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WEATHERING THE STORM: THE LESSONS FROM THE UNREST IN IRAN
By Richard Giragosian, Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS)
ArmeniaNow
19 June 2009
US intervention in the internal affairs of many a country in the
Middle East and elsewhere is common knowledge. The spectre of Coloured
Revolutions is in the minds of many analysts. It is beyond the means
of Keghart.com to conduct an independent study or investigations to
analyze the recent events in Iran.
Hence an item from GlobalResearch.ca is presented to the readers
towards the end of Giragossian's article to form their own opinions.
The recent post-election protests had many similarities with preceding
events of "coloured revolutions". Even if they were home-grown and
at grass-root level, one cannot avoid thinking that they had the
potential of "destabilizing" Iran, a distinct goal of Western and
Israeli plans. This represents another example of how local and global
interests are interwoven.
Keghart.com
For much of this past week, Armenia's southern neighbor Iran has been
gripped by a powerful, and at times, even violent post-election crisis.
While the past several days have seen the largest anti-government
demonstrations since the 1979 Iranian revolution, with hundreds of
thousands of Iranian citizens protesting a disputed presidential
election, the scale and scope of these protests have also revealed
a set of even deeper and more serious economic disco ntent.
The post-election unrest poses the most serious challenge to the
Iranian authorities since they came to power in the wake of the Iranian
revolution twenty years ago. In addition, the current wave of unrest
is largely directed against the ruling elite, although it is not,
at least yet, targeting the system itself.
Of course, the current unrest in Iran was triggered by political
developments - namely, by the 12 June presidential election,
in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the
official winner over his leading rival, former Iranian Prime Minister
Hussein Mousavi. But the deeper cause of the unrest is much more
than a political dispute, but stems from the broader context of the
"economics of change" within Iran.
The "economics of change"
Within this context there is also a class-based confrontation, with
much of the younger and more recently empowered Iranian middle class
aspiring for real change, while the older, much more conservative
ruling "clerical elite" merely seek to sustain the status quo. This
division, between those hungry for change and those simply struggling
to hold on to power, also reflects an economic competition.
For the Iranian middle class, the imperative is for Iran to forge
a new economic future, moving beyond international isolation and
state-imposed sanctions. Their demands are based on more than just
hopes for a better eco nomic future, however, but also reflect
more practical demands over corruption, social restrictions, rising
inflation, declining wages and an overall lack of jobs. Such economic
demands, naturally shared by university students throughout Iran,
have only swelled the ranks of the middle class demonstrators. And
it is a formidable force, empowered by years of unmet promises and
frustrated expectations, and also more politically assertive, better
educated and more socially sophisticated than its rivals.
Notably, the demographics of the protests reveal an interesting
generational aspect--whereby the majority of opposition demonstrators
have no real memory of Iran before the 1979 revolution. This
youth factor not only infers a much bolder, more courageous and
even idealistic element to the anti-establishment protestors, but
also implies a more difficult challenge to resolve the demands and
expectations of a new generation of Iranians who have matured only
within the confines of years of isolation and economic disengagement
defined by the Islamic Republic of Iran's world view.
On the opposing side, in open support for President Ahmadinejad, the
ruling "clerical elite" is backed by a combination of more pious or
religious-minded Iranians and the rural population. For these people,
representing the most conservative elements of Iranian society, their
future is rooted more in the past than the present, and is certainly
not seeking any degree of change. This ruling elite, and the small
wealthy upper class that supports it, is a product of a system that
has become defined by the accumulation of wealth and power in the
years after the revolution. Thus, for this group, by its very nature,
any change or deviation from the status quo is seen as a threat to
the system, to the state and, most importantly, a threat to their
own personal power and wealth. And it is this underlying economic
division, which has only driven and exacerbated the political unrest
and mounting instability that offers several important "lessons,"
and even warnings, for Armenia.
Lessons for Armenia
First, Iranians are now waging a struggle for the very future of Iran,
set off by a disputed presidential election. In this way, Iran is
now facing its own March 1st post-election crisis, similar to the
events in Armenia last year. Both crises led to the tragic deaths of
civilian demonstrators. Both episodes featured the use, and misuse,
of force, with police and security forces applying an excessive and
repressive response to the demonstrations.
In Armenia's case, the March 2008 crisis remains unresolved to date,
as the authorities have been unable or unwilling to fully and fairly
investigate the events of March 2008. Further, the Armenian case
is also plagued by a failure to adequately resolve the underlying
tension and demands of that crisis.
The second20lesson for Armenia from the current crisis in Iran
is the fact that the election revealed that very serious domestic
contradictions quickly developed into a highly volatile and explosive
internal situation that no ideology, no mater how powerful, could
contain. For the Armenian authorities, this lesson also includes a
warning: that there can be no political panacea or substitute for
not addressing concrete socio-economic problems. And with Iran, it
is also clear that the recent crisis has shown that no country in
this modern world can remain truly isolated.
But it is the third lesson from Iran, the "economics of change"
as a driving force behind this tension that is even more worrisome
for Armenia.
In both cases, young Iranians and Armenians share the same hopes,
for a brighter future, for economic opportunities, and for a voice
in how their country is governed.
For both countries, there is no return to the pre-crisis status
quo. The political and economic demands for change remain unmet. But
to continue to ignore these basic demands and natural expectations,
creates a real risk of only prolonging the crisis, and most
dangerously, merely fuels the fire of discontent.
Are the Iranian Protests Another US Orchestrated "Color Revolution?"
Is This the Culmination of Two Years of Destabilization? Global
Research.ca
By Paul Craig Roberts
A number of commentators have expressed their idealistic belief20in the
purity of Mousavi, Montazeri, and the westernized youth of Terhan. The
CIA destabilization plan, announced two years ago (see below) has
somehow not contaminated unfolding events.
The claim is made that Ahmadinejad stole the election, because the
outcome was declared too soon after the polls closed for all the votes
to have been counted. However, Mousavi declared his victory several
hours before the polls closed. This is classic CIA destabilization
designed to discredit a contrary outcome. It forces an early
declaration of the vote. The longer the time interval between the
preemptive declaration of victory and the release of the vote tally,
the longer Mousavi has to create the impression that the authorities
are using the time to fix the vote. It is amazing that people don't
see through this trick.
As for the grand ayatollah Montazeri's charge that the election was
stolen, he was the initial choice to succeed Khomeini, but lost out
to the current Supreme Leader. He sees in the protests an opportunity
to settle the score with Khamenei. Montazeri has the incentive to
challenge the election whether or not he is being manipulated by
the CIA, which has a successful history of manipulating disgruntled
politicians.
There is a power struggle among the ayatollahs. Many are aligned
against Ahmadinejad because he accuses them of corruption, thus playing
to the Iranian countryside where Iranians believe th e ayatollahs'
lifestyles indicate an excess of power and money. In my opinion,
Ahmadinejad's attack on the ayatollahs is opportunistic. However,
it does make it odd for his American detractors to say he is a
conservative reactionary lined up with the ayatollahs.
Commentators are "explaining" the Iran elections based on their own
illusions, delusions, emotions, and vested interests. Whether or not
the poll results predicting Ahmadinejad's win are sound, there is, so
far, no evidence beyond surmise that the election was stolen. However,
there are credible reports that the CIA has been working for two
years to destabilize the Iranian government.
On May 23, 2007, Brian Ross and Richard Esposito reported on ABC News:
"The CIA has received secret presidential approval to mount a covert
"black" operation to destabilize the Iranian government, current and
former officials in the intelligence community tell ABC News."
On May 27, 2007, the London Telegraph independently reported:
"Mr. Bush has signed an official document endorsing CIA plans for
a propaganda and disinformation campaign intended to destabilize,
and eventually topple, the theocratic rule of the mullahs."
A few days previously, the Telegraph reported on May 16, 2007, that
Bush administration neocon warmonger John Bolton told the Telegraph
that a US military attack on Iran would "be a 'last option' after
economic sanctions a nd attempts to foment a popular revolution
had failed."
On June 29, 2008, Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker: "Late last
year, Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major
escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current
and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These
operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million
dollars, were described in a Presidential Finding signed by Bush,
and are designed to destabilize the country's religious leadership."
The protests in Tehran no doubt have many sincere participants. The
protests also have the hallmarks of the CIA orchestrated protests in
Georgia and Ukraine. It requires total blindness not to see this.
Daniel McAdams has made some telling points. For example,
neoconservative Kenneth Timmerman wrote the day before the election
that "there's talk of a 'green revolution' in Tehran." How would
Timmerman know that unless it was an orchestrated plan? Why would
there be a 'green revolution' prepared prior to the vote, especially
if Mousavi and his supporters were as confident of victory as they
claim? This looks like definite evidence that the US is involved in
the election protests.
Timmerman goes on to write that "the National Endowment for Democracy
has spent millions of dollars promoting 'color' revolutions . . .
Some=2 0 of that money appears to have made it into the
hands of pro-Mousavi groups, who have ties to non-governmental
organizations outside Iran that the National Endowment for Democracy
funds." Timmerman's own neocon Foundation for Democracy is "a private,
non-profit organization established in 1995 with grants from the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), to promote democracy and
internationally-recognized standards of human rights in Iran."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Richard Giragosian, Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS)
ArmeniaNow
19 June 2009
US intervention in the internal affairs of many a country in the
Middle East and elsewhere is common knowledge. The spectre of Coloured
Revolutions is in the minds of many analysts. It is beyond the means
of Keghart.com to conduct an independent study or investigations to
analyze the recent events in Iran.
Hence an item from GlobalResearch.ca is presented to the readers
towards the end of Giragossian's article to form their own opinions.
The recent post-election protests had many similarities with preceding
events of "coloured revolutions". Even if they were home-grown and
at grass-root level, one cannot avoid thinking that they had the
potential of "destabilizing" Iran, a distinct goal of Western and
Israeli plans. This represents another example of how local and global
interests are interwoven.
Keghart.com
For much of this past week, Armenia's southern neighbor Iran has been
gripped by a powerful, and at times, even violent post-election crisis.
While the past several days have seen the largest anti-government
demonstrations since the 1979 Iranian revolution, with hundreds of
thousands of Iranian citizens protesting a disputed presidential
election, the scale and scope of these protests have also revealed
a set of even deeper and more serious economic disco ntent.
The post-election unrest poses the most serious challenge to the
Iranian authorities since they came to power in the wake of the Iranian
revolution twenty years ago. In addition, the current wave of unrest
is largely directed against the ruling elite, although it is not,
at least yet, targeting the system itself.
Of course, the current unrest in Iran was triggered by political
developments - namely, by the 12 June presidential election,
in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the
official winner over his leading rival, former Iranian Prime Minister
Hussein Mousavi. But the deeper cause of the unrest is much more
than a political dispute, but stems from the broader context of the
"economics of change" within Iran.
The "economics of change"
Within this context there is also a class-based confrontation, with
much of the younger and more recently empowered Iranian middle class
aspiring for real change, while the older, much more conservative
ruling "clerical elite" merely seek to sustain the status quo. This
division, between those hungry for change and those simply struggling
to hold on to power, also reflects an economic competition.
For the Iranian middle class, the imperative is for Iran to forge
a new economic future, moving beyond international isolation and
state-imposed sanctions. Their demands are based on more than just
hopes for a better eco nomic future, however, but also reflect
more practical demands over corruption, social restrictions, rising
inflation, declining wages and an overall lack of jobs. Such economic
demands, naturally shared by university students throughout Iran,
have only swelled the ranks of the middle class demonstrators. And
it is a formidable force, empowered by years of unmet promises and
frustrated expectations, and also more politically assertive, better
educated and more socially sophisticated than its rivals.
Notably, the demographics of the protests reveal an interesting
generational aspect--whereby the majority of opposition demonstrators
have no real memory of Iran before the 1979 revolution. This
youth factor not only infers a much bolder, more courageous and
even idealistic element to the anti-establishment protestors, but
also implies a more difficult challenge to resolve the demands and
expectations of a new generation of Iranians who have matured only
within the confines of years of isolation and economic disengagement
defined by the Islamic Republic of Iran's world view.
On the opposing side, in open support for President Ahmadinejad, the
ruling "clerical elite" is backed by a combination of more pious or
religious-minded Iranians and the rural population. For these people,
representing the most conservative elements of Iranian society, their
future is rooted more in the past than the present, and is certainly
not seeking any degree of change. This ruling elite, and the small
wealthy upper class that supports it, is a product of a system that
has become defined by the accumulation of wealth and power in the
years after the revolution. Thus, for this group, by its very nature,
any change or deviation from the status quo is seen as a threat to
the system, to the state and, most importantly, a threat to their
own personal power and wealth. And it is this underlying economic
division, which has only driven and exacerbated the political unrest
and mounting instability that offers several important "lessons,"
and even warnings, for Armenia.
Lessons for Armenia
First, Iranians are now waging a struggle for the very future of Iran,
set off by a disputed presidential election. In this way, Iran is
now facing its own March 1st post-election crisis, similar to the
events in Armenia last year. Both crises led to the tragic deaths of
civilian demonstrators. Both episodes featured the use, and misuse,
of force, with police and security forces applying an excessive and
repressive response to the demonstrations.
In Armenia's case, the March 2008 crisis remains unresolved to date,
as the authorities have been unable or unwilling to fully and fairly
investigate the events of March 2008. Further, the Armenian case
is also plagued by a failure to adequately resolve the underlying
tension and demands of that crisis.
The second20lesson for Armenia from the current crisis in Iran
is the fact that the election revealed that very serious domestic
contradictions quickly developed into a highly volatile and explosive
internal situation that no ideology, no mater how powerful, could
contain. For the Armenian authorities, this lesson also includes a
warning: that there can be no political panacea or substitute for
not addressing concrete socio-economic problems. And with Iran, it
is also clear that the recent crisis has shown that no country in
this modern world can remain truly isolated.
But it is the third lesson from Iran, the "economics of change"
as a driving force behind this tension that is even more worrisome
for Armenia.
In both cases, young Iranians and Armenians share the same hopes,
for a brighter future, for economic opportunities, and for a voice
in how their country is governed.
For both countries, there is no return to the pre-crisis status
quo. The political and economic demands for change remain unmet. But
to continue to ignore these basic demands and natural expectations,
creates a real risk of only prolonging the crisis, and most
dangerously, merely fuels the fire of discontent.
Are the Iranian Protests Another US Orchestrated "Color Revolution?"
Is This the Culmination of Two Years of Destabilization? Global
Research.ca
By Paul Craig Roberts
A number of commentators have expressed their idealistic belief20in the
purity of Mousavi, Montazeri, and the westernized youth of Terhan. The
CIA destabilization plan, announced two years ago (see below) has
somehow not contaminated unfolding events.
The claim is made that Ahmadinejad stole the election, because the
outcome was declared too soon after the polls closed for all the votes
to have been counted. However, Mousavi declared his victory several
hours before the polls closed. This is classic CIA destabilization
designed to discredit a contrary outcome. It forces an early
declaration of the vote. The longer the time interval between the
preemptive declaration of victory and the release of the vote tally,
the longer Mousavi has to create the impression that the authorities
are using the time to fix the vote. It is amazing that people don't
see through this trick.
As for the grand ayatollah Montazeri's charge that the election was
stolen, he was the initial choice to succeed Khomeini, but lost out
to the current Supreme Leader. He sees in the protests an opportunity
to settle the score with Khamenei. Montazeri has the incentive to
challenge the election whether or not he is being manipulated by
the CIA, which has a successful history of manipulating disgruntled
politicians.
There is a power struggle among the ayatollahs. Many are aligned
against Ahmadinejad because he accuses them of corruption, thus playing
to the Iranian countryside where Iranians believe th e ayatollahs'
lifestyles indicate an excess of power and money. In my opinion,
Ahmadinejad's attack on the ayatollahs is opportunistic. However,
it does make it odd for his American detractors to say he is a
conservative reactionary lined up with the ayatollahs.
Commentators are "explaining" the Iran elections based on their own
illusions, delusions, emotions, and vested interests. Whether or not
the poll results predicting Ahmadinejad's win are sound, there is, so
far, no evidence beyond surmise that the election was stolen. However,
there are credible reports that the CIA has been working for two
years to destabilize the Iranian government.
On May 23, 2007, Brian Ross and Richard Esposito reported on ABC News:
"The CIA has received secret presidential approval to mount a covert
"black" operation to destabilize the Iranian government, current and
former officials in the intelligence community tell ABC News."
On May 27, 2007, the London Telegraph independently reported:
"Mr. Bush has signed an official document endorsing CIA plans for
a propaganda and disinformation campaign intended to destabilize,
and eventually topple, the theocratic rule of the mullahs."
A few days previously, the Telegraph reported on May 16, 2007, that
Bush administration neocon warmonger John Bolton told the Telegraph
that a US military attack on Iran would "be a 'last option' after
economic sanctions a nd attempts to foment a popular revolution
had failed."
On June 29, 2008, Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker: "Late last
year, Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major
escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current
and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These
operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million
dollars, were described in a Presidential Finding signed by Bush,
and are designed to destabilize the country's religious leadership."
The protests in Tehran no doubt have many sincere participants. The
protests also have the hallmarks of the CIA orchestrated protests in
Georgia and Ukraine. It requires total blindness not to see this.
Daniel McAdams has made some telling points. For example,
neoconservative Kenneth Timmerman wrote the day before the election
that "there's talk of a 'green revolution' in Tehran." How would
Timmerman know that unless it was an orchestrated plan? Why would
there be a 'green revolution' prepared prior to the vote, especially
if Mousavi and his supporters were as confident of victory as they
claim? This looks like definite evidence that the US is involved in
the election protests.
Timmerman goes on to write that "the National Endowment for Democracy
has spent millions of dollars promoting 'color' revolutions . . .
Some=2 0 of that money appears to have made it into the
hands of pro-Mousavi groups, who have ties to non-governmental
organizations outside Iran that the National Endowment for Democracy
funds." Timmerman's own neocon Foundation for Democracy is "a private,
non-profit organization established in 1995 with grants from the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), to promote democracy and
internationally-recognized standards of human rights in Iran."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress