Tweet
Vremya Novostey , Russia
April 24 2009
Road Maps. Russia Risks 'Leaving' the South Caucasus Forever
by Ivan Sukhov:
Russia responded quite good-naturedly to the news that a "road map"
had been signed for an Armenian-Turkish settlement. However, if one
considers this English diplomatic term in its literal sense, i.e., as
an actual map of the Caucasus's roads, it gives one pause for thought.
In the fall of last year, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and his
Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev signed a special declaration on
Nagornyy Karabakh at [Russian President] Dmitriy Medvedev's residence
outside Moscow. Ever since then, Russia has been trying to regain its
status as the main "sponsor" of a Karabakh settlement, which it lost
over the past several years, as well as its image as a peacemaker.
This is important in light of the unfavourable impression that was
made on the international community by last year's military actions in
Georgia. Moscow tends to present any movement towards an agreement on
Karabakh as its own achievement. But it is hard not to notice that the
"defrosting" of Armenian-Turkish relations that was announced
yesterday [23 April] could ultimately reduce Russia's influence in the
South Caucasus to a minimum.
Karabakh is the oldest "frozen conflict" in the South Caucasus. It is
a blockage on the path to normal international communications. Armenia
and Azerbaijan are in a de facto state of war. In this war,
fortunately, they do not shoot at each other all that often. But the
longest of Armenia's borders - its border with Azerbaijan - looks like
a front line. Nor is its border with Turkey, a country that has seen
Azerbaijan as its main partner in the Caucasus throughout the
post-Soviet period and has supported its demand for the restoration of
its territorial integrity, much more open. Apart from a very narrow
"window" into Iran, Armenia's only open border is its border with
Georgia. But Georgia has problems with Russia, so it turns out that
this border, too, is only half open.
A year ago it seemed that Russia had fairly good prospects of
developing its links with Armenia, which it has always positioned as
its main ally in the South Caucasus. This includes transport links.
Russian Railways even took Armenia's railway network under
concessionary management. A railway on an "island," limited by closed
borders, does not make any sense. But by connecting it to the rail
network in Georgia and restoring railway communications via Abkhazia,
which were disrupted 15 years ago, it would be possible to turn this
railway into a powerful economic tool. This would not only
dramatically increase the volume of cargo between Russian and Armenia,
which are currently only linked by air, but would also strengthen
Russia's real economic presence both in Armenia and in Georgia. A road
link, once again via Abkhazia, and two border crossings between
Georgia and Ossetia - at Verkhniy Lars and on the Trans-Caucasus
Highway - could also "emerge." These highways would bring money and
development to the cities and provinces situated along the restored
roads. And where there is money and development, there is usually no
place for war.
Excluding the seasonal trails that are only accessible to smugglers
and Chechen militants, there are only six roads through the Caucasus
mountain range, i.e., real threads connecting Russia economically with
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. There are two railways: one along
the coast of the Caspian Sea to Baku, and the other along the Black
Sea via Sukhumi to Georgia and on to Armenia. Due to the
Georgian-Abkhazian war, however, the railway been dismantled in
Abkhazia. Now, following the war between Russia and Georgia, it is
hard to expect that it will be restored anytime soon. And it is
impossible to reach Armenia by train via Baku due to the conflict in
Karabakh.
The same goes for the highways. There are four of them. The road
through Abkhazia is blocked at the Inguri River on the border with
Georgia. The Trans-Caucasus Highway that runs through South Ossetia
fell into decline back in 2004 through the efforts of Tbilisi, which
was overzealously guarding its customs sov ereignty. Since the August
2008 war, this road has also run into a dead end at the
border. Verkhniy Lars, a crossing on the historical Georgian military
highway that was long being overhauled by Russia, was also closed for
several years. About a week ago it was reported that the repairs had
been completed. But in order to open the road, which would make
Armenian businessmen and consumers very happy, Russia and Georgia
would have to reach a special agreement. This looks problematic so
far. Thus, three of the four roads from the North Caucasus to the
South are closed by blockages that arose, or at least were reinforced,
as a result of the August war. The only functioning road leads to
Azerbaijan and, for obvious reasons, remains inaccessible to Armenia.
The "Road Map" does not yet mean that the border will be opened. There
is a whole range of difficult conflicts between Turkey and
Armenia. Within Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan, there are influential
political forces that are displeased with Ankara's rapprochement with
Yerevan. They condition the resumption of bilateral relations on
resolving the Karabakh problem in favour of Azerbaijan. But Karabakh
is a separate and very complicated issue, for which a solution might
be found more easily if Armenia could get out of its current
semi-blocked position. Within Armenia itself, there are also
opposition members who are inclined to blame Serzh Sargsyan for the
rapprochement with Turkey, which, they say, insults the memory of the
Armenian genocide of 1915.
But even Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the leader of the opposition in last
year's presidential elections and the first president of Armenia, has
repeatedly emphasized that assessing the genocide, which is very
difficult and traumatic for both Armenia and Turkey, remains primarily
an ethical issue. Pragmatically, meanwhile, rapprochement with Turkey
is inevitable for Armenia, no matter who is president. The Road Map is
an absolutely sure sign that such rapprochement is possible. For the
first time in the entire post-Soviet period, the opening of the border
between Turkey and Armenia has moved out of the realm of fantasy into
the sphere of seeking technical solutions.
If this border is opened, Russia's main ally in the South Caucasus
will inevitably turn towards Turkey. The economy will help heal old
wounds. In any case, getting outside by climbing over two of your
neighbours' fences is far less convenient than using the open gates of
your own back yard. If a ground transportation link with Turkey is
opened, and if Armenia is included in the Eurasian transport corridor
that leads through the South Caucasus to Turkey, then Russian money
and air links between Yerevan and Moscow may very well play a
constructive role, but it will be a purely auxiliary one in Armenia's
development.
The possibility of opening the border is a bonus that Turkey can offer
Armenia in the great haggling over Karabakh, thereby forcing Russia
out of its position as the main "sponsor" of the Karabakh
settlement. Moscow has no such bonus to offer. It might have had one,
however, if not for the August war. After which, incidentally, Russia
is now openly feared in Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara, despite the large
number of formulaic lines about eternal mutual respect.
In this context, Dmitriy Medvedev's meetings with Ilham Aliyev and
Serzh Sargsyan look like an attempt to seize the initiative and hop on
the back of the train heading for Ankara. But Karabakh, which Moscow
has grown accustomed to viewing as a tool for keeping both Armenia and
Azerbaijan in the wake of its own foreign policy, has so far not
enabled the Kremlin to formulate a position that would satisfy both of
the South Caucasus countries. Turkey, meanwhile, is actively seeking
such a position. And if it finds one, then the territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, which Russia has taken under its wing, will long
remain the limits of Russian influence in the South Caucasus.
[translated from Russian]
April 24 2009
Road Maps. Russia Risks 'Leaving' the South Caucasus Forever
by Ivan Sukhov:
Russia responded quite good-naturedly to the news that a "road map"
had been signed for an Armenian-Turkish settlement. However, if one
considers this English diplomatic term in its literal sense, i.e., as
an actual map of the Caucasus's roads, it gives one pause for thought.
In the fall of last year, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and his
Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev signed a special declaration on
Nagornyy Karabakh at [Russian President] Dmitriy Medvedev's residence
outside Moscow. Ever since then, Russia has been trying to regain its
status as the main "sponsor" of a Karabakh settlement, which it lost
over the past several years, as well as its image as a peacemaker.
This is important in light of the unfavourable impression that was
made on the international community by last year's military actions in
Georgia. Moscow tends to present any movement towards an agreement on
Karabakh as its own achievement. But it is hard not to notice that the
"defrosting" of Armenian-Turkish relations that was announced
yesterday [23 April] could ultimately reduce Russia's influence in the
South Caucasus to a minimum.
Karabakh is the oldest "frozen conflict" in the South Caucasus. It is
a blockage on the path to normal international communications. Armenia
and Azerbaijan are in a de facto state of war. In this war,
fortunately, they do not shoot at each other all that often. But the
longest of Armenia's borders - its border with Azerbaijan - looks like
a front line. Nor is its border with Turkey, a country that has seen
Azerbaijan as its main partner in the Caucasus throughout the
post-Soviet period and has supported its demand for the restoration of
its territorial integrity, much more open. Apart from a very narrow
"window" into Iran, Armenia's only open border is its border with
Georgia. But Georgia has problems with Russia, so it turns out that
this border, too, is only half open.
A year ago it seemed that Russia had fairly good prospects of
developing its links with Armenia, which it has always positioned as
its main ally in the South Caucasus. This includes transport links.
Russian Railways even took Armenia's railway network under
concessionary management. A railway on an "island," limited by closed
borders, does not make any sense. But by connecting it to the rail
network in Georgia and restoring railway communications via Abkhazia,
which were disrupted 15 years ago, it would be possible to turn this
railway into a powerful economic tool. This would not only
dramatically increase the volume of cargo between Russian and Armenia,
which are currently only linked by air, but would also strengthen
Russia's real economic presence both in Armenia and in Georgia. A road
link, once again via Abkhazia, and two border crossings between
Georgia and Ossetia - at Verkhniy Lars and on the Trans-Caucasus
Highway - could also "emerge." These highways would bring money and
development to the cities and provinces situated along the restored
roads. And where there is money and development, there is usually no
place for war.
Excluding the seasonal trails that are only accessible to smugglers
and Chechen militants, there are only six roads through the Caucasus
mountain range, i.e., real threads connecting Russia economically with
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. There are two railways: one along
the coast of the Caspian Sea to Baku, and the other along the Black
Sea via Sukhumi to Georgia and on to Armenia. Due to the
Georgian-Abkhazian war, however, the railway been dismantled in
Abkhazia. Now, following the war between Russia and Georgia, it is
hard to expect that it will be restored anytime soon. And it is
impossible to reach Armenia by train via Baku due to the conflict in
Karabakh.
The same goes for the highways. There are four of them. The road
through Abkhazia is blocked at the Inguri River on the border with
Georgia. The Trans-Caucasus Highway that runs through South Ossetia
fell into decline back in 2004 through the efforts of Tbilisi, which
was overzealously guarding its customs sov ereignty. Since the August
2008 war, this road has also run into a dead end at the
border. Verkhniy Lars, a crossing on the historical Georgian military
highway that was long being overhauled by Russia, was also closed for
several years. About a week ago it was reported that the repairs had
been completed. But in order to open the road, which would make
Armenian businessmen and consumers very happy, Russia and Georgia
would have to reach a special agreement. This looks problematic so
far. Thus, three of the four roads from the North Caucasus to the
South are closed by blockages that arose, or at least were reinforced,
as a result of the August war. The only functioning road leads to
Azerbaijan and, for obvious reasons, remains inaccessible to Armenia.
The "Road Map" does not yet mean that the border will be opened. There
is a whole range of difficult conflicts between Turkey and
Armenia. Within Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan, there are influential
political forces that are displeased with Ankara's rapprochement with
Yerevan. They condition the resumption of bilateral relations on
resolving the Karabakh problem in favour of Azerbaijan. But Karabakh
is a separate and very complicated issue, for which a solution might
be found more easily if Armenia could get out of its current
semi-blocked position. Within Armenia itself, there are also
opposition members who are inclined to blame Serzh Sargsyan for the
rapprochement with Turkey, which, they say, insults the memory of the
Armenian genocide of 1915.
But even Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the leader of the opposition in last
year's presidential elections and the first president of Armenia, has
repeatedly emphasized that assessing the genocide, which is very
difficult and traumatic for both Armenia and Turkey, remains primarily
an ethical issue. Pragmatically, meanwhile, rapprochement with Turkey
is inevitable for Armenia, no matter who is president. The Road Map is
an absolutely sure sign that such rapprochement is possible. For the
first time in the entire post-Soviet period, the opening of the border
between Turkey and Armenia has moved out of the realm of fantasy into
the sphere of seeking technical solutions.
If this border is opened, Russia's main ally in the South Caucasus
will inevitably turn towards Turkey. The economy will help heal old
wounds. In any case, getting outside by climbing over two of your
neighbours' fences is far less convenient than using the open gates of
your own back yard. If a ground transportation link with Turkey is
opened, and if Armenia is included in the Eurasian transport corridor
that leads through the South Caucasus to Turkey, then Russian money
and air links between Yerevan and Moscow may very well play a
constructive role, but it will be a purely auxiliary one in Armenia's
development.
The possibility of opening the border is a bonus that Turkey can offer
Armenia in the great haggling over Karabakh, thereby forcing Russia
out of its position as the main "sponsor" of the Karabakh
settlement. Moscow has no such bonus to offer. It might have had one,
however, if not for the August war. After which, incidentally, Russia
is now openly feared in Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara, despite the large
number of formulaic lines about eternal mutual respect.
In this context, Dmitriy Medvedev's meetings with Ilham Aliyev and
Serzh Sargsyan look like an attempt to seize the initiative and hop on
the back of the train heading for Ankara. But Karabakh, which Moscow
has grown accustomed to viewing as a tool for keeping both Armenia and
Azerbaijan in the wake of its own foreign policy, has so far not
enabled the Kremlin to formulate a position that would satisfy both of
the South Caucasus countries. Turkey, meanwhile, is actively seeking
such a position. And if it finds one, then the territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, which Russia has taken under its wing, will long
remain the limits of Russian influence in the South Caucasus.
[translated from Russian]