turkey and
Armenia wanted the border open, Turkey retreated, under pressure from
Azerbaijan, saying that only progress in the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process can move the situation forward.
We are willing to open a border with an intransigent neighbor and that is
a compromise. We have extended a hand to cooperate with a government that
finances the denial of the genocidal actions of its predecessors and that is
a compromise, a serious, grave, potentially consequential security
compromise.
But that is the extent of our compromise. We cannot allow that intransigent
neighbor who has not used its clout to foster confidence and cooperation in
the region, who has not been an honest broker in the Caucasus or in
international organizations as far as Armenia is concerned, we cannot, we
will not allow that neighbor to negotiate with third countries to push along
a resolution on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. That is a security compromise
we are not prepared to make. We want a negotiated lasting settlement for the
people of Nagorno Karabakh, and we will make the concessions necessary to
reach such a settlement, without conceding their security.
Such a settlement for any conflict at any time would depend on several
factors: the global and regional interests of the major powers and their
present interrelationships, the dominant trends in international relations
as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international organizations
(such as the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe),
the conflicting sides' own present political and economic situations.
For Armenia and Karabakh, all four of these quickly changing factors are
important. But the most pressing among the four parameters identified above
is the pressure resulting from the U.S. push for improved relations between
Turkey and Armenia. President Barack Obama stuck his neck out to try to
promote these relations. He believed this compensated for his not using the
term genocide on April 24. April 24 will come around again next year,
however, so the pressure has not disappeared. Relations still need to be
improved.
But the way in which Turkey has been exploiting the situation that's been
created as a result of Armenia's good will, means we are going to have to
work hard now to make certain that we indeed do not get blamed for this
process not having reached the result that everyone wants.
And the international community will proceed in one of two ways.
Either the international community will understand that Turkey took Armenia,
and the US, and Europe, for a ride and is responsible for what is now a more
distrustful atmosphere and for a border that remains closed.
Or -- and herein lies the danger and the challenge to all of us -- the
international community will increase pressure on Armenians in the Nagorno
Karabakh resolution process because Turkey and Azerbaijan say that only with
progress there can something positive be expected on the Armenia-Turkey
front. In fact, they have already been saying everything's ready, we're
ready so let's pressure them to return some territories so that we can
justify opening the border.
So we must put the pressure on in Washington and elsewhere to not allow
Turkey to manipulate the situation. Turkey having already benefitted will
now try to create a situation to satisfy Azerbaijan in order to be able to
open the border. The Armenia-Turkey process began with both sides promising
that there are no pre-conditions. Now there is a condition and it's related
to a third country, so we must insist that Azerbaijan's conditions not
become a pre-condition in Armenia-Turkey relations, and that the border be
opened based on whatever has been agreed bilaterally.
The Civilitas Foundation
www.civilitasfoundation.org
One Northern Avenue, suit 30
Yerevan, Armenia
tel: +37410500119
email: [email protected]
Vartan Oskanian, head of the board and founder of the Civilitas Foundation
was invited by the ANC of the Eastern Region and other American-Armenian
organizations to speak at Fordham University Law School on recent
developments in Armenia-Turkey relations.
*Vartan Oskanian: Armeno-Tukish Relations: Pitfalls and Possibilities.
June 18, 2009, New York*
I want to thank you for this invitation to speak here today, about a topic
that is at the center of Armenia's foreign policy, Armenia's international
relations, Armenia's relations with the Diaspora, and of course, also at
the
center of the Diaspora's own agenda. That is Armenia-Turkey relations.
In my book SPEAKING TO BE HEARD where I have a long introduction about the
foreign policy considerations that are reflected in my decade of speeches,
one of the points I make is that with any natural change of administration
anywhere, in any country, it is natural that there be both continuity and
change in a country's foreign policy.
In the case of Armenia's policy regarding Turkey, since independence, it
can
be said that the policies of each succeeding administration have indeed been
both the same, and different.
Armenia's interests dictate that we have normal relations with our
neighbors, all of them, including Turkey. And we have tried to achieve that
these 17 years. But it is also true that each administration has done so
differently, given the imperatives of the day and the philosophies of the
individuals in charge.
In Armenian society, too, over time there has been some evolution in
thinking about what we want from Armenia-Turkey relations, but again, by and
large, the thinking has been consistent - we are ready for normal relations,
despite deep and sometimes grave misgivings.
On the Turkish side, I think it's fair to say that there are four layers
of
thought, four types of groupings, that we have had to and that we continue
to have to reckon with.
The first, the most difficult to contend with, the deepest and most
pervasive level is the contingent that feeds and nurtures the xenophobia,
paranoia, racism and exclusion. That segment of society that has been raised
in a vacuum, with no historical information about their past or ours, that
level is at best ignorant of the causes and consequences of a lack of
relations between us, or, worse, wants them to stay that way because of a
cynical fear of a demonized Armenian neighbor. You and I still hear, too
often, the frightening statements by such extremist elements in Turkish
society, who, unfortunately, are not a minority, and whose actions are
dangerous, especially for Armenians, friends of Armenians, and other
minorities living in Turkey.
The second is the Kemalist elite - those who represent the deep state, the
military, the old guard who are more interested in protecting Turkey's honor
and image than in confronting history, acknowledging geography, accepting
responsibility and appreciating neighbors. The first two Turkish foreign
ministers I dealt with were part of this elite. Today, you and I continue to
hear ambassadors and other representatives of the Turkish Republic who have
made it their mission to distort, deny and dismiss Armenians and Armenia.
Fortunately, there is a third and more promising segment with whom I've also
dealt, and have come away from our meetings moved and hopeful. These are
those members of Turkish society from the press, academia, cultural and
other spheres who can best be described as personal and philosophical
friends and allies of Hrant Dink, those who acknowledge a responsibility for
our open wounds, and are ready to engage in a deep and meaningful dialogue.
This is the segment we need to work with, to reciprocate if need to be;
because if ever a change is to come in Turkish society, and create a
bottom-up pressure on their government for some kind of recognition in the
future, it will come from this group.
Finally, there is the fourth group - those in power in Turkey today - more
westward looking, more democratic, more pragmatic in foreign policy, more
cognizant of Turkey's potential role in the region. When this government
first was elected to office, they clearly articulated an intention to review
their policies towards all neighbors, including Armenia. They aimed for zero
problems with neighbors and a greater role in the swiftly changing
geopolitical dynamic. In my first meeting with then foreign minister Gul, he
clearly articulated a desire to distinguish Armenia-Turkey relations from
Azerbaijan. But Azerbaijani pressure prevailed and Turkey's policy did not
change.
At that time, Turkey's own interests were not what they are today. Accession
talks with the EU had not yet begun; Turkey wanted an oil pipeline from
Azerbaijan; the Armenian genocide resolution process around the world had
not gathered steam; Turkey's economy was not in crisis mode; and
Georgia-Russia tensions were not consequential.
In the end, Turkey did not find the political will to make a move that would
anger Azerbaijan. We continued to talk to Turkey's leaders, however, but
we
did so quietly, confidentially, in order not to allow Turkey to benefit from
the fact that it was talking. Turkey, as I've explained, did not have the
intention or ability to implement the results that they themselves had said
they needed.
But the world had changed greatly by 2008. And that, in part, can explain
the public daring of the new Armenian administration, who conducted
negotiations with Turkey in public, for all to see. My own brief optimism
that perhaps there really was something to this high-profile dialogue can
also be explained by how the new geopolitical deck of cards is being played.
The world is so different in fact that the necessity of opening the
Turkish-Armenian border is something about which both Russia and the US
agree. In fact, in the face of Russia-Georgia strains, Turkey can benefit
from a new role in the Caucasus. That is why it proposed the Platform for
Cooperation and Security in the Caucasus right after the Russia-Georgia war.
But Turkey let this opportunity go by. Just as it missed the chance in 1991,
with the collapse of the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations with
Armenia. Just as in 2004, with the beginning of EU accession talks. So, in
2009, too, although everyone -- Russia, Europe, the US, and Turkey and
Armenia wanted the border open, Turkey retreated, under pressure from
Azerbaijan, saying that only progress in the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process can move the situation forward.
We are willing to open a border with an intransigent neighbor and that is
a compromise. We have extended a hand to cooperate with a government that
finances the denial of the genocidal actions of its predecessors and that is
a compromise, a serious, grave, potentially consequential security
compromise.
But that is the extent of our compromise. We cannot allow that intransigent
neighbor who has not used its clout to foster confidence and cooperation in
the region, who has not been an honest broker in the Caucasus or in
international organizations as far as Armenia is concerned, we cannot, we
will not allow that neighbor to negotiate with third countries to push along
a resolution on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. That is a security compromise
we are not prepared to make. We want a negotiated lasting settlement for the
people of Nagorno Karabakh, and we will make the concessions necessary to
reach such a settlement, without conceding their security.
Such a settlement for any conflict at any time would depend on several
factors: the global and regional interests of the major powers and their
present interrelationships, the dominant trends in international relations
as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international organizations
(such as the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe),
the conflicting sides' own present political and economic situations.
For Armenia and Karabakh, all four of these quickly changing factors are
important. But the most pressing among the four parameters identified above
is the pressure resulting from the U.S. push for improved relations between
Turkey and Armenia. President Barack Obama stuck his neck out to try to
promote these relations. He believed this compensated for his not using the
term genocide on April 24. April 24 will come around again next year,
however, so the pressure has not disappeared. Relations still need to be
improved.
But the way in which Turkey has been exploiting the situation that's been
created as a result of Armenia's good will, means we are going to have to
work hard now to make certain that we indeed do not get blamed for this
process not having reached the result that everyone wants.
And the international community will proceed in one of two ways.
Either the international community will understand that Turkey took Armenia,
and the US, and Europe, for a ride and is responsible for what is now a more
distrustful atmosphere and for a border that remains closed.
Or -- and herein lies the danger and the challenge to all of us -- the
international community will increase pressure on Armenians in the Nagorno
Karabakh resolution process because Turkey and Azerbaijan say that only with
progress there can something positive be expected on the Armenia-Turkey
front. In fact, they have already been saying everything's ready, we're
ready so let's pressure them to return some territories so that we can
justify opening the border.
So we must put the pressure on in Washington and elsewhere to not allow
Turkey to manipulate the situation. Turkey having already benefitted will
now try to create a situation to satisfy Azerbaijan in order to be able to
open the border. The Armenia-Turkey process began with both sides promising
that there are no pre-conditions. Now there is a condition and it's related
to a third country, so we must insist that Azerbaijan's conditions not
become a pre-condition in Armenia-Turkey relations, and that the border be
opened based on whatever has been agreed bilaterally.