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The Civilitas Foundation
www.civilitasfoundation.org
One Northern Avenue, suit 30
Yerevan, Armenia
tel: +37410500119
email: [email protected]
Vartan Oskanian, president of the board and founder of the Civilitas
Foundation, and Armenia's Foreign Minister from 1998-2008, was invited to
speak about his decade in office, and SPEAKING TO BE HEARD, A DECADE OF
SPEECHES, just published by the Civilitas Foundation. The event, sponsored
by the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, the North
American distributor, took place at Bentley University. Bentley Professor
Asbed Kotchikian made the introductory comments. Marc Mamigonian, NAASR
Academic Director presented Mr. Oskanian. Salpi Ghazarian, the book's editor
and Director of the Civilitas Foundation spoke about the process of
preparing the book and the impact of the speeches on international and
Diaspora audiences.
OSKANIAN AT BENTLEY UNIVERSITY, SPEAKING TO BE HEARD, JUNE 17, 2009
I didn't think when I was living and studying here, nearly 20 years ago,
that I would be here one day, talking about my book. I remember stopping at
the old NAASR building looking at everyone else's books. I'm pleased that
NAASR has agreed to distribute this book.
I also used to come to Bentley to hear lectures but I didn't know that I'd
be giving one myself on these very interesting 10 years.
This year out of office, I've had time to reflect on this last decade of
my
life. During those years in the ministry, I was always aware that we are
living history. You can't let that thought drive your actions, but every
now
and then, especially on a Sunday, sitting alone in my office, I felt the
responsibility of history.
This book is a small way of paying back. I believe government officials,
especially of our small, new country, owe it to our people to go on the
record with what we've done and why. This book, although just a collection
of speeches, is really a mirror of the evolution of our foreign policy of
the last decade.
SPEAKING TO BE HEARD, the title of the book in English, expresses the
underlying purpose of each and every one of these nearly 100 speeches -
making Armenia's voice heard on the world stage, and bringing Armenia's
situation in the world to Armenian audiences.
ANAVART TASNAMEAK, the incomplete decade, is the Armenian title and that too
expresses the deep conviction that we still have lots to do - all of us, in
government and out of government - history is still being written.
In the introduction to the book, I explain that just as every new
administration in any country, when we came into office, we too were faced
with decisions about different foreign policy directions. In some areas, we
continued on the same path, in others we forged a new path.
Now, as I look back at those major policy areas, I see how today's new
administration, too, is making choices about areas of continuity and areas
of change. Naturally, some of those decisions I agree with, and others I
don't agree with. Nevertheless, what is obviously true is that given our
geography, our neighborhood and the geopolitical developments around us, our
room to maneuver is limited. In that light, even small nuanced changes can
and do impact our situation.
When I was appointed, in 1998, I believed that our foreign policy efforts
had to be aimed in five major directions: complementarity, of course
relations with Turkey and the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,
multilateralism and European integration. These five areas pretty much cover
the length and breadth of Armenia's foreign relations, philosophies, choices
and limitations.
The first one -- complementarity -- was born because we were obliged to
rethink the older, and simpler, policy of balance that had guided decisions
in the early days of the Republic.
It had always been apparent that the new Republic of Armenia would and
should have good relations with all three major power centers - the European
Union, Russia and the United States. The thinking was that we had to be bold
and open with friends and foes. We stated that we are not obliged to choose
among friends, that Armenia can be the place where the overlapping interests
of the European Union, Russia and the United States or any two seemingly
adversarial, competing countries, can prosper and where their divergent
interests will never be exploited or manipulated in pursuit of our own
national interests. We rejected a return to a Cold War mentality, insisting
that it is not in anyone's interests, including those of the big powers,
to
return to that era. Armenia adhered firmly to this approach for the sake of
our own future, and to reduce global tensions. We preferred to be the
country that found ways to conflate the others' conflicting interests,
rather than exacerbate and exploit them, for short-term, local gain.
To apply complementarity effectively, we had to take it upon ourselves to be
considerate of all those friendly to Armenia. This is a pre-emptive way of
choosing voluntary cooperation where desirable in order to avoid compulsory
collaboration where objectionable.
Without this policy, it would have not been possible to dare remain in a
strategic partnership with Russia, to be a member of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, a Russian-led security arrangement, and at the same
time bring our relationship with NATO to a level short of membership. Of the
former Soviet republics, we are the only country with such multilayered
alliances.
As I look back, it's clear that what we did and what is being done today
are
significantly different. For complementarity to succeed, it must be publicly
invoked, in order to prevent the public and private pressures to choose.
Especially in light of the unprecedented military confrontation that erupted
in the Caucasus last summer between Georgia and Russia, and the tensions
that persist between the two, our only line of protection is to publicly and
repeatedly pronounce our unwillingness to take sides. In other words, the
issue of complementarity came to our door. If before, we had applied the
concept to two distant allies -- Russia and the US, now we had to apply it
to Russia and Georgia, both strategic allies, with whom we must maintain
good relations.
The second policy area is Turkey-Armenia relations. This is one area where
we had both continuity and change. We continued the first administration's
sound policy of normalizing relations with Turkey, without preconditions,
establishing diplomatic ties and having the border opened. But we added a
new element - the recognition of the genocide as a foreign policy goal,
while at the same time, clearly explaining that the recognition by Turkey
was not a precondition. So with a new addition, the policy of unconditional
normalization remained the same.
We engaged Turkey in extensive negotiations to normalize relations. But
because of Turkey's close affiliation with Azerbaijan, we always suspected
that Turkey was more interested in showing that there is some process with
Armenia, rather than an outcome. We understood that they cannot deliver a
border opening because of Azerbaijani pressure. After all, let's not forget
that Turkey closed the border in 1993 because Azerbaijan lost territories
surrounding Nagorno Karabakh to Armenian control. At the same time, Turkey
needed some process to show to the world that there is discussion with
Armenia so they could say don't interfere in genocide issues, so they could
try to stem the tide of genocide recognition and so they could say, let's
move on with European integration.
So, although we were talking, we did so with the understanding that that
process would remain confidential so that Turkey would not be able to
exploit the situation and benefit from a process.
The new Armenian administration, although continuing the same policy, took
a
different approach to the negotiation process. By inviting President Gul,
they took the process public, and continued to talk. That process reached
fruition when on April 22, the foreign ministries of Turkey and Armenia put
out a joint statement that they've agreed on a roadmap to normalize
relations.
This automatically introduced a new element in the Nagorno Karabakh process,
because soon after that announcement, Turkish leaders repeatedly said that
they can't move on the Armenian-Turkish process until something is done to
satisfy Azerbaijan's concerns. So, although everybody stuck their necks out
to work to open the border, Turkey made clear that until Azerbaijan is
satisfied on the Nagorno Karabakh issue, they can't move to open the border.
So now the pressure is on the Armenian side to appease Azerbaijan so they
will ease their pressure on Turkey and Turkey in turn will be able to open
the border. This means that in the coming weeks and months, there will be
huge pressure on the Armenian side to move on this issue.
Pressures are not new in diplomacy. Armenia has been through this before.
Such pressures will always come. The trick is to resist them without
alienating international partners.
In 2002, Turkey wanted to take on the chairmanship of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. This organization of 54 countries has a
different country as chairman each year. This is also the organization which
oversees the mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. It was clear that
a
Turkish chairmanship would create all sorts of unforeseen problems for us.
Fortunately the OSCE operates on the consensus rule. That means all
decisions must be passed unanimously. The no vote of any one country in
effect becomes a veto.
So for nearly two years, at each opportunity any one of these 54 countries
would approach us to try to convince us that such a chairmanship would not
constitute a problem for Armenia and that Armenia ought to comply with the
trend. In the end, we triumphed.
We triumphed because the consensus rule worked. And ironically, about a
decade earlier, when the OSCE was considering changing the consensus rule,
the decision was blocked by one vote - ours.
The next policy area that we pursued is multilateralism. It was my
conviction from day 1, and after 10 years that belief has been reinforced,
that in order for Armenia, a small country with limited resources to be
heard, we had and have to be engaged in global issues, we have to be
considerate of the issues of other countries, and also of regional and
global problems. Talking about issues ranging from non-proliferation to arms
control to climate change, as well as conflicts elsewhere, means that when
it comes to our turn to talk about our issues, the rest of the world is more
attentive to our cause and concerns.
And finally, European integration. This is an indispensable tool for
bringing change within the country, in Armenia. Our relationship with three
European institutions - the Council of Europe, the European Union and NATO -
evolved over the years. Each provided clear instruments for cooperation and
a blueprint for reforms and development. The principles they advocate are
the ones that have been tested for centuries. It remains for Armenia to
adopt and implement them. I have repeatedly said to the Council of Europe
leadership and to our own people, Armenians have been beneficiaries of the
process of accession to European structures. Unfortunately with every
passing election, we realize that our reforms have not gone far or deep
enough. The latest evidence is the last presidential election and the city
council election of the last two weeks.
There are many reasons for this. In the countries of the former Soviet
Union, it was becoming clear that we are not developing deeply and broadly
enough economically to grow the middle class necessary for democratic
institutions and processes. There are three fundamental premises that we
must rethink if we are to come out of this cycle of expectations and
disappointments.
First and foremost, we have embarked on new, liberal, free-market
development but have misunderstood `development.' Development is a political
process, not an economic one. It requires political changes in society and
an organized process of engaging both elites and public, without threatening
one or discouraging the other. Development doesn't mean spending money on
infrastructure; it means infrastructures that are designed and maintained by
a responsive state apparatus with functioning governance systems. Developing
into a modern society requires the provision of fair, transparent public
services and institutions which operate on the basis of a system of checks
and balances. Only political will and a change in political thinking can
bring that about. Our countries must develop politically in order to develop
economically.
Second, pretense at democratization is dangerous and counterproductive. It
distorts the relationship between government and the governed, raising
expectations that can't be met, obstructing progress that could be taking
place elsewhere in society. There are many prosperous countries in the world
which are not democratic, and don't pretend to be. Singapore is one example
of a thriving country where democratic rights are largely suspended. If our
government and our people really want democratization, which I believe is
the unquestionable choice, then we must actively, genuinely, patiently,
consistently work to build the institutions that will make that happen. It
will not come with petulant street protests.
And third, the Soviet-era definition of power continues to distort the
modern concept of legitimate authority. World leaders like Mahatma Gandhi
and Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King had no power but operated from a
position of authority. They accomplished things that changed the world.
Except for a brief period immediately after independence, our society has
questioned the legitimacy of its government, and governments have not
enjoyed the support of the governed. Hard power will not compensate for this
suspicion and assure our leaders the authority they require to bring about
significant, lasting political or economic change.
As these speeches indicate, each time I addressed foreign policy issues, I
concluded with domestic issues. For any country, especially a developing one
like ours, internal developments are of primary importance. The
international community looks to our domestic successes as they gauge the
legitimacy of our international needs and challenges. So does the Diaspora.
You, too, follow events in Armenia and hope to see the improvements that
reflect your dreams.
So do I. I left office because although I believed that I had been an
effective advocate of Armenia's interests abroad, I knew I could no longer
do so unless we ourselves advocated for advancement and change at home.
I am doing that now through the Civilitas Foundation. Working with local
and international organizations, with the media, with young people and
activists to understand and explain where we want to go and how to get
there. For that to succeed, Armenia will continue to require your active
engagement. My message to the Diaspora is always the same - don't take
what
we've accomplished for granted, but at the same time, don't be satisfied
with what we have.
The Civilitas Foundation
www.civilitasfoundation.org
One Northern Avenue, suit 30
Yerevan, Armenia
tel: +37410500119
email: [email protected]
Vartan Oskanian, president of the board and founder of the Civilitas
Foundation, and Armenia's Foreign Minister from 1998-2008, was invited to
speak about his decade in office, and SPEAKING TO BE HEARD, A DECADE OF
SPEECHES, just published by the Civilitas Foundation. The event, sponsored
by the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, the North
American distributor, took place at Bentley University. Bentley Professor
Asbed Kotchikian made the introductory comments. Marc Mamigonian, NAASR
Academic Director presented Mr. Oskanian. Salpi Ghazarian, the book's editor
and Director of the Civilitas Foundation spoke about the process of
preparing the book and the impact of the speeches on international and
Diaspora audiences.
OSKANIAN AT BENTLEY UNIVERSITY, SPEAKING TO BE HEARD, JUNE 17, 2009
I didn't think when I was living and studying here, nearly 20 years ago,
that I would be here one day, talking about my book. I remember stopping at
the old NAASR building looking at everyone else's books. I'm pleased that
NAASR has agreed to distribute this book.
I also used to come to Bentley to hear lectures but I didn't know that I'd
be giving one myself on these very interesting 10 years.
This year out of office, I've had time to reflect on this last decade of
my
life. During those years in the ministry, I was always aware that we are
living history. You can't let that thought drive your actions, but every
now
and then, especially on a Sunday, sitting alone in my office, I felt the
responsibility of history.
This book is a small way of paying back. I believe government officials,
especially of our small, new country, owe it to our people to go on the
record with what we've done and why. This book, although just a collection
of speeches, is really a mirror of the evolution of our foreign policy of
the last decade.
SPEAKING TO BE HEARD, the title of the book in English, expresses the
underlying purpose of each and every one of these nearly 100 speeches -
making Armenia's voice heard on the world stage, and bringing Armenia's
situation in the world to Armenian audiences.
ANAVART TASNAMEAK, the incomplete decade, is the Armenian title and that too
expresses the deep conviction that we still have lots to do - all of us, in
government and out of government - history is still being written.
In the introduction to the book, I explain that just as every new
administration in any country, when we came into office, we too were faced
with decisions about different foreign policy directions. In some areas, we
continued on the same path, in others we forged a new path.
Now, as I look back at those major policy areas, I see how today's new
administration, too, is making choices about areas of continuity and areas
of change. Naturally, some of those decisions I agree with, and others I
don't agree with. Nevertheless, what is obviously true is that given our
geography, our neighborhood and the geopolitical developments around us, our
room to maneuver is limited. In that light, even small nuanced changes can
and do impact our situation.
When I was appointed, in 1998, I believed that our foreign policy efforts
had to be aimed in five major directions: complementarity, of course
relations with Turkey and the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,
multilateralism and European integration. These five areas pretty much cover
the length and breadth of Armenia's foreign relations, philosophies, choices
and limitations.
The first one -- complementarity -- was born because we were obliged to
rethink the older, and simpler, policy of balance that had guided decisions
in the early days of the Republic.
It had always been apparent that the new Republic of Armenia would and
should have good relations with all three major power centers - the European
Union, Russia and the United States. The thinking was that we had to be bold
and open with friends and foes. We stated that we are not obliged to choose
among friends, that Armenia can be the place where the overlapping interests
of the European Union, Russia and the United States or any two seemingly
adversarial, competing countries, can prosper and where their divergent
interests will never be exploited or manipulated in pursuit of our own
national interests. We rejected a return to a Cold War mentality, insisting
that it is not in anyone's interests, including those of the big powers,
to
return to that era. Armenia adhered firmly to this approach for the sake of
our own future, and to reduce global tensions. We preferred to be the
country that found ways to conflate the others' conflicting interests,
rather than exacerbate and exploit them, for short-term, local gain.
To apply complementarity effectively, we had to take it upon ourselves to be
considerate of all those friendly to Armenia. This is a pre-emptive way of
choosing voluntary cooperation where desirable in order to avoid compulsory
collaboration where objectionable.
Without this policy, it would have not been possible to dare remain in a
strategic partnership with Russia, to be a member of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, a Russian-led security arrangement, and at the same
time bring our relationship with NATO to a level short of membership. Of the
former Soviet republics, we are the only country with such multilayered
alliances.
As I look back, it's clear that what we did and what is being done today
are
significantly different. For complementarity to succeed, it must be publicly
invoked, in order to prevent the public and private pressures to choose.
Especially in light of the unprecedented military confrontation that erupted
in the Caucasus last summer between Georgia and Russia, and the tensions
that persist between the two, our only line of protection is to publicly and
repeatedly pronounce our unwillingness to take sides. In other words, the
issue of complementarity came to our door. If before, we had applied the
concept to two distant allies -- Russia and the US, now we had to apply it
to Russia and Georgia, both strategic allies, with whom we must maintain
good relations.
The second policy area is Turkey-Armenia relations. This is one area where
we had both continuity and change. We continued the first administration's
sound policy of normalizing relations with Turkey, without preconditions,
establishing diplomatic ties and having the border opened. But we added a
new element - the recognition of the genocide as a foreign policy goal,
while at the same time, clearly explaining that the recognition by Turkey
was not a precondition. So with a new addition, the policy of unconditional
normalization remained the same.
We engaged Turkey in extensive negotiations to normalize relations. But
because of Turkey's close affiliation with Azerbaijan, we always suspected
that Turkey was more interested in showing that there is some process with
Armenia, rather than an outcome. We understood that they cannot deliver a
border opening because of Azerbaijani pressure. After all, let's not forget
that Turkey closed the border in 1993 because Azerbaijan lost territories
surrounding Nagorno Karabakh to Armenian control. At the same time, Turkey
needed some process to show to the world that there is discussion with
Armenia so they could say don't interfere in genocide issues, so they could
try to stem the tide of genocide recognition and so they could say, let's
move on with European integration.
So, although we were talking, we did so with the understanding that that
process would remain confidential so that Turkey would not be able to
exploit the situation and benefit from a process.
The new Armenian administration, although continuing the same policy, took
a
different approach to the negotiation process. By inviting President Gul,
they took the process public, and continued to talk. That process reached
fruition when on April 22, the foreign ministries of Turkey and Armenia put
out a joint statement that they've agreed on a roadmap to normalize
relations.
This automatically introduced a new element in the Nagorno Karabakh process,
because soon after that announcement, Turkish leaders repeatedly said that
they can't move on the Armenian-Turkish process until something is done to
satisfy Azerbaijan's concerns. So, although everybody stuck their necks out
to work to open the border, Turkey made clear that until Azerbaijan is
satisfied on the Nagorno Karabakh issue, they can't move to open the border.
So now the pressure is on the Armenian side to appease Azerbaijan so they
will ease their pressure on Turkey and Turkey in turn will be able to open
the border. This means that in the coming weeks and months, there will be
huge pressure on the Armenian side to move on this issue.
Pressures are not new in diplomacy. Armenia has been through this before.
Such pressures will always come. The trick is to resist them without
alienating international partners.
In 2002, Turkey wanted to take on the chairmanship of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. This organization of 54 countries has a
different country as chairman each year. This is also the organization which
oversees the mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. It was clear that
a
Turkish chairmanship would create all sorts of unforeseen problems for us.
Fortunately the OSCE operates on the consensus rule. That means all
decisions must be passed unanimously. The no vote of any one country in
effect becomes a veto.
So for nearly two years, at each opportunity any one of these 54 countries
would approach us to try to convince us that such a chairmanship would not
constitute a problem for Armenia and that Armenia ought to comply with the
trend. In the end, we triumphed.
We triumphed because the consensus rule worked. And ironically, about a
decade earlier, when the OSCE was considering changing the consensus rule,
the decision was blocked by one vote - ours.
The next policy area that we pursued is multilateralism. It was my
conviction from day 1, and after 10 years that belief has been reinforced,
that in order for Armenia, a small country with limited resources to be
heard, we had and have to be engaged in global issues, we have to be
considerate of the issues of other countries, and also of regional and
global problems. Talking about issues ranging from non-proliferation to arms
control to climate change, as well as conflicts elsewhere, means that when
it comes to our turn to talk about our issues, the rest of the world is more
attentive to our cause and concerns.
And finally, European integration. This is an indispensable tool for
bringing change within the country, in Armenia. Our relationship with three
European institutions - the Council of Europe, the European Union and NATO -
evolved over the years. Each provided clear instruments for cooperation and
a blueprint for reforms and development. The principles they advocate are
the ones that have been tested for centuries. It remains for Armenia to
adopt and implement them. I have repeatedly said to the Council of Europe
leadership and to our own people, Armenians have been beneficiaries of the
process of accession to European structures. Unfortunately with every
passing election, we realize that our reforms have not gone far or deep
enough. The latest evidence is the last presidential election and the city
council election of the last two weeks.
There are many reasons for this. In the countries of the former Soviet
Union, it was becoming clear that we are not developing deeply and broadly
enough economically to grow the middle class necessary for democratic
institutions and processes. There are three fundamental premises that we
must rethink if we are to come out of this cycle of expectations and
disappointments.
First and foremost, we have embarked on new, liberal, free-market
development but have misunderstood `development.' Development is a political
process, not an economic one. It requires political changes in society and
an organized process of engaging both elites and public, without threatening
one or discouraging the other. Development doesn't mean spending money on
infrastructure; it means infrastructures that are designed and maintained by
a responsive state apparatus with functioning governance systems. Developing
into a modern society requires the provision of fair, transparent public
services and institutions which operate on the basis of a system of checks
and balances. Only political will and a change in political thinking can
bring that about. Our countries must develop politically in order to develop
economically.
Second, pretense at democratization is dangerous and counterproductive. It
distorts the relationship between government and the governed, raising
expectations that can't be met, obstructing progress that could be taking
place elsewhere in society. There are many prosperous countries in the world
which are not democratic, and don't pretend to be. Singapore is one example
of a thriving country where democratic rights are largely suspended. If our
government and our people really want democratization, which I believe is
the unquestionable choice, then we must actively, genuinely, patiently,
consistently work to build the institutions that will make that happen. It
will not come with petulant street protests.
And third, the Soviet-era definition of power continues to distort the
modern concept of legitimate authority. World leaders like Mahatma Gandhi
and Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King had no power but operated from a
position of authority. They accomplished things that changed the world.
Except for a brief period immediately after independence, our society has
questioned the legitimacy of its government, and governments have not
enjoyed the support of the governed. Hard power will not compensate for this
suspicion and assure our leaders the authority they require to bring about
significant, lasting political or economic change.
As these speeches indicate, each time I addressed foreign policy issues, I
concluded with domestic issues. For any country, especially a developing one
like ours, internal developments are of primary importance. The
international community looks to our domestic successes as they gauge the
legitimacy of our international needs and challenges. So does the Diaspora.
You, too, follow events in Armenia and hope to see the improvements that
reflect your dreams.
So do I. I left office because although I believed that I had been an
effective advocate of Armenia's interests abroad, I knew I could no longer
do so unless we ourselves advocated for advancement and change at home.
I am doing that now through the Civilitas Foundation. Working with local
and international organizations, with the media, with young people and
activists to understand and explain where we want to go and how to get
there. For that to succeed, Armenia will continue to require your active
engagement. My message to the Diaspora is always the same - don't take
what
we've accomplished for granted, but at the same time, don't be satisfied
with what we have.