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WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 11, 2009 Wednesday
"PAPER TIGERS" OF NATO AND CSTO
by Alexander Khramchikhin
COLLECTIVE RAPID RESPONSE FORCES MAY BE USED ONLY FOR SUPPRESSION OF
INTERNAL RIOT AGAINST A REGIME IN ONE OF THE CSTO MEMBER STATES?; So
far, all operational components of the armed forces of NATO and
European Union resemble "paper tigers." Now Russia decided to offer a
"decent response" creating a similar "tiger" in the framework of the
CSTO.
So far, all operational components of the armed forces of NATO and
European Union resemble "paper tigers" very much. Now Russia decided
to offer a "decent response" creating a similar "tiger" in the
framework of the CSTO.
Countries that are members of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) now have very different views at goals and tasks
of the organization. Russia sees it as one of the rudiments of the
USSR that the Kremlin values for purely psychological reasons. Moscow
may also view territories of its allies as a kind of antechamber in
three most important strategic directions. In turn, the allies of
Russia view Russia as a country that will fight for them (instead of
them, to be more precise) not only in case of external aggression but
also in case of internal conflicts (nobody cares if Russia itself
needs this).
NATO countries represent the only possible potential enemy for Belarus
(both from political and from geographic standpoint). Armenia has
potential enemy in the form of Turkey (Armenia can cope with
Azerbaijan without assistance of CSTO yet). Of course, Turkey is a
NATO member but in this case Yerevan justly views it as an entity
separate from the alliance. Armenia does not wish only to fight but
even to somehow quarrel with any other member states of this alliance.
It is possible to say the same about Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, only instead of Turkey they have China, Islamic terrorists
and, frankly speaking, Uzbekistan.
The Black and the Caspian seas divide the territories of CSTO member
states into three isolated strategic directions: European (Russia and
Belarus), Caucasian (Russia and Armenia) and Central Asian (Russia,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan). It is easy to notice
that there is only one country besides Russia in two of the three
directions. Hence, is it possible to imagine soldiers from Central
Asian countries defending Belarus from NATO or Armenia from Turkey?
In any case, Armenia and Belarus will not defend each other mutually
too. These countries will not send their soldiers to Central Asia for
sure. Lukashenko regularly informs citizens of his country that
Belarusian boys do not fight outside of the country. Will he send
these boys to save Armenians from Turks and Central Asian countries
from Talibs and moreover from China?
Thus, bilateral agreements on mutual defense with Belarus and Armenia
are more than enough for Russia for provision of defense in the
European and Caucasian directions. In this case the CSTO is not
necessary and is even burdensome because it creates a ground for
conflicts among its member states. Only in the Central Asian direction
it really makes sense to establish a collective military
organization. Even in this case, Russia needs to determine its own
interests. After all, it is high time to quit the practice established
in the CIS when Russia has only duties and the rest have only rights,
when Russia always pays for everything and it does not even occur to
the rest that they need to pay at least for something some time too.
CSTO member states obviously expect to receive Russian military
hardware at internal Russian prices. Along with this, their
contribution to the collective rapid response forces being formed (to
be more accurate, declared) will be, to put this mild, not very big.
Judging by the potential, the collective rapid response forces can be
used only for suppression of internal riots against a regime in one of
the CSTO member states. Hence, Russia will act as a regional gendarme
at its own expense. The might of the collective rapid response forces
will simply be insufficient for anything bigger. From this standpoint
the collective rapid response forces of the CSTO are really comparable
to those of NATO, although according to the formal potential they are
much inferior to such forces of NATO (six corps formations in the
ground forces alone).
The real value of the CSTO was already demonstrated during the war in
South Ossetia. Our allies did not come to help Russia and did not even
recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Kremlin
simply wastes money to atone its psychological complexes of Soviet
origin. It is good if the price is confined to money alone and it will
not be necessary to pay with lives of our servicemen for some of the
"allies" that will never do anything for Russia.
Source: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 8, March 06-12, 2009, p. 1
Translated by InterContact
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 11, 2009 Wednesday
"PAPER TIGERS" OF NATO AND CSTO
by Alexander Khramchikhin
COLLECTIVE RAPID RESPONSE FORCES MAY BE USED ONLY FOR SUPPRESSION OF
INTERNAL RIOT AGAINST A REGIME IN ONE OF THE CSTO MEMBER STATES?; So
far, all operational components of the armed forces of NATO and
European Union resemble "paper tigers." Now Russia decided to offer a
"decent response" creating a similar "tiger" in the framework of the
CSTO.
So far, all operational components of the armed forces of NATO and
European Union resemble "paper tigers" very much. Now Russia decided
to offer a "decent response" creating a similar "tiger" in the
framework of the CSTO.
Countries that are members of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) now have very different views at goals and tasks
of the organization. Russia sees it as one of the rudiments of the
USSR that the Kremlin values for purely psychological reasons. Moscow
may also view territories of its allies as a kind of antechamber in
three most important strategic directions. In turn, the allies of
Russia view Russia as a country that will fight for them (instead of
them, to be more precise) not only in case of external aggression but
also in case of internal conflicts (nobody cares if Russia itself
needs this).
NATO countries represent the only possible potential enemy for Belarus
(both from political and from geographic standpoint). Armenia has
potential enemy in the form of Turkey (Armenia can cope with
Azerbaijan without assistance of CSTO yet). Of course, Turkey is a
NATO member but in this case Yerevan justly views it as an entity
separate from the alliance. Armenia does not wish only to fight but
even to somehow quarrel with any other member states of this alliance.
It is possible to say the same about Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, only instead of Turkey they have China, Islamic terrorists
and, frankly speaking, Uzbekistan.
The Black and the Caspian seas divide the territories of CSTO member
states into three isolated strategic directions: European (Russia and
Belarus), Caucasian (Russia and Armenia) and Central Asian (Russia,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan). It is easy to notice
that there is only one country besides Russia in two of the three
directions. Hence, is it possible to imagine soldiers from Central
Asian countries defending Belarus from NATO or Armenia from Turkey?
In any case, Armenia and Belarus will not defend each other mutually
too. These countries will not send their soldiers to Central Asia for
sure. Lukashenko regularly informs citizens of his country that
Belarusian boys do not fight outside of the country. Will he send
these boys to save Armenians from Turks and Central Asian countries
from Talibs and moreover from China?
Thus, bilateral agreements on mutual defense with Belarus and Armenia
are more than enough for Russia for provision of defense in the
European and Caucasian directions. In this case the CSTO is not
necessary and is even burdensome because it creates a ground for
conflicts among its member states. Only in the Central Asian direction
it really makes sense to establish a collective military
organization. Even in this case, Russia needs to determine its own
interests. After all, it is high time to quit the practice established
in the CIS when Russia has only duties and the rest have only rights,
when Russia always pays for everything and it does not even occur to
the rest that they need to pay at least for something some time too.
CSTO member states obviously expect to receive Russian military
hardware at internal Russian prices. Along with this, their
contribution to the collective rapid response forces being formed (to
be more accurate, declared) will be, to put this mild, not very big.
Judging by the potential, the collective rapid response forces can be
used only for suppression of internal riots against a regime in one of
the CSTO member states. Hence, Russia will act as a regional gendarme
at its own expense. The might of the collective rapid response forces
will simply be insufficient for anything bigger. From this standpoint
the collective rapid response forces of the CSTO are really comparable
to those of NATO, although according to the formal potential they are
much inferior to such forces of NATO (six corps formations in the
ground forces alone).
The real value of the CSTO was already demonstrated during the war in
South Ossetia. Our allies did not come to help Russia and did not even
recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Kremlin
simply wastes money to atone its psychological complexes of Soviet
origin. It is good if the price is confined to money alone and it will
not be necessary to pay with lives of our servicemen for some of the
"allies" that will never do anything for Russia.
Source: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 8, March 06-12, 2009, p. 1
Translated by InterContact