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Washington Institute for Near East Policy
PolicyWatch #1488
March 12 2009
High Stakes, High Anxiety: Campaigning in Lebanon
By David Schenker
March 12, 2009
This Saturday, Lebanon's pro-West March 14 coalition officially kicks
off its election campaign in Beirut. Two weeks ago, the Hizballah-led
opposition -- backed by Syria and Iran -- started campaigning in its
stronghold in the Beqa Valley. With less than three months until
Lebanon's parliamentary election, the contest, which pits March 14
against Hizballah's so-called March 8 coalition, promises to be
extremely close. Four years ago, March 14 won a thin majority in the
parliamentary elections, but it is unclear whether the coalition will
return to power this June. Should the opposition prevail, the impact
on Lebanese and regional politics -- as well as on Washington's
relations with Beirut -- could be profound. Background
Just four months after the February 2005 assassination of former
Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon went to the polls to elect a
new 128-member parliament. The resulting legislature broke down into
essentially three blocs: first, the March 14 alliance, a coalition of
Sunnis, Druze, and some Christians led by Saad Hariri (the slain
premier's son), Walid Jumblatt, and Samir Geagea, which took 72 seats;
second, the Shiite Hizballah-Amal bloc, led by Hassan Nasrallah and
Nabih Berri, which secured 35 seats; and third, the Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM), an overwhelmingly Christian bloc led by General Michel
Aoun, which garnered 21 seats.
In February 2006, Hizballah and Aoun's FPM joined forces, providing
the opposition with a formidable 56-seat bloc. This development was
followed by a series of political assassinations allegedly perpetrated
by Syria and its Lebanese allies. The killings depleted the majority
bloc from 72 to 68 out of 128 seats, raising concerns that further
attrition would culminate in an opposition takeover. Since then,
although tensions have remained high, the status quo has not changed
dramatically.
The most significant change to the election dynamic since 2005 was the
June 2008 election of former Lebanese Armed Forces chief of staff
Michel Sulaiman as president. Sulaiman, who is widely viewed as
neutral in spite of his past close ties to Damascus, has lent his
support to the establishment of a "centrist bloc" to compete for
parliamentary seats, a move that could potentially siphon off
Christian votes from Aoun's FPM in key districts.
March 14 Preparations
For months, March 14 has been working behind the scenes to broker a
complicated compromise to the contentious issue of seat allocation --
coordinating which coalition partner will stand for seats in each
district. At the same time, March 14 has worked to forge electoral
alliances in key districts to improve the coalition's electoral
chances. To this end, the coalition has courted former Lebanese prime
minister Najib Mikati and the small but significant Armenian Tashnaq
party, which has proved pivotal in recent elections, particularly the
2007 by-election in Metn to fill the seat of assassinated March 14
parliamentarian Pierre Gemayel. (Former Lebanese president Amin
Gemayel ran for the seat but was defeated by a previously unknown
Aounist by a margin of 418 Tashnaq votes.)
There are some tentative indications that March 14's strategy might
bear fruit. In the crucial district of Metn, an alliance appears to
have been struck between the March 14-affilated Phalange Party and
longtime political operator Michel Murr. Murr backs the idea of a
centrist bloc, but his list is closely affiliated with March 14,
effectively undermining opposition inroads in Metn and other
districts. Importantly, Murr is also expected to deliver a significant
portion of the Tashnaq constituency to March 14.
Meanwhile, March 14 has been honing its campaign platform, focusing on
state legitimacy and sovereignty -- in particular, the need for all
weapons to be under the control of the state -- and a commitment to
implement UN Security Council resolutions toward Lebanon.
Hizballah and the Free Patriotic Movement
In early March, Hizballah deputy secretary general and general
observer for elections Naim Qassem held a campaign rally in the Beqa,
reportedly attended by ten thousand supporters from the Baalbak-Hermel
and Zahle districts. Under the slogan of "Together we will resist,
together we will build Lebanon," Qassem presented the broad outlines
of the Resistance and Development bloc.
During his speech, Qassem discussed the traditional Hizballah concept
of "resistance," boasting that in addition to countering the "Israeli
threat," the opposition had also demonstrated its bona fides in recent
years by "clip[ping] America's fingernails in Lebanon." On the topic
of development, Qassem touted a kinder and gentler side of Hizballah,
which he said believes that it is "unacceptable to deal with people as
numbers." In this context, he pledged his party's support for
"universal social and health insurance" and claimed his party would be
a "model for fighting corruption."
The FPM also launched its campaign in the beginning of March, with
Aoun framing the election as a choice between "Change and Reform" --
the name of his bloc -- and the alleged corruption of March 14. Since
then, Aoun has been narrowly focused on attacking President Suleiman,
Michel Murr, the idea of a centrist bloc, and the Maronite patriarch
who has come out strongly in the bloc's favor. Aoun has also spent
time fending off rumors that he might be excommunicated for allegedly
slandering Lebanese patriarch Nasrallah Sfair, who earlier this month
stated that it would be a "historic mistake" if March 8 won a majority
in parliament.
Key Questions and Imperfect Polls
In Lebanon, where polling is largely a subjective matter, it is
difficult to ascertain the relative support for March 14 vis-a-vis the
opposition. According to the calculations of prominent March 8
pollster Kamal Feghali, the opposition has 53 secure seats while March
14 has 41, leaving 34 to be contested. Meanwhile, a poll released by
the opposition-aligned Lebanese daily al-Akhbar on March 9 predicts 47
percent (60 seats) for the opposition and 38 percent (49 seats) for
March 14, with 19 seats up for grabs. Earlier this week, Hizballah's
Naim Qassem predicted a majority of 67 or 68 seats.
Not surprisingly, March 14 polling provides an entirely different
picture. March 14 has performed strongly in recent union and student
body elections, and according to the ruling coalition's numbers, if
the centrist bloc with Michel Murr remains a serious and robust
factor, March 14 will secure 66 seats -- and a continued majority --
while the opposition will take 58. On February 17, Murr announced that
his electoral alliance with Gemayel in Metn was "final," but Syria and
its allies will surely continue to press Murr to move away from March
14. A 2005 assassination attempt against Murr's son, March 14 defense
minister Elias Murr, may have permanently soured Murr on
Damascus. Should Murr succumb, however, the overall electoral balance
could shift in favor of March 8.
Conclusion
Hizballah and Syria have said that regardless of who wins in June,
Beirut should establish a government of national unity where the
minority possesses a "blocking third" -- the ability to veto all major
government initiatives. March 14, which currently governs under this
constraint, has made no such reciprocal offer, and majority leader
Saad Hariri has announced that his Future Movement would not
participate in a Hizballah-led government. While a boycott might
undermine the local and regional legitimacy of the government, as Naim
Qassem notes, a Hizballah victory would confer upon the organization
the benefits of greater global acceptance.
For Washington, the loss of Lebanon would represent a significant
setback on many fronts. In the aftermath of Britain's recent
ill-advised decision to diplomatically engage Hizballah, the prospect
of the organization making increased inroads into Europe would be
particularly troubling. At the same time, the region would perceive
the reversal of the Cedar Revolution as a victory for Tehran and
Damascus and a defeat for Washington -- a dynamic that could further
complicate U.S. efforts to end Iran's nuclear program and convince
Syria to modify its unhelpful policies. Assuredly, a Hizballah
government in Beirut would also undermine the bilateral relationship
with Washington.
Fortunately, while this scenario is troubling, it is far from
ordained. Against all odds, with three months to go, March 14 stands a
decent chance of squeaking out another narrow victory. In the
sensitive context of Lebanese elections, the most productive action
Washington can take is to help guarantee a level playing field. While
little can be done to stem Tehran's considerable funding for
Hizballah, the Obama administration can curtail, if not prevent, some
of the more egregious foreign interference at the polls. In this
regard, it is essential that Washington take full advantage of its
renewed diplomatic engagement with Syria to ensure that its new
interlocutors in Damascus do not meddle in the elections.
David Schenker is a Washington Institute senior fellow and director of
its Program on Arab Politics.
PolicyWatch #1488
March 12 2009
High Stakes, High Anxiety: Campaigning in Lebanon
By David Schenker
March 12, 2009
This Saturday, Lebanon's pro-West March 14 coalition officially kicks
off its election campaign in Beirut. Two weeks ago, the Hizballah-led
opposition -- backed by Syria and Iran -- started campaigning in its
stronghold in the Beqa Valley. With less than three months until
Lebanon's parliamentary election, the contest, which pits March 14
against Hizballah's so-called March 8 coalition, promises to be
extremely close. Four years ago, March 14 won a thin majority in the
parliamentary elections, but it is unclear whether the coalition will
return to power this June. Should the opposition prevail, the impact
on Lebanese and regional politics -- as well as on Washington's
relations with Beirut -- could be profound. Background
Just four months after the February 2005 assassination of former
Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon went to the polls to elect a
new 128-member parliament. The resulting legislature broke down into
essentially three blocs: first, the March 14 alliance, a coalition of
Sunnis, Druze, and some Christians led by Saad Hariri (the slain
premier's son), Walid Jumblatt, and Samir Geagea, which took 72 seats;
second, the Shiite Hizballah-Amal bloc, led by Hassan Nasrallah and
Nabih Berri, which secured 35 seats; and third, the Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM), an overwhelmingly Christian bloc led by General Michel
Aoun, which garnered 21 seats.
In February 2006, Hizballah and Aoun's FPM joined forces, providing
the opposition with a formidable 56-seat bloc. This development was
followed by a series of political assassinations allegedly perpetrated
by Syria and its Lebanese allies. The killings depleted the majority
bloc from 72 to 68 out of 128 seats, raising concerns that further
attrition would culminate in an opposition takeover. Since then,
although tensions have remained high, the status quo has not changed
dramatically.
The most significant change to the election dynamic since 2005 was the
June 2008 election of former Lebanese Armed Forces chief of staff
Michel Sulaiman as president. Sulaiman, who is widely viewed as
neutral in spite of his past close ties to Damascus, has lent his
support to the establishment of a "centrist bloc" to compete for
parliamentary seats, a move that could potentially siphon off
Christian votes from Aoun's FPM in key districts.
March 14 Preparations
For months, March 14 has been working behind the scenes to broker a
complicated compromise to the contentious issue of seat allocation --
coordinating which coalition partner will stand for seats in each
district. At the same time, March 14 has worked to forge electoral
alliances in key districts to improve the coalition's electoral
chances. To this end, the coalition has courted former Lebanese prime
minister Najib Mikati and the small but significant Armenian Tashnaq
party, which has proved pivotal in recent elections, particularly the
2007 by-election in Metn to fill the seat of assassinated March 14
parliamentarian Pierre Gemayel. (Former Lebanese president Amin
Gemayel ran for the seat but was defeated by a previously unknown
Aounist by a margin of 418 Tashnaq votes.)
There are some tentative indications that March 14's strategy might
bear fruit. In the crucial district of Metn, an alliance appears to
have been struck between the March 14-affilated Phalange Party and
longtime political operator Michel Murr. Murr backs the idea of a
centrist bloc, but his list is closely affiliated with March 14,
effectively undermining opposition inroads in Metn and other
districts. Importantly, Murr is also expected to deliver a significant
portion of the Tashnaq constituency to March 14.
Meanwhile, March 14 has been honing its campaign platform, focusing on
state legitimacy and sovereignty -- in particular, the need for all
weapons to be under the control of the state -- and a commitment to
implement UN Security Council resolutions toward Lebanon.
Hizballah and the Free Patriotic Movement
In early March, Hizballah deputy secretary general and general
observer for elections Naim Qassem held a campaign rally in the Beqa,
reportedly attended by ten thousand supporters from the Baalbak-Hermel
and Zahle districts. Under the slogan of "Together we will resist,
together we will build Lebanon," Qassem presented the broad outlines
of the Resistance and Development bloc.
During his speech, Qassem discussed the traditional Hizballah concept
of "resistance," boasting that in addition to countering the "Israeli
threat," the opposition had also demonstrated its bona fides in recent
years by "clip[ping] America's fingernails in Lebanon." On the topic
of development, Qassem touted a kinder and gentler side of Hizballah,
which he said believes that it is "unacceptable to deal with people as
numbers." In this context, he pledged his party's support for
"universal social and health insurance" and claimed his party would be
a "model for fighting corruption."
The FPM also launched its campaign in the beginning of March, with
Aoun framing the election as a choice between "Change and Reform" --
the name of his bloc -- and the alleged corruption of March 14. Since
then, Aoun has been narrowly focused on attacking President Suleiman,
Michel Murr, the idea of a centrist bloc, and the Maronite patriarch
who has come out strongly in the bloc's favor. Aoun has also spent
time fending off rumors that he might be excommunicated for allegedly
slandering Lebanese patriarch Nasrallah Sfair, who earlier this month
stated that it would be a "historic mistake" if March 8 won a majority
in parliament.
Key Questions and Imperfect Polls
In Lebanon, where polling is largely a subjective matter, it is
difficult to ascertain the relative support for March 14 vis-a-vis the
opposition. According to the calculations of prominent March 8
pollster Kamal Feghali, the opposition has 53 secure seats while March
14 has 41, leaving 34 to be contested. Meanwhile, a poll released by
the opposition-aligned Lebanese daily al-Akhbar on March 9 predicts 47
percent (60 seats) for the opposition and 38 percent (49 seats) for
March 14, with 19 seats up for grabs. Earlier this week, Hizballah's
Naim Qassem predicted a majority of 67 or 68 seats.
Not surprisingly, March 14 polling provides an entirely different
picture. March 14 has performed strongly in recent union and student
body elections, and according to the ruling coalition's numbers, if
the centrist bloc with Michel Murr remains a serious and robust
factor, March 14 will secure 66 seats -- and a continued majority --
while the opposition will take 58. On February 17, Murr announced that
his electoral alliance with Gemayel in Metn was "final," but Syria and
its allies will surely continue to press Murr to move away from March
14. A 2005 assassination attempt against Murr's son, March 14 defense
minister Elias Murr, may have permanently soured Murr on
Damascus. Should Murr succumb, however, the overall electoral balance
could shift in favor of March 8.
Conclusion
Hizballah and Syria have said that regardless of who wins in June,
Beirut should establish a government of national unity where the
minority possesses a "blocking third" -- the ability to veto all major
government initiatives. March 14, which currently governs under this
constraint, has made no such reciprocal offer, and majority leader
Saad Hariri has announced that his Future Movement would not
participate in a Hizballah-led government. While a boycott might
undermine the local and regional legitimacy of the government, as Naim
Qassem notes, a Hizballah victory would confer upon the organization
the benefits of greater global acceptance.
For Washington, the loss of Lebanon would represent a significant
setback on many fronts. In the aftermath of Britain's recent
ill-advised decision to diplomatically engage Hizballah, the prospect
of the organization making increased inroads into Europe would be
particularly troubling. At the same time, the region would perceive
the reversal of the Cedar Revolution as a victory for Tehran and
Damascus and a defeat for Washington -- a dynamic that could further
complicate U.S. efforts to end Iran's nuclear program and convince
Syria to modify its unhelpful policies. Assuredly, a Hizballah
government in Beirut would also undermine the bilateral relationship
with Washington.
Fortunately, while this scenario is troubling, it is far from
ordained. Against all odds, with three months to go, March 14 stands a
decent chance of squeaking out another narrow victory. In the
sensitive context of Lebanese elections, the most productive action
Washington can take is to help guarantee a level playing field. While
little can be done to stem Tehran's considerable funding for
Hizballah, the Obama administration can curtail, if not prevent, some
of the more egregious foreign interference at the polls. In this
regard, it is essential that Washington take full advantage of its
renewed diplomatic engagement with Syria to ensure that its new
interlocutors in Damascus do not meddle in the elections.
David Schenker is a Washington Institute senior fellow and director of
its Program on Arab Politics.